WORLD REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100030007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 21, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SEC INFORMATION
State Dept. declassificaTon & release
instructions on file
C21+ Apr 1953
WORLD REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S
FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS
General Western Reaction
The content of President Eisenhower's foreign policy
statement, its timing, and the prestige of the man who de-
livered it, made it one of the most effective messages for
world-wide impact since World War II.
The leading Western nations have acknowledged that United
States foreign policy seeks a relaxation of international
tension and a workable formula for world peace.
The free world generally acclaimed the address as a posi-
tive reaffirmation of Western aspirations and a victory for
the US in assuming the initiative for world peace.
A few adverse comments among our allies were based on
local, short range considerations or resulted from a feeling
of having been by-passed in the planning stage for a major
step in the field of foreign policy.
Soviet reaction,although unofficial, was unprecedented
in its quickness. Within a few hours after the speech, the
New York TASS summary, with some comment, was published in
Pravda and broadcast by Radio Moscow. Quick Kremlin approval
of the TASS coverage was evidently due to the fac at it
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did not compromise the current Soviet "peace" tactics or any
possible official, comment. TASS merely selected quotations
supporting the Soviet thesis regarding peaceful coexistence.
It also pointed out omitted items which would support the
Kremlin's policy but would not necessarily be considered prere-
quisites for the opening of negotiations - such as the recog-
nition of China and consideration of the Potsdam Agreement.
Presidium chairman Voroshilov, during his interview with
Ambassador Bohlen, carefully avoided commenting on the speech
unqualified enthusiasm over the content and timing of the
speech. They felt that the moderate TASS comment indicated
with the excuse that he had not. read the full text.
Several chiefs of diplomatic missions in Moscow expressed
that Soviet authorities would study it seriously.
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Various Communist accusations -- mostly non-Orbit --
attached stereotyped comments to the TASS communique in such
a way that they did not compromise and could supplement any
future Moscow reaction. For instance, President Eisenhower
was charged with having:
(1) Failed to "comply with the Soviet bid to meet the
USSR half way";
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(2) Evidenced that he wants - not peace - but the fruits
of victory;
(3) Proved that there is to be no change in his Govern-
ment's policy of "liberating" Eastern Europe;
(4) Reiterated the program of American imperialism.
Some Communist propaganda media interpret the US
desire for peace negotiations as a "capitulation" to
Soviet offers.
Eastern Europe
Satellite media closely followed the Moscow pattern in
transmitting the TASS account at least once on Friday and
Saturday.
Czech and Polish broadcasts in the English language
quoted criticism by British Labor MP's. One of them reportedly
accused Eisenhower of demanding the "unconditional surrender"
of the Soviet Orbit as a prerequisite for discussion of
"mutual aid."
A report from the US Legation in Budapest indicated that
the speech made a strong and favorable impression on Hungarian
listeners. The report said that many had wept and prayed
during the reading of the Hungarian translation. One in-
formant reported that the Hungarian press office had copies
in the hands of top officials within two hours.
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Yugoslav officials went out of their way to praise the
address. Marshal Tito considered it "the finest thing he
.(President Eisenhower) has done." He described it as beauti-
fully timed, and felt that it would probably produce positive
results in Korea. He was doubtful, however, about Austria
and thought it unlikely that the Russians would deal with the
US -- at least for some time -- on Germany, the heart of the
European question.
Western Europe
Official comment in West European capitals unanimously
approved President Eisenhower's speech as a contribution to
world peace. The reaction in non-Communist media has been
favorable, ranging from moderate approval through enthusiasm.
The President's definite proposals for a peace settle-
ment, the assumption of initiative by the United States, and
the challenge to the Soviet Union to clarify its real posi-
tion all were emphasized. The press in some countries singled
out points of particular local interest. For instance, the
French press commented on Eisenhower's support of French ef-
forts in Indochina.
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S.
Two considerations provoked adverse comment in Western
Europe. Two moderate political papers, French and Dutch, criti-
cized the failure of the President to consult his allies before
taking such a major foreign policy step. In sharp contrast
to Churchill's strong endorsement is Bevan's charge that Mr.
Eisenhower demanded too much from the Soviet Union and conceded
too little.
Editorials appearing in the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
France, and West Germany have pointed out that the conditions
laid down in the Eisenhower speech are not likely to be ac-
ceptable to the Soviet Union, and should not be set up as "ir-
reducible goals."
Near and Middle East
Middle Eastern reaction was generally highly favorable.
The conservative French Moroccan press hailed the speech as
a "capital document" and stated that Eisenhower has the
Kremlin's "back against the wall." Moroccan and Algerian
papers carried extensive direct quotes.
The English-language press in South Africa received the
speech favorably. Similarly, the Cairo papers used it as
Friday's major story and reprinted the full text. The Egyp-
tian state broadcasting service presented the full text
simultaneously with the delivery in Washington and broadcast
shortwave summaries in Greek, French, Italian and Arabic.
