ZAMBIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A003200190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1966
• Content Type: CH

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
August 1966
OCI No. 1884/66
Copy N2 323
Current Intelligence Country Handbook
ZAMBIA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
E.cluded from a.16-lie
downgrading and
declouification
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Current Intelligence Country Handbooks are designed to give the
reader ready access to the salient facts about a country and its main
current problems. They are not intended to provide comprehensive
basic intelligence on a country or to speak with the authority of
coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the
best available to the Office of Current Intelligence as of the date at
the top of the page.
This material contains information affecting the national defense
of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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August 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
1. Political
Zambian politics is an extension of the nationalist movement which
won independence from Great Britain in 1964. President Kenneth
Kaunda's skill in handling the divisive elements within the movement's
political vehicle, the United National Independence Party (UNIP),
has resulted in UNIP's continued dominance of the national scene.
Kaunda has maintained a consensus among the Zambian leadership
largely predicated on an intricate balance of tribal and regional inter-
ests and on early massive national development to provide Zambians
with the social and economic benefits which they feel should accom-
pany political independence.
Zambia's economic viability has enabled the country to institute a
development program which is impressive by African standards and
has helped restrict popular dissatisfaction. The principal stumbling
block is the lack of an educated or skilled indigenous labor force to
staff the government, the economy, or the social services with the
requisite manpower. Consequently, Zambia is dependent on a small
number (less than two percent of the country's population) of white
expatriates, most of whom work in Zambia under short-term contracts.
To retain the whites, Zambia must offer high financial inducements.
Many Zambians find racial wage disparities grating and campaign
vigorously for their elimination. The government also has had to
contend with widespread demands by the mass of unemployed and
unskilled semi-literate Africans of the cities and the industrialized
Copperbelt region for "Zambianization," or replacement of the whites.
In the vanguard of the discontent are Zambia's second echelon and
local leadership, often UNIP members, who wish to further their own
political careers or who are unable to understand the complexities of
compromise which the progress of the entire country entails.
Zambia's dependence on expatriate white personnel for years to
come is also a source of strong racial tension. Not only is the presence
of white expatriates in virtually all the "best" positions in Zambia
blatantly obvious to Africans, but most of the whites, although termed
"Europeans," come from white-dominated social structures in pre-
independent Zambia, South Africa, and Rhodesia. They maintain
strong ties with their southern neighbors.
Rhodesia's declaration of independence has complicated Zambian
politics. Pan-African feelings are strong among Zambians, and they
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM I
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM August 1966
toward their southern neighbor as a result
of past politica ties, especially the white, Salisbury-dominated Rho-
desian Federation (1952-63) which increased Zambia's economic
dependence on Rhodesia. However, the fact of Zambia's economic
dependence on white southern Africa and on sympathizers of the
Smith regime has dictated a relatively - moderate Zambian policy on
Rhodesia.
Tribal and regional jockeying also strains national unity. However,
the significance of lacalized interests is largely undercut by the pres-
ence of many regional leaders in the national superstructure, where
they support national policies. Furthermore, none has sufficient po-
litical or military power to threaten seriously the present government
individually, and they are too introversive to have attempted to form
a united position aimed against the central government.
As domestic pressures have obstructed national progress, the central
government has tended to extend government or UNIT' authority to
control them. To date it has avoided militant pressures for a one-
party state and other measures which would transform UNIP into the
monolithic national arbiter. However, a hesitancy to tighten UNIP
discipline has led Zambia's leadership to accept occasional heavy-
handed policies in individual cases. For example, it has attempted
to supplant the established leaders of a strong labor union with party
stalwarts, which has frustrated rather than helped attempts to achieve
national cohesion.
To defend against internal disturbances, the government relies on
the apolitical police force and its supporting units, the army and air
force. They are capable of carrying out their mission and the govern-
ment is sensitive to their needs. For historical reasons the police has
been able to have most of its European personnel replaced with rea-
sonably competent Zambians, and adequate pay, housing, and other
material benefits have limited other sources of disconti'nt.
