RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE: BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000800020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT : Rhodesian Independence: Background and Consequences
Summar -
1. The :Rhodesian Government appears to be forcing an
early showdown with Britain on the long-disputed issue of
Rhodesian independence. Prime Minister Ian Smith's cabinet
is determined to achieve independence from the UX under the
present constitution, which would prolong white rule in
Rhodesia indefinitely. The UK is committed to refusing in-
dependence until definite provision is made for eventual
African majority yule. Smith is scheduled to meet with Prime
Minister Harold Wilson in London on 7 October, and has wade
it clear that these talks must determine whether Rhodesia will
achieve negotiated independence or declare it unilaterally.
Smith is to arrive in London on 4 October to hold preliminary
meetings with Commonwealth Relations officials; three of his
cabinet; ministers are already in London and another will,
accompany him next week. Although Wilson will attempt to
deter Smith from a unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI) by spelling out political and economic sanctions which
the UX would take against a rebellious .hodesia, British
officials are pessimistic and believe that 'Rhodesia will. de-
clare its independence before the end of October.
Background
2. ' thodesia has complete internal self-government, with
its own legislature, army, air force, and police, all of
which are firmly controlled by approximately 225,000 whites--
outnuribered by the African population of almost 4 million.
Although nominally a British colony, Rhodesia ha.s never been
governed directly from London. It was colonized, developed,
and administered by Cecil Rhodes' British South African
Company until 1923, when the white settlers chose to form a.
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self-governing colony--then Southern Rhodesia--under the
British Crown. Although Britain retained the right to
intervene in the colony's affairs, particularly over legisla-
tion affecting Africans, this power was never exercised. In
1953, largely at the insistence of Rhodesian whites, the UK
agreed to federate Southern '::ihodesia and the two British
protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Although
the Federation was an economic success, it failed because of
fierce opposition from the Africans, particularly in the two
protectorates, who believed that they would never rule them-
selves within the white-dominated federal structure. It was
formally dissolved in 1963, following which Nyasaland and
Northern ihodesi2. became independent as Malawi and Zambia,
with African-run governments.
4. Since then, the white electorate of Rhodesia has
become obsessed with tche necessity of achieving its own in-
dependence and of preserving white control indefinitely. Al-
though the Rhodesian Constitution of 1961 provides for some
African representation in the Legislative Assembly--at most
15 out of 65 seats--the Africans have no effective voice in
.ihodesian politics. Successive nationalist parties have been
outlawed and their leaders placed in restriction or forced
to flee into exile. A battery of security laws makes it
extremely difficult for the nationalists to organize.
Rhodesia has never officially expressed a desire to follow
the extreme apartheid racial policies of its neighbor, the
Republic of South Africa, although a vocal minority has pro-
posed policies akin to apartheid. Nevertheless, whenever
the white electorate has suspected its government of making
concessions to the Africans, that government has fallen and
been replaced by leadership even more firmly determined to
maintain the white Rhodesian "way of life" under an independent
government.
4. The electorate's determination 'to achieve independence
under a white-dominated government has pressed Smith into his
present confrontation with the British. Smith became Prime
Minister in 1964 when his ruling Rhodesia Front party removed
from office a man whom its militant majority felt was moving
too slowly toward independence. Smith is undoubtedly well
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aware that the same fate could befall him. He has promised
the voters--who gave 'aim overwhelming support in elections
last May--that he would achieve independence. He has often
threatened to declare independence unilaterally and appar-
ently backed away from this drastic action last year only
because of the threat of UK sanctions and dire warnings from
the At.hodesian business community of what those sanctions
would mean. Instead, he followed the course of negotiating
a gradual independence from the Ui . With the past month,
however, pressure from within the Rhodesia Front party and
from the white electorate has risen to an all-time high, and
Smith appears to have decided that it will be politically
impossible to delay the acquisition of independence any
longer.
