THE USSR AND THE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002400170002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 27, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP83R00184R002400170002-6
CA
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL ANALYTIC GROUP
NIC/AG STAFF PAPER
THE USSR AND THE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE
NIC AG 81-10001
27 NOVEMBER 1981
Copy No.
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THE USSR AND THE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE
While the outward thrust of Soviet policy this past decade
has provided Moscow with strategic benefits, it has also created
vulnerabilities and tensions for the USSR that in some respects
resemble those the United States and its allies have had to
confront since the mid-1950s. Over the past generation the
Soviet Union has been able to seize the initiative in chipping
away at exposed Western positions of influence. But in recent
years Moscow has had to contend more with the vexing problem of
protecting its longstanding grip on Eastern Europe and has had to
deal with heightened local resistance and suspicions produced by
the expansion of Soviet pressures beyond the heartland of Central
Europe.
This changed circumstance affords the West an opportunity to
attempt to inhibit further expansionist activities by the USSR
and in some measure to exert pressure on its exposed positions of
influence. Such Western initiatives might, of course, entail
numerous risks, which would have to be carefully weighed against
the benefits of possible moves. This study explores some
possible alternative approaches the West could theoretically
take, and discusses the key opportunities and risks that would be
inherent in any such conflict arenas. No attempt is made to
conclude which approaches would be more desirable from the US
perspective.
This is the first of a new series of informal NIC/AG studies issued by the
Analytic Group of the National Intelligence Council. It was prepared to offer
certain propositions for discussion. It has been discussed with officers of
the National Foreign Assessment Center and within the National Intelligence
Council. Its views, however, remain those of its authors,
NTTr Ann 1 cyt i r- Group- They welcome comments QL1_ e
-4: th
e
propositions in is study (I I 25X1
NIC AG 81-10001
27 November 1981
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DISCUSSION
The Rising Cost of Empire
1. Like an overanxious chess player, Moscow, in advancing
its pieces in different directions (e.g., Indochina, Africa,
Central America), has exposed lines of attack to its adversary,
placed advanced pawns in jeopardy, and acquired positions that it
must defend at high cost. The political-economic costs of empire
and of enhanced global influence unquestionably have been
increasing for the Soviets. Although these costs do not yet seem
to have caused Moscow to modify significantly any of its
principal lines of assertive behavior in the world, Soviet
experience in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion may be having
some impact on restraining actions against Poland. The current
costs of empire are likely to become increasingly painful for
Soviet leaders over the next five years or so, in large measure
because of growing economic difficulties. Additional imperial
costs, whether voluntary or imposed, would hasten the time when
Moscow must make tough trade-off choices between pursuing
overseas adventures and reducing economic stringencies at home.
Although this trend of increasing imperial costs is clear, it is
impossible to know precisely when the Soviets will perceive the
need to make these choices.
2. The political costs incurred by the Soviets are already
growing. The invasion of Afghanistan has produced a serious
anti-Soviet backlash throughout the Muslim world and has somewhat
hardened European and Japanese attitudes toward Moscow. The
Soviet involvement in Vietnam has created anxieties in the ASEAN
countries and in China and Japan; and Soviet/Cuban inroads into
Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Central America have stirred strong
feelings against Moscow among neighbors and close associates of
the United States.
3. Although the financial costs of empire for Moscow have
risen dramatically, they are now just becoming burdensome. The
Soviets' largest and most rapidly growing cost has been a loss in
hard currency earnings that has resulted from economic largess to
Eastern Europe and Cuba. Moscow has been providing these
countries with oil at below-world-market prices since 1973 and
has been paying Cuba for its sugar at prices exceeding that on
the global market. Although by 1980 these subsidies had reached
some $20 billion, the Soviets have been able to accept painlessly
this loss in foreign exchange. They have been earning sufficient
foreign exchange to pay for desired imports of foodstuffs and
technology. Moscow also has been paying little attention to the
idea of abandoning its politically inspired trade subsidy policy
in order to build up foreign exchange reserves to meet some
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future period of stringent financial conditions or to relieve
ongoing consumer shortages.
4." Although economic and military assistance to its allies
(Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Afghanistan) other
than subsidies jumped from about $1 billion in 1970 to some $4
billion in 1980, these additional outlays-so far have placed
relatively little strain on the Soviet economy. The 1980
expenditures amounted to less than 0.5 percent of Soviet GNP and
included mainly goods that the Soviets produce in relatively
abundant quantities, such as food-processing equipment. Aid
elsewhere has had even less of a domestic economic impact.
