THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY -- A BALANCE SHEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OCI No. 2328/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
office of Current Intelligence
29 September 1965
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Dominican Republic: Prospects for
Stability ?? A Balance Sheet
A. Garcia Godoy2s actions as Provisional President
have roused the expectations of the left in the Dominican
Republic and created bitter resentments among the military
and moderate political elements. During his first weeks in
office he has continually made concessions to the rebel camp
--concessions that have been seen by the military chiefs as
threatening to their position and by the moderates as insur-
ing institutional advantages which would bring about an
election victory for the left.
B. Garcia Godoy has made no progress on re-integration
of the rebel zone and little on arms collection. He apparently
feels he must go "softly" with the rebels on these issues so
as to be able to solve them without resort to force. As time
passes, however, the rebels have felt encouraged to depict
themselves as the victors in the civil war and to make in-
creasing demands on Garcia Godoy at the expense of their
opponents.
C. In these circumstances the outlook for political
stability will change rapidly when IAPF leaves the country.
Departure of the IAPF is already becoming a heady political
issue. Garcia Godoy is suspicious and distrusta:ul of the
military and unwilling to become dependent on them for fear
of seriously compromising his political future. This leaves
him no alternative but to solicit voluntary cooperation from
the left, an almost hopeless task, ua thepformulation of
policies calculated to develop pkpnd
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D. Unless the provisional regime makes an effective
effort to resolve the bitter enmity existing between the
contending factions, longer term political stability is
unlikely. Neither side is presently reconciled to accept
the results of elections if the other wins and both are
bent on insuring that the "suspended revolution" reaches
a conclusion.
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OCI No. 2328/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of
SCurrent eptember 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Dominican Republic: Prospects for
Stability--A Balance Sheet
Introduction
1. Garcia Godoy's first weeks in office have raised the
expectat:ins of the left at oneofOthelmoderatesl tlhhe and military
ether,
aroused the bitter indign the warring camps tog
and conservatives. Far from drawing
the Provisional President's actions haveicontributed d to a
sudden increase in tensions and, power
undermine-'.the OAS settlement or insure the coming to p
of a deeply anti-American
moves by military leaders against the
The threatening of growing
government on 28 September were symptomatic atic her military
dismay with the new government. Apparently
not oche siiliaryd
moves were triggered when Garcia Godoy ion to
the regular military chiefs in choosing a commississabisment,
reintegrate rebel torheientmileditbodyary. Ambassador
but named a predominantly
Bunker has apparently persuaded the incensed military
chiefs not to carry out their threats against Garcia Godoy,
but there is little reason to suppose they are more than
temporarily cooled off.
This memorandum icanysituationoandrthencriaicalrrole
inherent nt in rthe Domin c Godoy. t also analyzes the considerations
by Garcia odogoverning the choice of Hector Garcia Godoy as ia p Proviandsiional
on
President, the general direction of his~polies
lxplosea the
conseqcomplexion of his appointees. Finally essee trend
consequences for the Dominican-Republic if the p
in Dominican policies continues.
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Garcia Godoy as President
2. Garcia Godoy's selection as negotiator during the
recent strife and his appointment as Provisional President
were dictated by the fact that he was acceptable to all tability, plus the presence
political , factions. Thrincipal assets o.f the new govern-
ment. of the IAPF, were the p was to effect a recon-
ciliation A major task of Garcia Godoy rocs
ciliation between the moderates of let of right. at This
requires that he obtain active support f both or neither
that his policies and actions be so shapedcth t
aicne to the
side fears that its interests are being
other. The presence of
the Pmonthseinowhgchatoyeffect
guarantee Garcia Godoy several
the kind of political climate in which elections could be
staged.
3. However, the Hector Garcia Godoy government is in
danger of losing the support and confidence of several
including the military, conservatives and many
moderaaur, tes. These groups have been alarmed by the regime's
mod
reluctance to press for the dismantling of the rebel zone
and by ineffectual steps to collecherebel ar s. At the
same time, they are concerned by concesions the enhance
ernrnent continues to make to ettlementewasbalrebelcvictory.
settlement
the feeling that the
4. If the provisional government does nottake n e ps
to regain the support of these elements, itiwill be be una-
con-
to achieve its stated goal of creating a
fidence in which hold
pofree liciesewouldsincreaseetherlikeli-
continuation of present s and complicate for
hood of a rebel victory at the prte staiate.
future regimes the problem of maintaining
5. Indeed, there is some doubt that the Garcia Godoy
ring
government can survive until
or early summer of 1966)
concessions to the rebees mwii~aryrnestablishment.toTheeIAPF
is, of course, a and very tsignificant stabilizing force, but
is, of
the Dominican military,might'still take the ri?k of int r-
vening against Garcia Godoy if convinced he were likely to succumb to leftist demands that the military be purged.
