REMARKS TO AIR FORCE CADETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1974
• Content Type: NOTES

REMARKS TO AIR FORCE CADETS
Approved For Qe seN6~/'11? CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4.
why need for clearly defined missions? Outputs
Basis for all-planning decisions at all levels
Just as director of academics at USAF Academy must understand what
you will be expected to do/know (output) in order to design-proper
educational program (input).
a So C of S of Air Force must know what the USAF is expected to do
(output) in-order to build/train forces, buy equipment and develop
tactics, (inputs):
0 The output is really just the mission. Mission
Mission of USAF.
of the USAF-Academy/
History of Naval Missions - very briefly -
Evolved over time.
Sea Control
SLIDES o First/only mission in Classical Times - Battle of Salamis 480 BC
Salamis
Cut off movement of armies and their support -.led to
Battles of Atlantic
a Trade increased
Protection/Denial of Trade - Blockade
# 2 o Today: Sortie/Choke Pt/Local Engagement/Open area ops
Sea Control
Tactics Note - Triple threat - air surface - sub
'Projection of Power - 19th C development
3
Tr
Sea Control
Chart
Approved For-Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 SLYDE S
6
rojection
Tactics
'TT 7
TacAir
# 4
# 5
leets
? Preventive Deployment
? Reactive Deployment
Strategic Deterrence
a Generally exclusive of other missions.-
(special/dedicated forces: Polaris/Poseidon/Trident)
SLIDE
# 8
Strategic
eterrence
Approved For Release 2005/1
? o3ection armies asv?g ,SCI -, P~9g01s5~AR Bfl(1'M81u-4 assault)
(French Revolutionary Wars)
? TacAir - post WW II
Possible as a/c and.munitions improved
o Today: Amphibious Assault
Naval:. Bombardment
TacAir
Presence - 19th Century - Gunboat Diplomacy
#,l,l
urnmary
1- miss ions
a Today: Assured Second Strike
Controlled Response
Deter Third Powers
Balance of power image
Summary -_4 missions - interrelated
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 ?`'1Clission's' change" as' world' siua'tidr~~t~i'~id~ial' goals change.
e Can see how naval missions developed. and emphasis changed.
e Can any comparisons be made between USN and USAF missions?
Let's take them separately.
(OPEN DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT TO INCLUDE CADETS)
Air Force Comparisons
SLIDE Here's statement of Air Force Mission. It talks about
9
USAF
many of the same things I've just discussed with relation-
Strategic - Where Air Force fit it?
9
USAF =
Missions
Start w/B-52 - which purpose?
Controlled response - Yes,
Deter 3rd powers - Yes
# 11
USN Strategic
Deterrence
Balance of power - ?
e Minuteman
2nd strike - Yes
Controlled response - ?
Command data buffer
Conflict with appearing to have 1st strike
Approved For,Release.2005/11 2005/11/23: CIA._RDP8QBOI 5548003700010001-4,'
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 CIA-RDP80B01554R00370001,0001-4
e Polaris/Poseidon
SLIDES
Controlled - ?
Accuracy
Range vs Security
Communications
? TRIAD
Sea Control.
Alternative uses
Base loading/availability
a Open Area
Recco - air - satellite
Anti-Ship
P-3 type capability?
Local Engagement
Inteceptors
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
Mining
B-52? C-5A?
Air Attacks on bases
B-52 - ?
. Subs
. Mining
Anti-Ship
Attack aircraft
 SLIDE
;= 10
acAir Tactics
# 7
acAir Chart
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001=4
? Tac Air
Land - mortars
Deep Interdiction
Where one'better other?
Security of bases
? Battlefield/CAS
SLIDES
# 9
USAF Missions
# 4
USN Presence
Advantages
Commitment
Permanent
Ready
9
Air Force
Miss ions
Need for bases
Navy quick response
AF C-5A/mobility/bare base kits
Presence
How can .Air Force perform?
1. Okinawa, Japan, Taiwan, Europe
2. C-5A - Air movement in exercises/demonstrations
3. Rescue/humanitarian operations
Conclusion
These are questions you must ask self when evaluating
what the Air Force should be prepared to do.
You must begin now to question the rationale for your
Service's mission. We are trying to do this in the USN
Approved for Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BOl554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
Be skeptical of traditional rationale and hackneyed
phases, e.g., aerospace power - does it support the
goals of a special interest group more than national
goals - or mere Madison Ave. salesmanship?
?? Is there a better way of doing what you are doing?
With commitments all over the world, limited resources, an
unsympathetic public (generall the case in peacetime)
? Priorities must be established so $ spent wisely.
? Inter-service cooperation encouraged.
