IBM REMARKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1974
• Content Type: NOTES

IBM REMARKS (18 March 74/New Orleans)
A oved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
Ti+F9 ~ ~err~ p K e- 1n -Q - out.1o0~.? ~b1...~i~t ernat- i n
A
Optimism - Perhaps- isn--of year ago on detente game, -
Mid East War, Energy Crisis, set back in U.S. Economy.
Skepticism - questioning how all going so well with old opponent
IVV
- Why over-optimists ?
Looked at detente only from our point of view - American point
of view.
Assumed Soviet view was same
U.S. viewpoint - 2 reasons for detente:
Rational - Emotional
First, Rational
(1) tension plus
vast stocks nuclear weapons on both sides - equals Dangerous
situation.
Also, was rational because:
(2) No unfulfilled needs or ambitions that requre competition with
Soviets. Perfectly happy to forego/not take advantageri-
Even think willing to take calculated risk. Because Do not fear
USSR, despite Cold War years.
Partly because: superior militarily and economically all those years
Partly because: 150 years not attacked/invaded at home. No
tradition of having to fight on own soil.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700039001-2
 Second reason - emotional - stemmed from revulsion to Vietnam
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
opportunity to avoid war - to step farther back from the threshold
of war.
- alternate use of $
- pushed emotionally into detente
Did same conditions exist in Soviet Union?
Emotional? No - public opinion not allowed to give emotional thrust to
policy.
Rational? - Reasons - same as ours?
1. Same concern over nuclear stockpiles and hair-trigger.
2. Soviet homeland invaded repeatedly. Wary of entrusting future to
another's goodwill or intentions.
3. .Soviets clearly have external ambitions.
- in part from ideological belief that until capitalism suppressed
everywhere, it will be aggressive. Threat to Communist Philosophy.
- in part have external ambitions. Haven't been global power we
have in past 30 years.
- We humiliated them - from their point of view in Lebanon-58.
Cuba & Berlin-62- Real confrontation they backed down.
N. Vietnam-72- mining Haiphone. Another loss of face before
their allies.
4
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
Today feel the need to compete, to prove the worth of their system
Evidence they are striving hard for global power status - Emerging from
being the traditional continental power, to a maritime power able to
project power around globe - not just ground power across land frontiers.
The Soviets are well aware that the successful world powers of recent
history have projected their power from a.maritime base. Why with these
objectives did the Soviets elect to participate in Detente?
1. We wanted to play that game. After all militarily there are only 2
super powers - The Soviets must do the power waltz with us.
2..,-:At the same time economically and politically the world has been
evolving toward multi-polarity.
Thus, detente opened up some tactical opportunities for the Soviets
through easing pressure on one front while dealing with China on other.
Musn't forget serious USSR - PRC differences Easy to forget we are not
only focus of Soviet attentions.
3. Opened possibilities for solving some domestic problems for
trade and technology.
6
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
 A proved For Release 200 111/23 ; CIA=RDP80B01554R0037000-3U001-2
Therefore, Detente means something different to each of us
Without casting accusations of distingenuousness/malevolence/false
- simply had different reasons. Not necessarily incompatible with each.
Could work to both our advantages; Basically it means to Soviets
not cessation of competition, but shifting competition to non-
military arenas.
- must expect continued competition with USSR.
- must expect Soviets to look for weaknesses and capitalize on them.
often means rushing in or overreacting when situations appear.
- did in mid east when going well for Egypt and Syria.
Anaology to faithfulness to wife ' e!sy when no opportunity.
61
We must not provide Soviets opportunities.
In part means continued diplomatic effort
s.ff
In part that means remaining militarily strong ri difficult o"under-
.~..._ --fi~r.,--?;?.~.__
stand reed for strong military in peacetime.---fit ili`tary serves diplomatic
functio -in peacetime. It provides leverage in world affairs and demands
that possi e adversaries carefully consider conseque ces of their actions.
Peacetim deterrence then is a question of the imp ession our, military forces create
On Sov ets
iv,
On othersNay be tempted tamper with our interests,
indirectly perhaps
Even impression friends/allies
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R0037000300q-2
 In that regard all are aware of pescures to withdraw forces from overseas
bases.
,Will place
more em}basis on naval forces which can be dispatched
globe Preifiium on numbers of foxes
Lot pY ssur~s innopposite direction
1. Fixation on big war
2. Idea big war - sophisticated enemy demands expensive
-.Cost-of-sophisticated--'hardware-- driving # units downward
4. Mobilization philosophy
Have the s phi~sticease
Approved 2tbdd15/1/2WaE?A 2bPid6615r52k0tt03700030001-2 10
or a
shQphisticated systems
 All these pqKFrP6jj5 05y
r 3s IA 8A B01 554R003700030001-2
1. No time to mobilize
Few mass production items anyway -
Even simplest of ships
~;; -,t; x-,- e.g. electror}ic components
2. Preparing big war and assu'ing others lesser included - cases
not necessarily best. Admittedly most vital - but least likely.