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There is also some chance, if Garcia Godoy remains reluc-
tant to use the police and military forces, of a series of
violent incidents and reprisals leading to a breakdown of
public order. Under such
thechas encounteredhsoafarn-
tinuation of the lesser pressures
Godoy might simply resign. The outlook for the
continuation in power of his provisional regime would
become much dimmer, if as appears possible, it joins in the
already existing demands for an early withdrawal of the
IAPF.
Garcia Godoy's Motives and Tactics
ent line of policies, Garcia
6. In following his pres
Godoy's motivations appear to be mixed. His liberal politi-
cal values probably make him more sympathetic too the rebels
than he realizes or admits. Underlying certain
policies, for
concessions to rebel demands regarding labor nlof
example, is genuine concern over working conditions in the
Dominican Republic. His desire to avoid appearing as a
"reactionary" hampers forthright antisubversive measures.
He is not without political ambitions, moreover, perhaps
even hoping at some future point to stand for elections
as president. He is thus anxious to avoid the stigma of
seeming to be a US puppet.
7. Since his installation, Garcia Godoy has made no
tt heir
effort to challenge the rebels' continued over
zone, although under military pressure on September
promised to work out procedures to solve the problem.
Neither has he disarmed the rebels or collected their
weapons. As a privileged sanctuary and base for forays
into the countryside, the zone presents a distinct threat
to stability everywhere in the country. On 16 September,
for example, a mob left the zone to demonstrate for the
removal of some government officials and returned safely
when challenged by police.
8. Under the terms of the settlement, the rebels were
to begin to disarm and after "due course'''the provisional
government was to take such steps as were necessary tor-
tegrate the sector into Santo Domingo. Garcia Godoy pledged
in writing to his top military chiefs that the provisional
government would wait no more than 15 days--that is until
18 September--before taking action to force rebel compliance.
He has failed to do so. It is now probable- that the only
weapons turned over will be defective or too large to be
hidden.
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9. Garcia Godoy has said repeatedly that the issue
of disarmament is of major concern to his regime. He is
unwilling to employ force to seize the rebels' arms. In
order to win rebel cooperation, therefore, he is following,
in his own words "a soft position." This tactic, symbolized
by actions which can be construed as pro-rebel, has deeply
disturbed Dominican moderates and conservatives, particularly
the military.
Concessions to the Rebels
10. The first move the new regime made to gain rebel
cooperation was the abolition of General Wessin's Armed
Forces Training Center, followed ;within a few days by the
ousting of Wessin, Instead of inducing the rebels to comply
voluntarily with provisions of the Act of Reconciliation
the Wessin affair increased rebel appetites for changes in
Dominican military leadership--demands that culminated in
Juan Bosch's call on 25 September for a purge of 8 to 10
top military leaders, Garcia Godoy then advised US offi-
cials in Santo Domingo that he was considering a "package
deal" whereby Francisco Rivera Caminero would be removed
as Defense Minister and replaced by an officer who has
been described by others as compliant and unlikely to com=
mand the allegiance of other officers, in return for vague
rebel assurance to proceed with disarming. However, after
a series of conversations, including several with US offi=
cials Garcia Godoy said he had decided against any "im-
mediate" changes in the armed forces leadership.
11. Garcia Godoy has failed to counter leftist attempts
to oust key government officials or respond forcefully to
the rebel seizure of the University of Santo Domingo. The
rebels have physically ousted officials of the Education,
Health, and Public Works Ministries. Moreover, the pro-
visional government capitulated to extremist demands and
replaced the head of the government-owned sugar corporation
with a man acceptable to Bosch's party. The Communists
controlled paper Patria greeted this change with the state-
ment "70,000 workers emerged triumphant when the provisional
government acceded to their demands." This has shaken the
confidence of business and financial leaders=-confidence
vital to the Provisional Government's avowed intent of
resuscitating, the nation's economy.
