SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200230002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200230002-2
Top Secret
NOFORN
C~
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Top Secret
Handle via COMINT Channels
November 26, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
058(1), (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Data Impossible to Determine
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NOCONTRACT
CAUTION--PROPIN
RA002200230002-2
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
November 26, 1975
Soviet Concern Over Bangladesh . . . . . . . . 1
Czechoslovakia: Choosing Sides! . . . . . . . 3
First Signs of Delays at Soviet
Grain Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Food Shortages in Romania. . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Soviet Concern Over Bangladesh
The Soviets are concerned about the shaky in-
ternal situation in Bangladesh, particularly the
emergence of political forces they think sympathize
with Peking. The South Asian expert in the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yury Filipov, told an
American embassy officer last week that the internal
situation in Bangladesh had deteriorated significantly
since the release of political prisoners jailed under
former President Mujib. Filipov specifically pointed
to members of the National Socialist Party CJSD),
who he alleged are "very pro-Peking." He accused
the extreme leftists of the JSD of exacerbating
tensions in the army through the creation of'""revo-
lutionary committees." Despite his concern over the
"influence of Maoist elements," Filipov maintained
that the recent coups and countercoups were inspired
by "personal rivalries" and were not the result of
instigation by outside forces.
Filipov expressed concern about the fate of
Soviet specialists in Bangladesh. Moscow has
experienced some difficulty in contacting Soviet
nationals in the south. Several Soviet geologists
working in the area between Dacca and Chittagong
have not been heard from since November 8.
Filipov made positive comments about former
President Mushtaque who he said seemed to be
"operating behind the scenes" to overcome internal
chaos. Filipov speculated that Mushtaque would
very probably be heard from soon. The Soviet press
was muted on Mushtaque at the time of his takeover,
but clearly he is beginning to look better in compari-
son to other Bangladesh leaders.
Filipov also expressed dismay over the extent
of anti-Indian and anti-Soviet sentiments which have
surfaced during the troubles. He said Indian inter-
vention was not likely, but he would not be drawn
out on the question of whether India might intervene
November 26, 1975
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under such circumstances as a massive influx of
refugees.
Soviet reporting in recent weeks has implied
support for a more active Indian policy toward
Bangladesh. Pravda commentator Veniamin Shurgin
wrote Sunday that left-wing extremist groups have
stepped up their activities in promoting anti-Indian
and anti-Soviet feeling through the use of Maoist
slogans. He stated that if these forces were not
rebuffed, the "democratic gains" of Bangladesh would
be endangered. Izvestia also carried two articles
last week highly critical of the regime's failure to
halt the activities of right-wing clerical and
left-wing Maoist factions.
This coverage did not accord with India's own
more circumspect treatment of Bangladesh, but in
recent days New Delhi has been coming around to a
more negative view of events there.
Despite Moscow's strong propaganda line, of-
ficial Soviet policy has undergone little change
since the coups. Filipov stated that Moscow will
continue to trade with and provide some economic
assistance to Dacca, although he acknowledged that
these efforts. are insignificant in light of the
country's enormous problems. (SECRET NOFORN/NO-
CONTRACT)
25X1A
November 26, 1975
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Czechoslovakia: Choosing Sides!
The party daily Rude Pravo last Friday added
a new fillip to Prague's continuing attack on Maoism
by asserting that it is the duty of the entire commu-
nist movement to take sides against Peking.
Two signed commentaries set the tone of the
unusual full-page assault by describing Peking's
foreign policy as fomenting tensions and opposing
detente. The catalog of Chinese sins includes
breaking ranks with the revolutionary movement and
becoming a "factual ally of imperialism," thus
making the problem of Maoism the. "concern of all
peoples." The attack is punctuated with photos
of the Chinese ambassador in Santiago engaging in
friendly conversation with Chilean strong man Pinochet
and of Mao shaking hands with Franz-Josef Strauss.
The centerpiece of the article consists of
56 quotations from more than 50 communist parties,
all of which support the thesis that the anti-
Maoist controversy is not merely between the So-
viets and Chinese, but between the Chinese and the
entire communist movement. The leaders quoted
range from Brezhnev and Husak to an unidentified
representative of the Communist Party of Lesotho.
