THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND INVOLVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

~ ~ ~ ~ Approved For Relea~
~"' ~ Foreign ;.~
~~ Assessment
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Secret
The Egyptian Military:
Political Attitudes
and Involvement
Secret
PA 81-10006
February 1981
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the Directorate of Operations; and the National
Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia.
This paper has been coordinated with the Offices of
Strategic Research, Economic Research, Central
Reference, and Geographic and Societal Research;
Secret
PA 81-10006
February 1981
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Egyptian Military:
Political Attitudes
and Involvement
Research for this report was completed
on 12 December 1980.
This paper was written by Egypt-
North Africa Branch, NE A Drvision, PA.
Questions and comments are welcome and should
be directed to the Chief NESA Division, OPA, on
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Secret
The Egyptian Military:
Political Attitudes
and Involvemen
Key Judgments The role of the military in Egyptian government and politics has declined
during the presidency of Anwar Sadat. Nonetheless, the armed forces are
the ultimate arbiter of power, and their continued support is vital for any
Egyptian leader. As a result, the military's views must be weighed carefully
in the formulation of policies affecting the interests of the armed forces.C
President Sadat increasingly is being criticized by military personn~i5~~-
marily for his inability to relieve the hardships caused by continuing
inflation. Unless he can alleviate economic grievances, this unhappiness
probably will grow,
25X1
Support for the peace treaty with Israel is strong, for examp~5X1
rimaril because of general indifference toward the Palestinian cause.
25X1
Nevertheless, the complaints over economic conditions and some other
issues are eroding Sadat's credibility. Criticism is aimed more directly at the
President now than in the past for allegedly mismanaging the Egyptian
economy. Other sources of unhappiness include:
? The declining status of the military within Egyptian society.
? Reduced military privileges and more austere conditions of service.
? Vice President Mubarak's purported meddling in military affairs.
? Corruption at high levels within the government.
? The rivalry between the military and the civilian security services.
25X1
President Sadat's reliance on the United States to modernize Egypt's aging
arsenal is also a concern of the military. Some officers complain about the
high prices charged by the United States and the long delivery times for US
equipment, and worry that Israel continues to receive better treatment than
Egypt. Such complaints are not major, however, and at least some senior
military personnel appear to have gained a better understanding of the US
foreign military sales process. 25X1
The increasing level of US military activity is also a sensitive subject to
many Egyptians, who have bitter memories of the earlier British and Soviet
presence in Egypt. On the other hand, indications that US support for
Egypt's military, economic, or political objectives was waning would be a
serious setback for Sadat. 25X1
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Government leaders are aware of the armed forces' concerns and problems
and realize the need to retain its allegia~ice. Their options for dealing with
these complaints are limited, particularly their willingness to stem inflation
through austerity measures, but the government could provide short-term
relief by increasing pay and other military benefits. A positive development
in the foreign policy field also could slov~~ but is unlikely to halt the decline in
Sadat's prestige.
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The Egyptian Military:
Political Attitu
and Involvemen
Background
The stability that has characterized modern Egyptian
politics stands in sharp contrast to the post-
independence situations in other key Arab states such
as Iraq and Syria. Egypt has had but four leaders in the
past half-century. All three changes of regime were
accomplished without bloodshed, including the re-
moval of King Faruq by Nasir and the Free Officers in
~~
of powerful rivals. Additionally, military leaders ap-
pear to have played an important role in the decision to
end the Soviet military presence in Egypt in July 1972.
The military's role in government has declined in re-
cent years. The current cabinet of 27 individuals,
excluding Sadat as Prime Minister contains ~ ree
professional military officers. 25X1
Nonetheless, the military is the ultimate arbiter of
power in Egypt, and its interests cannot be ignored by
Sadat or other government leaders. Sadat's attitude
toward the armed-forces reflects a respect for its poten-
tial as a force for political change. Sadat, likQ$I~r,
promised to allow the military to participate in govern-
ment-sponsored political organizations, but has not
fulfilled that promise, apparently fearing the politici-
zation of the most powerful institution in the country.
