YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900080017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 23, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Y os AY-SW
The
:cent
ov ie
to Yugoslav-Soviet relations since Khrushchev
began wooing Yugoslavia in 1955.
A. All, bers of the bloc followed meow's lead and wtthdr
their official delegations.
Likewise,, bloc members appear to falling into
f Moscow's strong rebuttal of the Yugoslav
ck in full.
Czechs have (ally indorsed the scow attack, and l;aria
initiated its own direct attack on the Yugoslav program.
;4 has associated itself with some of Moscow
own road to socialism.
icisa, but has recognised Seigra
C. In lieu of delegations the bloc seal
the congress an "observers."
1. With the exception of the Polish aambass
1. C nniet China's Peoples Daily i has printed Moscow's
nalysis of the Yugoslav draft party program conded as non-
'
Ti
23 April
-deana tt n of the Yugoslav party
fight to follow
following a break In the anti-Soviet speed
highlighted the, Moscow imposed boycott.
18 April, the Soviet theoretical journal g+unist in a det=ailed
Marxist virtually every basic principle of Yugoslav ideology.
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Cott of the Yugoslav party congress in conjunction with
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A. Ko unisst made aaade it clear that unless Tugoelavs non-. rx
role
telly dropped there is no hope for any future
via in the Communist wort
R. Moscow gave its condemn tiau of the Yugosiasvprogram
coverage in radio broadcasts to foreign audiences,
Tito seriously concerned over the dispute, there is 1,
likelihood that he will knuckle under.
A.. Concessions on the main issues would represent an abandoaaaa cnt
of the Yugoslav road to socialism.
1. Tito's internal position andhis position in history it;
primarily by his *$heres
2, past Soviet lecturing to the Yugoslavs has generally &gerved
to strengthen the latter in their non-conformity,
Aware of Soviet intentions to boycott the congress since
5 April, Belgrade on 17 April announced changes in its draft.
Belgrade apparently hoped this old persuade dos to
attend the cou:#ress.
These concessions were not on basic Ideology, but were an
obvious effort to meet Soviet complaints concerning
draft prograa m" s foreign policy p
Yugoslav ambassador I*igunovic in Moscow net with Zbru*bchev
but the seating reportedly terminated in bad feeling as
Yugoslavs probably indicated they could concede
iothiog further.
25X1 C(a) Iiicunovic has
requested ressiga nt as a re
Of his fruitless
efforts to achieve a normalization is Yugoslav-
Soviet relations
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C. Tito in his opening Speech at the congress confirmed the
nkovi> subsequently declared that "certain very r+espaibie
people who are our neighbors, instead of profiting fro-,4 the
the USSR, leaving this to his chief lieutenant R&nkovie.
isv road to socialises, but he hurled no fire and brimstone
experiences of the past, are again sharpening the old n.ad
rusty weapons of the Comisiform.
if. The diet attack on the Yugoslav pargram was cast in terms of an
ideological schism between Yugoslavia and the bloc. If t
oslavs refuse to concede, Yugoslavia will be In ideological
Isolation to a degree similar to that of 1948.
Apparently :,scow and Belgrade still hope to avoid ccmpletc
break as in 1948.
the USSR hopes to maintain at least "correct" state relations!
The visit of Soviet President Yoroshilov to Yugoslavia
in May which has not as yet been cancelled,, suggests t
Tito still supports most Soviet foreign policy objectives.
1, Tito's speech before the congress
any economic relathnss.
Soviet relations were progressing "very favorably,"
The relatively neutral tone of Tito's National Assembly on
however
1.
onfidence.
uggest that Tito any be interested in r
Yugoslav;
American aid to which no strings were attach
that termination of its military aid had
"negatively influenced" t-Yugoslav relations.
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V. The Yugoslavs are no in rather genera;
The visit by Tito to Gaulks scheduled for late spring now
considerable significance for Tito's relations
the bloc.
The polish observer at the T W slay congress has not
acted in concert with his bloc colleagues.
Western urope's socialist parties have refused
the congress largely because of Tito's treatment of
the more recent trials of several pro--war Yugoslav
.
G. Yugoslavs, nevertheless, are likely to continue to hope that
history is on their side (fits in his October rore
article clearly statedd, this belief) and that ultimate;
views will win out without si
socialist world,
modification
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