SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE NIO SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000300090038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: August 16, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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16 August 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Hicks
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Some Thoughts about the NIO System
1. As I noted in my first progress report to you, my
research into. the Impact of Intelligence on the NSC Policy
Review and Decision Process indicates that there are a
number of problems that relate to the NIO system. Since
it seems likely that the new D/NFAC will want to look closely
at the NIOs and consider the merit of continuing the system,
I thought it might be useful to outline now what my research
has uncovered so far--and some proposals the NFAC leadership
might want to consider--rather than wait unt=.1 I can produce
a more extensive and formal paper. The data I have gathered
is based on some fifty interviews, including discussions with
a few of the NIOs.
2. My research'leads me to conclude thr.t the NIOs can
play a vital role in the policy review and decision process
in providing intelligence to key policy consumers:
--As the officer who is most likely to l-e able to judge
the needs of key policy people.
--As the person who can tap, resources throughout the
intelligence community and bring those resources together.
--As the intelligence representative to senior policy
review and decision working groups.
--As a major briefer, presenter--salesmr..n, if you will--
of the intelligence product.
3. In fact,if there were no NIOs, the -information gained
from my investigation would suggest that such a system should
be created. Policy people seem to be very dependent on having
adequate linkage to the intelligence community. While some
ad hoc networks do exist and work efficiently outside the NIO
structure, these nets do not always bring the: best combination
of resources together. They tend mostly to lie groupings related
. STAT
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SUBJECT: Some Thoughts about the NIO System
to geographic rather than issue-oriented problems. Policy
people seem to respond best to a system which provides them
with a peg point, and a person with whom they can discuss
needs or problems. From'the community's point of view,
individual production units seem to require some sort of
catalytic agent to bring.indiyidual analysts, especially
from different disciplines or from different agencies, into
the kinds of working groups that tend to produce the intelli-
gence products policy makers find most useful.
4. Unfortunately, as'I indicated in my first report,
the performance of the NIOs is decidedly mixed:
--Out of five case studies, the NIO was a significant
factor in only two. In two others, the NIOs did not take an
active role. In one case, an OSR officer way: appointed by
the DCI to chair intelligence participation, and he became
a surrogate for the.NIO. In one case, polic,, makers--perhaps
because they-were newcomers to the administrvtion, but also
because they did not know how best to tap into the intelligence
system--began their deliberations without an intelligence
input at all. In two cases, existing ad hoc networks were
used to assign-intelligence tasks, but this meant that the
decision about which intelligence resources to use were made
by policy makers and not by intelligence managers.
--In discussions with policy people where the NIOs came
into the discussion, criticism as well as pr,:ise often surfaced.
A great many people, after hearing my list of case studies,
suggested that I should take a good look at i number of other
areas where they had difficulty obtaining intelligence and
where there was a problem with the NIO, either because of a
reluctance to bring resources together, or because the NIO
did not seem to want to take on the problem. Although there
seems to be general recognition among policy people that the
NIOs are supposed to be the channel to intelligence production,
it appears to be a bit difficult to find out who the NIOs are,
and how they divide their labor.
--Intelligence people within the agency find the NIOs can
be a problem because they seem to be inserter' into the NFAC
management structure between D/NFAC and the production offices,
.rather than as.an adrisory staff group. This.means that the
NIOs can bypass production office management structure to tap
an analyst for a project without the knowledge, or approval of
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SUBJECT: Some Thoughts about the NIO System
the office leadership. This would tend to disrupt the office
management's ability to control its resources and schedule its
work. On the other hand, NIOs complain that they are expected
to be able to answer questions about the management of the
production offices, as well as to serve as substantive experts
in their areas, and the present structure does not enable them
to play either role very well.
--There does not seem to be any mechanism to bring the
NIOs together on an inter-active basis to discuss or deal with
problems that-cut across issue-related or geographic lines.
This is particularly a problem in trying to produce multi-
disciplinary intelligence where there are di?fering views
about the value of various. inputs.
--The NIOs are perceived to lack a sense of direction or
cohesiveness and it appears that the system we now have has
evolved without any central plan. Consumers, producers and
some NIOs themselve.:: all complain that the NLO charter is
unclear and that each NIO has carved out his role based on
his own view of what an NIO is and what he should do.
5. While I think the problems I have outlined are serious,
they do not a ply tc all the NIOs, many of w;iom are thought to
be highly effective professionals. Nevertheless, they should
be corrected if the NIO system is to play a nore consistently
useful role in suppcrting policy makers. I would therefore
suggest considering the following ideas in reeviewing.the
NIO system:
--The NIOs need a leader--a chief NIO, if you will--who
would give them a sense of erection, a more c intent
charter, and would serve as a force to bring the NIOs into
some sort of forum 'there they could work wit'i each other.
The chief would probably need to have an executive officer
to serve in the same way as does for the Senior
Review Group.
--The charter should make it clear that the NIOs serve as
advisors to the D/NFAC, and not as "super-managers" of the
line production. offices.' The NIOs should be(:ome catalysts for
intelligence production across community line's. in that sense,
they should deal with NFAC production office; in the same way
STAT
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SUBJECT: Some Thoughts about the NIO System
that they would deal with INR and DIA. NIOs should be the key
interface between policy makers and intelligence producers.
The NIOs should represent the community in policy deliberations,
although they should be authorized to designate a production
analyst to serve as the community leader for particular pro-
jects--a system that seems to.work well where it has already
been tried.
--The NIOs should be encouraged to expand the warning
meetings they have been holding to become a regular forum
where intelligence producers and policy consumers can exchange
ideas at the working level.. In those areas where these kinds
of get-togethers have already become a common practice, con-
sumers indicate that they are highly satisfied that the
intelligence product is meeting their needs.
--While many respondents have indicated that NIOs who
have experience as intelligence professionals seem to have--
or create--fewer problems. than their colleagues from academia
or the think-tanks, 'm not so sure that a diversity among
the NIOs is necessarily a bad thing. It woul:i seem useful,
however, in those ca3es where the NIO is from "outside" that
the deputy should be an experienced professional, either from
within CIA or from oae of, the other agencies.
--I think the policy maker is ill-served when an NIO
becomes the substantive spokesman on an area or an issue.
Policy makers indicate that they benefit fron hearing-diverse
arguments, rather than one judgment, and NIOs seem to think
they would do better if they could focus on selected issues
rather than a broad spectrum that requires diverting their
effort into long sessions reading traffic or interrogating
analysts. I think NIOs should be able to chcose effective.
analysts to represen: them as "experts" in briefings, or
meetings, and should probably defer to the production offices
where the problem does not require a multi-or inter-disciplinary
approach.
6. In discussing some of the other areas of my research.
topic with policy ma'.kers,'a number of other issues have surfaced
in which the NIOs mi,;ht become involved. This material is
still being sorted o-it, but involves such things as:
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SUBJECT: Some Thoughts about the NIO System
--Developing a better system of production tasking that
is more responsive than NITS as a reflection of policy makers'
needs.
--Establishing a production evaluation system that will
be able to tell us how well we are meeting policy makers'
requirements and that will also enable us to get a better
handle on costing production from the "output" side.
--Marketing intelligence to make sure that the right
customers get the most appropriate material--and that they
pay attention.
7. I hope to address each of these matters in the
months ahead as I coitinue to dig away at the case studies.
STAT
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