2. Economic
The modern sector of Zambia's economy is booming. The monetary
gross domestic product for 1964 was $613.8 million, an increase of 18
percent over 1963, while Zambia's favorable trade balance for 1964 was
$250.7 million. However, the entire modern sector of the economy
depends on the copper industry, with mines and smelters concentrated
in the Copperbelt, a small area along the Congo border. Zambia's cop-
25X6
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August 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
per production-third highest in the world-accounts for over 90 per-
cent of Zambia's export earnings and almost half of the GDP. Thus
Zambia is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world copper market.
It is also dependent on continuing relations with white-controlled Rho-
desia because most of the electric power and coal required for copper
production comes from Rhodesia, and almost all of Zambia's exports
and imports have passed over Rhodesian railroads.
The economy is lopsided, however. Only 8 percent of the indige-
nous population are wage-earners; most Zambians remain in the rural
subsistence economy and live under primitive conditions. Further-
more, the African wage-earners earn far less than the white wage-
earners. In 1964 the overage of African wages ($600) was only one-
eighth of the average for the 32,000 white wage-earners. The dis-
crepency is due primarily to differences in skills and education, but
expatriates also receive higher wages than Africans holding com-
parable positions.
Zambia's Transitional Development Plan, running from January 1965
to July 1966, aimed to double the moderate rate of developmental
spending ($2.8 million per month) which had been reached under Brit-
ish administration. Most of the developmental investment ($98 mil-
lion) is to be distributed about evenly among four sectors: 1) transport,
communications, and power; 2) agriculture and national resources; 3)
housing and local government services; and 4) education and technical
training. Although the plan was conservative from a fiscal standpoint,
being financed mostly from Zambian resources, actual implementation
has lagged almost 25 percent below targets, primarily because of the
lack of skilled manpower. Current political trends, intensified by the
confrontation with the white regime in Rhodesdia, are pushing the
government toward projects which offer hope of early release from
dependence on the white regimes of southern Africa. The vaguely
projected "Tanzam rail link," intended to provide a new outlet on the
Indian Ocean by connecting the present Zambian and Tanzanian rail
systems, has become a particular political "must" for both Kaunda and
President Nyerere of Tanzania, although its economic feasibility is
uncertain. Other priority projects are road networks through black-
ruled Africa, the exploration of rich but undefined coal deposits, and a
large hydroelectric scheme.
3. International Relations
Zambia's international importance derives from its pivotal position
on the frontier between the independent African states and white.-
ruled southern Africa. President Kaunda, determined to maintain
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Zambia - 3
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM August 1966
substantial economic ties with the white regimes, hopes he can assert
a moderating influence among militant African nationalists who seek
to liberate southern Africa. He may not in the long run withstand
internal and external pressures to permit the use of Zambia as the
primary staging area for subversive operations against the white re-
gimes. These pressures include: the anti-colonial tradition of the
UNIP, frequently evoked by Kaunda's rivals within the party; the need
to go along with the OAU, which assists the freedom fighters through
its African Liberation Committee; the refugee nationalists from all
the white-ruled territories of Southern Africa, who congregate in
Lusaka and mend their own fences among Zambian politicians; and
five Communist embassies newly established in Lusaka, where they
can cultivate the refugee leaders as well as Kaunda's domestic rivals.
Zambia's primary and most immediate foreign policy problem is
Rhodesia's drive to gain full independence from Britain on the basis
of white supremacy. Zambia has sought to press Britain for a solu-
tion by military force or mandatory economic sanctions under United
Nations aegis, but has avoided unilateral measures against Rhodesia
that would risk retaliation crippling to Zambia's economy. Concur-
rently, Zambia is attempting to develop transport routes through inde-
pendent African countries, which would reduce dependence on Rho-
desia and permit greater Zambian freedom of action, perhaps involv-
ing support for Rhodesian insurgents.