Sadat's efforts to modernize Egypt's aging military
machine through the acquisition of sophistic~`r;~~
equipment from the United States and other friendly
states are presumably motivated in part by the need to
Egypt's military is the only institution in the country
that can overthrow the regime. Conversely, and
equally important, the armed forces can keep a regime
in power against any combination of existing opposi-
tion groups. The military has a long history of loyalty
to the presidency in spite of the stresses brought about
by such events as Egypt's costly involvement in the
Yemen civil war in the early 1960s and the military
defeats by Israel in 1956 and 1967. The military still is
the most disciplined institution in the country, despite
the recent increase in discontent amon military
personnel
The President is the supreme commander of the Egyp-
tian armed forces. The Minister of Defense is com-
mander in chief of the armed forces and exercises
control through the armed forces' chief of staff and the
commanders of the Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense
Command. The armed forces' chief of staff, who also
commands the Army, exercises day-to-day control over
all services. The respective heads of these services,
however, have direct access to the Minister of Defense
as particular service interests require
Role of the Military in Decisionmaking
During the Nasir era the role of the military in govern-
ment was clearly evident. For example, from 30 to 66
percent of the members of Nasir's cabinets had mili-
tary backgrounds. During his years in office, Anwar
Sadat also has relied heavily on the military to sustain
his position. In May 1971 Sadat was careful to gain the
support of key commanders before eliminating a group
assure the political loyalty of the armed forces.
The influence of the armed forces extends be2~~the
area of military equipment acquisition. Egypt's current
Foreign Minister, Kamal Hasan Ali, is a career army
officer who represents the views of the military in the
government. Following his appointment to that post in
mid-1980, Ali moved quickly to put his own people in
key positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many
of the new appointees were recently retired military
personnel. Career Foreign Ministry officials reportedly
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have mixed feelings about this development. Some
believe that Egypt's international position could be
improved if foreign policy specialists, rather than mili-
tary officers such as Ali and Vice President Mubarak,
were Sadat's principal foreign affairs advisers. Others
hope that through his military ties Ali will revitalize
the Foreign Ministr and make it a more effective arm
of government.
Sadat is the primary policymaker in Egypt, but must
corisider the views of the Egyptian military when policy
is being formulated. Sadat and other senior officials
are deeply concerned about Soviet and Cuban involve-
ment in the Middle East and Africa and stress the need
to counter this threat, with military force if necessary.
Many Egyptian military officers, particularly at the
middle and junior levels, do not share their superiors'
concerns and could be expected to complain if signifi-
cant numbers of Egyptian troops were committed
abroad to counter Soviet designs.
Officers, enlisted men, and civilians welcomed the
peace treaty with Israel because it reduced the chances
of another costly war. They now expect the government
to concentrate on alleviating economic hardships and
do not want a repeat of Egypt's disastrous involvement
in the civil war of the 1960s in North Yemen. Although
the military would probably obey if ordered to deploy
abroad, it manifests an "Egypt first" attitude that
admits little tolerance for expending men and scarce
resources in foreign conflicts not directly threatening
to Egypt. Sadat has provided limited amounts of mili-
taryaid to several African states, but this modest effort
has involved no Egyptian combat forces, thus drawing
no serious objections from military personnel.
Despite Libya's aggressive posture toward Egypt,
many Egyptians oppose military action against Libya.
Senior military officers have urged caution because of
a general unreadiness to sustain combat operations,
because they fear Libya's ability to inflict losses on
Egypt, and because of opposition to the idea of fighting
a fellow Arab state. A protracted war with Libya that
resulted in significant casualties or that was widely
perceived as a policy failure for Sadat would probably
produce significant discontent and perhaps organized
dissent within the military. Although hard evidence is
lacking, the military's attitude probably is one of the
factors that deterred Sadat from taking forceful action
against Libya in the three ears since the border con-
flict of 1977.
