DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100010046-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: May 22, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 Approved For Release 20T~x:, 54 I P Pq-OP60RO01 100010046-5 25X1
Confidential
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Developments in Indochina
u-~
r0
22 May 1973
No. 2018/73
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Developments in Indochina
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CONTENTS
22 May 1973
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
On 20 May, Thieu outlined the government's
projections for post-war economic recovery
and development, which call for the attain-
ment of economic self-sufficiency by 1980.
The government may be preparing to crack
down on political factions that are now
illegal following the expiration last March
of the deadline for meeting the terms of
the decree on political parties.
CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Khmer Republic's new cabinet will prob-
ably carry out the High Political Council's
bidding and offer few innovations in carry-
ing out the council's policies.
NORTH VIETNAM 5
Hanoi is putting increased emphasis on re-
construction goals and is apparently for-
mulating guidelines on how to use its man-
power pool to rebuild the country and
expand the economy.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Thieu Seto Forth Pootwar
Economic Projram
In a TV and radio speech on 20 May, President
Thieu made public the goveznmient's projections for post-
war economic recovery and development, which call for
attainment of economic self-sufficiency by 1980. Thieu
emphasized the establishment of several funds for ref-
ugee relief and for private investment support, and the
need to curtail domestic consumption as a basis for
future economic growth. Specific foreign support re-
quirements were not mentioned in the speech, but large
amounts of Free World aid would be needed to achieve
the extremely ambitious 1980 targets.
The speech summarizes a aetailed set of postwar
economic forecasts, first presented by President
Thieu during his April trip to the US. These call
for the gross national product to grow at an average
annual rate cf 7.5 percent during 1973-80 with the
rate accelerating from 5 percent in 1973 to 9 percent
in 1977-80. Tables accompanying the projections
presented at San Clemente indicate that about $4 bil-
lion in foreign assistance would be required from
foreign sources to sustain projected import levels.
This amount does not, however, include provisions
for imports needed to support reconstruction and
specific project development. These uses could, ac-
cording to GVN estimates, account for an additional
$4 billion of foreign and domestic resources over
the period.
Although the government program represents a
good first effort to chart out the country's economic
goals and requirements, it is not an integrated
economic plan because of unrealistically high targets
and numerous gaps in sectoral details and import pat-
terns. Thieu's decision to announce the projections--
coupled with recent economic and government reform
measures--suggests that current economic policies will
be based on principles outlined in the San Clemente
package even without firm commitments of foreign as-
sistance and assurances of implementation of the
cease-fire agreement.
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The announcement of the economic program appar-
ently represents the first step in a series of measures
designed to improve the government's standing in the
countryside. Further announcements of a government
reorganization and administrate reforms are expected
soon.
Status of Political Partieo
The government may be preparing to crack down
on illegal political facticns following the expira-
tion last March of the deadline for meeting the terms
of the decree on political parties. The official
Vietnam press reported last week that the Interior
Ministry has ordered the c'issolution of some 26
parties, most of which previously enjoyed full legal
status. The delay in issuing such an order indicates
that the government does not regard the factions as
much of a threat, and it is still not clear how strictly
the measure will be enforced. The ministry asserted,
however, that the only remaining parties are the gov-
ernment's Democracy Party and two independent coali-
tions that have provisional status, the Freedom Party
and the Social Democratic Alliance.
Most of the factions affected by the order have
little political clout, but some, such as the Revolu-
tionary Dai Viet Party and elements of the Vietnamese
Nationalist Party, have long been fixtures on the
Saigon political scene. Many of these groups have
continued to operate as usual since March, and they
may still hope that the government will ignore them.
At least a few factions have indicated that if the
government tries to force them out of business, they
will try to go underground to survive.
Both the Freedom Party and the Social Democratic
Alliance are still facing serious internal problems
that may render them unable to meet the provisions
necessary to achieve full legal status as required
by early next year. Neither group has done much to
organize outside of Saigon, but the Alliance is try-
ing to arrange financing to go ahead with organiza-
tional work. F_ I
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CAMBODIA
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The New Cabinet
On 16 May 1973 the new cabinet of the Khmer
Republic was officially presented to President Lon
Not. The cabinet includes members of all of the
country's major non-Communist political parties or
groups. Its installation was preceded by several
weeks of maneuvering on the composition of the cab-
inet among members of the ruling four-man High Po-
litical Council--Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, In Tam, and
Cheng Heng. This maneuvering caused some dissension
within the council, which may indicate that the
council will have difficulty governing harmoniously
and effectively.
The majority of the posts in the new cabinet
went to men who are either members of Lon Nol's
Socio-Republican Party or are generally considered
loyal to the President. Most of them have contacts
with other prominent political figures, however,
and seem sufficiently flexible to change their
political allegiance if future events warrant. Sev-
eral ministers, for example, have long-standing po-
litical ties to former prime minister Son Ngoc Thanh.
The cabinet includes 13 holdovers from the
previous government headed by Hang Thun Hak. Many
received advanced education or training in France,
and two are US-educated. Six of the ministers are
in their thirties, but most are over 45. Although
most of the new ministers have had prior government
experience, their performances have generally been
rather undistinguished. As technicians, they can
be expected to do the council's bidding and offer
few innovations in carrying out the policies and
programs laid down by the council.
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Council member In Tam, who also heads the cab-
inet in his capacity as prime minister, has indicated
that the council and the cabinet will tackle an am-
bitious program that includes: reorganization of
the army and restoration of its discipline, designa-
tion of a commander in chief responsible to the
government, gradual replacement of military province
governors by civilians, creation of a police force
under the ministry of interior, stabilization of the
exchange rate, financial austerity, and national rec-
onciliation. The last goal, which involves contacts
with the Khmer Communists, is-the res onsibilit of
a special ministry.
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NORTH VIETNAM
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North Vietnamese Army would play a prominent role
North Vietnam is putting increasing emp asis
on reconstruction goals. Premier Pham Van Dong''s
May Day speech focused on this theme and General
Giap echoed the same line by hinting that th?
in the reconstruction.
specific guidelines on how Nor ch Vietnam envisages
using its manpower pool to rebuild the country and
expand the civilian sector of the economy.
i oars had appeared in the capital urging
y ng men to join "reconstruction brigades." The
signs apparently replaced military recruitment
posters and may indicate that the reconstruction
program has a higher priority than conscription.
An editorial in the army newspaper on 16 May sug-
gests that local militia and self-defense forces
will be the first military units to join in the
reconstruction effort. The editorial urged these
units to serve as the "shock forces in labor pro-
ductivity" and to take on especially difficult and
long-term works "such as the building of irrigation
projects, reclamation of fallow land, and expansion
of the cultivated area."
North Vietnam's reconstruction plans also in-
clude recently demobilized troops--many of them
handicapped as a result of combat. The North Viet-
namese media have recently acknowledged that larger
numbers of sick and wounded troops are now showing
up in the North than ever before. They urge
localities to care for the veterans and help them
to contribute to the restoration of the economy by
establishing handicraft industries for them.
The North Vietnamese leadership expects diffi-
culties in the transition toward a civilian economy,
and they probably will proceed slowly with their
plans for reconstruction and expansion.
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