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CAN ANDROPOV CONTROL HIS GENERALS

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85M00364R001001580066-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 26, 2007
Sequence Number: 
66
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 6, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 Can Andropov.control his generals.? The Soviet Union does not have a militaryindustrial complex; it is one. If Mr Yuri Andropov Is to get the Soviet economy moving again, he needs to break the generals' control over the country's resources. The Soviet Union is a military giant but an economic weakling. Its leader,. Mr Yuri Andropov, was hoisted to power. nine months ago in the expectation that he could put new muscle into the ailing economy. The Soviet Union is a super- power because of its military strength. This needs a strong economic base, But the base is crumbling under the increas- ing weight of the military burden it has to carry. Defence spending is still rising by a real 4-5% each. year, outstripping gnp growth, which has slumped from an annual rate of about 4% in the 1970s to barely 2% today. Nobody knows for certain what the total defence budget is, but its share of the national cake is rising. The Rus- sians say defence accounts for only 3% of gnp, which is obviously untrue. The American CIA reckons the figure is over 16% of g*cp, which is probably closer to the mark. In his latter years, Brezhnev paid the military bill by cutting back on industrial investment. The slump in the growth of investment from over 7% a year in the mid-1970s to an average of barely 2% in the past two years has had a dampening effect on . an already declining growth rate. Because of the time lag between new investment and a visible return, this' starvation diet will hit harder as the 1980s wear on. Under Mr Andropov's new management, investment is planned to grow by 4% this year and by more in 1984. But to achieve this Mr Andropov will have to cut resources from else- where: either out of consumer spending or, less likely, out of defence. The defence effort has 'not merely drained cash from the civilian economy. It has also distorted economic develop- ment. For example, in the past 40 years, productivity in the food industry and light industry has increased only about four times; but in the machine-building, met- allurgy and -chemical industries, all of which devote a large chunk of their output to defence, productivity has risen over 15 times. The Soviet Union has been remarkably efficient at producing guns and-partly as a consequence-patheti- cally inefficient at producing butter. How they got there Twenty years ago the -Soviet Union's strategic missile forces barely, existed; today they are a match, and maybe more, for the best a far richer United States can produce. Improvements in naval, air and land forces have been no less spectacular. The Soviet Union now boasts the world's largest submarine force. According to American government figures, Soviet tank production in recent years has out- numbered Nato's by three to one, its production of fighter-bombers by three to two, and its production of surface-to-air missiles by about seven to one. This build-up has been achieved by the follow- ing policies: Absolute priority to defence. The Sovi- et system of central planning is tailor- made to suit generals. Raw materials or parts in short supply can be redirected to priority tasks, and military industry al- ways has top priority. All branches of the economy are obliged to satisfy military demands first; civilian factories have to make do with what is left. If supplies run out, factories working on military con- tracts can simply take what they. need from civilian factories. Party officials have instructions to make sure that they get it. - Special favours for key workers. De- fence industrialists have been known to stay in the same job for 20 years or more. Weapon design teams under such.famous names as Korolev, Yangel, Ilyushin and Antonov span more than one generation. There is no shortage of funds or research facilities and research teams can call on the assistance of a battery of research institutes attached to the Soviet academy of sciences. Brain drain: The best manufacturing brains and skills go into defence. Talent- ed managers head for missile plants rath- er than factories making refrigerators. And the best workers follow the best managers. An engineer can earn between 20% and 50% more in a military enter-', prise than in a civilian one. There are other benefits too: easier acctssto educa- tion for children, better housing and better-stocked factory shops. Consumer control. Unlike the ordinary Soviet consumer, who has to put up with If the soldiers want Andropov to,get things moving, they've got to move too Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 EUROPE ' Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 whatever second-rate goods are avail- able, the generals order what they want. They give precise instructions to the de- sign teams and manufacturers, and they send their own military inspectors to make sure their high standards are met. Faulty equipment is discarded. Cost is a secondary consideration. Generals as politicians. In- the United States, defence manufacturers and their lobbyists press the government to buy their arms. But they are still an outside influence. In the Soviet Union the de- fence lobby is lodged firmly inside the political system. At the top, the defence council, chaired by Mr Andropov, brings together the most-senior party and mili- tarv men to make important' decisions. Farther down in the hierarchy,.defence allocations are handled by an indepen- dent department of the state planning agency, Gosplan, which always puts mili tare interests first. A military-industrial commission acts as troubleshooter to make sure the generals