Attitudes Toward Sadat
The armed forces appear to be basically loyal to Sadat,
but his standing among military personnel has slipped
over the past several months. Rapid inflation and other
economic pro):~lems have led to increasing criticism
among military personnel and civilians alike. The
monthlong bar on meat sales that Sadat announced on
1 September 1980 herd a particularly deleterious effect
on attitudes within the military. Complaints about the
economy have become more intense, and some are
aimed directly at Sadat.~
percent a year rs expecte to contrnue in 1981 and
probably will cause further unhap iness amon mili-
tary personnel as well as civilians. )(1
The military's respect for Sadat is bein
diminished b
other factors as well.
25X1
he President's economic liberalization
program doubtless has contributed to the problem by
allowing the g,3p between rich and poor to widen. The
bitterness of some in the military over the increasingly
ostentatious sF~ending habits of the privileged few and
the hardships ~~f those who live on overnment salaries
was highlighte.
On the positive side, the Egyptian armed forces, like
virtually all ci~rilians, support Sadat's efforts to pursue
peace with Isr;~el and arrange a comprehensive settle-
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ment of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Weary of decades of
hostility with Israel, military personnel believe that
Egypt has done more than its share for Palestinian and
pan-Arab causes. The peace treaty with Israel, more-
over, carried with it the promise of an improved econo-
my and the prospect that the United States would
become a major supplier of arms to Egypt, thus halting
the deterioration of the country's military strength and
helping to ensure that it remains a major Middle East
power. Egyptians continue to support the peace with
Israel despite what is perceived as Israeli intransigence
in the West Bank-Gaza autonomy talks. Egypt's isola-
tion from the other Arab countries as a result of the
peace treat remains a nagging but manageable con-
cern.
Vice President Mubarak's Position
Vice President Husni Mubarak, a former commander
of the Egyptian Air Force, is the most influential
military figure in government after President Sadat.
Over the past few years Mubarak has played an active
role in Egyptian domestic politics and has strengthened
his position by arranging for the appointment of close
associates to key government posts. He also maintains
a strong voice in the running of Egypt's military,
particularly the Air Force. Mubarak apparently in-
Other Military Complaints 25X1
The rivalry between the military and the secur~iX1
services represents another problem for Sadat. Armed
forces officers hold the security forces in low esteem.
Some have come to believe, moreover, that Sadat is
increasing the influence and size of the police and
security forces at the expense of the military to create
an alternative power base. A few officers buttress the
charge by claiming that the police are getting a ui
ment that rightfully belongs to the armed forces
Since the food riots in January 1977, both the national
police and the paramilitary Central Security F~#~1
have been upgraded and enlarged. These efforts are
intended to enhance the government's ability to deal
with civil disorder. Elements within the militar~7~,~-1
trust the government's intentions, however, and this
could hamper cooperation between civilian security
forces and the armed forces durin a serious break-
down of public order. 25 1
government.
concern to military personnel like inflation and inad-
equate housing, the armed forces probably will have
considerable sympathy for the demonstrators, thus
hampering the effectiveness of military efforts to re-
store order. The possibility might arise of military
personnel joinin o ular demonstrations against the
The military traditionally has been regarded as an
internal security force of last resort. During the riots of
January 1977 military units brought the situation un-
der control when the police failed to do so. During
periods of civil unrest, therefore, the attitude of the
armed forces will be of critical importance. Should
popular protest center on economic problems of equal
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A recurrent and worrisome complaint within the
armed forces centers on the erosion of military prestige
within Egyptian society. The primary military threat
to Egypt was largely eliminated upon the conclusion of
the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979. Since then,
the public's attention has shifted from Egypt's military
needs toward economic problems. Military officers
believe that members of the newly prosperous middle
class are more respected than armed forces personnel
who have devoted their entire lives to the defense of
their country. They further note that officers no longer
are considered a "good catch" by Egyptian women
from eood families.
