Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00890A001300010001-1
Body:
NSC BRIEFIN&pproved For Relea
1300010001-1
5 October 1960
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
1. We have evidence that Russians and Chinese met recently in Peiping
to resolve differences. They seem to have been unsuccessful.
II. Chinese refrained from public polemics while talks were under way.
But when talks were over, Peiping--far from yielding to Soviet pres-
sures--reaffirmed hard-line positions.
A. On 29 September, Chinese radio broadcast lengthy commentary on new
publication of Mao's works. The commentary repeated old saws about
guarding against peace "tricks" of imperialists, hailed Mao's pub-
lication as weapon in struggle against modern revisionism (Peiping's
description of Soviet policy).
B. Russians are not hiding their annoyance either. Public lecturer
in Moscow on same day said Chinese were dogmatists who should
engage in self-criticism and make admission of error.
111. The meeting of world Communist parties, scheduled for Moscow in No-
vember, shaping up to be real showdown.
IV. We think contributing factor to Khrushchev's strong anti-Western
stand in UN is need to minimize his vulnerability at November meet-
ing to renewed Chinese criticism of giving "aid and comfort to the
enemy."
A. At same time, ostentatious meetings in New York with Tito--Peiping's
favorite whipping boy--indicates that Khrushchev has no intention at
this time of making fundamental concessions to Peiping's views.
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V. Chinese, however, are receiving surprising support from Albanian
party.
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A. Party leader Hoxha only East European party chief whose country
has UN membership who failed to attend UN.
B. At Peiping's National Day ceremonies 1 October, Albania was only
bloc country with official delegation present.
C. At Albanian-Chinese friendship rally in Peiping on 4 October
China and Albania unequivocally affirmed their solidarity in
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
1. Albanians lauded Peiping's defense of "the purity of Marxism-
Leninism."
D. Thus weakest And most insignificant satellite of all appears
willing to defy Moscow.
1. Possible that Hoxha believes--perhaps wishfully--that
Khrushchev's backing in international Communist movement
not as firm as it now Appears.
2. Khrushchev cannot afford to let Albania get away with it
since this might tempt other satellites to challenge Moscow's
authority; so strong Soviet action against Hoxha may be ex-
pected soon.
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25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001300010001-1
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001300010001-1