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12. The case of the University is particularly dis-
turbing. Garcia Godoy has proved unwilling to offer more
than moral support to a legally elected rector ousted from
office by what amounts to a leftist coup. Garcia Godoy has
told the deposed rector that he Is not willing to use troops
or police to remove the insurgents who are now in posses-
sion of the university and all its facilities, including
a printing plant.
Appointments
13. With the appointment of a Foreign Minister on
27 September, Garcia Godoy completed formation of his
cabinet and the bulk of his administration. Although most
of the cabinet members are moderates, the overnment has
a marked leftward orientation
Many of the appointees made to the courts by the liberal
Supreme Court appear to be sympathetic to the left, indi-
cating future difficulty in the rapid prosecution of sub-
versives. Although Garcia Godoy agreed to review critical
appointments with US officials, he has done so in only 17
out of 224 of the government's nominations. In several
cases, he at first disregarded US counsel only to say later
that he would remove questionable officeholders--something
he has not done.
Opposition
14. While disturbing to many non-leftist Dominicans,
the regime's current course has not yet resulted in the
emergence of active political opposition. The military
have warned Gircia Godoy that his policies may end in a
default to the left. On 28 September the military chiefs
were incensed by Garcia Godoy's appointment of a commission
with a predominantly pro-rebel cast charged with reinte-
grating rebel officers into the military services. In'the
face?of strong J)ressures from the chiefs,?the President in
this case backed down and agreed to select a new commission.
n MT
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Exiled General Wessin has spoken of acting as a focal point
for conservative and riaht in i on nt
Insurgency
15. Meanwhile, the extreme left is continuing to make
preparations for guerrilla warfare, The pro-Peking Domini-
can Popular Movement (MPD) has plans for terrorist activity
and an elementary form of guerrilla warfare in the country-
side. Elements of the divided pro-Castro 14th of June
Group will probably join the MPD. They may, however, con-
serve the bulk of their resources until the IAPF has left.
Because these groups lack support among the traditionally
conservative peasantry, Dominican security forces could
probably limit such insurgent activity so that it would not
be a major threat. If, however, harsh repressive measures
are indiscriminately employed and the economic situation re-
mains stagnant, the extremists might gain significant non-
Communist support.
16. The outlook for political stability will change
drastically when the IAPF leaves the Dominican Republic.
The provisional government will be under increasing domestic
pressure to effect the IAPF's departure in the next few
months. In the meantime, the extreme left can be counted
on to creat incidents to embarrass the provisional govern-
ment over the IAPF presence. Even moderate politicians
will use the presence of the IAPF as a campaign issue. The
demonstrations of 27 September over IAPF occupation of school
buildings were the first of such incidents. Bosch has
already indicated that the IAPF presence will be a major
campaign issue and has called for strikes to bring about
its withdrawal. Even relatively conservative Joaquin
Balaguer has said the continued IAPF presence offend, na-
tional "sovereignty."
17. If the provisional government were to ask for the
IAPF's removal it would be difficult for Latin American
nations in the OAS, many of them still sensitive over the
US intervention, to fail to comply. Garcia Godoy might
exploit such a request in order to win popular backing.
He has already displayed a sensitivity over the OAS resolution
calling for joint OAS-provisional government determination
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somestic
of the date of IAPF withdrawals. He has
politics demand a statement that the provisional go
would prefer to make the decision on withdrawal. In a
recent interview with a Mexican magazine, Garcia Godoy
reportedly said that he hopes the IAPF will leave "soon"
and that the election campaign should be conducted without
the presence of foreign troops.
18. Until some decision is reached on the IAPF, the
paramount problem relating to security and stability will
be the conduct of the provisional government. The present
trend is toward further concessions to the rebels. Garcia
Godoy clearly is reluctant to resort to any action that
might entail use of force. He is suspicious and dis-
trustful of the military and unwilling to become dependent
on them for fear of seriously compromising his political
future. This leaves him no alternative but to solicit
voluntary cooperation from the left, an almost hopeless
task, and the formulation of policies calculated to develop
popular support.
19. Unless the provisional regime makes an effective
effort to resolve the bitter enmity existing between the
contending factions, longer term political stability is
unlikely. Neither side is presently reconciled to accept
the results of elections if the other wins and both are
bent on insuring that the "suspended revolution" reaches
a conclusion.
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29 September 1965
OCI No. 2328/65
Copy No, 83
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PROSPECTS FOR
STABILITY--A BALANCE SHEET
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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