USSR: LEADERSHIP RANKS IN TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001101590020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 4, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
vsiur~ton n c trios
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
January 4, 1QR2
USSR: Leadership Ranks in Transition
Summary
Yuriy Andropov has clearly established himself as the
Soviet Union's top leader. Re is moving cautiously,
nonetheless, to place his stamp on key personnel decisions.
While a number of changes have been announced since he became
General Secretary, most appear to have been the product of
compromise and some may even have been decided before
Rrezhnev's death. The cumulative effect of the actions
already taken, however, has given the impression of decisive
movement after the staenation f Rrezhnev's last years, and
major new appointments are
likely in the spring.
Opportunities and Constraints
Andropov has a unique opportunity--greater than Brezhnev
ever enjoyed--to influence within a relatively short period
the selection of the next generation of party and government
leaders. As a result of the emphasis on cadre stability
during the Brezhnev years and the reluctance of the old guard
to bring new blood into the top ranks of the party, as well as
vacancies caused by the death of Brezhnev and others, a record
number of positions are now or soon will be vacant.
This paper was prepared by
Issues Branch, Policy Analysis Division, Office
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division
the Domestic
of Soviet-
may be directed
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Brezhnev's heirs, in addition, apparently recognize that
the job security of the past 18 yearn-has fostered a
permissive climate of corruption and that some sort of
housecleaning is in order. To judge from Andropov's words and
actions, he intends to capitalize on :this sentiment using a
campaign against corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency in
the party and government to weed out deadwood and bring in new
Andropov, however, faces certain disadvantages In
attempting to extend his influence within the party and
government. Ais experience has been almost entirely in the
foreign policy arena, and he has not held the kind of posts,
other than as head of the KGB, that would allow him to develop
a wide network of clients or allies that he can draw on to
staff key party and government positions. Brezhnev, by
contrast, had years of party executive experience as the head
of various regional party organizations and several stints in
the central party apparatus that gave him an extepsive network
of invaluable personal contacts.
of their past ties, Andropov's dependence on his colleagues
gives them some political leverage and serves to reinforeP
The relatively high proportion of officials with KGB
backgrounds among recent appointments attests to Andropov's
appreciation of the importance of an institutional base, but
the K(:B has obvious limitations for this vurpose. Re will
likely have to rely on other Politburo colleagues for
recommendations for staffing key positions. Although
officials now being promoted to leading posts will undoubtedly
see it in their own interest to serve him loyally regardless
Politburo, he would appear to be indebted to those who
reportedly helped him gain the top party post, Defense
Minister T)mitriy .Ustinov and Ukrainian party boss Vladimir
While Andropov has become the preeminent leader in the
continued collegiality within the leadership.
Shcherbitsky chaired: the Politburo meeting that chose
Shcherbitskiy in particular.
Andropov, and Ustinov nominated him. Brezhnev's closest
associates, moreover--Premier Nikolay Tikhonov and Party
Secretary K.onstantin Chernenko, Andropov's putative rival--
continue to hold positions of power in the Politburo and will
constitute a brake on Andropov's acquisition of power as long
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Signs of Resistance
Despite a generally impressive beginning, the results of
the Central Committee plenum and Supreme Soviet session
following Brezhnev's funeral indicate that Andropov has
encountered some resistance in consolidating his power. The
Politburo failed to select a new Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet and the few personnel decisions that were
taken seemed to reflect political compromise.
The Presidency - The Job Nobody Wanted?
Numerous rumors were floated.in the week preceding the
Plenum and Supreme Soviet session concerning the choice of a
new president. Many of these reports came from what appears
to be an Andropov promotional network
These sources strongly
indicated that three candidates were under consideration:
Chernenko, Foreign Minister Andrey nromyko and Andropov
himself. The selection of Chernenko would have effectively
removed him from his powerful post in the party Secretariat
and was, reportedly, Andropov's first choice. 'Barring that or
the choice of Gromyko, an Andro ov ally, Andropov was expected
to take the post himself.
Chernenko Gromyko were able to avoid being reassigned to
what is largely a ceremonial post and that Andropov also
turned it down. While sources close to the Andropov camp are
bushing the line that Andropov does not want the Job,, it is
one that would add measurably to his prestige, and it is more
likely that he is playing a politically astute waiting game.
Re may still be hoping to maneuver Chernenko into the post at
a later date and, failing that, he probably calculates that
his own claim to the post can only improve with the passage of
time. Whatever the reasons, however, failure to fill this
important post promptly has left an impression of some
leadership indecision and disarray that the AndroDov network
has not been able to entirely dispell.
Changes at the Top
Few personnel actions were taken by the plenum, and most
appear to have been in the works before Rrezhnev's death.
Planning official Nikolay Ryzhkov was named to the party
secretariat and Azerbaijan party boss Ceydar Aliyev was
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elevated to full membership on the Politburo. Two days later
at the Supreme Soviet session his ao_pointment as First nenuty
chairman of the USSR t'ouncil of Ministers was announced.