The attack came on the heels of the deadlocked
preparatory session of the European Communist
Party Conference (ECPC) and may have been intended
in part to isolate the more independent minded
participants. The Yugoslav, Romanian, Spanish,
San Marino, Swiss, Greek, Cypriot, and Irish. were
conspicuously absent from Rude Pravo's list. Their
insistence that anti-Chinese polemics have no place
at an ECPC has been one of the obstacles to con-
vening the conference. A quote from Italian party
leader Berlinguer is given pride of place, ap-
parently in order to give the impression that
November 26, 1975
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Italian communists have resolutely taken sides
against the Chinese. This, however, appears a gross
misrepresentation of the Italian party's- position,
and could well draw answering fire. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 26, 1975
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First Signs of Delays
at Soviet Grain Ports
The Soviets are beginning to experience delays
in handling grain imports.
up to one month delays in u ing grain at Lenin-
grad, Novorossiysk, and Riga. Less lengthy, but per-
sistent delays are occurring at other Black and Bal-
tic Sea grain ports. As Baltic operations slow down
with the onset of adverse weather, Black Sea port
congestion is likely to increase.
Given the magnitude of Soviet grain imports,
delays are inevitable. We still believe that these
problems are transitory--similar conditions existed
during 1973--and that the USSR will be able to handle
up to 36 million tons of imported grain annually, an
amount exceeding the foreign purchases probable for
this crop year.
The most important factors contributing to con-
gestion at Soviet ports are:
--Rail car shortages at dockside. The
Soviets have adequate numbers of rail
cars to move imported grain inland,
but management and scheduling problems
are causing delays. In addition, in-
adequate storage facilities, both at
ports and inland, aggravate the rail
car shortages.
--Labor shortages at the ports. At the
Black sea port of Poti, for example,
stevedore crews are divided between
ships, and, as a result, unloading
time is greatly increased.
The delays being encountered by individual ships
vary considerably mainly because the Soviets are at-
tempting to minimize their foreign exchange costs.
For example, US ships--which earn a higher demurrage
November 26, 1975
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fee after 30 days under the latest US-USSR working
agreement on grain shipments--are not encountering
serious unloading delays. Soviet ships are also
turned around expeditiously to conserve foreign ex-
change and meet plan commitments. On the other hand,
chartered third-flag ships are waiting as much as 30
days for discharge. Demurrage penalties or added
time chartering fees for these ships are currently
at low levels.
To reduce demurrage payment further, the Soviets
are liberally implementing a provision in the US-USSR
shipping agreement allowing for adverse weather. When
rain, squalls, or other adverse weather occurs, the
Soviets designate the affected port closed, although
actual discharging operations continue. This ploy
allows the Snv;ets added credit toward demurrage
payments.
25X1A
November 26, 1975
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Food Shortages in Romania
Although the regime has been generally successful
in its efforts to increase food supplies, major
shortages persist, particularly in areas hit by
the disastrous floods last July. Rumors of discon-
tent and in some cases violence are continuing to
make the rounds.
The following account from a resident of Cluj,
Romania's third largest city, is an example of reports
reaching the US embassy in Bucharest.
There is still almost no food available
in the market. More and -more people are
adopting life style of eating in canteens
rather than wasting time standing in lines
to buy high-priced, fourth-rate produce.
My friend knew of no recent public demon-
strations. He related a story about a riot
in a shopping center on the outskirts of
Cluj which occurred 3-4 weeks- ago. People
had been standing in line from 3:00 a.m.
to buy oil. When the store opened, at 7:00
a.m. the manager announced he had only 24
bottles available for sale. The crowd be-
came furious, surged into the store, and
started smashing up the premises. When
the manager began to fight back, the crowd
turned on him. He was rescued by the po-
lice and taken to a hospital. He died
four hours later. According to my friend
this event was covered in a local Cluj
newspaper.
A second outburst took place at another
housing development 48 hours later. Four
policemen, seriously injured, were carted
off to the hospital before the crowd could
be brought under control.
November 26, 1975
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Cluj is predominantly Hungarian, and its
residents have long claimed that Bucharest discrimi-
nates against them. Indeed, a frequent complaint
has been the lack of consumer goods and foodstuffs
compared to other parts of the country. This normal
discontent has undoubtedly heightened since the
floods. We still cannot confirm stories from other
areas of violence and death related to food short-
ages. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORNI
November 26, 1975
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