THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010074-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For.$elease 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79TO0826001600010074-7
Top Secret
LIG
G,1,TFD STATES OF
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
17 e ?uary 1967
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Q
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Information as of 1600
17 February 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
US and Communist forces are still engaged in stiff
fighting in PleikUr-Kontum provinces. A series of
clashes have taken place since 14 February in this
area.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Heavy contact is continuing between US an Communist,
forces in Pleiku-Kontum provinces (Paras. 1-3). The
successful South Vietnamese Operation DAN CHI 279
ended on 16 February with 331 Viet Cong reported killed
(Para. 4). Operation BIG SPRING, targeted against the
western edge of the Communists' War Zone "D," ended on
16 February (Para. 5). US Marine Operation CHINOOK
ended in northern Thua Thien Province on 16 February;
CHINOOK II was initiated on 17 February in the same
general area (Paras. 6-7). Civilian-run organizations
have been formed to procure Viet Cong food supplies
(Paras. 8-13).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The
Constituent -Assembly has approved an article empower-
ing the legislature under'-the flew constitution to: vote
out the prime minister and his cabinet (Paras. 1-2),
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
ZL captured letter
 Approv
from Le Duan to cadre in South Vietnam reveals
Hanoi's direction over the war in the South (Paras.
2-5). Hanoi has roundly criticized British Prime
Minister Wilson for his attitude toward the Viet-
nam war (Para. 6).
VI. Other Major As ectse The Communists have
extended a road in than panhandle toward
the South Vietnamese border (Paras. 1-2).
17 February 1967
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SAM HOUSTON
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH-VIETNAM
1. Heavy contact continued to be reported on
17 February--the fourth consecutive day--between
Communist forces and units of the US 4th Infantry
Division participating in Operation SAM HOUSTON
in the central highlands of Pleiku and Kontum
provinces near the Cambodian border.
2. As the result of several engagements on
16 February, the casualty toll now stands at 137
Communists killed compared with 39 Americans killed
and 137 wounded.
3. These actions near the Cambodian border
began on 14 February when infiltrating North Viet-
namese tried to overrun one of three US field
positions established within three miles of the
border. The enemy force--estimated to be of
regimental size--probably contains elements of
the 1st and/or 10th North Vietnamese Army divi-
sions, which traditionally operate in the Pleiku/
Kontum/Cambodia border area.
4. The four-battalion South Vietnamese Army
search-and-destroy Operation DAN CHI 279 ended on
16 February. This successful operation was con-
ducted in the Mekong Delta province of Chuong
Thien and resulted in enemy losses of 331 killed.
Fifty Communist suspects were detained. Friendly
casualties for this operation which began on 13
February were 32 killed (two US) and 119 wounded
(seven US). Nine of ten US helicopters shot
down while supporting the South Vietnamese sol-
diers have been retrieved, repaired, and returned
to service. Viet Cong losses also included 56
weapons and large quantities of munitions which
were captured and destroyed.
17 February 1967
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5. Operation BIG SPRING, a search-and-
destroy operation conducted by four US Army bat-
talions in northeastern Binh Duong Province,
ended on 16 February. Seventeen Americans
were killed and 124 wounded in this sweep of the
western portion of Communist War Zone "D'.' which
began on 31 January. Communist losses were
reported as 43 killed. Twenty-five weapons,
grenades, small-arm ammunition, and miscellaneous
equipment were captured. Fifty bunkers, three
trenches, and numerous bombs and mines were de-
stroyed.
6. Operation CHINOOK, conducted in northern
Thua Thien Province by one battalion of US Marines,
ended on 16 February. This search-and-destroy
operation, which began on 19 December, resulted
in Communist losses of 261 killed and five cap-
tured. There were 706 Communist suspects detainerd.
American losses were 25 killed and 185 wounded.
Enemy losses also included 58 weapons and large
quantities of rice captured.
7. Operation CHINOOK II began on 17 February
in the same general area of Thua Thien Province,
Two US Marine battalions have been committed to
this search-and-destroy operation which will seek
out Communist forces--estimated to number 1,500
men--and enemy base camp areas.
Creation of Civilian-Run Organizations to Procure
Food for Viet Cong Units
8. Further clarification of the reported dis-
banding of Viet Cong military rear service groups
and their replacement by specialized subsections
of civilian forward supply councils has been ob-
tained with receipt of the full translation of the
relevant documents.
9. The change amounts simply to a shifting
of responsibility for the purchase and supply of
food for combat units from rear service groups
17 February 1967
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to forward supply councils, and not the disbanding
of the rear service units, as previously reported.
Neither will "military provision subsections," com-
posed of reassigned rear service personnel, be es-
tablished under tprward supply councils for the pro-
curement and transportation of all military provi-
sions.
10. According to the full document just re-
ceived--a copy of a Central Office for South Vietnam
resolution adopted at a 9 October 1966 conference--
food needs for military units have increased to
such an extent, "five or ten times," that rear service
units can no longer perform all of their tasks in
the rear and at the same time support units on the
front line. For that reason, COSVN has ordered the
establishment of "food subsections" subordinate
to civilian-run forward supply councils at village,
district, and province levels for the sole pur-
pose of purchasing food supplies, providing for
and supervising the storage of these food items,
and managing the transport of the food to rear
service units, which will then distribute them to
combat units.
11. The new procurement system is to go into
effect in three phases during 1967. Phase One,
ending in March, involves the establishment of the
food subsections and a determination of the sub-
sections' specific duties.