Rvzhkov, is
being brought in as an "idea man," Alivev to "get things
done."
The Pyzhkov Appointment. Nikolay Ryzhkov's career has been
focused entirely outside of party apparatus work. Pe had been
a first deputy chairman of Gosplan since 147? with
responsibilities for heavy industry and machine building, and
before that served for many years as manager of a huzze machine
building complex in Sverdlovsk. He presumably owed his
(osplan position to Andrey Ririlenko, who headed the
Sverdlovsk party organization back in the early 1Q.5ns.
Rvzhkov's close connections with the Sverdlovsk group suggests
that his appointment may have been Dart of a prior political
deal linked to securin Virilenko's departure from the
Politburo. R.yzhkov is
the kind of energetic manager that Androood is looking
for, but Andropov is unlikely to have been acquainted
personally with him.
broug t into the secretariat to head the newly established
Economics Department. This department, which has been
identified in Pravda, is an expansion of the old Dlanning and
Finance Organs Department and reportedly will he responsible
for studying economic reform ideas, particularly in the
industrial sector of the economy.
The Aliyev Appointment. The appointment of Aliyev to the
('ouncil of.Miuisters was, in a way, the most puzzling action
taken. While there had been rumors earlier in the summer that
A.liyev night be elevated to the politburo, his government
appointment was unexpected and even caught the Supreme Soviet
deputies by surprise
Alivev is
AndroDOV s man and has been brought in to spear-head the drive
to ferret out bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption and
enforce greater managerial accountability at all levels of the
government. Pe will reportedly have specific responsibility
for the troubled transportation sector. Aliyev's subsequent
attendance at a meeting at the railways ministry (it was
sharply criticized by Androvov at the plenum and is now
undergoing a shake-up) would seem to bear this out.
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Aliyev's politburo status makes him the number two man
M
Tlhile Aliyev has made a name for himself rooting out
corruption in Azerbaijan and has been credited with the
remarkable economic recovery of the republic, he,
nevertheless, would seem to lack important qualifications for
the premiership and even for the deputy post. F.e is not
himself entirely free of the taint of corruption. (There have
been rumors that some of his republic's economic achievement
are based on falsified data). die has not had experience at
the national level and does not know his way around the Moscow
bureaucracy. Moreover, his Muslim background is not likely to
endear him to the largely slavic Moscow bureaucracy and is
perhaps the most important strike against him for the
Premiership.
T,hy Al.ivev was named as first deputy premier rather than
some other more qualified official such as Shcherbitskiy is
all the more puzzling in view of Aliyev's rather checkered
past political allegiances. Aliyev reportedly was closer to
Brezhnev's Protege, K(=B First Deputy Chairman Tsvigun, than to 25X1
Andropov. Aliyev had been
solidly in the .:rez nev- ernen o ;camp until recently and may
have owed his promotion to the Politburo in part to their
backing. Aliyev was Chernenko's 25X1
choice to replace Andropov as Chairman of the KGB last May,
hut he lost out to Vitaliv Fedorchuk, the ttkrainian Vr-R chief,
who reportedly had the solid backing of Shcherbitskiy and
AndroPOV. 25X1
Aliyev, in fact, probably owes his elevation to support
from both camps, but will almost certainly be more sensitive
to Andropov's interests. Andropov, in addition, may feel that
Alivev's ties to all groupings will deflect some of the
resentment away from him that is sire to develop if Ali.vev's
effort to crack the whip runs into resistance. Andropov also
would probably he willing to disassociate himself from Alivev
if he becomes too controversial.
The Shrinking Party Secretariat. As anticipated, the Central
Committee plenum dropped Kirilenko from the Politburo and
Secretariat on the stated grounds of ill health. The reason
for xirilenko's eclipse remains something of a mystery, but
considerable evidence suggest that illness and a scandal
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involving a member of his family earlier this year made him
vulnerable to the machinations of political rivals. In any
event, he had already been excluded from the leadership some
time before 'Rrezhnev died. his removal at the plenum was
only a formality.
With Rrezhnev's death, the death of Suslov earlier in the
year and now Kirilenko's retirement, the number of senior .
secretaries (those with full membership in the Politburo) has
dropped from five to three: Andropov, Chernenko and the
secretary in charge of agriculture, Gorbachev. Party
Secretary 1)olgikh, who oversees the heavy industry sector and
had been filling in for Kirilenko during his absences, was
expected in Soviet circles to be elevated to full membership
in the Politburo at the plenum to'replace Kirilenko, but such
a move may have run into some political difficulty. He is
from the Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk, an area know
receive special attention from Chernenko.
.Chernenko Hangs In
By most Soviet accounts, Chernenko offered little
resistance to the Andropov blitz following Rrezhnev's death.
In so doing he seems to have protected his Position in the
leadership. and he continues to be an important political
Chernenko appears to be performing the functions of
unofficial "second secretary"--the same functions that Suslov
carried out under Rrezhnev--and he; has recent v been ranktuti
right after Andropov in Politburo line-ups.