May find pressure has shifted and we could lose by default.
Alternative preparing more likely smaller wars and aggregating.
Issue. of not letting enemy shiftocus of competition.
!'i T f ; 1
Whether concentrate on large or small question whether meeting
shophisticated enemy does require "best" of everything.
tting a-171 eggs in one basket dangerous
Aggregate many, less capabile, less flexible units may be greater
l ,Especially due vulnerability to surprise attack.
productivity -
4. /The best in sophistication also has disadvantages
Lose in reliability and availability what hope to gain. in
capability
Lose capability because can not train people to operate
Trained manpower areas cost
Industry - Draft
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030Q 1-2
 se~~l"~be~Ia~lA~T01b0~0(1f2 going
reverse these pressures for big and best:
1) Inclination of military men to take brute force to more-of what
attempted before and no longer works.
2) Inclination of industry and the military to get what technology
can produce whether need we it or not.
1. In our military bureaucaracy - R&D people don't have many
incentives to curb research and development..
Project managers incentives . . .
New tactic or adaptation of something old -
not profitable.
Degree to which industry tempted to oversell
technology will be a short term benefit
14
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 t, ould sugge pproved For Release 2.005111/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
1 V
Industry must convince the military to buy only what it needs,
not buy because it's the newest, latest technology, etc.
- Some complex equipment will always be needed, but the
trend is more toward to-mix and demand will be more for
simple, maintainable equipment. Those companies who have
gone that route will prosper in long run.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 IBM REMARKS (18 March 74/New Orleans)
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
World Scene - Change in our outlook on International Relations
Optimism - Perhaps over-optimism of year ago on detente - gone -
instead -
Mid East War, Energy Crisis, set back in U.S. Economy.
Skepticism - questioning how all going so well with old opponent -
so many problems at home -
- Why over-optimistic?
Looked at detente only from our point of view - American point
of view.
Assumed Soviet view was same
- U.S. viewpoint - 2 reasons for detente:
Rational - Emotional
First, Rational
(1) tension plus
vast stocks nuclear weapons on both'sides - equals Dangerous
situation.
Also, was rational because:
(2) No unfulfilled needs or ambitions that requre competition with
Soviets.
Perfectly happy to forego/not take advantage
Even think willing to take calculated risk. Because Do not fear
USSR, despite Cold War years.
Partly because: superior militarily and economically all those years
Partly because: 150 years not attacked/invaded at home. No
tradition of having to fight on own soil.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R0037000302001-2
 Second reason A-pp~i~iFoaPeleas~E //j/2 rcg~?`iic540gjgqp 1-2
- opportunity to avoid war - to step farther back from the threshold
of war.
alternate use of $
pushed emotionally into detente
Did same conditions exist in Soviet Union?
Emotional? No - public opinion not allowed to give emotional thrust to
policy.
Rational? - Reasons - same as ours?
1. Same concern over nuclear stockpiles and hair-trigger.
2. Soviet homeland invaded repeatedly. Wary of entrusting future to
another's goodwill or intentions.
3. Soviets clearly have external ambitions.
- in part from ideological belief that until capitalism suppressed
everywhere, it will be aggressive. Threat to Communist Philosophy.
in part have external ambitions. Haven't been global power we
have in past 30 years.
We humiliated them - from their point of view in Lebanon-58.
Cuba & Berlin-62- Real confrontation they backed down.
N. Vietnam-72- mining Haiphone. Another loss of face before
their allies.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
Today feel the need to compete, to prove the worth of their system
Evidence they are striving hard for global power status - Emerging from
being the traditional continental power, to a maritime power able to
project power around globe not just ground power across land frontiers.
The Soviets are well aware that the successful world powers of recent
history have projected their power from a maritime base. Why with these
objectives did the Soviets elect to participate in Detente?
1. We wanted to play that game. After all militarily there are only 2
super powers - The Soviets must do the power waltz with us.
2. At the same time economically and politically the world has been
evolving toward multi-polarity.
Thus, detente opened up some tactical opportunities for the Soviets -
through easing pressure, on one front while dealing with China on other.
Musn't forget serious USSR - PRC differences Easy to forget we are not
only focus of Soviet attentions.
3. Opened possibilities for solving some domestic problems for
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
Therefore, Detente means something different to each of us
Without casting accusations of distingenuousness/malevolence/false
intent.
- simply had different reasons. Not necessarily incompatible with each.
Could work to both our advantages; Basically it means to Soviets
not cessation of competition, but shifting competition to non-
military arenas.
- must expect continued competition with USSR.