You can make a real contribution to your service and the nation
e developing a skeptical, inquisitive mind (ask "why" a lot;
don't accept things because they've always been that
way
a Speak out
Study, analyze, criticize, recommend.
write articles -
Express your ideas.
You'd be surprised who'll publish them
(Naval Institute, War College Review)
o Above all, THINK about the big issues of national defense
for they influence everything else in the military.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 April 74
Approved For Release 2005111/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
NAVAL MISSIONS
USAF ACADEMY CATETS
VuGraph Sequence
--LEFT
RIGHT------------
1
(Salamis)
2
(Tactics)
3
(Chart)
6
(Tactics)
Projection of Power
7
(TacAir Chart). J
4
(Tactics)
5
(Fleets)
8
(Tactics)
Strategic Deterrence
11
(Missions interrelated)
Mission Summary
9
(USAF Missions)
Air Force Comparisons
9
(USAF Missions)
11
(Strategic
2
(Sea Control Tactics)
3
Deterrence)
(Sea Control Chart)
10
(TacAir Tactics)
7
(TacAir Chart)
9
(USAF Missions)
4
(Presence Tactics)
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
9
(USAF Missions)
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
Back up Slides:
12 A/C & Weapon Characteristics
13 Army Missions
14 Assertion/Denial Sea Control
15 Weapon Systems Applicable to Sea
16 Comparison of Amphibious Task Organization
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
A = what now exists?
C = what weS`uld I like it>to be?
B = wb,6t is the diff rence between A and C?
That is wh5kXmust be done.
he case of,the NWC:
After I received my assignment as President, had about 5
months before taking over.
A. I sought to answer: "What should one teach at a War
College?" What does a mid-career military officer
need to improve his effectiveness/productivity? (In
other words: what are your objectives?"
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
- must be objective nbiased
- must be compl ely open to al ideas, good and
bad
/
- must seek out all av 1 ble counsel. (Good ideas
so/times come from unlikely places)
? Asked a small group of respected educators, industrialist
bureaucrats, Vie' FRIs to j oik me in Washington to
discuss wbaat they believed the strengths and weaknesses
l of the military officer were. (Can also be a means for
il
testing your initial ideas).
? From this meeting I began to se-
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R0037000
1. Excessive conformity of thought -
 2. Narrowness of view, e.g., Industry-profit
20WI-C ' ' " f
3. Vast scope worth covering. Facts - impossible.
Method of thinking approac
:----A---ag.ue idea of approaching mid-career military
education three discxi lk ines_ with
: t ~cai h thA
which most officers are inyxYlved one way or
another:
- strategy
- managemen
- tac CS.
They s med basic to the needs of 0-4's and above.
(The danger here is to become set too quickly.
Approved For F2&L a 29G 11t//31. D'80B01554R003700010001-4
 j Review of syllabus showed literally hundreds of
subjects covered. Every Navy community was repre-
sented: ASW, AAW, subs, Intelligence, Oceanography,
etc. Course lacked discernable form. Every year
added something due to pressures/vogue of the day.
How could you cover so many subjects and hope to
have an integrated course?
Approved For Release 2005/11/239 CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
B. At the same time, was examining the extant WC program.
Must influence the form of any new program which might
be decided up Some example- of the things I found
which di urbed me:
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
*Decision: Reduce subject diversity; teach a few
? Course was very current events oriented. Today's inter-
national picture. If material is current, it must be
time sensitive, ergo value to student must be short.
*Decision: Course should be of permanent value to
student. Should bring about a fundamental improve-
ment in officer's capability.
? Over 170 guest speakers during school year.
9
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
Fact: you cannot design a course around 0 guest
speakers over whose lecture content you have no control.
1? from y1!~ ar to yer
Never knows what ,the nc urse wi 1 /.from
1i1 /.e G
*necision: Lectures? arejpassiveeJ 'Learning must
V _IA.
d.~.c-abfle. Must establish
high grade in-house capability to teach the course.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
0 Trips - Student trips (NYC to UN; London to Royal
Defense College) were expensive, used up valuable
time. How did they enforce what the NWC was trying
to teach? Were they really necessary? Could the
money/time be better used?
*Decision: Benefits not worth costs. Time
too precious. Cut out the trips. Use money
for books.
Extra curricula Masters degree program (GWU)
Approved For Release 2005/11/23: IA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R00370001000
- they competed for student time '~ 01
- if needed to prop us NWC program, then NWC
not doing job
- Navy had 3X more MS's in International Affairs
than it could use. Why make more?
*Decision: End these programs. Strengthen
NWC program. Demand more from students.
C..-.._..Dec!ded-on c.o_ur_se theme: Learn to handle uncertainty.
