THE CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET STRUGGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 12, 1968
• Content Type: IM

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-R DP94T00754R000200290008-
The Czechoslovak-Soviet Struggle
"I/
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the Unite l States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
 Approved For ReleaTOP6SECRETI DP94T00754R000200290008-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 July 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Czechoslovak-Soviet Struggle
Summary
Soviet-Czech relations are again at a point of
high tension. Moscow has publicly likened the situ-
ation in Czechoslovakia today to that which existed
in Hungary just before the revolt there twelve years
ago. The message, though implicit, was clear to all:
Soviet troops which were moved into Czechoslovakia
were placed there not for the "exercises" that provided
a pretext, but as a token of Moscow's readiness to in-
tervene militarily if worst came to worst. The Soviets
have not been persuaded by Dubcek's repeated assurances
that he can control the situation, and they have not
seen the course of liberalization he has set in train
slowed or changed. They have, therefore, been in no
hurry to withdraw the forces they have positioned in
his country.
For their part, the Czech leaders seem not to
have lost their nerve. Indeed, their resolve seems to
have stiffened under Soviet pressure. There is little
choice for them but to stand their ground on the key
issues. They seem to understand more clearly than
their Soviet overlords that what has been set in mo-
.tion in Czechoslovakia will not easily be reversed.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared .jointly by the Office of Current InteZ-
Zigence and the Office of Strategic Research and co-
ordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
TOP SECREIL_____]
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
TOP SECRE If 7 25X1
1. There is no longer any pretense that the
Soviet units that arrived in Czechoslovakia in mid-
June for what the Czechs once hopefully billed as
a standard communications exercise were departing
gracefully and on time. It is now a matter of the
Czechoslovaks "negotiating" their removal.
2. Some of the foreign forces have been with-
drawn--the Czechoslovak minister of defense uses
the figure 35 percent--but Soviet ground force ele-
ments in unknown numbers, as well as aircraft and
tanks, remain. They may all go in the near future.
On the other hand, the Russians may try to keep a
military presence in Czechoslovakia until such time
as they feel easier about political trends within
the country. Or the units that participated in the
June exercises may be pulled out, but only temporar-
ily. The Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact is
said already to have proposed that another "exercise"
be held in Czechoslovakia next month. The Russians
may devise yet other forms of military pressure.
3. While these questions remain, there can no
longer be any question that the Warsaw Pact, to which
Prague has repeatedly affirmed its allegiance, is
one of Moscow's chosen instruments of leverage with
the Czechoslovaks. Under its cover, the Soviets, in
a real sense, have already intervened militarily in
Czechoslovakia. It is also clear that, in their un-
dulating course, Soviet-Czechoslovak relations are
again at a point of high tension.
4. This has been the pattern of relations ever
since the old order in Prague was overthrown in Janu-
ary, and unless the Czechoslovak regime lurches more
sharply to the left or right than it has yet done,
this pattern may persist for some time. Moscow must
realize that it cannot turn the clock back in Czecho-
slovakia, even if it wanted to. But the Soviets want
greater certainty than they now have that the new
order in Prague is stabilizing, is master in its own
house, and has the will and the way to force internal
political ferment to subside.
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA- 48000200290008-1 25X1
TOP SECRET
5. The Czechoslovaks have given some ground
in the face of the political and military pressures
applied by the Soviets and other like-minded Commu-
nist states, e.g., on relations with West Germany.
On the nub issue--their right to chart their own
internal course within a socialist framework--the
Czechoslovaks have stood their ground. The Russians
believe that they know best what the Czechs must do
to stay within this socialist framework. They are
far from sure that the Czechs, given their readiness
to tamper with such sacred institutions as centralized
party control, will manage to do so. They question
the Dubcek regime's foresight and its capacity to
steer a true course if not its intentions. They also
see far worse elements than.Dubcek in the wings--
elements which, given their head, might put Czecho-
slovakia on a course that would take it right out of
the Soviet orbit.
6. Moscow has little to show for the effort
it has spent on Czechoslovakia since January. Prague's
reiterated pledges of fidelity to the Soviet alliance
have not allayed Soviet misgivings. The Russians
would feel better if the Dubcek regime could demonstrate
in concrete ways that it is committed to preserving
one-party rule. They would breathe easier if they saw
it do something to rein in the raucous Czech press.
They might, especially, have more confidence if they
thought that Dubcek was capable of ensuring the elec-
tion of a "safe" central committee at the party congress
forthcoming in the fall.
