NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: AUGUST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:
1.4 /
Z
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM F RM 36-8
I FEB 55. 241 WHICHCMAY0BE USED. (47) -
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #6289-83
1 September 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: August
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. Lebanon
(1) The renewed fighting in late August
poses the most serious threat to the survival
of the Gemayel government since last fall.
Collapse of the government, the assassination
of Gemayel, or major Muslim defections from
the Army would precipitate a showdown between
the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Muslim-
Druze coalition. Israeli withdrawal to the
Awwali River will remove the only remaining
restraint on a contest for control of the Shuf
and a renewed partition of Beirut along the
Green Line.
(2) The Syrians almost certainly will
seize the opportunity to deepen their
intervention in Lebanese politics. Syrian
media have warned that "Syria cannot be
neutral" when Israel and the Phalange militia
are attempting to sharpen the polarization
between Christian and Shia/Druze forces, and
it may orchestrate the installation of a
separatist regime based on the National
Salvation Front formed by Druze leader
Junblatt in late July. The Syrians may also
exploit the chance to gain control over the
port of Tripoli and to eliminate Palestinian
forces loyal to Arafat in refugee camps
outside the city.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
(3) The confusion in Israeli politics
caused by Begin's declared intention to resign
will encourage the Syrians to press their
advantage in Lebanon. Israeli contacts with
the Lebanese Forces and the impending Israeli
withdrawal to the Awwali will strengthen
Assad's incentive to force a Muslim-Christian
showdown in a bid to establish irreversible
Syrian predominance in Lebanon north of the
Israel security zone.
(4) If the Lebanese Forces appear to be
losing in a showdown with Syrian-backed Shia
and Druze forces, the Israeli government
almost certainly will intervene to prevent a
Christian defeat. This contingency would
sharply increase the chances of renewed
Israeli-Syrian hostilities, particularly if
Assad pursues a deliberately provocative
course in an attempt to force the U.S. and the
Soviet Union to intervene to arrange a cease-
fire and negotiations for a "comprehensive"
Arab-Israeli settlement, including the return
of the Golan Heights to Syria.
b. USSR-INF
(1) The Soviets are setting the stage for
a new proposal ostensibly designed to break
the impasse in the Geneva talks. Moscow's
immediate objective will be to generate strong
sentiment in Western Europe for a postponement
of INF deployment. A new Soviet initiative
may be announced in connection with the next
round at Geneva that opens on 6 September or
during Andropov's visit to Bulgaria in late
October.
(2) The Soviets may couple a proposal for
a mutual moratorium on INF deployments as long
as the Geneva talks continue with further
revisions of Andropov's December 1982 offer to
reduce Soviet delivery vehicles and warheads
to a level equal to that of Britain and
France. Andropov's 26 August offer to
"liquidate" all missiles the Soviets would
reduce, including a "considerable number" of
SS-20's, suggests that Moscow is preparing
further gestures along this line, perhaps an
offer to allow Britain and France to retain
three missiles for each SS-20 in order to
freeze warheads at 162 on each side.
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
STAT
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
SECRET
f. Chile
(1) The government's strategy to keep the
lid on, strengthen military support, and
divide the opposition by making a number of
concessions is vulnerable to leftist-
instigated violence. The next major test
probably will occur on 8 September, when
opposition leaders plan a fifth day of
national protest--the 10th anniversary of the
overthrow of the Allende government.
(2) If these demonstrations result in
casualties that exceed those of the clashes on
9-12 August, there would be heightened chances
of a split in the armed forces that could lead
to military pressure for Pinochet's
resignation. The Navy and Air Force appear to
be increasingly restive. Air Force Chief
General Matthei called on 12 August for an
"understanding" with the political parties and
for a "political debate."
g. Pakistan
(1) Violent disturbances by the Pakistan
People's Party have disrupted life throughout
Sina Province and forced Army units to take
control in several areas. If the movement
spreads to the Punjab, the home of most of the
Army, Zia's hold on power would be threatened.
Attachments:
NI0/AF
NIO/EA
NI0/Narcotics
NIO/LA
NI0/NESA
NI0/USSR-EE
NI0/WE
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4
STAT
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85M00363R000601490020-4