Basic n,,,e~eds-- hC' O%'4"` 5-
L.
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
? Recognize non-quantfiable, non-rational decision
factors, e ._go. ", bureaucracy.
This would/represent a permanept'"change of long range
bene_,-fa't to the officer.
__?}.
IV.- Risks: (must be weighed for every decision against ex-
6 Not being able to find the right people. Could a
team be put together which could implement the
program?
pected benefits).
* Not being able to define the new program.
14
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
? Time against us. To throw out old syllabus, needed
a new one. Could we be ready for next school year?
? Could new program be sold to "powers"?
? If new program were a flop, could the NWC's reputation
Admiral Zumwalt gave full support and encouragement
to make changes I saw fit - Direct pipeline.
VADM Cagle (head of Ed & Training in USN) also full
..>..
past
0__Caul,a__3, 6.rs.ter~ee--4e- a g~e..lae~ overcome _ alumni ,
presidents. ex CN.ts,.,_refi red_f.Las3....cammuni.ty...-., etc.)
es :
survive?
r`
support. ~TW~7 ~
ApproQe&FoPlQe)e.9sfe S~1:teIA P8 Os1554R0037000 0001 4 be
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
- couldn't get faculty
- couldn't get books/materials
couldn't get lecturers
- couldn't get printing done
couldn't mold faculty into team
coming students caught? by- sure-rise.. --expe.cted- one
Ong-r-qot afro her.
VI. Implementing the Plan:
A. Decided if wanted to accomplish major change, had to
use Blitzkreig vice gradual methods. Would be absorbed
by bureaucracy over period of several months.
Approved For Release 2985j11/23 IJF2DI 5 P 0001-4
 d For 41easJ2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4?"
Decided necessary to break established hierarchy
put own people in key jobs.
- to get control of program and get it going,
appointed 3 academic department heads in whom
I had faith. Gradually stripped College directors
of assets - this was interim step toward reorgani-
zation where academic departments would control
faculty assets; Colleges would be admin caretakers
of students.
- personally oversaw/approved all conceptual/
mechanical/administrative aspects as they
developed.
Approved For Release 2005/11/237CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
VII. Seeking support/fine tuning:
A. Enlisting support.
1. Active PR program to explain rationale for changes.
Much criticism based on incomplete or incorrect
information.
2. Personal communication with key flag officers
(active & retired), old NWC supporters, other
Senior Service School Directors, etc., to explain
rationale,'enlist support.
3. Open door policy to press.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 8CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
request for e mments on - lity of the course
they r eived.
d outside curriculum evaluator.
Z. Second year.
X. Where did resistance to innovation raise its head?
Special interest groups
a) International lawyers
Letters to SecNav
C~1~1
Approved For Release 2005/11/2i1 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
i (/
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
b) Sub - components of Navy
e.g. communications
WWMMCS
c) People who see opportunities to indoctrinate
2. Alumni - Friends of College
Some influential
e.g. GSD attendees
Well placed aides
Some seniors --f
3. Retired
Rub off of Z opposition
/70
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23,. el
4. Faculty
a) downright opposition
Leaks to press
Disturbing to students
b) pressure for contemporary
c) pressure for completeness
5. Students
Especially contemporary
Approved For Release 2005/11/2323 CIA-RDP80B01554R003 0001-4
6
 e f t" .1
.L i Appro d i 3ele s t 5/11/23': CIA-RD ;6,015p
XI. What would I do-differently?
? Convocation address (explanation of rationale and
program to incoming students) might have been too
abrasive. Possibly could have encouraged less
resistance to change with a strong yet
address.
unabrasive
Approved For Release 2005/11/2325CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
President's Hours.- Gripe sessions,- Do people
keep finding things which are wrong; do you keep
asking what's wrong? Constant pulse taking
...~.r. drat o a o"'d'rf'fe~rernt-ij?
Fire some faculty peremptorily
~~7hP~],~zne?s-f" e NWCaction plan are common to
al_,l .p laaa s,wgf-o+-c~h-a,n-'g e ?
 Approved Fo6 le ,g12005/4111/j33,i&4A-BPF J3Qti p0a7-(MlQQ 4
ially Navy-Marine forces
Especially sea control forc essential 4 -
.
an r uib1e--t
Securj' air/beach heads
ing edge only
my/Air Force
Rapid closure forces
Sustained combat forces
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4
 --4
Way we make public comparisons shapes- attitudes,
e- is of "other- -nations"
Vis ible
e Lp..de &r~'"",
Commitmmdht forces - hostage forces
Europe
ry?,,,r~
Display interest/intent
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700010001-4