SURINAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604010009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 16, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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SURINAME: Current Situation
13 August 1982
Army Commander Daysi Bouterse emerged as Suriname's strongman six
months after he and a group of fellow noncommissioned officers toppled
the constitutionally elected government of Henck Arron in February
1980. Since then Bouterse has exerted effective control over the
civilian government and military establishment, although he has little
popular support. Bouterse has made several attempts to develop a
political base but has met with little success. Despite several
failed coup attempts by disgruntled minorities, public apathy and the
lack of an attractive alternative perpetuate Bouterse's hold on power.2
Suriname's constitution has been in a state of suspension since
August 1980. Bouterse appointed the current civilian government in
March 1982 after dismissing the somewhat more independent government
of President Chin A Sen, who was appointed shortly after the 1980
coup. Theoretically, a Policy Center composed of the top military
and civilian leaders decides the course of Suriname's policies. In
reality, however, Bouterse and Foreign Minister Harvey Naarendorp
make most decisions affecting the nation's political orientation and
foreign relations, leaving only the recommendations on economic mat-
ters in the hands of Prime Minister Neijhorst. Elections have not
been scheduled and probably will riot be held until--if ever--Bouterse
feels confident that he could be elected by a popular vote. Although
a new constitution has been written, it probably will not be promul-
gated because it gives insufficient governing powers to the military 25X1
Although Bouterse and Naarendorp claim that their foreign.policy
is nonaligned and nationalistic, they appear to be directing Suriname
on a leftist and pro-Cuban course. In order to entrench himself more
securely i'n power, Bouterse is looking to Cuba and Grenada as models,
and he is, taking advice and some limited military assistance from
the Castro regime. 25X1
Havana recently designated a high level party official with intel-
ligence experience as Cuba's Ambassador to Suriname in an apparent
effort to expand its influence and access with the Bouterse regime.
Moreover, the Ambassador-designate Osvaldo Cardenas Junquera--,is one
of the few black Cubans in a prominent party position and already has
established a close relationship with Bouterse--.a black creole. The
Castro regime employed a similar strategy successfully in Grenada
where their ambassador is close confidante and advisor to Maurice
Bishop. 25X1
In the last week, domestic opposition to some of Bouterse's policies
has stirred. Legal professionals protested his unilateral reversal
of a judicial decision which released two alleged participants in the
March coups tTheir criticism was strong enough. to force B.outerse to
back down. We also have reporting that Deputy Commander .Horb and labor
leader Fred Derby confronted Bouterse with criticisms of his policy
tow
d C
b
ar
u
a. As' the lines are drawn for'and against Bouterse, the
ossi'biliti
p
es of yet another coup attempt increase.
Suriname's economy experienced no growth in 1981 and none is ex-
pected for 1982. In the past, trade deficits have been covered by
foreign aid, however, we expect that Suriname will experience its
first Balance of Payments deficit in 1982. Investment has stagnated,
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a situation caused by political uncertainty, perceived instability,
and import.difficulties. We anticipate more deficit financing by
the government as bauxite taxes decrease due to world market condi-
tions, raises for civil servants are approved for political reasons,
social welfare programs are instituted, and military spending increases.
Nevertheless, Suriname's relatively high GNP per capita, low debt
service ratio, and modest inflation/unemployment situation out it in
better shape than most of its Caribbean neighbors. 25X1
Relations with the Dutch have been strained since the dismissal
of Chin A Sen and the summary execution of one of the leaders of an
abortive coup in March 1982. Suriname is highly dependent on the
generous, 15 year development aid package initiated by the Dutch
upon independence in 1975. The bilateral meetings to program the
aid were suspended after Chin A Seri's ouster and have not resumed."
If the stalemate continues, money in the development pipeline will
slow to a trickle by early next year and worsen the economic stag
nation. 25X1
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