PEACE MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403510021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/04/10: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403510021-0
SECRET J) c?,
The Director of Central intelligence
W3shingtm Q C 20505
16 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
THROUGH: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Peace Movement
At your press conference last week you had another question on Communist
support to the peace movement. You are likely to be pressed on this again.
I attach a new paper on "Peace Groups and.Leaders in INF Basing Countries"
which may be useful in supporting your response, along with solid intelligence
reports that: -
1 In April 1982 the 25X1
I prove a cas an irec ions
or is in eve ua to support the s aging of the anti-nuclear
demonstrations held in New York in June 1982.
2. In March 1982 the KGB tasked its agents to collect information
about the structure, slogans and political platforms, identities of
influential figures, plans for demonstrations and conferences, and
proposals for the possible use.of the anti-war movement in "active
measures" operations.
3. Also, in March 1982 KGB residencies received direction to get
participants at the June demonstration in New York to adopt slogans
placing sole responsibility for the arms race on the US and to get
anti-war contacts to well-known public figures in the US known to be
demanding curbs on.the arms race.
I am having the attached paper on "Peace Groups and Leaders in INF
Basing Countries" sanitized in the hope that it can be used in information
programs which SACEUR plans to.bring to the Epopepn public.
CR 82-14875/EUR 82-10114
Distribution (Over).
25X1
11.
 Directorate of
Intelligence
Peace Groups and Leaders
in INF Basing Countries
1
This paper was prepared
b
ffice of
25X1
Central Reference, and ice of
25X1
European Analysis. Contributions were made by
25X1
of Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be add
Europe Division, OCR, o
Chief,
r Chief,
25X1
European Issues Division, EURA, on
25X1
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations, the National Intelligence Council
Analytic Group, and the National Intelligence
7
Secret
CR 82-14875
EUR 82-10114
November 1982
 Overview
Information available
as of 25 October 1982
was used in this report.
Peace Groups and Lead
in INF Basing CountrielI
This research paper discusses the most prominent peace organizations and
leaders in the five West European countries designated by NATO as hosts
for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) basing: West Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy. It is in these
countries that the West European "peace movement" poses the greatest
immediate threat to US interests because of the pressures it creates against
INF. It is also in these countries that the largest antinuclear demonstra-
tions have taken place.
The groups discussed here do not constitute the entire peace movement in
these countries; indeed, their memberships probably provide less than half
the demonstrators in the streets. Nevertheless, this study of the most
prominent groups covers a substantial cross section of peace movement
ideas and activity and should provide a valuable resource for information
on major organizations and leaders.
Peace activity is only one of the many factors that West European political
leaders must take into account when deciding defense policy. But it is a
dramatic phenomenon that, given the right political context, could be
decisive on certain security issues and affect the shape of relations with the
United States for years to come.
Secret
CR 82-14875
EUR 82-10114
November 1982
 Peace Groups and Lead r
in INF Basing Countrie
Peace Groups in Perspective
Organized peace groups have been a familiar feature
of the West European political scene for decades.
Prominent during the ban-the-bomb campaigns of the
late 1950s and early 1960s, they were drained by a
long period of public indifference from the early
1960s until the late 1970s. After the start of the anti-
neutron-bomb campaign of 1977-78, however, peace
activity accelerated dramatically. The sizes of the
crowds and the amount of media attention during the
past two years have set new records for protest
activity in postwar Western Europe. We believe that
the recent hiatus in arms control progress, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and instability in Poland
have combined with increased public awareness of
Europe-oriented weapons systems to heighten public
concern about nuclear risks and led large numbers of
people to join in opposing new nuclear weapon
The "Peace" Movement and the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF)
In our view, the greatest immediate threat that the
movement poses to US interests lies in the pressures it
creates against INF. It is no coincidence that the
countries with the strongest peace movements-or at
least those that have had the largest antinuclear
demonstrations-are those on whose soil INF deploy-
ment is supposed to take place: West Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and
Italy. INF has been a catalyst for peace sentiment
because the public has received the message in the
press and the electronic media that it. represents a new
step in the arms race. Moreover, public discussion of
INF has often focused on Western Europe's supposed
impotence in the face of increasing nuclear risks. INF
is to be the first Europe-based missile system in 20
years capable of reaching the Soviet Union, and much
press commentary contends that because it is a US-
controlled system host governments will have no say
about whether it should be employe
25X1
Composition of the Movement
The groups and individuals involved in agitation
against government security policies in Western Eu-
rope defy attempts to characterize them precisely.