'. The UK, under severe pressure from non-white members
of the Commonwealth to hold a firm line with Smith, continues
to refuse independence unless provision is made for eventual
uiaa; ority rule. For over two years both Tory and Labor govern-
mmierits has attempted to avoid a showdown and Wilson will un-
doubtedly attempt to frighten m i.th into backing off in their
u 7comi.n al_'? s. British of 'icials fear that Wilson will. fail,
: owe /e ', and the UK will be : aced with the need to cart', 0u.1.t
is ihrea+tr and i-,';?poise soue sanctions.
rit;isiz Policy
London has done little to specify, either. publicly
or privatel , wha actions it v uld take. Probably few de-
.d
isions have been taken. Arms e--ports to _11.hodesic. would be
banned; Britain's limited economic aid would cease; %lhodesia
probably would be excluded 3rem the London money nar et and
lose trade preferences. More serious measures being con-
templated include a ban on imports of "Ihodesia sugar and
i o'Qacco--the key item- in Rhodesia's trade with Britain, a
co-tip ehensive trade embargo, the blocking ng of ~ 3hodesian sterling
assets, and the exclusion of :1hodesia from the sterling area.
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7. However, harsh economic measures would create
economic and political difficulties for Britain. Loss of
Rhodesia trade would damage Britain's precarious balance
of payments--the UK has a payments surplus with Rhodesia.
London fears that the Smith government might retaliate by
striking at vulnerable Zambia. Quite aside from British
feelings of responsibility for Zambian welfare, Britain im-
ports about 50 percent of its copper from Zambia, and it
has been estimated that loss of these supplies could throw
some 10,000 Britons out of work. The Labor Government,
with a 3-vote margin in Parliament, is uncertain of support
from its voters--many of whom have personal and family ties
with white .hodesians--in taking severe measures.
8. On the other hand, failure to react vigorously to a
UDI could bring withdrawal of at least some non-white members
of the Commonwealth--destroying the Commonwealth in its
present form, and jeopardize what remains of British influ-
ence in the rest of Africa and Asia. British officials also
fear that failure to react could cause anti-British, and
even general anti-Western, demonstrations in some African
states.
9. Diplomatically, the UK would exert all of the pressure
at its command, and would probably call on other Commonwealth
and NATO allies to do likewise. London would announce the
dismissal of Smith, stop all dealings with the Rhodesian
government, withdraw the bulk of its staff in Salisbury, and
appeal to Rhodesian citizens to remain loyal to the Queen.
Military action against Rhodesia has been emphatically ruled
out, and UK officials are warning African Commonwealth mem-
bers against participating in other paramilitary operations.
10. Only severe and sustained economic reprisals by
Britain and other Commonwealth countries would seriously damage
an independent -Rhodesia. Its economy is well-developed and
diversified. A broad program of economic sanctions would
cause confusion and a general slowdown, however. One problem
would be finding new markets to compensate for the 31 percent
of foreign earnings derived from tobacco sales, if Britain
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bars tobacco. Loss of access to the London .,honey market
would exacerbate ex .stiing~ problems of obtaining private
foreign investment but South African facilities would help
fill the gap. African laborers in the cash economy would
probably be the first ,o feel any cutbacks, and Smith might
consider repatriating the 45, 300 Zambians employed in
_111 udesia. In the unlikely event of a total embargo imposed
byT the entire Commonwealth and other Western nations for a
year or more, the pinch would become severe.
11. Although the African nationalists have threatened
massive uprisings in the event of UDI, internal security
problems would probably be . minimal. While some sporadic
violence and sabotage .iii ght Occur) all top African nation-
alist leaders have been interned by the government, the two
main African political parties are in e;:ile and have been
wrani ling anions cher::nseI've s, and the African population within
Rhodesia is generally cored. Most observers are convinced
L.
at: the _.ihhocesi an security forces can and will maintain in-
security. ;Smith has reshuffled some of his 'op
security officials to ensure -their loyalty to his government.
i hodesia has a 333 man army (including 1, 001 Africans) ,
and an 300 man (all-white) air force with Z2 jets and 17
propellor aircraft. In addition there is a police force of
-,100 (including 1,501 whites). An active white reserve
ground element o : s, 110-3,OJO ould be called up on short
notice. To date the African members of the army and police
have followed orders from their white superiors, even when
directed to take action against fellow Africans.