get what they need. Nine ministries form the core of the military-industrial complex: from the ministry of general machine-building, which- is in charge of the production of Soviet nuclear weapons, to the more aptly-named ministries of shipbuilding and aviation. . . Defence information monopoly. The generals control all information on de- fence issues. There are no civilian think- tanks in the Soviet Union, such as Rand or-the Brookings Institution in the United States, to carry out independent research into defence policy. Even civil servants are kept in the dark. This jealous guard- ing of military secrets has its ludicrous side. In the Salt-1 missile talks, General (now Marshal) Nikolai Ogarkov took an American delegate aside and asked the Their guns are better than their fridges Americans not to discuss the details of Soviet weapons in front of the Soviet civilian negotiators, who were not meant to know about them. Civilian chaos The planning that guarantees the smooth running of the Soviet Union's military economy creates periodic chaos for civil- ian industry. Competing with the defence industries, for example, is a mug's game. A manager of a civilian refrigerator fac= tory, offered the choice between an up- to-date insulating material used in mili- tary production and an old-fashioned sort, is likely to choose the old-fashioned one simply because his stocks are less likely to be raided by the army. The much vaunted scientific-technical revolution, which was to have helped remake Soviet industry in the 1970s, has turned instead into a narrow military- technical revolution. In the west new ideas developed for military -and space programmes-in computing, electronics and materials science-have given extra zip to civilian industry. In. the Soviet Union the spin-off has led to industrial innovation in a few cases but more often to decline in the civilian sector and con- surer frustration. Recognising at least part of the prob- lem, Brezhnev several times called on the defence sector to devote more effort to the production of consumer goods. In 1971, he claimed that 42% of defence production already fed back into the civilian economy. He gave no details but defence factories do produce goods rang- ing from aluminium foil and outboard motors to baby carriages, children's toys and vacuum cleaners. The Russians do not go short of real tanks and guns to produce toy ones. The burden on Russia Defence spending as % of gdp 01975 01982 !A$% 01 qnsi. Military enterprises . make consumer goods just to use up spare capacity. All the same, the wise Soviet shopper looks for factory codes to identify goods made in military factories. The quality control may not be as high as that for rifles, tanks or aircraft, but it is often better than in civilian factories. . . . Andropov's choices Before he died last November, Brezhnev had called his top officers to the Kremlin for a pep talk. He told them that the Soviet Union's economic resources were not unlimited and that the armed forces would have to make maximum use of the resources already at their disposal. That -came close to saying that not all the army's demands could be met. . Senior military men were part of the coalition for change that put Mr Andro- pov in power, and he has been careful not to trample on their interests. But that has not stopped him echoing Brezhnev's, warning. There are some economic facts that neither Mr Andropov nor his mili- tary backers can ignore: as the cut-back in investment has shown, the choice is not one of just guns versus butter, but of guns versus the sort of investment in defence industry as well as the civil sector that can support the pace of Soviet weapon development. Mr Andropov has three choices. He can slow down the growth in defence spending and devote the extra resources to the rest of the economy. Or he can reform the . system of planning which allows the generals to choke off industrial growth. Or he can keep tinkering with the existing economic mechanism, trying to squeeze out greater efficiency and higher output, and leave the defence sector unscathed. Mr Andropov would face several diff- iculties if he tried to slow down defence spending.- First, he would have to over- come opposition from the generals..This would be especially tricky if he. had made no progress in the arms-control negotia- tions with the Americans. Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 Second, the benefits of defence cuts would take a long time to materialise. According to American figures*, even if defence spending were frozen until the end of the decade-itself a far-fetched proposition-the annual rate of growth of Soviet grip would probably increase by no more than 0.2% a year. The growth in per capita consumption could be greater, up to 0.5% a year. But this might not make the Soviet consumer's lot markedly better, especially if most of the money. not spent on defence was diverted first to investment. Part of the problem. is that resources defence to the civilian sector. Factory re- tooling costs money. On present perfor- mance Soviet civilian industry would find it hard to absorb extra capacity, and what it did absorb would be plagued by the same bottlenecks, caused by the army- first policy, that have worn down the rest of civilian industry. Biting-the bullet Without radical reform of the civilian economy, any injection of new resources taken from defence would be largely wasted. So is Mr Andropov making a stab at serious reform? Probably not. He has tried to boost farm output by paying farm workers by results; he has booted out the most incompetent of his ministers; and he has started a series of `'experiments" to. increase industrial effi- ciency. The latest, due to begin on Janu- ary 1st in: two Moscow-based ministries and selected -industries in Byelorussia, Latvia and the Ukraine, will give manag- ers more freedom. to take their own production