Among them are party organizations of various politi-
cal persuasions, church groups, student groups, envi-
ronmentalists, and many other concerned individuals.
While leftists predominate in peace activity and pro-
vide most of the activists, many self-described moder-
ates and even conservatives also take part. The active
role played by Catholics in Belgium and the Nether-
lands, for example, is one of the more striking facets
of recent peace activity because it contrasts with their
earlier disinclination to take controversial positions on
security questions. Rivalry and distrust exist even
among the leftist participants. Membership figures
are often unreliable, and groups change their names,
split, or merge 25X1
The degree of centralization in peace activity varies
considerably. In the United Kingdom, for example,
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is by far the
predominant organization in terms of membership
and probably provides a majority of demonstrators in
the streets. At the other extreme is West Germany,
where the movement is a kaleidescope of more than
1,000 groups, and the ones discussed here re resent
only a minority of those who demonstrat 5X1
What these groups and individuals have in common-
and what defines them collectively as a, peace move-
ment-is the conviction that their own governments
and the United States are doing too little to reduce
the dangers of a. nuclear war, and a demand that the
West reduce these dangers by making at least initial.
concessions to the East. While all elements of the .
movement agree that the momentum of the arms race
should be reversed, the complex and emotional subject
of nuclear weapons leads them to diverse policy
25X1
 conclusions. Peace groups often cannot agree on how
radical their demands should be or on an alternativ
security polic
One pattern common to all five countries is the
division of opinion within the movement on the ques-
tion of military balance. Almost all elements of the
movement demand at least "initial concessions" by
the United States in arms policy, but the more radical
deny the need for a military balance or even a military
establishment at all, calling instead for total disarma-
ment and political neutrality. Though often papered
over, this division can also be seen at times in the
attitude toward the current arms control process:
many in the movement endorse arms control, but the
more radical contend that it only perpetuates the arms
race. Such disagreements have become more apparent
recently, and may well grow in importance if arms
control negotiations show signs of progres I
This paper discusses the peace groups that are the
largest, or that have played an important role in
demonstrations. Not all of these groups, however, are
equally important. Some of them, moreover, are
national "umbrella" organizations that have no direct
membership but have secured the affiliation of a
variety of individual peace organizations. We have
described the philosophy of the umbrella groups pri-
marily on the basis of statements by their leaders, but
not all of their affiliates would subscribe to these
-
statements. Just below the
ideologies continues to boil
Communist and Soviet Influence
During the lean years for peace activism, Communist
parties were the main groups actively pushing the
cause, and in some countries practically the only ones.
Thus, when the campaign against the neutron bomb
captured the public imagination in 1977-78, the Com-
munists were in a position to provide leadership and
agitational expertise to the masses of new militants
who were not particular about their marching part-
ners. Peace organizations during that period tended in
effect to be Communist fronts or nearly so. Even after
the focus changed to anti-INF agitation in 1979, the
Communists retained a disproportionate (though di-
minishing) influence over the planning and execution
The actions of Soviet officials indicate their belief
that pressure against NATO arms programs-partic-
ularly INF-serves their country's interest. Soviet
leaders typically tailor their statements on security
issues to appeal to the West European public. Several
sophisticated and articulate officials of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) spend much of
their time trying to popularize the Soviet view on
armaments questions. This group includes Vadim
Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International De-
partment of the CPSU Central Committee; Leonid
M. Zamyatin, chief of the International Information
Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Valen-
tin Falin, Zamyatin's first chief deputy; and Georgiy
Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and
Canada. In addition to these spokesmen, a network of
minor Soviet officials performs liaison duties to local
Communist parties and sometimes is represented at
meetings of peace groups. While many peace activists
are skeptical about Soviet good will on arms issues,
they are often impryssed by the willingness of Soviets
to talk to them and to be interviewed by the West
European press, and by what they perceive to be the
We believe that formal organizations are not neces-
sarily the most important potential influence on na-
tional security policy. In our judgment, political lead-
ers pay less attention to the hard-core agitators-a
type they have seen for decades-than to supporters
of the movement among apparently moderate or
previously apolitical sectors of the public. In most
countries there are many people who have not joined a
specific peace group or taken to the streets, but whose
opposition to nuclear weapons is confirmed in public
opinion surveys. These people can be considered part
of the peace movement broadly construed, and West
European political leaders, who increasingly use polit-
ical polling, are sensitive to the possible effects of
peace sentiment at the ballot bo
flexibility of Soviet positions.