Economic assistance to other LDCs amounts to only $500-600
million'a year, and even that minimal amount has been self-
supporting since 1973, when repayments began to top-new aid. The
$6 billion or so a year in military goods and assistance
delivered to LDCs in recent years has been 90 percent covered by
cash sales to oil-rich countries (such as Libya) or by
repayments.
5. The currently unfolding Soviet economic situation,
however, could make Moscow consider more carefully the
continuation of its policies of trading off foreign exchange
losses (mainly on oil) for the political benefits derived from
supplying Eastern Europe and Cuba with subsidized commodities.
Moscow is already concerned about its deteriorating foreign
exchange position due to the continuing need for vast quantities
of imported grain and to the slack in exports to the West.
Within a few years the Soviets will be running a large deficit on
their hard currency trade flows if,. as expected, oil exports to
the West fall off dramatically because of.stagnating Soviet oil
production and increasing domestic oil demand. To ensure
sufficient foreign exchange earnings to buy needed grain and
wanted technology, Moscow will in any event probably have to make
hard decisions on substantially reducing the flow of subsidized
oil.
6. These already rising political and expected economic
burdens of empire will become especially onerous because of
Moscow's pressing domestic economic difficulties and aging
leadership. Potential competitors for power will be less able to
ignore the political and economic implications of empire as the
USSR approaches.a period of leadership transition. Competitors
may seek to disassociate themselves from domestic economic
hardship and would have less personally at stake in the foreign
adventures of Brezhnev.
Potential Western Approaches
7. General. As a start in exploring the possible vehicles
for exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Soviet empire, it seems
most valuable to compare two broad alternative approaches.
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Although both approaches have or are being employed in one form
or another, the increasing Soviet vulnerability may make each
more useful.
8. The first, the "attrition" approach, centers on raising
the costs to the USSR of the most exposed of Soviet positions of
influence; that is, it aims not so much at forcing the Soviets
out of their strongholds as at pushing them further into
quagmires like that in which the United States found itself in
Vietnam. The means include a variety of pressures, including the
provision of training, arms, and advice to anti-Soviet or
antiregime elements. In most cases, the effort requires. only
modest levels of assistance and could best be carried out by
subtle and covert means. The "attrition" approach has several
advantages:
-- It is relatively inexpensive in financial terms.
-- It is not passive but active: an activist policy which
seizes. the initiative and turns the USSR's very presence
against it, by pressuring it into repressive overreaction
and burdensome overcommitinent.
-- It accords well with Chinese policy to counter Soviet
"hegemony."
-- It would push Moscow toward a dilemma heretofore pretty
much the monopoly of the United States: that of having
to choose between underwriting the costs of increasingly
unviable regimes or reducing the Soviet political
presence (or influence) in the affected country.
Such an approach, however, would assure increasing the client
regime's dependence on the USSR and leaving the regime little
alternative to inviting the Soviets to increase their presence
and, therefore, their influence on the scene. An "attrition"
approach would also. tend to:
-- Increase tensions between the West and the Soviets.
-- Entail risks of broadening local conflicts.
-- Invite reciprocal measures against US friends.
-- Alienate segments of the Third World that do not wish the
East-West struggle to impinge upon them.
9. "Dependency reduction," the second general approach, by
contrast would center on efforts to woo client regimes from the
USSR by offering local Soviet allies and friends the prospect of
attractive political and economic benefits in the event that
Soviet influence and the Soviet presence were markedly reduced.
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This approach requires patience and a willingness to coexist, at
least temporarily, with Soviet bastions of influence; but, unlike
the "attrition" approach, it aims at the ultimate expulsion of
Soviet influence from a region, increasing the independence of
Soviet clients, and perhaps even creating a certain measure of
dependence by them on the West. The advantages of this approach
would be to:
-- Emphasize the use of economic and cultural resources with
which the West is well endowed, taking advantage of the
fact that the USSR is poorly equipped to stimulate and
sustain economic growth in a postrevolutionary period.
-- Run less risk than the "attrition" approach of political
or military confrontation with the Soviets, at least in
the short run.
-- Accord better with the preferences of major US allies in
Western Europe, also offering significant prospects of
evolving joint strategy with them.
However, this approach would promise few short-te nn benefits to
the United States, might prove to be expensive in the long term,
and might create perceptions in Moscow that the West will not
oppose Soviet opportunism with vigor.