decisions.. _ When measured against 50 years of tight central planning, none of this is adventurous enough to make much of an impact on the performance of the econo- my. The signs so far are that Mr Andro- pov is going for the third option: mud- dling. He seems to be hoping to avoid hard decisions, and to duck a clash with the generals. . But, without radical change, the Soviet economy will enter the 1990s with the same problems ,that dog it today. The army's top brass had supported Mr An- dropov as the party leader most likely to ..break the immobilising spell of Brezh- nev's last years and to -get the country working again. If they cannot get what they want out of the limited changes he has introduced so far, they may have to bite the bullet and put their weight be- hind real economic reform. In the end, it could be the only way to maintain the Soviet Union's military'might. 'Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects, Part I. Published for the joint economic committee of. congress, 1983. Craxi told the president he could do it Italy Veni, vidi Luck favours the persistent. Italy's So- cialist leader; Mr Bettino Craxi, this week succeeded in his fourth attempt in as many years to become prime minister. On -August 4th he told President Pertini that he had the necessary support to form a five-party coalition made up of Social- ists, Christian Democrats and three -smaller parties-Republicans, Social Democrats and Liberals. Mr Craxi will be the first Socialist and only the second non-Christian Democrat to be prime min- ister since 1945. Mr Craxi has benefited from the defen- siveness of the Christian Democrats, whose support fell by 5% to 33% in the June election. The party feared that if it .had rejected Mr Craxi the Socialists might have gone into opposition and, eventually, joined an alliance with the Communists. Mr Ciriaco de Mita, the Christian Demo- cratic leader, is comforting himself with the thought that the prime minister's chair could prove uncomfortable for Mr Craxi. The installation of 112 cruise missiles in Sicily, due to begin at the end of this year, and the containment of runaway public spending are issues which will severely test any government. The smaller parties, although uneasy about Mr Craxi's domineering manner, have an interest in seeing him succeed. A defeat for the Christian Democrats is, in some measure, a victory for them. The' idea of having a prime minister from outside the Christian Democratic ranks, established by the Republicans' Mr Gio- vanni Spadolini in 1981, will in future seem less unusual. The Craxi ministry reflects the strengthening of the middle ground: .the Socialists and their three small partners increased their share of the. vote from 17.4% to 23.5% between 1976, and 1983. The price Mr Craxi has had to pay for Christian Democratic and Republican support is an agreement to introduce the policies of economic restraint they fa- vour. The Socialists now 'seem to accept the logic of that. Party officials say that Mr Craxi is considering cuts in public spending, particularly pensions and health benefits. He is also said to favour a curb on tax exemptions and evasion, more restrictions on the scala mobile (wage indexation) and strict price con- trols as methods of -containing a 16% inflation rate and a public-sector borrow- ing requirement that is heading for 100 trillion lire (#42} billion) this year, some 18% of gdp. The new government will aim to reduce inflation to 7% by the end of 1984. A two-year programme to create jobs for 200,000 young people may, how- ever, be included as a concession to Socialist and Social Democratic concern over-, unemployment. The Christian Democrats had also wanted a commitment from Mr Craxi that he would gradually ease his party out of its alliances with the Communists in many of Italy's major cities. Mr de Mita wanted an insurance against a possible future Socialist alliance with the Commu- nists at the national level, should the proposed coalition of the centre-left fail Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8 EUROPE .- to ;prove any more stable than its prede- cessors were during the previous parlia' ment. Mt Craxi regarded this demand as unreasonable, although he seems to have given some vague promise that he would avoid joining new coalitions with the Communists in the cities. Assuming that Mr Craxi wins a parlia- mentary vote of confidence next week, he. will soon be gazing down from the terrace of his top-floor suite in the Hotel Raphael ors modern and imperial Rome, having conquered the political capital which spurned him so often. in the past. Immigrants- Enoch Chi.rac.. Long; hot summers are traditional en- emies of good race relations. France is no exception.. The past month has seen a series of shooting attacks on immigrants and a tear-gas- assault on a block of flats occupied mainly by Turks in the normally peaceful Auvergne town of Bourganeuf. The incident which caused most anger was the shooting, on July 9th, of a 10-- year-old Algerian-boy; Toufik Ouannes, as he let off. fireworks to celebrate the end of Ramadanrin a Paris suburb. The. fact that the. victims were. from Africa and the Caribbean has revived a debate about how 'France can best cope with its _ 4.3m- immigrants who do not qualify for - French nationality-parti- cularly the 1.4m. Arabs, and the 106,000 from black Africa. The less visible though larger immigrant populations from Por- tugal,. Italy and Spain are rarely men- tioned, and understandably keep their heads down. Extreme right-wingers, who did unex- pectedly well, in municipal elections in March, say that if France booted out its 2m immigrant workers unemployment would disappear, ignoring the, unwilling- ness of most Frenchmen to take the dirty, poorly-paid jobs immigrants perform. At the. other extreme, some of the more emotional mourners at Toufik Ouanni s's funeral vowed to