The US Factor
Once the only major military power in the Arab world,
Egypt has seen its position eroded by the virtual cutoff
of Soviet military assistance in 1975. The loss of Arab
financial aid as a result of the peace treaty with Israel
in 1979 also hurt Egypt's efforts to obtain needed
military hardware. Currently, Cairo is looking to the
West, particularly the United States, for help with its
military programs. It also is obtaining some military
equipment from such Communist countr' s hina
North Korea, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
Egypt's military needs are enormous and are not likely
to be met fully by any combination of sources in the
near term. The process of modernizing the Egyptian
armed forces is likely to be prolonged, raising the
danger of a further decline in military morale. This
factor will continue to impel the government to press
friendly states such as the United States fors eed
delivery of modern military hardware.
Egyptians at all levels viewed an expanded US eco-
nomicand military assistance program as one of the
promised benefits of peace with Israel. Expectations
within the Egyptian armed forces were high, and as the
limitations on the US military aid program became
clear, disappointments inevitably appeared. In early
1980 senior military officers were complaining that US
arms offers were inadequate and that delivery sched-
ules were not rapid enough. Air Force officers charged
that Israel continued to receive better treatment than
Egypt. The}~ grumbled, for example, that the United
States had agreed to supply only limited numbers of
F-16 aircraft despite Egypt's need for many more, and
that deliver~/ of these aircraft would not begin until late
1981. Such complaints continue, but do not seem to
have seriou~;ly undermined the generally favorable
military suF~ply relationship.
view within the Egyptian armed forces of the US
25X1
25X1
Egypt's extf;nsive requests for US military equipment
are to a large extent the product of a real need to
replace and refurbish aging Soviet equipment. Political
factors are important as well, including the need to
maintain high morale and thus ensure the loyalty of
the military, and to demonstrate that Egypt's alliance
with the United States is paying dividends. Egypt's
request for F-15 aircraft was a case in point. Wash- 25X1
ington's agreement in principle to supply this aircraft
was an important political symbol, signaling that
Egypt was receiving treatment from the United States
comparable to Israel's 25X1
The increasing level of US military activity in Egypt,
however, could lead to serious domestic problems for
Sadat. Egyptians are highly sensitive to the presence of
foreign forces on their soil as a result of bitter experi-
ences with the British occupation beginning in the late
19th century and later with the Soviet presence that at
one time numbered 16,000 military advisers, tech- 25X1
nicians, anel combat personnel. The growth of Arab
nationalism. and the increased superpower involvement
in the region have reinforced E ypt's determination to
guard its sovereignty
If the level of US military activity in Egypt is carefully
managed, i1: will not cause serious problems for Sadat
despite voc~il criticism by opposition groups on the
right and left. The temporary deployment of US air- 25X1
craft to Eg~~pt this summer apparently reassured those
Egyptians who fear that the United States will estab-
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lish permanent military bases in their country. Over
time and as the use of Egyptian facilities increases,
however, this issue could become a more pressing
domestic problem for Sadat unless such activity is
compatible with Egyptian objectives and provides tan-
gible benefits to the Egyptian armed forces.)
Any significant downturn in Egypt's relations with the
United States, on the other hand, also would be a
serious setback for Sadat. In particular, indications
that the US commitment to supply military hardware
was weakening would generate strong military criti-
cism of Sadat for relying too heavily on the United
States. Pressures would increase for a return to the
Arab fold so that Egypt's military needs might be met
through aid from moderate Arab states.
Attempts To Suborn the Military
Despite the range of problems troubling military
personnel, the complaints apparently are diffuse, and
there has been no firm evidence of organized dis-
sidence within the armed forces over the past several
years.
The presence of Soviet military and intelligence advis-
ers in Egypt gave the Soviet Union opportunities to
recruit agents, and many members of the Egyptian
armed forces received training in the Soviet Union.
Most Egyptians developed a lasting dislike of the Sovi-
ets, but Moscow probably has some assets amo>~X1
military personnel. We suspect that Soviet influence is
nominal, however, and see no possibility of a Soviet-
engineered military move against Sadat.