Kaunda looks to neighboring African states, and particularly to
Tanzania, for support. With the goal of disengagement from Rho-
desian ties in mind, Zambia has expanded the primary attention of its
foreign policies towards black Africa from East Africa to include the
Congo (Kinshasa) and Malawi. Improved relations with these two
countries has been abetted by their own desires to improve pan-
African images.
Zambian relations with Portugal and South Africa are correct but
diplomatic representatives are not exchanged. Zambia's policy to-
ward the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola and South
Africa have the same ultimate objective of disengagement as its Rho-
desian policy. However, for several years many of Zambia's trade
needs and substitutes for Rhodesian goods and services must be found
in the other white-ruled African entities, particularly Mozambique's
and Angola's transport facilities..
On the world scene, Zambia wishes to avoid involvement in inter-
national crosscurrents that do not directly affect Zambia. It follows
a policy of non-alignment and strong support for the United Nations
and other international bodies to settle disputes. Relations are main-
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August 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
tained with Communist countries-the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and Poland-but, principally because of a wariness of Com-
munist intentions, diplomatic activity in Zambia is under strict con-
trol. Zambia looks to moderate foreign countries to supply vitally
needed skilled manpower, preferring the less-powerful states in the
Commonwealth and Europe. For large needs, Zambia turns to the
United Kingdom and to a lesser extent the US.
4. Subversion
The known opposition movements in Zambia are so localized and
ineffective that they are unlikely to overthrow the present constitu-
tional government. The most serious challenge is posed by various
elements within the cabinet, the UNIP, and the labor movement who
seek to subvert Kaunda's constructive policies by inflaming the anti-
white and anti-colonial sentiments among the Zambian people and by
stirring up popular dissatisfaction with the rate of material and social
progress since independence. Although no Zambian openly espouses
Communism, at least 150 have received academic or technical train-
ing in Communist countries since 1960. The five Communist em-
bassies in Lusaka are making. circumspect but persistent efforts to
cultivate the Zambian elite as well as the refugee nationalists from the
white-ruled territories of southern Africa.
The Zambian Government has issued tight regulations on. the con-
duct of foreign diplomats and representatives of foreign refugee or-
ganizations, restricting them to Lusaka and generally curtailing their
political activities.
Internal security problems are also posed by tribal and other primi-
tivistic movements, which continuously impede modernization through
passive resistance and occasional violence. The Lumpa Church, com-
prising a volatile mixture of Christianity and indigenous animism, pro-
voked a wave of terrorism in the Northern and Eastern Provinces dur-
ing the summer of 1964 which took over 700 lives. Prophetess Alice
Lenshina and other leaders remain under indefinite detention. Local
obstructionism by the African National Congress in the Sounthern
Province is goading the authorities toward repressive measures which
might transform an ineffective legal party into a spearhead for a Tonga
tribal uprising.
Chronology of Key Events
1889 British South Africa Company (BSAC) granted a royal charter
"to promote trade, commerce, civilization, and good gov-
ernment."
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Zambia -- 5
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM August 1966
1924 British Government assumes full administrative responsi-
bili
ty for the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, with
BSAC retaining mineral rights obtained ? hrough previous
treaties with indigenous rulers.
1953 Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia included in the Federa-
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
1960 Formation of the presently dominant United National In-
dependence Party? (UNIP) with Kenneth Kaunda as party
president.
1962 Elections under a transitional constitution results in the
first African majorities in both Legislative and Executive
Councils.
1963 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolved.
1964 (January) First general election under a cons? itution granting
universal adult suffrage and full internal self-government
results in a large legislative majority for (?NIP; Kenneth
Kaunda becomes first Prime Minister.
(October) Republic of Zambia becomes a fully independent
member of the Commonwealth; Kaunda is inaugurated
President following an unopposed election.