- must expect Soviets to look for weaknesses and capitalize on them.
often means rushing in or overreacting when situations appear.
did in mid east when going well for Egypt and Syria.
Anaology to faithfulness to wife - easy when no opportunity.
We must not provide Soviets opportunities.
In part means continued diplomatic efforts.
part that means remaining militarily strong. Often difficult to under-
stand need for strong military in peacetime. Yet military serves diplomatic
91,
function in peacetime. It provides leverage in world affairs and demands
that possible adversaries carefully consider consequences of their actions.
Peacetime deterrence then is a question of the impression our
military forces create
On Soviets
On others may be tempted tamper with our interests,
indirectly. perhaps
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
Even impression friends/allies
 'Deterrent i4aa_pvgFA''iggl?@Ls 1u4g3_ q6Pp1iP1ZOR@41sand than.:
is warfighting potential. Not only for civilians but also for military.
- Warfighting -
Hardware
Tactics Basics of our trade
Morale
- Deterrence -
Phychological
Perceptions
"Mind-reading"
Want to be sure opponents do not mis-read intent - important our
capabilities be evident.
In that regard all are aware of pressures to withdraw forces from overseas
Will place more emphasis on naval forces which can be dispatched - around
globe - Premium on numbers of forces -
Lot pressures in opposite direction
1. F' ixat ion on big war
Greatest risk.
Natural tendency of military men
2. Idea big war - sophisticated enemy demands expensive
shophisticated systems
3. Cost of sophisticated hardware - driving # units downward
4. Mobilization philosophy
Have the sophisticated - mass produce rest
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
All these pressure wrong
1. No time to mobilize
Few mass production items anyway -
Even simplest of ships
e.g. electronic components
2. Preparing big war and assuming others lesser included - cases
not necessarily best. Admittedly most vital - but least likely.
May find pressure has shifted and we could lose by default.
Alternative preparing more likely smaller wars and aggregating.
Issue of not letting enemy shift focus of competition.
3. Whether concentrate on large or small question whether meeting
shophisticated enemy does require "best" of everything.
Putting all eggs in one basket dangerous
Aggregate many, less capabile, less flexible units may be greater
productivity -
Especially due vulnerability to surprise attack.
4. The best in sophistication also has disadvantages
Lose in reliability and availability what hope to gain in
capability
Lose capability because can not train people to operate
Trained manpower areas cost
Industry - Draft
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R0037000300~i-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
There are several natural inclinations we must turn around if going
reverse these pressures for big and best:
1) Inclination of military men to take brute force to more. of what
attempted before and no longer works.
Inclination of industry and the military to get what technology
can produce whether need we it or not.
1. In our military bureaucaracy - R&D people don't have many
incentives to curb research and development.
Project managers incentives . . .
2. In industry often need prove some new capability to get
contract.
New tactic or adaptation of something old -
not profitable.
Degree to which industry tempted to oversell
technology will be a short term benefit
We won't have $
We won't have people maintain and operate.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700013R001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
Would suggest
- Industry must convince the military to buy only what it needs,
not buy because it's the newest, latest technology, etc.
V
- Some complex equipment will always be needed, but the
trend is more toward to-mix and demand will be more for
simple, maintainable equipment. Those companies who have
gone that route will prosper in long run.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 IBM REMARKS (18 March 74/New Orle ns)
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001
world Scene - Change in our outlook on International Relations
Optimism - Perhaps over-optimism of year ago on detente - gone -
instead -
Mid East War, Energy Crisis, set back in U.S. Economy.
Skepticism - questioning how all going so well with old opponent -
so many problems at home -
- Why over-optimistic?
Looked at detente only from our point of view - American point
of view.
Assumed Soviet view was same
U.S. viewpoint - 2 reasons for detente:
Rational - Emotional
First, Rational
(1) tension plus
vast stocks nuclear weapons on both'sides - equals Dangerous
situation.
(2) To unfulfilled needs or ambitions that requre competition with
Soviets.
Perfectly happy to forego/not take advantage
Even think willing to take calculated risk. Because Do not fear
USSR, despite Cold War years.
Partly because: superior militarily and economically all those years.
Partly because: 150 years not attacked/invaded at home. No
tradition of having to fight on own soil.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R0037000230001-2
 telga %etWLIJ /2 ~o A u810BUA554o00v3ie0tOnam01-2
Second reason ApglR8 gArap
? - opportunity to avoid war - to step farther back from the threshold
of war.
- alternate use of $
- pushed emotionally into detente
Did same conditions exist in Soviet Union?
Emotional? No - public opinion not allowed to give emotional thrust to
policy.
Rational? - Reasons - same as ours?
1. Same concern over nuclear stockpiles and hair-trigger.
2. Soviet homeland invaded repeatedly. Wary of entrusting future to,
another's goodwill or intentions.