25X1
Government Efforts To Combat Military Complaints
Government officials, including Sadat, are acutely
aware of the need to keep the allegiance of the Egyp-
tian armed forces and to forestall the development of
organized opposition groups among military personnel.
To that end, the Directorate of Military Intelli~cX1
and Egypt's other security services watch closely for
indications of dissident activity within the armed
forces. 25X1
In the past the Egyptian officer corps was carefully
cultivated and in some ways the most privileged class
in Egyptian society. This no longer appears to be the
case, but military officers still receive preferential
treatment in some areas. During religious holid~~}(r~
October 1980, for example, lamb was sold to ofl~v~~t
30 percent below the normal government-controlled
price. Such reduced prices apparent) are available to
the officer corps on a regular basis 25X1
In an attempt to counter increasing military com-
plaints about inflation and other economic problems,
Minister of Defense Badawi in September 1980 began
a speaking campaign among military units intended to
convince officers of the benefits of military service.
Badawi emphasized the privileges available to military
personnel, such as health care, and claimed that when
these were taken into consideration, officers received
higher salaries than their civilian counterparts in gov-
ernment. Although the results of Badawi's efforts are
not known, such official attention to military cd~)C1
plaints may help defuse the spreadin concern c~~y)C1
economic conditions 25X1
25X1
Other methods of dealing with the deterioration in
military morale are being tried as well. Air Force
leaders reportedly are attempting to .boost morale
Opponents of the Sadat regime abroad continue trying
to suborn Egyptian military personnel, but their efforts
apparently have been only marginally successful, and
there is little evidence to suggest that aforeign-
inspired military revolt is possible in the near term.
Libya has long tried to win the allegiance of Egyptian
armed forces personnel.
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through increased training.)
Cairo has shown keen interest in developing other ties
with NATO countries. In a similar vein, Egyptian
officials have repeatedly emphasized the equality of
the partnership with the United States and the fact
that the military facilities offered to the United States
are not bases, but are for use in the event that a fellow
Arab countr re nests external assistance.
There is no evidence that such events are imminent,
however, an~i in the past Egyptians have demonstrated
their ability to tolerate hardships without resorting to 25X1
precipitate action. A positive development in Egypt's 25X1
foreign policy, moreover, could reduce or halt the
decline in S~idat's prestige. Even a limited rapproche-
ment with Arab moderates such as Saudi Arabia, for
example, would be popular and could rekindle hopes
that Arab aid might allow Egypt to accelerate military
programs anal further boost economic development. A
breakthrough in the West Bank-Gaza autonomy talks,
particularly one engineered by the United States, a1so25X1
would tend to improve morale and underscore the 25X1
benefits of E.gypt's relationship with the United States.
Outlook
In the months ahead Sadat is likely to be increasingly
on the defensive to preserve his standing with the
Egyptian armed forces. A further deterioration in mili-
tary morale, and consequently in Sadat's credibility,
appears inevitable if the military are not persuaded
that the government can address the inflation issue and
other economic grievances. Egyptians believe that the
government is directly responsible for their welfare and
expect inflation to be eased without onerous austerity
measures. Sadat, therefore, probably will have to con-
tinue to rely on stopgap measures designed to ease the
burden of past inflation as well as resort to further
high-level personnel shifts in the economic sector.
If popular discontent worsens, perhaps because of a
government misstep on consumer subsidies or the sup-
ply of basic commodities, serious civil disorders could
result. Should such unrest persist and spread, the gov-
ernment probably would need to call on the military to
restore order. This would provide an important test of
the depth of military disaffection. In a worst case
scenario, and if Sadat's credibility had eroded further,
the armed forces might intervene and replace Sadat
with a military officer.)
25X1
Even without such dramatic developments, Sadat is
capable of imaginative actions to preserve his position.
If he perceived malaise within the armed forces reach-
ing adangerous level, he could announce pay raises or
improve benefits to relieve tem oraril the economic
sources of discontent. 25X1
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