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The address received top billing in the Israeli press
except for the Communist Kol Roam. The pro-Soviet paper of
the Mapam party criticized the speech as "not indicating
any real means for relieving tension...."
The Turkish radio regarded it as a challenge to the Soviet
leaders to offer deeds instead of words, and pointed out that
the Kremlin must now answer Eisenhower's.... "frank questions
with the same frankness."
The Iranian press is divided in its reaction. Friendly
comments noted that the speech has made it possible for the
masses to discuss peace, hitherto dealt with behind U' closed
doors. The speech was treated as a solemn declaration to the
world that the United States sincerely desires peace,
Adverse Iranian criticism appeared in one pro-Mossadeq
paper and in the Tudeh press where the United States was
linked with British imperialism.
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Near Eastern UN delegations viewed the speech as an
honest and worthwhile contribution toward easing world tension.
They felt that it would have a favorable reception in the
underdeveloped countries. In Pakistan, the anti-Communist
Evening Times, noting that US development of non-Communist
countries was the best deterrent to Communism, recommended
the President's speech as "a lever to tackle overall problems
of peace."
The Indian Ambassador in Cairo told Ambassador Caffery
that "he (Eisenhower) has gone more than half-way. No other
living man could have done it," In India, the independent
Statesman of Calcutta, stated that the hearts of millions
would respond to Eisenhower's proposal to divert to productive
channels the savings from disarmament. It cautioned, however,
that, although Western defense should not be slackened, the
approach to the USSR should be less stiff since Malenkov really
desires a "detente". Press reaction and broadcasts over the
government-controlled Indian radio supported the view that
the US is as guilty as the USSR for the present fear and dis-
trust. The US was called upon as much as the USSR to "prove
by deeds rather than words that it really wants peace," The
Indian press gave the Orbit credit for the initiative in the
recent peace overtures.
In Ceylon, the press stated that the West could not be
blamed for being suspicious of Soviet actions, and that the
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speech should clear the air. It noted that world peace could
not be guaranteed until the USSR renounced its interference
in the internal affairs of other countries.
Far East
Over-all Japanese reaction has been very favorable, the
speech being generally viewed as a clear statement of American
objectives that required the Soviet Union to demonstrate its
sincerity. There was little optimism that the Soviet response
would be favorable.
There has been no immediate comment from South Korean
leaders. They have long insisted that only "peace through
victory" and unification under South Korean domination offer
any firm basis for settlement of major issues. President
Rhee's press secretary noted that while South Korea appreciated
Eisenhower's peace efforts, no honorable armistice would be
possible until all Chinese troops retired to Manchuria. The
press has previously demanded that the Soviet Union show its
sincerity by agreeing to unification and UN-supervised nation-
wide elections.
There has been no North Korean reaction.
China and S. E. Asia
Chinese Nationalist officials were at first disappointed
over the omission of references to China and Formosa. Some
officials connected this with recent reports that the United
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States was contemplating a UN trusteeship over Formosa. They
expressed fear that Formosa might be sacrificed in an overall
US-USSR understanding. Nationalist leaders were later re-
ported, however, to have come to the view that omission of
references to China meant that the President did not recognize
the Communist conquest of the mainland and wished to leave the
Nationalists free to attempt its recovery.
The Chinese Communists have not yet originated comment.
Peiping Radio on 1S April broadcast the text of the TASS re-
port, including the statement that "Eisenhower made no mention
whatever of China and of restoring her reasonable rights....
The "rights" previously demanded by Peiping include sover-
eignty over Formosa and occupancy of China's seat in the UN.
There has been no extensive comment on the'speech in
Southeast Asia. Although no Malayan reaction has as yet been
received, the Vietnamese Premier and Australian and Philip-
pine officials gave it hearty approval.
Official Latin American reaction has generally been favor-
able. The speech has been referred to as an "excellent states-
manlike document" which would be difficult to criticize. The
clear delineation of US foreign policy and the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration's course were praised.
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.Probable Soviet Reaction
The world-wide distribution of the address at the dip-
lomatic level almost demands an official reply from the Krem-
lino We feel that Moscow would weigh carefully the relative
propaganda advantages of an immediate or a deferred answer.
The more important factors Moscow would probably consider
in deciding on an immediate statement would include:
(1) The necessity for further signs of Soviet sincerity
in Korea;
(2) Maintenance of the initiative in the "peace" campaign
(3) The possibility of losing face in the Communist camp
through apparent indecision.
On the other hand, there are a number of factors which
would favor a delayed response. These include:
(1) An opportunity to gain world-wide attention and a
well-coordinated line, perhaps on May Day. A maxi-
mum effort could thus be made to regain the peace
initiative.
(2) Time to consider effective countermeasures.
(3) Avoidance of tipping Moscow's hand prior to the
forthcoming NATO conference.
(4) Use of the already agreed-upon Korean negotiations
as a means of dissipating the effectiveness of the
American initiative.
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