IChernenko
now c airs meetings of the Secretariat. He evidently has
taken over Sus]ov's former responsibilities on the party
secretariat for culture, propaganda and ideology as well and
there is tenuous evidence that he has some responsibility for
overseeing personnel assignments. Perhaps as a consequence of
.these new duties and due to the General Secretary's perogative
for having his own man as the Politburo's executive officer,
Chernenko has apparently given up his job as head of the
General Department. Nonetheless, his long time assistant
Bogolyubov has reportedly gotten the Job.
Chernenko and Andropov appear to share many views on
policy issues and may concievably have worked out a modus
vivendi. The new practice of publicizing regular Thursday
Politburo meetings, for example, seems to reflect Chernenko's
long-standing interest in promoting a more open style of
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leadership and the first reported item on the Politburo
agenda--work with letters from Sovie-t citizens--is one with
which he has been closely identified. The present arrangement
is an inherently unstable one, however, in view of their
political rivalry, and it is clearly In Andropov's interest
either to ease Chernenko out of the Secretariat or brim
someone else in to act as a counterweight.
The Pace of Personnel Actions Picks Up
Following the plenum a number of important appointments
were made to second level party and government posts, but
again some of them would appear to have been in the works
since earlier in the year. In a musical chairs round of
appointments, First Secretary of the Komsomol (youth)
organization, Boris Pastukhov, was replaced by one of his
deputies and transferred to the less important post of
Chairman of the state publishing committee. The,former head
of the committee, Boris Stukalin, in turn, moved,up to replace
the chief of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department,
Tevgeniy Tyazhelnikov. The latter has since been given an
ambassadorial post. There were rumors shortly after Suslov
died in January that both Tyazelnikov and Pastuknov would be
fired as part of an effort to remove Suslov people from
positions of power. Chernenko's apparent assumption now of
Suslov'-s former responsibilities for culture, ideology and
propaganda suggest that he is likely to have had some hand in
carrying this out, although Andropov's approval would have
The KGB-MVVf Switch
The most important reshuffling of assignments since
Andropov took over was the replacement of Brezhnev's close
associate Nikolay Shchelokov as Minister of Internal Affairs
(MVP) by KGB chief Fedorchuk, and the elevation in turn of
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov to head the
KGB. These moves have allowed Andropov to expand his control
over both security organs. The shift is one of the clearest
'
signs of Andropov
s authority to date.
On the face of it, the appointment represents a demotion
for Fedorchuk, but his initial assignment to the KGB post last
May was unusual (typically a professional cop is not picked
for this role) and one for which he would not appear to have
been well qualified. The choice of Fedorchuk was probably
made with succession-related politics in mind rather than
considerations of the requirements of the top KGR post.
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Andropov presumably supported him as. part of an effort to
bring Shcherhitskiy into his camp and to block any Brezhnev-
Chernenko candidate--whether it be Aliyev or one of Brezhnev's
men among the KGB A
eputies.
Having accomplished this and after he emerged on top,
Andropov was presumably willing to reconsider the
appointment. There is certain to have been widespread
unhappiness at having a relatively junior KGB professional
appointed to the top KGB post, particularly among senior
officials in the organization, and Andropov's interests may
have been better served by having Fedorchuk take the MVO
post. Fedorchuk reportedly has a mandate to clean up the
corruption-riddled police organization and s since been
promoted to the rank of General. = -1
The new KGB chief, Chebrikov, like Andropov, has a
background in party work. Be served for many years in the
Dnepropetrovsk party organization, Rrezhnev's.former political
bailiwick in the Ukraine, and was transferred to the KGB in
1967 along with another close Brezhnev associate soon after
Andropov was appointed head. Chebrikov has worked closely
with Andropov for the past 14 years, however, and they
reportedl
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are
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on
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Winds of Change
There are growing expectations among the Soviet elite
that more important changes are in the offin.
has been left that in the process of working hishwayrtoetheon
top party post, Andropov dangled the possibility of high level
posts before a number of would-be supporters: Shcherbitskiy,
Aliyev, and maybe Dolgikh, and he now may be encounterin me
problems in how to honor these political debts.
The cumulative impact of these changes, real and
anticipated, contributes to the impression that the long-
delayed rejuvenation of the party and government ranks is
finally underway, after the near paralysis of Brezhnev's'last
years. Moreover, Andropov seems to be perceived by the Soviet
elite as firmly in control of this process, even if he has not
been the principal initiator sole beneficiary of each
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SUBJECT: USSR: Leadership Ranks in Transition
SOVA/PA/D
Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 _ - DT)I/AS
1 - DDI/PF.S
5 - D/OCPAS
1 - T)/SOVA
1 - PD/SO 7A
Chief, SOVA/CS
Chief, SOYA/PI
Chief, SOVA/EA
Chief, SOYA/SF
Chief, SOYA/SF
Chief, SOVA/TF
Chief, SO'7A/PA
Chief, PA/D
Chief, PA/F
Chief, PA/S
DCI
DUCT
NIO/11SSR
Chairman/NIC
ED PCI
Exec. Registry
(4 Jan 83)
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