TH VIET MINH OFFENSIVE IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200290046-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 21, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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p~~;~ 4~.;s~? 21 April 1953
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Minh forces from Tonkin, which began advancing into
Laos on 13 April, have now taken control of about one fifth of
that country. This campaign has been virtually unopposed by
French-led forces who have so far avoided contact with the
enemy. The early establishment of a puppet Laotian government
to rule the newly acquired territory may be expected.
Latest reports show that Viet Minh forces of about 19,000
are converging on the French defensive position on the Plaine
des Jarres. The nearby town of Xieng Khouang has already been
taken. One column of these forces numbering about 9,000 is
advancing southward from the French post of Sam Neua, evacuated
in mid-April, and the other of 10,000 is moving directly west.
It is not certain, however, whether the Communists will hit
the French here.
The 3,000-man garrison on the Plaine des Jarres is com-
posed of two Foreign Legion and one Laotian battalion. It has
been reinforced by some 2,000 additional native units retreating
from Sam Neua. These forces are well entrenched in defensible
terrain and they could only be overrun at great cost to the
attackers. Therefore, the Viet Minh may bypass this position
and proceed west toward the lightly defended cities-of Luang
Prabang, the historical capital, and Vientiane, the admini-
strative headquarters of the government. On the other hand,
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it may stop at Xieng Khouang as the rainy season is fast
approaching.
French reaction to the Viet Minh campaign in Laos has
been characterized by extreme confusion. No immediate counter
plan, except to defend the Plaine des Jarres, is known to have
been formed. Strategy for the future, if any, has not been
divulged to American observers.
Command itself is reported to be for the most part ignorant
of Viet Minh strengths, dispositions, movements and intentions
in Laos.
This is the current military picture. Now, what is behind
the invasion of Laos?
Short term aims probably are:
1. An easy "real estate" victory;
2. A boost to Viet Minh prestige and morale;
3. A shot in the arm to Laotian dissidents;
4. An undermining of Laotian confidence in
the French; and
5. A dispersion of French forces.
Long term aims probably are:
1. The build-up of an extensive "liberated
area" in Indochina not readily accessi-
ble to_French military action;
2. The use of northern Laos to create
sounder economic support of the Viet
Minh war effort;
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3. To link up with 50,000 Vietnamese in
northern Thailand who are mostly sympa-
thetic to the Viet Minh;
4. The setting up of a puppet government with
the attributes of authority and with the
outward appearances of popular support;
5. Preparations for an advance through Cam-
bodia to attack the Saigon area via the
back door; and
6. Paving the way for a Chinese invasion of
Southeast Asia, if such is decided on in
the future.
It may be assumed the Viet Minh has already achieved its
short-term objectives. Its capability of attaining most of
the long-range aims is good.
French-Laotian forces number only some 25,000 and are
widely spread in static defense posts. Reinforcement from
Vietnam is possible, but only by weakening badly needed strength
in that country. In this connection, on 21 April the Viet Minh
staged strong guerrilla attacks in the Tonkin delta and blew up
a large French ammunition dump.
The Laotian people are racially distinct from the people
of Vietnam. They would thus be resentful of encroachments by
the Vietnamese Communist movement. They would not, however,
vigorously resist Viet Minh attempts at political and military
subjugation. In Cambodia, there would be more resistance, but
the King announced in New York last week that the French could
not count on his people for substantial aid in case of a Viet
Minh invasion.
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An eventual attack on the Saigon area by a march down the
Mekong valley might be possible but would be very difficult
for logistical reasons. It would, however, out-flank the French
position in Tonkin.
Northern Laos and a section of the Mekong valley is the
best route for a Chinese invasion directed at Thailand and
southern Indochina.
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