COCOM BOOK CABLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000601070005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/04: CIA-RDP85M00364R000601070005-6
UNCLASSIFIED
COCOM
STAT
1. The. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) was established in January 1950 as NATO's
economic counterpart. Composed of all the NATO signatories
(except Iceland and Spain) plus Japan, COCOM is governed by no
formal treaty or charter and has no standing under international
law. 'Instead, COCOM operates as a "gentleman's agreement" among
its member-states to coordinate their national export controls
policies vis-a-vis proscribed Best' USSR, the PRC and STAT
the countries of Eastern Europe). 7
2. COCOM administers several embargo lists that -- together
with interpretive notes, administrative principles, special rules
and developed practice -- constitute the body of rules by which
COCOM operates. These embargo lists are:
-- International List I, which covers industrial and
commercial items;
-- the International Munitions List of controlled
military items;
The Atomic Energy List, which includes sources of
fissionable materials, nuclear reactors and their
components.
Items on the Munitions and Atomic Energy Lists have clear
military applications; generally, there is little disagreement
within COCOM on the need to restrict their export. International
List I, however, contains dual-use items having both civilian and
military applications. Disagreement among COCOM's member-states
usually is focused on these items. STAT
3. Every three years, COCOM reviews each List for
deletions, amendments and additions. These List Reviews enable
COCOM to:
- keep its controls current by incorporating
scientific and technical advances into each List;
-- accommodate its internal debate on the relative
emphases given security concerns vs. trade
opportunities in each List.
COCOM's strategic criteria for conducting these List Reviews are
twofold:
-- Soviet capabilities and deficiencies in producing
each item on the Lists must be considered.
-- The potential military applicat
the Lists must be anticipated. STAT
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UNCLASSIFIED
4. Once the COCOM member-states agree on the Lists'
compositions, applications for export licenses from member-
states' firms are processed COCOM by comparing the item proposed
for export against the items enumerated on the appropriate
List. COCOM's system of interpretive notes, administrative
principles, special rules and developed practice bears directly
on this license review process because it can provide for an
exception to the general COCOM embargo of items specified by the
Lists. STAT
5. The overall trend in COCOM's controls through 1979 has
been one of gradually increasing liberalization. This has
resulted from several factors, including the:
-- increasing Soviet capability to produce items
previously subject to COCOM controls;
-- desire of many COCOM member-states to exploit the
trade opportunities with proscribed destinations
which arose during the detente era;
-- proliferation of "third-country" (i.e., non-COCOM)
sources of supply for many of the items on the COCOM
Lists.
In the 1982-83 List Review. the ttempting to reverse this
liberalizing trend. -._, STAT
6. Decision-making in COCOM (in both the List Review and
licensing processes) reflects the informal nature of the
organization:
all COCOM decisions are made on the basis of
unanimity;
no COCOM decision is binding (in the sense
understood in international law) on its member-
states.
The unanimity rule has both positive and negative effects on
COCOM's operations:
-- where all member-states agree on the extent of
COCOM's controls, the rule reinforces COCOM's
operational consensus and enhances its
effectiveness;
-- where the member-states' security and trade
interests diverge,.the unanimity rule allows any
country to exercise a unilateral veto on COCOM's
operations and can, therefore. result in grave
Approved For Release 2008/02/04: CIA-RDP85M00364R000601070005-6
STAT
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7. Perhaps the greatest limitation on COCOM's effectiveness
is its reliance on voluntary reporting by exporters to member-.
states' governments, and on those governments to submit
applications for export licenses to COCOM for its approval. This
self-reporting principle allows unscrupulous businessmen or (more
rarely) recalcitrant member-states' governmen s to circumvent
COCOM',s export restrictions. STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/04: CIA-RDP85M00364R000601070005-6