Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP81M00980R000100060018-6
Body:
Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP81 M00980R00010009, 018,-6._
OJ,C: 7(136 7/2
25 August 1978 '"'` . '`_
J`.3-F!', VIORAM)UM FOh,: Chief, Liaison and Oversight Control, Policy arid
Coordination Staff, ODO
Assistant Legislative Counsel
Senate Foreign Relations International Operations
(McGovern) Subcommittee Investigation of Foreign
Intelligence Activities in the United States
connection with its ongoing investigation of the activities of foreign intelli~'
gence services in the U.S. The Agency will certainly be asked to testify,
and I believe it would be wise for us to plan now for this eventuality.
1. I I Chairman George McGovern (1.). , S. Dak.) ha:> announced that
the International Operations Subcomi-nittee plans to hold hearings sho.rtl
2.1 As you know, we have consistently tried to impress upon
Subcommittee staffers Michael Glenno.n and John Hitch the fact that the
Agency is by statute and Executive Order specifically denied any domestic
police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. We have also
pointed out to the Subcommittee that its specific concern with alleged
harassment of U.S. residents by foreign intelligence services is
particularly the province of other Government departments.
3.Nevertheless, I believe that the Agency's witness at the
Subcom c. is hearings must be prepared to respond to the following
line of questioning:
--Recognizing the proscriptions on the Agency that exist
in the internal security field, is it not true that the
Agency sometimes develops information on foreign
intelligence activities in the U.S. through its sources
overseas, or becomes aware of such activities via
disseminations from the F131 and NSA? If so;
--Why doesn't the Agency use its influence with foreign
intelligence services with which it has liaison relation-
ships to put a stop to harassment of U.S. residents and
various other kinds of undesirable activities ? Are
there explicit or implicit understandings between the CIA
and these liaison services regarding unilateral operations
in one another's country? Does the Agency ever ask the
FBI not to take action regarding particular instances of
foreign intelligence service activity in the U.S. because
of such an understanding?
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--Is there it significant difference between the Agency's
attitude toward: (1) operations run by a foreign
intelligence service against a third country in the
U.S.; and (2) foreign intelligence service harasst-nent
of U.S. residents ? What does the Agency do when
it becomes aware of the first type of operation?
Does the Agency's attitude in such cases depend on
the countries involved?
4. LJ The answers to some of these questions overlap with the CIA
comments you drafted on the Senate Select Committee on.Intelligence
report entitled "Activities of 'Friendly' Foreign Intelligence Services
in the United States: A Case Study." (The recommendations and conclusions
section of this report were to have been discussed by the NSC/SCC sometime
after 15 July; has this meeting taken place?) The Subcommittee's concerns
also relate to ongoing negotiations with the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence regarding reporting to the Committee on the CIA's liaison
relationships. I believe the DDO should be thinking about the drafting
of testimony for a prospective Agency witness before the McGovern
Subcommittee that will be responsive to the line of questioning indicated
above
and in keeping with our views on disclosing the specifics of the
Agency's liaison relationships to the Legislative Branch. The McGovern
Subcommittee is focusing on activities in the U.S. by the intelligence
services of Iran, Chile, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia.
Distribution:
Original -- Addressee
I - OLC Subject
1 - O rono
OL.Cfinlg (28 August 1978)
Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP81M00980R000100060018-6