3. Soviets clearly have external ambitions.
- in part from ideological belief that until capitalism suppressed
everywhere, it will be aggressive. Threat to Communist Philosophy.
- in part have external ambitions. Haven't been global power we
have in past 30 years.
- We humiliated them - from their point of view in Lebanon-58.
Cuba.& Berlin-62- Real confrontation they backed down.
N. Vietnam-72- mining Haiphone. Another loss of face before
their allies.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R00370.0030001-2
Today feel the need to compete, to prove the worth of their system
Evidence they are striving hard for global power status - Emerging from
being the traditional continental power, to a maritime power able to
project power around globe not just ground power across land frontiers.
The Soviets are well aware that the successful world powers of recent
history have projected their power from a maritime base. Why with these
objectives did the Soviets elect to participate in Detente?
1. We wanted to play that game. After all militarily there are only 2
super powers - The Soviets-must do the power waltz with us.
2. At the same time economically and politically the world has been
evolving toward multi-polarity.
Thus, d4tente opened up some tactical opportunities for the Soviets -
through easing pressure, on one front while dealing with China on other.
Musn't forget serious USSR - PRC differences Easy to forget we are not
only focus of Soviet attentions.
3. Opened possibilities for solving some domestic problems = for
trade and technology.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
Therefore, Detente means something different to each of us
Without casting accusations ofdistingenuousness/malevolence/false
intent.
simply had different reasons. Not necessarily incompatible with each.
Could work to both our advantages; Basically it means to Soviets
not cessation of competition, but shifting competition to non-
military arenas.
- must expect continued competition with USSR.
- must expect Soviets to look for weaknesses and capitalize on them.
often means rushing in or overreacting when situations appear.
- did in mid east when going well for Egypt and Syria.
Anaology to faithfulness to wife - easy when no opportunity.
We must not provide Soviets opportunities.
In part means continued diplomatic efforts.
part that means remaining militarily strong. Often difficult to under-
stand need for strong military in peacetime. Yet military serves diplomatic
function in peacetime. It provides leverage in world affairs and demands
that possible adversaries carefully consider consequences of their actions.
Peacetime deterrence then is a question of the impression our
military forces create -
On Soviets
On others may be tempted tamper with our interests,
indirectly perhaps
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
Even impression friends/allies
 Deterrent im .vedEForrR 20p 143. q*RPRR@P1 0~ 0aia stand than.:'.
is warfighting potential. Not only for civilians but also for military.
- Warfighting -
Hardware
Tactics Basics of our trade
Morale
- Deterrence -
Phychological
Perceptions
"Mind-reading"
Want to be sure opponents do not mis-read intent - important our
capabilities be evident.
In that regard all are aware of pressures to withdraw forces from overseas
bases.
Will place more emphasis on naval forces which can be dispatched - around
globe - Premium on numbers of forces -
Lot pressures in opposite direction
1. Fixation on big war
Greatest risk
Natural tendency of military men
2. Idea big war - sophisticated enemy demands expensive
shophisticated systems
3. Cost of sophisticated hardware - driving # units downward
4. Mobilization philosophy
Have the sophisticated - mass produce rest
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2
1. No time to mobilize
Few mass production items anyway -
Even simplest of ships
e.g. electronic components
2. Preparing big war and assuming others lesser included - cases
not necessarily best. Admittedly most vital - but least likely.
May find pressure has shifted and we could lose by default.
Alternative preparing more likely smaller wars and aggregating.
Issue of not letting enemy shift focus of competition.
3. Whether concentrate on large or small question whether meeting
shophisticated enemy does require "best" of everything-
Putting-all eggs in one basket dangerous
Aggregate many, less capabile, less flexible units may be greater
productivity -
Especially due vulnerability to surprise attack.
4. The best in sophistication also has disadvantages
Lose in reliability and availability what hope to gain in
capability
Lose capability because can not train people to operate
Trained manpower areas cost
Industr - Draft
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R0037000302991-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
There are several natural inclinations we must turn around if going
reverse these pressures for big and best:
1) Inclination of military men to take brute force to more of what
attempted before and no longer works.
2) Inclination of industry and the military to get what technology
can produce whether need we it or not.
1. In our military bureaucaracy - R&D people don't have many
incentives to curb research and development.
Project managers incentives . . .
2. In industry often need prove some new capability to get
contract.
New tactic or adaptation of something old -
not profitable.
Degree to which industry tempted to oversell
technology will be a short term benefit
We won't have $
We won't have people maintain and operate.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700q p001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2
-'Would suggest
- Industry must convince the military to buy only what it needs,
not buy because its the newest, latest technology, etc.
- Some complex equipment will always be needed, but the
trend is more toward to-mix and demand will be more for
simple, maintainable equipment. Those companies who have
gone that route will prosper in long run.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700030001-2