10. Because Soviet expansionism has taken a variety of
forms, has occurred in significantly diverse areas, and entails
situations that are starkly different, no approach of course can
be applied in a "pure" fashion. Nor could the two general
approaches easily be wedded in individual situations (even though
some of their elements could be combined in differing
proportions), because the first would increase a client's
dependence on the USSR whereas the second would be explicitly
fashioned to reduce this dependence.
11. Mention should be made also of other approaches-. At one
extreme might be the possibility that a purposeful "no action"
strategy would be most prudent for the United States. For
example, in a few instances the USSR may already be sufficiently
mired so that US efforts would neither attract local leaders nor
add substantially to Moscow's woes, while actually exacerbating
local suspicions of US intentions. At the other extreme is the
possibility of openly coercing a Soviet client with the avowed
purpose of altering its political orientation. Such a course,
obviously, could be pursued only rarely, and in carefully
tailored fashion, because it would run the risk of confrontation
with the USSR, might produce the very proregime "backlash" within
the client that is not desired (and consequently seldom
succeeds), and might injure other US equities in the world.
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12. Specific Examples of Approaches.. To illustrate the
possible utility of these various approaches, we examine briefly
advantages and disadvantages in a number of key cases--
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, Eastern Europe
(especially Poland),'South Yemen, and Libya. In each case, the'
following factors are examined to determine which approaches
might be most effective:
-- A largely "attrition" approach would seem most feasible
if :
The presence of the Red Army or proxy forces makes it
difficult for the West to woo local leaders and
increases the number of tempting targets for local
dissident groups.
The client society is deeply cleaved along political,
tribal, or ethnic lines (as in Angola) or if strong
anti-Soviet elements already exist (as in Afghanistan
and Syria).
-- A largely "dependence reduction" approach would seem most
feasible if:
Local government leaders are popular, have been
thrust forward by local nationalism, and discern the
inability of Moscow to serve effectively the
postrevolutionary needs of their societies.
Soviet influence is largely the consequence of an
ephemeral compatibility of interests with the client
such as mutual hostility to a third party.
13. Finally, any approach chosen for one case would, of
course, have consequences for others. For example, a largely
"attrition" approach against Cuba, aimed at raising the cost of
its foreign adventures, would be likely to conflict with the
prospect for using an effective "dependence reduction" approach
in the cases of Nicaragua, Angola, or Ethiopia. Actions to bog
down the Cubans also might provoke a harsh Soviet response in the
case of Poland. Moscow might feel less restrained if it
perceives increased Western support for groups creating troubles
in the Soviet sphere of control. Also, even though a largely
"dependence reduction" approach in the case of Poland might
assist that country's aim of preserving its fragile independence
from Moscow, it might relieve the USSR of future political and
economic burdens.
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Specific Countries
14. Afghanistan has been recognized by Western observers as
the clearest case for a largely "attrition" approach. The Red
Army is already mired in the country, and there is no realistic
prospect for pressuring the USSR to get out. Local leaders are
Soviet creations who could not shift their loyalties. Whatever
the interests of the Afghan state, the regime is so closely
identified with Moscow that a withdrawal of the Soviet presence
would probably spell its demise. Finally, the major tribal
groupings of the country, though as yet unable to weld themselves
into a single force, are all bitterly opposed to the USSR.
Selective Western military assistance to the most successful of
these anticSoviet groups (such as the provision of antiaircraft
missiles) combined with persistent public and political pressure
on Moscow (possibly through increased support for pro-Afghan
demonstrations in the West and Third World and more vociferous
denunciations of Moscow at the United Nations and other
international forums) might raise costs to the USSR and intensify
Moscow's quandary: no-win, withdrawal, or escalated conflict.
15. If the United States were to decide to intensify its
activities against Soviet involvement in. Afghanistan, this might
boost the US image among moderate Muslim states and China. The
most serious risk of such an effort would be in the form of
heightened Soviet pressures against and/or limited cross-border
incursions into Pakistan. Given its difficulties in Afghanistan,
Moscow probably would not undertake a military offensive against
Pakistan which would entail occupying portions of that country's
territory. But to counter the possibility of-significantly
tougher Soviet moves would require a stiffening of Islamabad's
political resolve by the provision of increased amounts of
military hardware and active diplomatic support. Such enhanced
US support probably would be necessary even if there were no
stepped-up support for thee Afghan rebels, because Moscow's
frustration with its Afghanistan venture would be likely to
persist no matter what the United States did. The impact on
India of such assistance to Pakistan, of course, would have to be
weighed.