turn the housing estate where he died into an immigrant fortress which no policeman would dare enter. The Socialist government is well aware of the potential explosiveness of the im- migrant issue, and is somewhat embar- rassed by it. Left-wingers would like to see France as an open-hearted country ready to receive the poor and downtrod- den. The realities of office have forced them to introduce measures to cut immi- gration to a trickle and to crack down on illegal immigrants who failed to register during.a grace period last year: The trouble is that?nobody is convinced The fires in the south The. chunky yellow aircraft scud over lagoons and calm patches of sea, scoop- ing, up water.. Then they swing inland, skimming over flaming ridges or probing into smoke-filled valleys. They release their cargo, return for more water, and come back to the hills-hour after hour. Thee headquarters of the busiest of these aerial fire-brigades is near Mar- seilles. It controls 22 firefighting aircraft; four reconnaissance aircraft and nine helicopters, and can call out 1,000 spe- cially trained troops. Since mid-July the force has beew in action in Corsica; where fires have devoured more- than 40,000 hectares of woodland and scrub, in French and Spanish: Catalonia- where over 20,000, hectares of -pine and cork oak were lost, and on the Cdte d'Azur. In: the same period an inferno 130 kilo- metres wide charred Sardinia; and major fires broke.- out in Calabria and Jugoslavia. Most fires are attributed to the care- lessness of smokers, picnickers and oth- ers, but deliberate fireraisers are surpris- ingly. - numerous. - They include speculators wishing to acquire land cheaply, shepherds who want more pas- ture, children eager to see firemen at work, people with a grievance, and ter- rorists. In Corsica last week 14 fires were started deliberately in one day. Few fires are ignited by natural phenomena such as lightning. Their spread is helped by the neglect of woodland resulting from the rural exodus: too many woods are choked by undergrowth that flares up at the drop of a spark. The French are the most efficient firefighters in the Mediterranean region and they pay more attention than their neighbours to preventive. measures. the government's measures are working. Second thoughts about some of the more arbitrary regulations, together with diplo- matic pressure from former colonies in north Africa, have created loopholes. A- move to have expulsions dealt with by the courts, rather than by police or officials, is causing a big backlog of cases. Illegal immigrants still trek over the mountains into France: 1,186 were caught crossing the eastern Pyrenees last year. Since West Germany decided to reduce its immigrant worker population (see next article), clandestine human traf- fic into France from the east has in- creased. One favoured route lies through a cemetery in Saarbrucken which is con- veniently close to the frontier. Other people from former British colonies, who claim right of entry under EEC freedorn- of-movement rules, have come to France . from Britain. Indeed, worry about .black immigration from Britain may explain Some local authorities in France are financing the clearing of undergrowth and even encouraging shepherds to graze their flocks in woodland from which they were. once barred because they damaged saplings. A French. firm has designed a six-wheeled tractor which rips up undergrowth and crushes it into bales of saleable fuel. - In Spain, firefighting :has improved since the late 1970s, when an industrial city of 100,000 inhabitants had, only four fire-engines. But a recent fire near Gir- ona, which left a. vast. regional park-a.- desert-of ash and black treetrunks, re- vealed inadequate equipment and poor co-ordination between the central gov.' ernment, which controls Spain's 12 fire- fighting aircraft, and the Catalan-author- ities, which operate other fire services. Inadequate equipment. hampered effi- ciency in Sardinia, too, and the Italian government asked its EEC' partners to help.. Efficient firefighting is, of course, expensive. One hour's flight by a DC-6 costs the taxpayers $34,000. Since 1970 some 1.3m hectares have been destroyed by fire in Spain, repre- - senting . a loss of over $100m. Spanish Catalonia. has lost a tenth of its wood- land in eight years. And in France some 100,000 hectares have been ravaged in the past three years. In Spain and some other Mediterranean countries more trees are burnt each year than are plant- ed. Yet attempts to reafforest devastat- ed areas with trees which are less flam- mable than the fragrant Mediterranean pine are- sometimes resisted. In Spain a new plantation of deciduous trees was cut down one night by self-styled ecolo- gists. They -said they were preirenting "ecological imbalance". why coachloads of West Indian day-trip- pers were not allowed to enter Calais or Boulogne last weekend: a decision which provoked an official protest from the British foreign office. . The French government is promising fresh measures against illegal immigrants, now estimated at 300,000. But the real running on the issue is being made by Mr Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and lead- er of the opposition Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR). While stressing how much be abhors racism, Mr Chirac reckons that "the tolerance level has -been passed" in some areas of the capital where more than half the primary school- children are foreigners. Mr Chirac plans to make life tougher for illegal immigrants by imposing more stringent tests of the.. documents they have to produce to show that they are in- France legally. He also. wants to ,ensure that social services and health care in THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 6. 1983 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580066-8

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