MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000800360001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 30, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000800360001-5
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0664/75
April 30, 1975
135
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No Foreign Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
North Yemen: Hamdi Strengthens Grip
on the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
India-Bangladesh: Agreement on
Ganges Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Hamdi Strengthens Grip on the Army
Colonel Ibrahim Hamdi, head of the ruling
command council and commander-in-chief of the
North Yemeni army, took effective control of all
key military units on April 27 when he relieved,
without incident, two important army officers of
their commands. The dismissed officers are relatives
of Sinan Abu Luhum, an opportunistic tribal leader
who has ties with North Yemeni leftists and report-
edly also has Iraqi backing.
Abu Luhum has been maneuvering in recent months
to exacerbate the strained relations between the
moderate Hamdi and the conservative Sheikh Abdallah
al-Ahmar, the country's most powerful tribal leader
and head of the Consultative Assembly. North Yemeni
leftists anticipate they would be able to pick up
the pieces should a donnybrook occur between mod-
erates and rightists. In that event, the leftists
would probably install former prime minister Muhsin
al-Ayni in power.
Unless he was involved in Hamdi's decision to
remove the Abu Luhum brothers, al-Ahmar may read
their dismissal as Hamdi's way of eliminating the
threat from his left before moving to a showdown
with traditionalist forces. We have no evidence
that this is Hamdi's intention; several of his top-
level supporters have told US officials recently,
however, that they fear such a showdown in the next
several months.
Al-Ahmar has been applying heavy pressure on
Hamdi this spring to bring to a speedy conclusion
the so-called "transitional period" of military rule
that began in mid-June 1974 and to return government
to civilian hands. Al-Ahmar anticipates that new
assembly elections would result in a larger role for
tribal conservatives. Until recently Hamdi and his
(Continued)
Apr 30, 1975 1
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military and civilian supporters--who consider al-
Ahmar and other locally-oriented sheikhs as drags
on modernization--favored a delay until at least
late this year.
After a three-day meeting with al-Ahmar in
early April, however, Hamdi and the command council
agreed that military rule would end on June 13 and
that assembly elections would take place immediately--
providing that the Consultative Assembly has drafted
a constitutional amendment acceptable to the command
council concerning the form of the country's executive
authority. We are not certain what Hamdi wants, but
we believe he favors a presidential system,. rather
than the cumbersome collegial executive provided for
in the current constitution. Hamdi also probably
favors reducing the age requirement; the constitution
now provides that members of the Republican Council--
the collegial executive--must be at least 40 years
old. Hamdi is in his late 30s. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
Apr 30, 1975
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India-Bangladesh
Agreement on Ganges Water
India
and
Bangladesh have come to an interim
agreement
for
sharing water from the Ganges River.
It should
help
ease recently growing tensions between
Dacca and
its
closest ally.
The agreement allows India to operate its $200-
million Farakka barrage on a trial basis through May,
the last half of the area's dry season. The Indians
agreed, however, to limit their diversion of water to
16,000 cubic feet per second or less. The system's
maximum diversion capability is 40,000 cubic feet
per second; the river flows at an average rate of
about 55,000 cubic feet per second at this time of
year. During the trial period, water flows will be
closely monitored by joint teams whose observations
will be used in future negotiations.
As a result of the agreement, the economic damage
that Bangladesh will suffer because of the dam will
be limited over the short run. Enough water will be
available for areas of the country irrigated from the
Ganges, although additional silting may hamper opera-
tions of the already troubled $132-million Ganges-
Kobadak irrigation project.
In the long run, however, repeated dry season
diversions of even minimal amounts of Ganges water
from Bangladesh would limit the potential for expand-
ing surface water irrigation in Bangladesh. A perma-
nent reduction of the Ganges flow would also increase
salt water intrusion, complicating numerous coastal
agriculture projects and the major Chandpur irrigation
scheme. In abnormally dry years, Indian diversion would
leave a large stretch of the Ganges. in Bangladesh un-
navigable even by the small boats engaged in river
commerce. Likely additional Ganges use by Indian irri-
(Continued)
Apr 30, 1975
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gation projects upstream from the barrage would
worsen the impact of Indian withdrawals at Farakka.
Diversion during the low-water season was the
most controversial issue in the protracted negotiations,
and the concessions the Indians made for the trial
period do not necessarily presage the terms of a
permanent agreement. For New Delhi, the Farakka
barrage represents, among other things, hope for res-
toration of Calcutta, the principal port and urban
center for eastern India. Besides helping to expand
operations at theport, the barrage is supposed to ease
Calcutta's acute water shortage,.which has hampered
industrial production and worsened health problems.
Although the Indians of course want to maximize
the returns they have counted on from their investment
in the dam, their desire to retain the friendship of
Bangladesh constrains them from pushing their case
with Dacca quite as hard as they had in negotiations
with Pakistan before the 1971 war. Moreover, New
Delhi is mindful that diversion of Ganges water would
violate the UN's Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, which India supported. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 30, 1975
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