16. Ethiopia presents a much more ambiguous case for
"attrition" than Afghanistan. Somali and Eritrean elements might
offer tempting potential instruments if an "attrition" approach
were invoked, although in a few years the situation may change to
one where a longer term "dependence reduction" approach might be
more profitable. For the near future, increased small-scale,
indirect, clandestine support for local insurgent groups and
dissidents (for example, the Ethiopian People's Liberation Front,
the Eritrean Liberation Front, and the Tigrays) would tend to
increase tensions among the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia and
between the Ethiopians and the Soviet/Cubans. The Soviets and
their friends would- find themselves becoming more entangled in
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another unruly and seemingly endless situation that could
significantly raise the cost to them of maintaining their
presence. Such an approach might also alter the present state of
affairs, where Moscow has achieved the most that it can
reasonably expect from the circumstances. Failing a rapid
political settlement of the Ogaden and Eritrean conflicts (a
highly doubtful outcome), the Soviets might prefer to maintain a
manageable level of political tension and guerrilla fighting that
would perpetuate Ethiopian dependence on Soviet military
assistance but avoid a confrontation with the United States.
From the US viewpoint, despite the fact that the nationalism of
Ethiopian leaders runs deeper than professions of Marxism-
Leninism, there would be little chance at_ present wooing them
away from the Soviets. Because Ethiopia is'still in the midst of
revolutionary turmoil, anti-US feeling is strong, and Addis Ababa
seems to feel reasonably content with the Soviet presence despite
some recent reports to the contrary. It is plausible, however,
within a few years that the Mengistu or a similar regime might
become disenchanted with Soviet-Cuban meddling and wish to
encourage a greater Western presence.
17. There are more regional complexities in the case of
Ethiopia than in that of Afghanistan, which would require that
any resort to a basically "attrition" approach be undertaken with
the utmost care and subtlety. Neither the Kenyans nor the
Sudanese--both friendly to the United States--would look with
favor on an upsurge in violence in the Horn of Africa. Kenya
sees itself (along with Ethiopia_~__.as_.a__target of Somali
irredentism. Sudanese President Nimeiri feels himself to be
extremely vulnerable to Libyan subversion and terrorism, and
Sudan would have to bear a still greater Ethiopian refugee burden
than is already the case. Thus, any US decision to lend
significant support to anti-Mengistu forces in Ethiopia would
probably require:
-- Considerable reliance on intermediaries such as the
Saudis.
-- Diplomatic efforts to persuade President Siad to renounce
or water down Somali claims against Kenya.
-- Sufficient collaboration with the French in Djibouti to
shield that unstable country from any spillover of
violence.
-- A concerted international effort against the intrigues
and adventures of the Libyans, and perhaps an improved
international effort to deal with the burden of Ethiopian
refugees in both Sudan and Somalia.
-- Enthusiastic support by the new Moubarek regime in Egypt.
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-- Guarantees to Sudan against Ethiopia or Libyan counter-
pressures.
18. Angola is a case that would be susceptible to a mixture
of approaches. On the one hand, the Soviets, East Germans, and
Cubans already constitute an unpopular presence in the country,
and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA is already a significant antiregime
force. Any "attrition" approach would quickly raise direct costs
for the USSR, as well as indirect costs in the form of further
underwriting the Angolan economy and any further Cuban
involvement in the region. The disadvantage would be a risk of
losing Western oil investments and opportunities in Cabinda, and
increased anti-Western agitation by some African states about
indirect US support for South Africa. By contrast, a more
"dependence reduction" approach would also carry pluses and
minuses. The Soviets and their allies have already shown
themselves to be ineffective in aiding Angolan economic
development in contrast to the Western presence, particularly in
the oil industry of Cabinda. Angolan leadership is clearly
nationalist and may be susceptible to Western offers of
assistance in return for a reduction of the Soviet and Cuban
presence. A prerequisite, however, for the success of a
"dependence reduction" approach would most likely be a UN-
sponsored resolution resolving the Namibian situation. The
obvious difficulty with this approach is that the Savimbi forces
would have to be either disregarded or invited to participate in
the government.
19. A blend of the two approaches might be feasible in the
Angolan case. There might be some benefit if, for example,
clandestine Western assistance to UNITA were gradually increased,
while the possibility was suggested to Luanda of increased
economic assistance from the West in exchange for a significant
reduction in Communist personnel in the country and for bringing
the Savimbi faction into the Luanda government. To back this
effort, the West might simultaneously press for free elections
(similar to those that took place in Zimbabwe) as the democratic
means of halting the continuing bloodshed. By taking such a
combined tack, the West might have a chance to achieve the best
of both worlds. The Soviets and their friends could become mired
in an interminable guerrilla conflict or their local influence
could be greatly attenuated.