Selected Factual Data
LAND (U)
288,000 sq. mi.; (of which less than 57c under cultivation), 10 7.,
grazing, 13% dense forest, 6% marsh, 61% scattered trees and
grassland
PEOPLE (U)
Population: 3.8 million; males 15-49, 888,000; 450,000 fit for military
service
Ethnic Divisions: 97.9% African, 1.9% European, .2% other
Religion: 80% animist, about 20% Christian and under 1 % Hindu
and Muslim
Language: English official; wide variety of indigenous languages
Literacy: 15-20 %
Labor force: 304,000 wage-earners; 269,000 Africans, 32,000 non-
Africans; 18% mining, 107o agriculture, 10% domestic service,
15% construction, 8% commerce, 117o manufactw ing, 277o mis-
cellaneous services
Organized labor: a majority of industrial wage-earners are unionized
GOVERNMENT (U)
Capital: Lusaka
Regional breakdown: 8 provinces
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Type: independent republic since Oct. 1964; formerly a British
protectorate
Organization: modified presidential system; unicameral legislature;
judicial system, a mixture of western and tribal law
Government leader: President Kenneth Kaunda
Suffrage: universal adult
Elections, last election (Jan. 1964)
Political parties and leaders: United National Independence Party
(UNIP), Kenneth Kaunda; African National Congress (ANC);
Harry Nkumbula; National Progress Party (NPP), John Roberts
Voting strength (1964 election): UNIP had 69?4; of vote, but 24 of
its candidates were unopposed; strength probably would have
been about 80% if these seats had been contested
Communists: no Communist party, but sympathizers of socialism in
upper levels of government, UNIP, and labor unions
ECONOMY (U)
GDP: $671 million (1964), about $190 per capita
Agriculture: corn, tobacco, cotton, peanuts, cattle; net importer of
every major agricultural product except corn
Major industries: copper mining and processing
Electric power: 966 mw. capacity (1964) including 705 mw. Kariba
power station, jointly owned with Rhodesia: 2.9 billion kw.-hr:
consumed (1965)
Exports: $470 million (1964); copper, zinc; tobacco, lead, cobalt
Imports: $219 million (1964); consumer goods, machinery, transport
equipment, foodstuffs, fuels
Trade: single tariff schedule; major partners-U.K., Rhodesia, South
Africa, Japan, Western Europe
Aid: U.K. provided $21 million (1964) and has promised additional
long-term development loans; IBRD loans $67. million (1960-65);
$1.9 million from U.S. (FY 1964 and 1965)
Exchange rate: I Zambia pound = US$2.80 (official) .
Fiscal year: 1 July-30 June
COMMUNICATIONS (Confidential)
Railroads: about 840 mi., all narrow gage (3'6"); 8 mi. double
tracked; 640 mi. are owned jointly with Rhodesia Railways; 200
mi. privately owned
Highways: 21,217 mi.; 817 mi. paved, 3,124 mi. crushed stone, gravel,
or stabilized soil, 17,276 mi, improved and unimproved earth
Inland waterways: 1,409 mi. on Zambezi River, Luapula River, Lake
Kariba, Lake Banguaulu; principal port on Lake Tanganyika is
Mpulungu
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Zambia - 7
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM August 1966
Civil air: no major transport aircraft; Zambia Airways operates 2
major transports registered in Rhodesia
Airfields: 83. total, 64 usable; 4 with permanent surface runways; 19
with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.
Telecommunications: all services being expanded and modernized;
presently adequate; high capacity wire and radio relay links con-
nect centers of Kitwe in northern mining region ind Lusaka along
axial north-south route; 1 TV and 5 AM stations; '31,000 telephones
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are relevant:
NIS Area 57 (Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi)
Sec 20 Introduction-Military
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions
Sec 23 Weather and Climate
Sec 24 Topography
Sec 25 Urban Areas
Sec 30 Introduction-Transportation & Telecommunications
Sec 31 Railway
Sec 32 Highway
Sec 38 Telecommunications
Sec 45 Health and Sanitation
Sec 62 Fuels and Power
Sec 63 Minerals and Metals
Sec 91-94 Map and Chart Appraisal
Gazetteer
Map
The best available general reference map is: Surveyor-General's
Department; The Republic of Zambia; 1:2,000,000; 1964
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