Reliable sources have described how Soviet represent-
atives have often given top priority to the peace
campaign when meeting with West European
munists.
 --kast German officials frequently
counsel local West European Comm
the tactics they wish to see pursued. u
It appears, however, that the Soviet commitment does
not extend to major financial contributions. The
25X1
This episode was publicized by the Danish Govern-
ment and resulted in heavy public criticism of the
Soviets, resignations by many non-ConinMilts from
the e
mat 25X1
Soviets and East Germans often provide funding At Soviet insistence, most of the local Communist
through local Communist parties and fronts for such parties have thrown themselves into alliances of con-
items as transportation and printing. We believe, venience with socialists, social democrats, ecologists,
however,-that non-Communist organizations provide religious groups, and a wide variety of leftist fringe
the bulk of the funding for the larger rallies, in which groups that historically have been their bitter rivals.
they generally predominate, and that many inThe Communists do their best to domi ch
demonstrators n expenses groupings. Especially during the early ning of
I Inoted recently that peace activity, many in the movement i no fully
e anti-neutron-bomb campaign of 1977-78, which understand Communist techniques of political ma-
was generally a Communist-dominated operation, was nipulation, or realize which of their colleagues in the
financed largely through fund-raising events and con- movement were Communists
tributions from individual art" ' Moscow's interests
f
rom IVILOSCOW ecently that most peace activists in the
laim to be aware of such Communist t
e
noted
try
is,' but the
enetration of essentially non-Communist peace orga-
izations by unacknowledged Communists who have
he time and resources to devote to such activit is a
ontinuing proble 25X1
In our judgment, therefore, Such sub rosa influence, however, is insufficient to
levels of peace activity would not be affected greatly if explain why the movement has attracted such a broad
the movement had to do without financial contribu- constituency during the past two years after a proxi-
ti
f
M
ons
rom
oscow mately two decades of failure by Comm4i - pon-
sorea groups using similar tactic 25X1
The Soviets and some of the West European Commu- ave not l k the
nist parties are conducting an elaborate covert cam- strength of non-Communist participation in the move-
paign intended to attract broad participation in peace ment indicates that it would be influential and op-
activities. The Soviets use forgeries, for example, to posed to many NATO policies even without Commu-
try to discredit the United States and NATO in nist involvement. Public opinion surveys in West
Western Europe. At times, however, these efforts Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium support this
have been clumsy and have been exposed by Western contention; they indicate
governments to good effect. For example, an article in tion is at most 15 percent! 25X1
a Norwegian newspaper in November 1981 cited a
document that "proved" US intentions to use nuclear
weapons against Norway under certain circum-
stances. The document was exposed as the latest
fraudulent rewrite of a NATO document stolen 20
years before which contained no such references to
Norway. Another example of Soviet active measures
came to light last winter in Denmark, where the
Soviets employed a Danish journalist as a conduit for
channeling funds to a peace group that they favored.
Furthermore, the balance of forces within the peace
movement is becoming more unfavorable to the Com-
munists. In the Northern European countries where
the movement is strongest, Communist leverage has
diminished during the past year as the base of the
movement has expanded. The non-Communist parts
of the movement now have funds to hire their own
 militants to work on a permanent or semipermanent
basis, and these elements have gained experience and
confidence in promoting protest activity. Now the
Soviets sometimes find themselves in the uncomfort-
able position of having to deal primarily with their
docile front organizations, or encouraging broader
peace groups that have more credibility with the
public, but also criticize Soviet policies.
