SOUTH ARABIAN DISSIDENT AND FEDERAL ARMED FORCES

Document Type:

CREST [1]

Collection:

General CIA Records [2]

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9

Release Decision:

RIPPUB

Original Classification:

Document Page Count:

Document Creation Date:

December 20, 2016

Document Release Date:

June 25, 2001

Sequence Number:

Case Number:

Publication Date:

March 9, 1967

Content Type:

File:

Attachment	Size
CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9.pdf [3]	337.16 KB

Body:

Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010034-9 Secret No Foreign Dissem DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum SOUTH ARABIAN DISSIDENT AND FEDERAL ARMED FORCES Secret 23 9 March 1967 No. 0797/67 Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010034-9 Approved For lase 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T0082601700010034-9 No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP f EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOV:NCRADINO AND D Er LA 551FICATION Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010034-9 Approved For Release 2006/1 HUET DP79T00826A001700010034-9 NO'TOREIGN DISSE /N DlSSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 9 March 1967 Summary In anticipation of the independence of South Arabia in 1968, the Adeni dissidents in Yemen are preparing a "Liberation Army" of South Arabian tribes- men. This army is being trained at Egyptian army camps in conventional and guerrilla warfare for use as a disciplined commando-type unit against the Federal Army, The Federal Army, which consists of 5,000 British-trained tribesmen, will become the se- curity force of South Arabia after the British evacu- ation. The new "Liberation Army" is intended to se- cure South Arabia for the dissidents, who will prob- ably form a government-in-exile, but the army's ultimate effectiveness will depend upon whether it remains loyal to the political group which formed it or whether it ultimately aligns itself with its military opponent, the Federal Army. Both forces, composed of the same type of hill tribesmen, share a contempt for the urban politicians who will dominate any independent government. NOTE; This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Clan- destine Services, CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSE / O DISSEM ABROAD SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010034-9 Approved For Release 2006/106QP79T00826A001700010034-9 ST - Now, N0 FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM 1. The Federation of South Arabia is sched- uled to become independent on 1 January 1968. The British will not only have withdrawn their forces from the Federation by that date but will also can- cel present security guarantees to the existing protectorates. 2. Security responsibility for the new state, as envisioned by the British, will devolve upon the present Federal Army, a well-trained, 5,000-man force of South Arabian tribesmen, plus local Federal Guard units in each state. The British will assist this army with training, weapons, and financial credits, even attempting in the short time left to set up an embryonic air force. 3. South Arabian dissidents, particularly those groups established or financed by Egypt, will not accept any British-sponsored independent govern- ment unless they can control it. This has so far proved unacceptable to the British and the pro- British political leaders in the Federation. 4. It thus seems likely that, as the British evacuate and anarchy increases, the South Arabian dissidents, located a short distance across the border in Yemen, will attempt to set up a govern- ment-in-exile. They have already begun to organize and train an army to seize power in the resulting political vacuum. 21 CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9 Approved For Release 2006/10 I P79T00826AOO1700010034-9 WC Kff ~Wp NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO :DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM 21 7. The groups trained by Egypt have now been surfaced. In late February and early March between 350 and 400 men were seen in Yemen, wearing Egyptian- type uniforms and berets, with two arm patches--one displaying FLOSY in Arabic and the other, "Libera- tion Army." 8. There are other reports indicating that part of the organization may be intended as a clandestine infiltration group. The entire opera- tion appears to be intimately connected with the Egyptians' Operation SALAH AL-DIN, the name for the training and organizing of terrorism against Aden. However, the exact relationship between the two is not clear. 9. Whatever the ultimate use of the new force, it has not yet shown any signs of possessing a capa- bility with armor and heavy weapons. The emphasis thus far appears to be on building a commando-type force, intended to carry out partisan warfare. 10. To date, Egyptian training of South Arabian dissidents of all types has proved spotty. The total number trained has been estimated at 7,000, but half this figure probably is more realistic. Of these, 1,500 or so who were interested primarily in a handout of cash and guns, have now disappeared into the hills. Most of the remaining "trainees" are tied by some sort of loyalty to the NLF. 11. Egypt has been the prime organizer of all dissident groups in South Arabia. The USSR and Com- munist China have made offers of military aid, but CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010034-9 Approved For Rase 2006/10/~JAR'IDP79T0082 1700010034-9 VAMf NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM no significant quantity of aid has been accepted by any group. Egyptian control of Yemen allows Cairo to channel arms shipments, perhaps sometimes in- tended by a bloc donor for one recipient, to what- ever recipient the Egyptians choose. 12. The most important question with respect to the new army will be its dependability. South Arabian tribesmen tend to have extremely divided loyalties, often based on clan affiliations. It may be difficult to find leaders whom the troops can admire not only as warriors but as being above tribal allegiances. The need for strong leadership will be increasingly important as the central gov- ernment of South Arabia disintegrates during the evacuation and as practical British support is withdrawn from the present tribal leaders. The South Arabian Federal Army faces the same problem and neither it nor the dissident army appears to have solved it. 13. If the Liberation Army proves dependable and able, it will still face formidable problems posed by the terrain and political system of South Arabia. It has been estimated that with adequate air support the best that an Egyptian military thrust might accomplish would be the occupation of Aden and the state of Lahij, which is located be- tween Aden and the Yemen border (see map). Main- taining lines of communication might prove to be costly unless the hinterland was abandoned and Aden was supplied by sea and air. It appears certain that a South Arabian "Liberation Army," brought to the highest possible state of readiness, would not accomplish more. Furthermore, even if this army became the new garrison of Aden, it would probably be dissolved in a short time by the Adeni politicians. Most of the Liberation Army troops come from the same tribal stock as the Federal Army they would be opposing. All of them are contemptuous of the Adeni townsmen, the type now controlling FLOSY. 14. The chief alternative is that the Libera- tion Army might be used to strike directly at the CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DI SEC~ETDISSEM ABROAD Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM Federal Army, gaining advantage by Egyptian air sup- port. If the Federal Army were destroyed as an ef- fective military unit, the future occupiers of Aden would then have to face primarily isolated groups of tribal forces which might try to seize Aden for loot and guns. These would not prove so formidable, and some sort of mercenary army might be maintained to protect Aden. The picture is not a bright one, however, for the future leaders on either side of South Arabian affairs. CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034.9 FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA Ttainrng a ftps,a f c side gfi southr~Arabian ' ibesiiaen . Ins has AbbasiyaCCU CAIRO vFa OSANA SAUDI ARABIA / / EASTERN I3au'i ADEN PROTECTORATES AI Buraygah Gulf of Aden MILES 5 Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010034-9 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010034-9