7. It must have occurred to some of the Soviet
policy makers that if they press too hard they will
force the Czechs, against their better judgment,
further and further into defiance. Their actions
might have the effect of undermining rather than
strengthening the authority of the Communist Party,
thus forcing Moscow closer to an unwelcome step--
massive intervention. But if these questions have
raised serious issues within the politburo, there is
no good sign of it. Soviet policy is evidently to
keep the pressure on. In devising ways to do this,
they are proving inventive, if not subtle. Thus, at
best, Prague probably faces a protracted test of will
and nerve.
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RD 0200290008-1
TOP SECRET] - " F 25X1
The Czech Attitude
8. Moderate party chief Alexander Dubcek has
been beset by critical problems at all levels--inter-
national, national, and local. Up to now he has
exhibited a fair degree of both firmness and finesse
in dealing with his most crucial foreign problem,
the hostile attitudes of the Soviet and other ruling
Communist parties. Lately, however, in the face of
frequent Soviet provocation, the emphasis has shifted
to firmness. So far, at least, he seems to have kept
his nerve.
9. The key to Dubcek's relations with his Warsaw
Pact allies is the differing interpretation each places
on the concept of "Communist control." Dubcek's readi-
ness to share power with non-Communists is looked upon
by his neighbors as a dangerous revision of the basic
Communist formula for maintaining power. Furthermore,
Dubcek's promotion of a largely free press, of nation-
alism, of outspoken criticism, of the formation of
nonparty political pressure groups, and of closer re-
lations with the West, indicates to the alarmed ortho-
dox Communists that the situation is slipping out of
control. They clearly fear that such concepts will
be contagious among their own populations.
10. Dubcek all along has been keenly aware that
his destiny and Czechoslovakia's rest largely on his
ability to convince the USSR that he can maintain the
Communist Party in power and in control of developments
in Czechoslovakia, and that he can keep the country
basically aligned with the Soviet bloc. Within the
context of his definitions, Dubcek has made many ef-
forts to mollify the Soviets in order to buy time.
But this has not been enough, and the Soviets seem
now to be requiring actions, not words, as proof of
his good intentions.
11. Dubcek has skillfully juggled his domestic
problems, but he has been forced to juggle rather
than to attack them head-on because nearly all his
energies have been devoted to fending off outside
pressures. Soviet opposition to the course of the
Dubcek regime has encouraged party conservatives
and leaders discredited along with former party boss
and president Novotny to resist the reforms and to
-4- 25X1
TOP SECRET
 A
roved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-
000200290008-1
pp
TOP SECRET
25X1
attempt to incite the population against the new lead-
ership. Prior to the election on 30 March of President
Svoboda, for example, Soviet personnel in Prague were
openly in contact with conservative leaders, and East
German diplomats and party personnel toured Slovakia
in an attempt to drum up support for an orthodox candi-
date. At about the same time, leaflets calling for
the workers to repudiate the Dubcek regime were found
in Prague. They were traced to the Albanians by the
Interior Ministry. East German agitators are still
being sent into the country, and the conservatives
are printing and distributing their own leaflets in
Prague and other cities. The dissident hard-line fac-
tion has been so emboldened by the presence of Soviet
troops on Czechoslovak soil that there has been talk
of an attempted anti-Dubcek coup.
12. There are growing indications, including
public opinion polls, that the Czechoslovak public
supports Dubcek[s leadership and welcomes his plans
for change. One newspaper reported that it had re-
ceived within a week of the publication of a liberal
appeal for the ouster of conservative officials,
40,000 letters of support. The fact that such sup-
port has increased sharply in recent weeks probably
results more from resentment of foreign pressures
than from the things that Dubcek has done so far.
Nationalism is on the rise and several organizations
have pledged their support to Dubcek, even if it
means resisting foreign intervention with arms.
13. The party, too, is rallying to the new lead-
ership. Once the decision was made in May to convene
a special party congress on 9 September, uncertainty
began to be replaced by commitment at the lower party
levels. Preparations for the congress are under way.
They began with district meetings to select delegates
to regional meetings where delegates to the congress
would be chosen. Dubcek took 70 percent of the
district meetings, and an overwhelming majority of
delegates to the congress elected at the regional
meetings are Dubcek supporters.
14. Despite the chaotic political situation,
the liberal-moderate coalition in the leadership
has moved to begin the reform programs promised in
January. The steps taken so far are those most
TOP SECRE'11
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R00020029000001
1
TOP SECRET
responsive to popular complaints, e.g., the abolition
of censorship, the establishment of a National Front
in which, politically speaking, the Communists are
merely first among equals, and the rehabilitation
of a number of prominent former political "criminals,"
some of whom were condemned with Soviet collusion.
But these are precisely the steps that would most
arouse concern, if not fear, among the Soviets and
their East European followers.