25X1
25X1
The balance of forces in the Italian peace movement
is quite different from that in Northern Europe. The
Communist Party (PCI) is more than ever the primary
actor in the peace movement. PCI leaders, however,
appear to be motivated more by domestic politics than
by Moscow's efforts to encourage peace activity. We
believe that the PCI wants to benefit with the voters
by being the main "force for peace" in Italy, and at
the same time to avoid losing votes on the peace
i s
to the small parties of the far left. 25X1
The Italian Communists in the past have often been a
thorn in the side of the Soviets. The party criticized
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
more recently criticized the Soviet line on Afghani-
stan and Poland. In the wake of martial law in
Poland, the PCI went so far as to state that the Soviet
model for Communism was invalid.' In our judgment,
In the Netherlands, the powerful Interchurch Peace
Council (IKV) has begun to speak out critically on the
same issues. In May an IKV official went to Moscow
intending to bring up Soviet arms policy and human
rights in Eastern Europe at the "Peace Congress of
World Religions." When he was denied the right to
speak, he walked out and made his points to the
Western press. The IKV has also been criticized by
some elements in the peace movement for its insist-
ence on supporting groups such as Solidarity in
Poland and the Czech dissident group Charter `77.
We believe that some of this increased desire to be
"evenhanded" arises from a genuine resentment about
Soviet policies and about the Communists who try to
force those policies on the movement. At the same
time, some movement leaders probably realize that
good public relations increasingly demand a critical
stance toward some Soviet policies
In either case, the resulting fragmentation and criti-
cism has caused worry amon Iocal
Communist
officials and in Mosco
Secret
such PCI criticism at times has detracted from Mos-
cow's prestige and impaired Soviet ability to conduct
effective propaganda campaigns in Western Europe.
Although the PCI's present activism against INF
deployment serves IMM'oscow's interests, we believe that
the party would quickly abandon this position should
the PCI leadership determine that its role in the ace
movement is costing the party political support e 5X1
Growing international contact among the various
West European peace groups also is working against
'For a full r d' &CJDJPI Intelligence Memorandum, EUR
82-1004 April 1982, The PCI and the 25X1
Italian o urca ame: The Impact of Polan25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 200
Soviet attempts to control the movement. Such con-
tact consists primarily of exchanges of opinion,
mutual encouragement, and publicity seeking, rather
than binding decisions. Newly created international
umbrella groups like the International Communica-
tion and Coordination Center and the Campaign for
European Nuclear Disarmament have reduced the
role of the Communists and undermined the influence
of the Moscow-dominated World Peace Council
(WPC). Although the WPC leadership, like the West
European Communist parties, often congratulates it-
self on "successes" in promoting peace activity, the
biggest demonstrations are generally those that owe
the least to WPC efforts. For example, it was the
Dutch IKV rather than a WPC affiliate that took the
lead in organizing the demonstration in Amsterdam
last November, which was probably the largest that
the new West European peace movement has generat-
Communists still retain greater influence in the peace
movement than their relatively small numbers would
imply. Nevertheless, we believe that with the excep-
tion of Italy the main impetus behind peace activity
today-in terms of ideas and control as well as
participation and funding-comes from non-Commu-
nist elements within these countries rather than from
their Communist parties or the Soviet Union. This
can be attributed in part to the heightened awareness
among movement leaders of Communist and Soviet
attempts to steamroll them, but it is due also to the
wider composition of the movement. We believe that
even in the absence of further Soviet assistance the
peace movement would have sufficient momentum to
maintain substantial pressure on key NATO govern-
ments.
The broadening of the composition and concerns of
the movement to encompass more non-Communist
elements and greater agitation against Soviet policies
presents some problems for the Soviets. They are
concerned that peace groups increasingly criticize
their nuclear weapons policy and their policies in
Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, in our judgment, even
the more "nonaligned" segments of the movement
pose far greater dangers to Western than to Soviet
interests. Virtually everyone in the movement still
focuses primarily against NATO's INF program. If
pressures produced by the movement helped to kill
that program, it would be a boon for the Soviets
outweighing any damage caused b increased anti-
Soviet activity. 25X1