12. During this phase, the food subsections
will begin "development of sufficient purchase and
requisition agencies," presumably meaning the recruit-
ment in government-controlled markets of purchasing
agents and firms who will agree to supply the Viet
Cong regularly. The food subsections will, however,
work under the close supervision of the rear service
groups during this phase.
17 February 1967
 Approve
13. In Phases Two and Three, more and more
responsibility will be shifted to the food sub-
sections as they become more familiar with their
duties, so that rear service units will eventually
be able to concentrate entirely on procurement of
other than food supplies and support of units on
the front line.
17 February 1967
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1. During its session on 15 February, the Con-
stituent Assembly approved a compromise version
of article 41-dealing with the-legislature's author-
ity to propose the removal of the "government," i.e.,
the-prime minister and his cabinet. As the article
stands now, the legislature may recommend the re-
placement of all or part of the "government" by a
two-thirds majority vote of both houses. That rec-
ommendation will be binding "unless the president
has special reasons for rejecting it." If the
president should veto the recommendation, a good
possibility since the "government" presumably will
be appointed by the president, the legislature can
then make it binding by a three-fourths majority
vote in both houses.
2. Although the legal means will exist for
making a legislative vote of "noi=confidence" in the
government stick, a three-fourths majority will be
difficult to attain, in practice according to a
US Embassy assessment. The Directorate's desire
not to make a legislative recommendation binding
was supported by the Democratic-Alliance Bloc,
which is the largest in the assembly and by
Dr. Phan'.Quang Dan. Those in favor of a binding
agreement were the Southern Renaissance and Greater
People's (GP) blocs, The latter group has been
reduced in size to a small group, primarily of
Central Vietnamese Dai Viet party members, follow-
ing the recent withdrawal of 21 former GP members
who favor the government line. Debate on the
article, which had been expected to be lively, re-
portedly was orderly and unemotional.
17 February 1967
 III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY 2 ELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
17 February 1967
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
2. A preliminary translation of a document
recently captured in South Vietnam provides new evi-
dence of Hanoi's control and direction of the Commu-
nist insurgency in the South. The document--a let-
ter over the typed name of North Vietnamese First
Party Secretary Le Duan--explains three resolutions
of the North Vietnamese Central Committee evaluating
the war in the South.
3. The letter appears to have been written in
late 1965 or early 1966, and provides some insight
into the reactions of the North Vietnamese leader-
ship to the developing military situation in South
Vietnam over the previous two years. The massive
introduction of US troops into South Vietnam in
1965, for example, apparently caught the leadership
by surprise. Although Le Duan explained that the
party has always correctly analyzed the main trends
of the revolution, he admitted that the situation
"developed more quickly than we had expected."
4. The letter supports other evidence in cap-
tured documents that the North Vietnamese believed
17 February 1967
 Approved
at the end of 1964 that they weje reasonably close
to defeating the ARVN and that .a quick and dramatic
military push would bring South Vietnam under Commu-
nist control. The introduction of US troops, how-
ever, changed Communist plans, causing Hanoi to con-
clude that it would be necessary to wage a protracted
war, according to Le Duan. The letter reveals some
dissatisfaction within the party over this policy.
It criticized "right-wing comrades" who fear a pro-
tracted struggle and who are "blinded by the military
power of the US."
5. Le Duan's letter emphasized the importance
to the Communists of a "military success over the
enemy." The party first secretary used the analogy
of Laos to demonstrate this principle. He claimed
that the "victory of Nam Tha" made the "successful
Geneva Conference of 1962" possible, and that with-
out such a victory in South Vietnam Communists would
never be able to negotiate on favorable terms. He
told the southerners in so many words not to cozlcern
themselves with the problem of negotiations. This
was a subject, he said, which had been "unanimously
entrusted to the politburo" and that the politburo
would pursue this course when it decided the time
was right. He was frankly critical of foreign allies
who urge the Vietnamese to go to the conference
table "as early as possible" and said that they did
not understand the Vietnamese situation.
DRV Criticizes British Prime Minister
6, An article in the 17 February issue of the
North Vietnamese party daily Nhan Dan included some
of Hanoi's sharpest criticism to date of British
Prime Minister Wilson. Completely ignoring that
Prime Minister Wilson's most recent statements on
the Vietnamese question were made in conjunction with
the visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to the UK, the
article accused the British leader of being a
"clumsy defender of the US aggressors" and the only
one among the leaders of the US allies in Europe
who is pleading the US cause. The article also
pointed to Britain's role in the 1954 Geneva Conven-
tion, claiming that Wilson's failure to condemn US
"criminal action" in his capacity as co-chairman of
the convention was "hypocritical" and proved. that the
British Government was a "devoted, faithful accomplice
of the US." 17 February 1967
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LAOS PANHANDLE
uang Khe
107
16
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101' .:. ..
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Don Ha
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1. Continuing analysis of photography
I Ishows the first verifiable addition
to e Laos panhandle road net rted this dry
season. Photography "shows that
Route 922--one of the three principal routes used
in past dry seasons to move supplies within Laos
to the South Vietnam border--has been extended
from its last reported terminus about five miles
from the South Vietnamese border to a point 900
yards from the border.
2. There is no evidence of a motorable road
on the South Vietnamese side of the border at this
point. Thus, supplies trucked through Laos to the
barde.r still have to be moved from that point by
porters.
17 February 1967