15. Pressure from some Czechoslovak officials to
reduce the military establishment, one of the strong-
est in Eastern Europe, has caused great concern to the
Soviets, who have in recent years based their European
military strategy on a strong "northern tier" that in-
cludes Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and the
USSR. With eight of its ten divisions combat-ready
and with some 550 aircraft, mostly late-model inter-
ceptors and fighter bombers, the Czech forces are well
trained and the best equipped of any in Eastern Europe.
16. Dubcek's determination to return Czechoslo-
vakia to its prewar place as a "central European state"
carries with it in the eyes of Czechoslovakia's Commu-
nist allies the connotation that Prague will no longer
respect its commitments to them. Dubcek is sensitive
to this issue, and he and his ministers have made count-
less pledges that their regime will not become involved
in undertakings injurious to the real interests of the
Communist half of Europe. Such protestations are inef-
fectual, however, when viewed against Prague's equivoca-
tion, for example, concerning the imposition on West
Germans by the East Germans on 11 June of passport and
visa requirements.
Dresden and After
17. The Czechoslovaks announced on 9 July that
they have declined an invitation to make another
trip to Canossa. They have told the Russians and
their friends that differences between them can be
discussed, but this will have to be done on some-
thing like even terms. They are not ready, in other
words, to go through a re-enactment of the Dresden
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA
TOP SECRET
0002002900{ -11
meeting in late March, when Czechoslovak leaders
were summoned to appear before a panel of their
peers--the Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian,
and Bulgarian party and government chiefs--to ex-
plain and justify themselves and to be lectured on
their obligations to the socialist commonwealth.
18. The latest stage in the troubled progress
of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations--now at a point of
heightened strain--began at Dresden. Enough is
known of what happened there to make it clear why
the Czechoslovaks do not want to have to run the
gantlet again. Soviet actions since Dresden have
demonstrated that general professions of good inten-
tions on the part of the Czechoslovaks will, at
most, earn them only a brief respite from Soviet
pressures. Moscow has indicated that it will not
be mollified unless the Dubcek regime will take the
next step and clamp down on the liberals and pro-
gressives in Czechoslovakia. This Prague has been
unwilling or unable to do.
19. On 9 and 10 April, the Soviet party central
committee met to hear a report by General Secretary
Brezhnev which, though never made public, unques-
tionably dwelt heavily on the problem of Czechoslo-
vakia. Subsequently, other specific issues arose
to reinforce Soviet anxiety. Charges in the Czech-
oslovak press of Soviet complicity in the death of
Jan Masaryk were followed by insinuations that the
Russians were deeply involved in the Czech blood
purges of the early 1950s. The progressives in the
Czech party were pressing the leadership to summon
an extraordinary party congress to set the seal on
the new course and, in electing a new central com-
mittee, to sweep the old guard from power once
and for all. By early May, a new climax in Soviet-
Czechoslovak relations was clearly building up.
Dubcek traveled to Moscow for two days of talks with
the Soviet leaders on 4 and 5 May, which left the
Soviets more uneasy than ever. Hard on the heels of
the departed Dubcek, on 8 May, the leaders of Mos-
cow's more reliable allies--Poland, East Germany,
Hungary, and Bulgaria--arrived in the Soviet capital
for a meeting that signaled the Soviet decision to
deploy military forces along the Czechoslovak frontiers.
TOP SECRET 1
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-R
TOP SECRET
0200290008-1
25X1
The first of these demonstrative movements virtually
coincided with the Eastern European leaders." trip to
Moscow.
First Military Pressures
20. By 8 May, elements of the Soviet 31st Tank
Division were already moving to the Soviet-Czechoslovak
border while part of another , Carpathian. Military District
(MD) unit, the 24th Motorized Rifle Division, began
moving across southern Poland to the Krakow region
near the Czechoslovak border. Polish and Soviet
news agencies belatedly announced that these troops
were participating in a "Warsaw Pact exercise."
21. Also in early May, the southern section
of East Germany was put off limits to allied missions,
and Soviet troops moved into the area. Southern
East Germany is still restricted, and the expanded
Soviet communications net set up in early May has
been extended into western Czechoslovakia.
The Warsaw Pact Exercise in Czechoslovakia
22. Two further acts in the intricate maneu-
vering that culminated in the scheduling of a War-
saw Pact exercise in Czechoslovakia followed in mid-
May with the dispatch to Czechoslovakia of Soviet
Premier Kosygin and Defense Minister Grechko.
23. Whether Kosygin talked hard or soft to
the Czechs is. not known. The nature and effect of
Grechko's persuasions were, however, clear. On his
departure from the country, Prague finally acknowl-
edged that a Warsaw Pact exercise would take place
in Czechoslovakia in June. At this point, the
Czechs, in the first of many references to the
exercise which were to prove to be wishful think-
ing, labeled it a "staff-command" exercise. Czech
Defense Minister Dzur at first said the maneuvers
would be "fair-sized" but that they would not in-
volve "big contingents" of troops. Initially, the
Czechs said no foreign combat troops would participate
in the exercise, only "communications and security
troops" would enter Czechoslovakia. Prague later
announced that some foreign combat troops would enter
the country to serve as "marker units"--small numbers
of troops representing larger units.
