DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090027-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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CZs/sA ? Q
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
Top Secret
9 February
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
The South Vietnamese are trying to clear
the Communists out of the Tuy Hoa area before
the arrival of international teams. Joint
Military Commission members arriving in
Kontum Province have been harassed by the
local population? South Vietnamese mili-
tary commanders are generally confident
that the army can handle any future Com-
munist attacks in the southern half of the
country. In the preliminary talks now
going on in Paris, both Saigon and the Viet
Cong are showing an initial willingness to
compromise.
Hanoi is repairing southern airfields.
1 1
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tr in to reta a osi.ti.ons
Government forces are
alon the Mekong,
Former c ie o s a e
eng eng as a new peace plan that would
eliminate both Sihanouk and Lon Nol from the
political scene,
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Government troops withdrawing from Paksong
are in disarray. Vang Pao is trying to salvage
some last minute gains on the Plaine des Jarres
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SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnamese territorial forces are engaged
in sharp fighting with Viet Cong forces north and
west of the Phu Yen provincial capital of Tuy Hoa.
Three government battalions have been dispatched to
the area to fill the gap caused by the departure of
two South Korean regiments. Province officials have
said privately they hope the truce teams will not
arrive for another four or five days so that there
will be time to clear the Communists from about 24
hamlets that are contested or enemy-controlled.
Elsewhere, enemy action remained relatively low
although a slight increase in small-scale harassing
attacks was reported in the delta. The South Viet-
namese have opened additional sections of major high-
ways that ha,re been blocked by the Communists. Some
vegetable trucks are again rolling from Da Lat to
Saigon.
Government Commanders Voicing Confidence
South Vietnamese military commanders are ex-
pressing confidence that the army can handle any
Communist attacks in the southern half of the
country. They are more apprehensive, however, about
their chances in northern South Vietnam, especially
Military Region (MR) 1. General Minh, commander in
MR 3, said recently that he is keeping his forces on
full alert and will continue to contest vigorously
Communist actions anywhere in the region. Despite
reports that the Communists are planning a last
minute "land grab" just before the arrival of ICCS
inspectors, Minh seems confident his forces can con-
tain any such attempt. He believes in particular,
that the enemy lacks the ability to mount any major
assaults because of heavy casualties sustained over
the past several months.
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In the delta General Nghi anticipates that the
Communists may try one last push there shortly be-
fore ICCS teams arrive and that the attacks will be
"short" but "traumatic." He too claims that gov-
ernment forces will be able to handle such assaults
and keep losses to a minimum. Nghi says Saigon will
concede that the Communists dominate such areas as
the U Minh Forest along with four or five Viet Cong
smaller base areas, but will regard these locations
officially as "contested" areas not under Communist
control. Government troops are under orders to keep
enemy units from leaving these areas and will counter
any attempt to do so.
The chief of staff of the Joint General Staff
(JGS), General Manh, recently expressed some concern
that the Communists may try a final round of heavy
attacks in the northern provinces. He said he was
especially worried about Quang Ngai and Quang Tri
provinces in MR-1 and that a major Communist effort
in either of these areas might result in new govern-
ment setbacks. He said that General Truong, the MR-1
commander, shared his concern.
PRG-GVN TaZks Making Headway
Both the Provisional Revolutionary Government
(PRG) and the Thieu Government (GVN) seem genuinely
interested, at least for the time being, in moving
ahead in the bilateral talks. Differences have al-
ready emerged in the preliminary talks going on in
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Paris, but both sides have shown a wilJ.ingness to
compromise. The PRG, for example, hacked down from
its original demand that the first feu sessions of
the upcoming formal talks be held in Paris before
moving to Saigon. The GVN, for its part, then ap-
parently dropped its proposal to hold the inaugural
session of the formal talks at Tan Son Nhut Air Base
in a relatively publicity-free atmosphere.
The PRG, however, has paid little heed to its
agreement not to publicize the content of these dis-
cussions. Undoubtedly anxious to gain as much pub-
licity as possible, the PRG is using the talks to
enhance its international status and legitimacy.
This may help account for their interest in holding
as many sessions of the talks as possible in Paris.
Current PRG demands for full diplomatic rights and
freedom of movement when the talks begin in Saigon
are in part posturing, designed to underscore PRG
pretensions to be a legitimate pc,lit.ical entity.
The PRG clearly hopes to make some progress in the
talks, however, and most of their demands may be
modified if they prove insurmountable.
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Nam UiiiI
?Hai Thupng
Thanh Hoa
VIETNAM
LAOS
Haiphong.
11 1
. Ha Tinh
ai Duc' user construction
IV MNgon R,io Pheo
~ ~', 2f+NE
. Uong ha
SOUTH VIETNAM
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NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese have repaired several
southern airfie 1AR and are using them for trans--
port activity.
The repairs consis. filling in bomb craters an
clearing the graded earth runway. While these
repairs permit light aircraft such as IL-14s and
AN-2s to use the airfie',d, MIGs cannot use the
field for sustained operations. The airfields
at Khe Phat and Vinh also have bean repaired, and
both can be used for transport aircraft. The
North Vietnamese are repairing facilities at
Quan Lang and Bai Thuong, but these repairs are
not proceeding with the same degree of urgency
noted at the other airfields. Construction has
apparently stopped at the two n irfields of
Naon Rao Pheo and Bai Duc Thon.
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CAMBODIA
Another Peace PGan
Former chief of state Cheng Heng is refloating
a peace plan first scuttled by Lon Nol early last
year. He has been contacting most of the local.
