STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001300140008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 20, 1975
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2006/07/18: CIA-RDP80B01495R001 00140008-8
20 February 1975
NMEMORANDU'4 FOR THE R.TTCORD
SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff
1. On 19 February 1.9 75 I visited with M/G Faurer and
those members of his staff involved in the restructuring of
the strategic warning mechanism and functions. The first
part of our visit was a discussion of how the Strategic
Warning Staff proposes to tackle the problems of manning and
operation, and the present thinking with respect to product.
2. Current plans call for a staff of 10 analysts made
up of two each from NSA, DIA, and CIA, while State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force will furnish one each. General Maurer
expressed his pleasure about the high quality of the per-
sonnel being nominated by each of the community elements.
The analytical staff would be supported by an Executive
Officer and necessary secretarial assistance to help in the
reproduction and handling of incoming and outgoing information.
One of the thoughts being mulled over is that the Staff
would probably produce a monthly periodical (they felt that
a weekly would too nearly approach the old Watch Report and
might suffer some of the same ills) and on the order of one.
or two good information reports a week. At about this point
I raised a question to the effect that if an item was issued
that caused the alarm "flag" to be raised, would a follow-up
item be issued when it was time for the flag to be lowered.
It, was generally agreed that such a follow- i.p item should be
issued, even though there was a good possibility that the
intelligence information warranting lowering the flag would
be generally available throughout the Community.
3. One questio which is of some concern to
General Faurer and to is, the matter of how much
coordination should be ca.rrie ou prior to Strategic Warning
products being published. Both General Faurer and
felt that the need for a fully coordinated USIB
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document could result in excessive delay while seeking for
the common denominator rather than rapidly laying out for
users the various views held on a developing situation. At
this point I recommended that the product could be drawn up,
incorporating the variously held positions, and sent to
the DCI with USIB review following as appropriate. They
were pleased with this suggestion and hope to proceed along
those lines. I also indicated that their products would be
.reviewed by ray Product Review Division as part of its
ongoing review of all National Intelligence.
4. The latter part of the visit involved a discussion
o- the facilities being, and to be, built into the NMIC, the
type of equipment anticipated, the data banks that would be
netted together, and the means of information exchange that
were anticipated.
5. The concept, professionalism, and enthusiz,s-m which
I saw are indeed encouraging and I believe the SWS will
~
a
provide the DCI with an effective mecnan
utenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC
Approved For Release 2006/07/18: CIA-RDP80BO1495R001300140008-8