_e_
TOP SECRE~
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA- 800020029002?-11
TOP SECRET
24. The confusion and conflicting statements
about the exercise made it very plain that the
scheme was hastily concocted to provide a pretext
under which at least token Soviet military forces
could be introduced into Czechoslovakia.
25. The exercise began on 20 June, and on 23
June Prague announced that a Soviet tank unit had
entered Czechoslovakia. Soviet units previously de-
ployed from the Carpathian MD started moving in un-
known numbers into central Czechoslovakia between
20-23 June. Five squadrons of jet fighters and re-
connaissance aircraft from the Soviet tactical air
force in Poland also deployed to Czechoslovak fields.
26. Soviet participation in the actual ex-
ercise, however, was very limited--a fact that gives
further evidence the Soviet troops were in the coun-
try primarily to establish a military presence.
27. It has not been possible to establish with
any degree of assurance how many ground force units
Czechoslovakia.
The five Soviet squad-
rons--60 aircraft--of fighter and reconnaissance
aircraft also are still in the country. Soviet
tanks are reported to have been sighted, but there
is no reliable evidence of their number. It is
probably small. Similarly, some combat motorized
infantry units have probably been moved in, but,
again, in unknown numbers. Czech spokesmen, who
have tried to minimize the number of Soviet combat
troops, have spoken variously from "several hun-
wo regiments."
have spoken only of "some" combat 25X1
25X1 units.
28. As the Soviet reluctance to withdraw these
troops attests, their significance lies more in their
presence than in their number. They are clearly
agents in a war of nerves. The force that is in
Czechoslovakia, even if only a token force, is a
reminder of Moscow's readiness to involve itself
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-PBP 4:F9 000200290008-1
TOP SECRET`[ .
25X1
militarily and to intervene in force should bad
go to worse, should Dubcek lose control, and should
Czechs take to the streets after the fashion of
Hungary 12 years ago.
The Next Phase
29. Moscow's latest message to Prague, an
article in Pravda on 10 July, says clearly that
Soviet patience has worn thin, but it is less than
an ultimatum. Its statement that the USSR has con-
fidence that the Czechoslovak Communist Party will
be able to defeat the "reactionary antisocialist
forces" is a left-handed exhortation to the Dubcek
regime to act, not an endorsement. Having turned
the political and military screws on the Czechoslovaks
about as far as they will go without provoking open
estrangement, the Soviets will now be looking to Prague
to see if they have succeeded in eroding the Dubcek
regime's will. Moscow's doubts about Dubcek's met-
tle have grown. They are obviously not committed to
him personally and,'if there were some practical al-
ternative, Moscow might be inclined-to do what it
could to arrange his replacement. It is also clear that
an attempt by the Soviets to interfere directly in the
Czechoslovak party might only increase the present
instability. The economic lever remains in reserve.
Otherwise, the courses open to Moscow are unpalatable:
either to acquiesce in the Czechoslovak experiment or
to set up a new regime under Soviet guns.
30. Even if he should like to relieve Soviet
pressures by drawing back from his promises, Dubcek
is in no position to do so. His regime is committed
to reform. Its executives are moving to implement
the reform in every way they can. They are working
to overcome conservative opposition by removing re-
calcitrants from every level, but by legal means.
Initially apathetic, the population is being swept
along with the regime, even though many are fearful
of the economic reform that is yet to come.. The most
vocal elements in the population are organized and
are supporting the changes. A serious retreat now
from Czechoslovakia's new course would at least mean
the political demise of Dubcek and the liberals, and,
because it would necessarily be based on severe re-
pressions, could conceivably lead to rebellion.
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
TOP SECRET I I 25X1
31. Although the leadership has, up to now,
been somewhat unsure of itself as regards the degree
of firmness it should exhibit in the face of the So-
viet challenge, within the past week it seems to have
decided that it has no choice but to draw itself to-
gether, to stand firm and not to be intimidated.
32. There is little doubt that the Dubcek re-
gime intends to stand its ground, for it really has
no other choice. It is not disposed to push its
differences with the Soviets to the point of military
conflict, and has been conducting itself as if the
Soviets were not there in force. But it has now
crossed the bridge into new territory by publicly
acknowledging Soviet military pressures;., in so doing,
it has embarked on a crucial phase of its fight for
survival.
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290008-1
Top Secret
Top Secret