20. Cuba probably would not be amenable to a "dependence
reduction" approach for the foreseeable future under a Castro
regime:
-- Although there are reasons for increased discontent in
Cuba, there are no organized elements that could be
turned against the regime.
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-- Although Cuban interests diverge from Moscow's in many
respects, there is a fundamental coincidence.of interests
and revolutionary aims that weds the two.
-- Castro gives his revolutionary and political aspirations
overseas a high priority even when they interfere with
domestic economic considerations.
21. Also, although Cuba is relatively invulnerable to
direct applications of an "attrition" approach, it would be
peculiarly vulnerable to an indirect application of such an
approach in Nicaragua and Africa. For instance, because Castro
values the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua sufficiently to go to
great" lengths to preserve it, outside pressures against it would
induce an ever-increasing Cuban commitment in that country.
Pressures applied to the Cubans in Africa and Nicaragua would
place further strains on Cuba's resources and would require the
Soviets to underwrite still further the Cuban economy and
military adventures. As the Cubans became still more committed
to interventions overseas, they might lose further credibility in
the nonaligned movement and provoke greater suspicions on the
part of some countries that were previously sympathetic to
Havana.
22. The significant difficulty with an "attrition" approach
of this type toward Cuba is that it could come into conflict with
a "dependence reduction" approach for Nicaragua, Angola, and
Ethiopia. The issue would come down to whether priority were to
be given to raising the costs to Cuba (and therefore indirectly
to the USSR), or encouraging the independence of Nicaragua and
those African governments. In the case of Nicaragua, an
"attrition" approach also would mean that the United States would
be accepting, at least temporarily, rather complete. domination of
Managua by Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista forces.
23. Vietnam. For the immediate future the "attrition"
approach would seem more feasible in Vietnam. The leadership in
Hanoi is fundamentally nationalist; and is looking to reduce the
economic hardships and social strains that are the consequences
of its mismanagement, its earlier conflict with the United
States, its interventions in Cambodia and Laos, and its
continuing confrontation with China. In a word, the Vietnamese
economy is sorely tried and. can ill afford continuing large-scale
investments for national security. At the same time, elements in
the Vietnamese leadership are casting about for alternatives to
complete dependence on the Soviet Union. For these reasons, the
"dependence reduction" approach (including US recognition of the
Hanoi regime) might offer rewarding prospects in time for both
reducing the military weight of the Vietnamese in Southeast Asia
and encouraging a "Titoist" solution.
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24. A "dependence reduction" approach, nonetheless, would
entail serious problems that might make such an effort
questionable at this time:
-- Such a US approach to Vietnam would be a major irritant
in the more important Sino-American relationship.
-- It would not necessarily reduce Vietnamese militance in
the region, and the potential for increased Vietnamese
strength would surely frighten the ASEAN countries.
-- It would not necessarily reduce Soviet presence in the
one instance that really counts, the strategic use of
Vietnamese naval and air bases.
25. Under current circumstances a more "attrition" approach
would seem to offer more advantages.for the United States:
-- It would be a major stimulant to Sino-American
cooperation in Asia, and a signal to Beijing that the
United States was prepared to parallel and support
Chinese policy in that region.
-- It would place immediate pressure on the Soviet Union in
a region that is remote from the USSR and which would be
a logistic drain for Moscow were the USSR to commit
itself there much more deeply.
26. In addition, Vietnam already suffers from labor
shortages that increased military conscription would aggravate,
and Hanoi confronts a very serious situation in agriculture. The
Vietnamese economy is already sufficiently stretched that
additional burdens would have a telling impact, forcing Moscow to
make another decision about greatly increasing its support. The
major risk inherent in using any such approach as this against
Vietnam would be that in the immediate future it might provoke
the Vietnamese to continue to build their already formidable
army. This prospect and the increased turmoil within Vietnam
would hold little appeal for most of the ASEAN countries. But it
should be noted that the ASEAN countries would not be comfortable
with either this approach or one that was more "dependence
reduction" in character.
27. An "attrition" approach was used in Eastern Europe by
the United States without great success during the early years of
the Cold War and was replaced by a more or less limited
"dependence reduction" approach in the late 1960s and 1970s.
This approach has been modestly successful in helping wean the
East European countries--especially Poland and Romania--away from
the USSR and in reducing the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact.
The continuation of a "dependency reduction" approach would seem
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appropriate except in the case of Poland. That country has
reached a new stage, one which calls for a fresh look.
