MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000090002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOPOIN
(2ffl~T HOUE
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0871/75
October 20, 1975
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N OFORN/NO CONTRACT
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Somalia: Prisoners Released . . . . . . . . . . 1
Kenya: Crackdown on Parliament
Increases Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pakistan: New Problem at Tarbela Dam . . . . . 4
Nepal: Currency Devalued . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Oct 20, 1975
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Somalia
President Siad has released nearly two hundred
prisoners in the past three weeks, some of whom
were prominent politicians in the previous Scnali
government. The releases are associated with the
ceremonies surrounding the sixth anniversary on
October 21. of the military seizure of power.
Among those freed were former prime minister
Mohammed Egal and several members of his civilian
cabinet who were ousted by Siad and his military
associates in October 1969. Egal reportedly }iad
been recently offered his freedom if he petitioned
Siad for forgiveness of alleged errors committed
against the Somali people.
Earlier this month, 52 radicals, arrested last
March on charges of plotting against the regime were
also released. Many of these individuals had worked
in Siad's own office of the presidency.
Siad said he was releasing the prisoners because
Somalia needed a united society in order to build
its socialist state. He offered to help those
pardoned to start a new life. Over half of those
released---many of whom reportedly were servinj
sentences for criminal offenses--will probably be
urged to join the agricultural and fishing cooperatives
Siad has :Launched.
1.)
According to the US embassy in Mogadiscio,
rumors circulating in the Somali capital suggest
that the pardoning of Egal and the other prominent
prisoners is a preliminary step prior to the
launching by the regime of its long-awaited political
party. The embassy tends to believe such speculation
is premature.
(Continued)
Oct 20, 1975
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Siad has been attempting to obtain financial
support from the Arab world and the West to bolster
his country's flagging economy. Within the past
week Vice-President Culmie has been pressing Arab
ambassadors in Mogadiscio to urge their governments
to come up with the $103 million in assistance they
pledged earlier this year. Siad may be hoping
that Egal's release--he had a reputation of being
pro-Western--will convince the more conservative
Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, that Siad is
moderating his strong socialist stance.
Somalia is still a tribally oriented society.
Although Egal and the others probably no longer
have any political clout, their release would
probably please their respective tribes and make
them more amenable to working with the government.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Oct 20, 1975
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 SECRET
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Kenya
Crackdown on Parliament Increases Tensions
President Kenyatta's arrest of two of his most
persistent parliamentary critics last week and his
_threat to arrest any other legislators who do not
support the government have increased political
tensions.
The two arrested deputies, J. M. Seroney and
Martin Shikuku, are established political figures
who have been outspoken advocates for Kenya's "have-
legislators is likely to increase popular cynicism
and weaken support for the government.
Seroney's detention may be politically damaging
to Vice President Daniel arap Moi, a fellow Kalenjin
tribesman. The Kalenjin, a group that makes up about
11 percent of the population, are likely to blame Moi
for not interceding with Kenyatta on Seroney's behalf.
A loss of support from his own tribe would further
diminish the somewhat tarnished political standing
of Moi.
There have been indications over the last few
months that Moi's influence with Kenyatta has slipped.
Last month, for example, Kenyatta deprived Moi of
administrative responsibility over the police. Moi
has been touted as a contender to succeed Kenyatta,
a member of the majority Kikuyu tribe, partly because
of his potential for obtaining support from non-
Kikuyu.
Kenyatta still appears to able to rely on the
loyalty of the police and the army. Junior officers,
however, are reported to have become more willing in
recent months to voice their discontent with political
events and the unwillingness of senior officers to do
anything about such developments. (SECRET NOFORN/
NOCONTRACT)
25X1A
Oct 20, 1975
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Pakistan
New Problem at TarbeZa Dam
New difficulties at the Tarbela Dam will
reduce the amount of water available for Pakistan's
winter wheat crop. The dam's stilling basins,
downstream from two tunnels discharging irrigation
water, have lost massive chunks of their concrete
flooring. This, in turn, has eroded the rock foun-
dations below the basins and forced the closing
of the irrigation tunnels. Repairs will not be
completed before May 1976.
Last year, construction defects necessitated
draining the dam's reservoir prior to the fall
planting. This new problem will limit the
volume of water available to irrigation to less
than one fifth of what the dam is designed to provide.
Despite the added damage at Tarbela, next
year's wheat harvest--now being planted--may not be
seriously affected. Current moisture conditions are
favorable and more fertilizer is available. The
target of 8.4 million tons--a 12 percent increase
over this year's harvest--may still be reached.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Oct 20, 1975
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Nepal
Currency Devalued
Nepal. recently devalued its currency by 15.5
percent relative to the dollar. The devaluation is
primarily a technical adjustment prompted by the
recent fall in the value of sterling. The exchange
rate against the Indian rupee, the main trading
ur:rency, remains unchanged. The new rate of 12.5
Nepalese rupees to the dollar is approximately
equivalent to the exchange rate for the Indian
rupee at present dollar-pound and pound-Indian
rupee exchange rates.
Katmandu may have timed the devaluation to
draw attention to the country's uneasy balance of
payments situation and so support its campaign for
inclusion in the United Nations list of countries
"most seriously affected" by international price
increases. Although one of the poorest countries
in the world, Nepal has not been so listed and thus
is not eligible for assistance from the Secretary
General's Special Account nor from other donors who
use the :List as a guide.
In the past, Nepal has not met the criteria for
listing because its foreign exchange reserves were
high and growing. This situation changed sharply
during the past fiscal year, partly due to higher
prices for imports of petroleum products and fertilizer
and partly because India, the cheapest source, would
not supply some key goods.
The prospect of a substantial balance of
payments deficit looms for the next several years.
As a result, Nepalese officials have been anxious
to improve their access to foreign aid. Their most
recent plea for most seriously affected status was
made during the foreign minister's address to the
UN General Assembly on October 7.
(Continued)
Oct 20, 1975 5
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The economic impact--as opposed to the political
objective--of the devaluation will be negligible,
because 85 percent of Nepal's foreign trade is
with India and only a small part of that is settled
in convertible currencies. The local cost of imports
from third countries will increase as will the rupee
value of earnings from tourism, investments, and
exports of jute goods. However, any increase in the
volume of exports for the next year or so will be
limited by Nepal's inability to increase production.
Increased revenue from tourism will also be limited
until planned hotel projects are complete. The
internal effect of the devaluation is probably some-
what inflationary but not seriously detrimental to
development. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Oct 20, 1975 6
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Secret
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