12. Prime 1.,11.nister Smith has been developing closer
ties with white-dominated neighbors, the a:epublic
of South Africa and the Portuguese territo-.1-JiLes. of Angola and
ruzambigiue, and would hope for their support in the event of
a UDI. In the ;east year, hodesia leas signed trade agreements
with South Africa and Portugal, high-level visits exchanged
among the three governments have been frequent, and i.nt-elli-
genlce liaison has g.-i.-own closer. :3hodesia recently established
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an independent representative in Lisbon, over the violent
objections of the UK, and already has representatives in
Mozambique and South Africa. Both governments would prob-
ably give Smith some diplomatic support, and South Africa
could probably be counted on for economic assistance, and
an alternative money market. In the unlikely event of an
African invasion of Rhodesia, or widespread subversive efforts,
South Africa has implied that military assistance would be
available, according to a high Rhodesian official. Both
Portugal and South Africa, however, have troubles of their
own which would limit the amount of help they could provide.
Other Repercussions
13. A UDI would place Zambia's moderate President
Kenneth Kaunda in a deep dilemma. The breakup of the
Federation left Zambia with close economic ties to its
southern neighbor. Zambia's copper industry, for example,
which generates an export income of about $415 million
annually and. accounts for almost half of Zambia's gross
domestic product, depends almost exclusively on coal and
electric power from Rhodesia, as well as on the rail routes
through Rhodesia to the Indian Ocean. Although the Portuguese
may permit Zambia more extensive use of the Benguela Railroad
through Angola to the port of Lobito, which might partially
replace the Rhodesian routes, this has not been decided.
14. Kaunda has followed a policy of restraining the
militant Rhodesian nationalists who have taken refuge in
Zambia. UDI would put him under severe pressure from domestic
and external African sources to sponsor a Yhodesian nationalist
government-in-exile and to permit the use of Zambia as the
prime staging area for paramilitary operations against
Rhodesia. Kaunda's latest responses to the mounting UDI
threat indicate that he will ostensibly support collective
action measures proposed by the Commonwealth, the OAU, or the
United Nations, but will attempt, insofar-as is politically
possible, to avoid any concrete measures which might provoke
crippling economic reprisals from Rhodesia. Smith would prefer
to avoid taking reprisals which, for his part, probably could
disrupt R'hodesia's valuable trade with Zambia.
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15. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) might
respond to UDI by pulling out all the verbal stops--a
special conference and angry resolutions calling for
recognition of a Rhodesian nationalist government-in-exile
and support for a war of liberation. (An OAU summit
meeting is already scheduled for 21 October) In May, the
OAU's African Liberation Committee reportedly adopted
secret recommendations to the OAU that all members be
asked to contribute arms and troops for joint intervention
in the event of a UDI; that Zambia be asked to accommodate
the OAU task force; and that Zambia meanwhile be asked to
accommodate irregular freedom fighters. Actual implementa-
tion of such a plan would be impossible unless Zambia agreed.
Even if Kaunda were forced to agree, or were overthrown in
the chaos, the limited finances and organizational abilities
of the OAU would make such paramilitary operations of only
limited effectiveness against superior Rhodesian security
forces. The ALC's recommendations reflect the fiery attitude
of such states as Tanzania, safely beyond the range of
feasible retaliation by white Rhodesia.
16. The United Nations majority would respond to a UDI
with expressions of strong disapproval, and might pass
resolutions calling for specific sanctions such as an arms
embargo. There would probably be some pressure from radical
African and Communist states for military intervention, but
General Assembly or Security Council approval of such action
is unlikely. The Security Council last May called on the UK
to deny independence to Rhodesia under white rule, a resolu-
tion on which the United States as well as the UK abstained.
A divergence of views between the UK and African Commonwealth
members would raise a dilemma for the United States in the UN.
US Policy and Interest
17. US policy on i.liodesia, which was reaffirmed by
Assistant Secretary Williams last week, is essentially to
let Britain take the lead, using its own limited leverage
to buttress British efforts to find a peaceful solution which
is based on a clear prospect of early majority rule. The US
is investigating the possibility of joint economic sanctions
with the UK. The US has turned down some Rhodesian requests
for military equipment, and it has been made clear to Smith
that we would not recognize a UDI.
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n,
13
US investment in :`'hode sip totals about $53 million,
much of which is concentrated in chrome and copper mining.
hodesia is the largest supplier of chrome to the US, and
American companies control most of the chrome production.
Considerable US capital is also invested in tobacco marketing,
and a wide variety of other US companies have :hodesian sub-
sidiaries. The American community numbers about 2,000.
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