28. At this time in the case of Poland the "dependence
reduction" measures, such as the extension of further loans to
Warsaw and the provision of food and investment, still serve to
provide the country with alternatives to complete dependence on
the USSR. However, complete reliance on an approach such as this
might carry with it certain disadvantages:
-- It would have inherent limitations because, the.USSR is
unwilling to permit Poland to withdraw from the Warsaw
Pact or CEMA, and remains able to subdue Poland's
centrifugal tendencies whenever it decides to do so.
-- Large-scale Western assistance to Poland that eases
conditions there would reduce costs to the USSR as well,
particularly by reducing turmoil in the country.
-- It would be a very expensive and open-ended set of
activities.
-- It would place brakes on Western willingness to initiate
activist measures elsewhere lest the USSR use these as an
excuse to invade Poland.
29. In contrast, an "attrition" approach, including anti-
Soviet propaganda and various forms of assistance and
encouragement to anti-Soviet elements in the Polish labor and
agricultural sectors, would serve to help keep the pot boiling in
Eastern Europe. In that case Moscow would continue to fear
ideological contamination in the Bloc, and must continue to
confront the very thorny choice between ending liberalization in
Poland by military means (and suffering enormous political damage
as well as having to underwrite the Polish economy in the
process) or risking further damage to the fabric of the Bloc.
30. A Soviet invasion of Poland would significantly raise
the possibility of a superpower confrontation. It might well
also endanger the prospects for arms control and create a
situation that would benefit neither superpower (although,
ultimately, the combination of growing strains on the Soviet
economy and military modernization in Western Europe might make
arms control once again a desirable prospect for Moscow). To
reduce the danger of a Soviet invasion, a mixed approach might
prove rewarding. Poland could be given assistance which would be
sufficient to prevent total economic collapse but which would be
insufficient to resolve Warsaw's acute economic difficulties,
thereby maintaining centrifugal tendencies in that country. At
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the same time, the encouragement of nationalist and anti-Soviet
elements in the country would produce embarrassment for Moscow
and force the Soviet Union to forgo other opportunities as it
continues to wrestle with the Polish problem.
31. Conversely, a Soviet invasion of Poland might serve US
interests in certain ways:
-- It would remove the Polish "hostage" on US behavior and
justify stronger US measures in other regions, such as in
Central America.
-- It would, at least initially, tend to unify the Western
alliance and weaken opposition to NATO modernization.
-- It would justify increased investment in defense by the
West.
-- It probably would weaken Soviet influence in the Third
World and reduce pacifist and neutralist sentiments in
Europe.
-- It would be very costly in economic resource terms for
the Soviets to subdue Poland.
32. South Yemen is a case where neither of the approaches
seems feasible, and it may be prudent for the United States to do
little. The chances of raising the costs to the Soviets through
a basically "attrition" approach seem slim at best. The .
government and its various factions are strongly pro-Soviet, and
there appear to be no significant local dissidents. The
neighboring countries of North Yemen and Oman, although. hostile
to Aden, lack the capability to take offensive actions against
South Yemen. The "dependence reduction" mode is of little value
because the South Yemeni Government has little or no interest in
improving its relations with the West or in obtaining economic
assistance from it.
33. In the case of Libya, the foregoing approaches also
might avail little. The "dependence reduction" approach is not
easily imaginable. Libya already depends on the West for much of
its economic modernization efforts and for markets for its oil.
The success of such an approach depends on the sort of long-term
cost-benefit calculus that is conspicuously absent in the
adventurism of Qadhafi. A largely "attrition" approach would
also seem improvident given the large sums Qadhafi has at his
disposal to continue his international subversion.
34. The problem, however, is too important for the United
States to remain a passive onlooker. Libya clearly is a
significant element in Soviet expansionary and disruptive global
activities, although it is by no means dependent on the USSR or a
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puppet on a Moscow string. Indeed, the Soviets lean more heavily
on Qadhafi than vice versa. In their symbiotic relationship, the
Soviets receive-considerable hard currency and a proxy (often
unguided) in Africa and the Middle East in return for a nearly
unrestricted flow of conventional arms and military assistance.
The Libyan regime is synonymous with international terrorism, and
its adverturism has surfaced in areas as diverse as Chad, the
Philippines, and the United States. Any-concerted approach
directed against Libya, therefore, would be more feasible the
more it sought to dislodge the Soviets and their Libyan clients
rather than merely raising the costs for Moscow in any direct
fashion.