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Insurgent a,tack ompong Thorn
Kratia
PHNOM PENH*
? Prey Veng
Government
Banain.o- clearing operation
Neak'
Luong
vay Rieng
Insurgent attacks
1
SAIGON *
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 Approv
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diplomatic corps, excluding the US but including
the Eastern Europeans, to tell them that the way
to achieve peace is to negotiate directly with the
"real leader" on the other side--Sihanouk's "prime
minister," Penn Nouth. The terms to offer, accord-
ing to Cheng Heng, are the group retirement of all
the "old generation," including Lion Not, Sihanouk,
and himself. The politically powerless Cheng Heng
claims to be speaking for "several groups," which
he has as yet to identify. In view of his continuing
political differences with Lon Nol, Cheng Heng's
soundings may be no more than an effort to ascer-
tain the President's standing with various countri-
having relations with Phnom Penh.
The Military Situation
Government forces on the east bank of the Me-
kong River have launched a three-battalion operation
to retake several small positions in the vicinity of
Banam that were overrun by Khmer insurgent elements
on 7 February. Insurgent harassing attacks against
Cam]--odian positions along Route 15 between Banam and
Prey Veng have fallen off, but the insurgents are
continuing to shell other government positions east
of Neak Luong along Route 1.
The insurgents are also keeping up the pressure
against the isolated provincial capitals at Svay
Rieng in the southeast and Kompong Thom in the north.
Numerous shellings were carried out against Kompong
Thom's defense perimeter on 8 February, and the in-
surgents also made a ground attack on the perimeter's
southern edge.
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LAOS
i
CHINA
BURMA
Ban
auolSal
Pak BCng
HanoI V
Sam Nouc i 1 - ~~ I
_IVIETNAM- t,
tJlwruau
Luang Bouom unrlu, conslr,ictl~,n /
rabnng Long li I
Long Tieng?
Govur 1nicnt coiitlollclt
?? : ,. i,??i iit.tul
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LAOS
The loss of Paksong on 8 February has triggered
a disorderly withdrawal of nearly all government
troops on the Bolovens Plateau. Government commanders
are attempting to rally their units at Ban Gnik, the
last natural defensive position on the western Pla-
teau. Many of the troops, however, have already
deserted their units and morale of the remaining few
is shaky. The North Vietnamese appear to be con-
solidating their control of Paksong. They will prob-
ably seek to push government forces quickly from the
western Bolovens, but there is no evidence that they
intend to depart from their longstanding policy and
attack Pakse, the major town in southern Laos. They
are more likely to try to tie down as many government
troops as possible to forestall a counterattack.
In the central panhandle, four irregular bat-
talions that recently joined Lao Army troops in
clearing operations south and southeast of Thakhek,
are encountering little resistance. A Lao Army ef-
fort to push north from the town along Route 13 has
been delayed by command problems. General Thao Ly,
one of the few competent Lao Army officers, has
arrived an is attempting to breathe life into this
operation.
The Northwest
The Communists have attempted no major new at-
tacks in Houa Khong Province since they overran Nam
Yu last week, but, in the next few days, they may
try to grab some additional villages in the western
part of the province. Difficulties in moving signif-
icant quantities of supplies across the rugged ter-
rain south of Nam Yu are likely to prevent any major
attempt to breech the defenses around Ban Houei Sai,
the only important population center in this area
still in government hands.
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Plugging AwaH Around the Plaine
With government units on the defensive else-
where in the country, General Vang Pao has been
trying for several weeks to salvage some last minute
gains around the Plaine des Jarres. A force of over
2,000 irregulars is in the Muong Soui area trying
to move into that Communist logistics base west of
the Plaine. Lead units are within three miles of
Muong Soui to the north, but Communist units have
been diverted to the area from Bouam Long and Sala
Phou Khoun, and there appears to be little chance
that the irregulars will capture the village.
Elsewhere a 1000-man irregular force is moving
from Ban Na toward the western edge of the Plaine and
a smaller force is attempting to Push toward the
southern Plains from Pha Dong.
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Tokyo is actively considering recognition of
Hanoi. Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, Susumu
Nikaido, told the press on 8 February that the govern-
ment could not "forever" hold to recognition of Saigon
as the only legitimate government in Vietnam. Nikaido,
who is one of Prime Minister Tanaka's closest advisers,
was responding to remarks made to Japanese reporters on
6 February by the chief editor of the North Vietnamese
party daily. The North Vietnamese had told the re-
porters that Hanoi was prepared to overlook Japan's
cooperation with the US in the Vietnam war and that
Tokyo' relations with Saigon would not hinder the
establishment of normal relations with his country.
The Japanese official characterized Hanoi's attitude
as realistic and said the Japanese should be flexible.
Nikaido's statement comes on the heels of Australian
and Canadian recognition of Hanoi.
Despite the forthcoming attitude on both sides,
the Japanese fear a number of issues may arise. They
are concerned that Hanoi may insist on bilateral
postwar aid or press Japan to include aid for areas
under Provisional Revolutionary Government control.
The Japanese favor a multilateral approach to recon-
struction, partly because Japan is already under some
criticism in Southeast Asia for being too heavily in-
volved economically in the area, Tokyo also has to
consider its relations with Saigon, which it intends
to retain.
Hanoi's terms may be spelled out when a Japanese
delegation headed by the Foreign Ministry's First 25X1
Southeast Asian Division chief, visits Hanoi on 20
February, after attending a Japanese ambassadors'
nnnfarence on Vietnam in Bangkok.
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s) In Document Denied
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