LON NON, CAMBODIA'S PRIME TROUBLEMAKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160041-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: March 16, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Lon Non, Cambodia's Prime Troublemaker
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/02/08
16
March 1973
No.
1633/73
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Lon Non, Cambodia's Prime Troublemaker
Summary
16 March 1973
The Byzantine and contentious nature of Cambodian political life leaves little
room for a national consensus, but there is one thing that almost all Cambodian
political figures can agree on: Brigadier General Lon Non, the Presidents younger
brother, has contributed more than anyone else to the present political disunity in
Phnom Penh. In devoting most of his considerable energy to the perpetuation of the
ailing and often inept President's power-and advancing his own-Lon Non has
alienated most civilian and military leaders and has deprived the government of
badly needed popular support.
Over the past year, Lon Non has begun to show increasing signs of strong
personal ambition. He has used his military rank, his ministerial position and-above
all-his brother's name to exten9 his influence at the expense of cabinet ministers
and key members of the military establishment. He has focused on keeping
Republican Party Chief Sirik Matak and other opposition elements out of the
government, thereby obstructing the President's periodic efforts to broaden the base
of his regime. Lon Non may feel that he has little time to build a political base of his
own before his brother leaves the scene. As matters stand now, he is unlikely to
survive Lon Not politically.
Il' Lon Non is not reined in, the chances for a greater measure of political
cohesiveness and governmental effectiveness are nil. Lon Not might relieve the
situation by appointing his brother to a prestigious but remote ambassadorial post,
but there is no certainty that the President would be willing-or even able-to
impose any form of exile upon his increasingly confident and active brother. The
removal of Lon Non and Matak's installation as vice president would not provide a
miraculous cure for Phnom Penh's political ills, though it wou!d hold out the hope
for improvement. The alternative is additional drift and decay in Phnom Penh.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Current Intelligence,
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Lon Noland Lon Non
Little Brother Is A 1waYs at Hand
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Lon Non, His Brother's Keeper
The Lon Non - Lon Nol relationship is a classic example of the
importance of kinship in Asian politics. Lon Non appears to have his
brother's complete trust, and no one else can make this claim. Lon Non has
dedicated himself to protecting and preserving his brother's political in-
terests-and advancing his own in the process. The President has rewarded
Lon Non by allowing him to play a larger and more direct role in the
day-to-day operations of the government.
Lon Nol took over in March 1970, and in the first year of his rule, Lon
Non remained behind the scenes. He spent most of his time managing the
activities of a small but powerful extra-governmental body, the "special
coordinating committee," which performed a variety of sensitive jobs for
Lon Nol. Its authority cut across the formal bureaucracy, and its respon-
sibilities ranged from internal security and intelligence matters to covert
political operations. The committee laid the groundwork for the creation of
the pro-government political organization, the Socio-Republican Party.
Lon Non's early career prepared him well for this method of operating.
Now 42 years old, he studied in France and later went through the Cam-
bodian Military Academy. In 1954, he embarked on a career in intelligence
and developed his bent for intrigue. He became the head of army counter-
intelligence in 1960, and in 1968, assumed command of Phnom Penh's
military police, a position he held at the time of Sihanouk's overthrow. In
the late 1960s, Lon Non was also deeply involved-as were many army
officers-in the clandestine shipment of sizable quantities of arms, ammuni-
tion, and other goods through Cambodia to Vietnamese Communist forces in
South Vietnam.
Unlike his introverted older brother, Lon Non is an activist, a swaggerer
who relishes being the center of attention. He is tough and devious, with a
strong streak of cunning and a reputation for impetuousness. For a Khmer,
he displays uncommon energy and drive, which he uses to wear down his
opponents and attain his objectives. His closest collaborators are oppor-
tunistic young men who see association with Lon Non as a way to advance
their own careers and interests.
Lon Non began to emerge from the shadows after Lon No] suffered a
stroke in February 1971. During the past two years, the President's partial
physical incapacitation and his growing political isolation have increased his
reliance on Lon Non. The latter has made the most of this situation. He-and
his small entourage-have used their special access to the President to
override the views and proposals of other officials and to promote ill-will
between Lon Nol and former associates like Sirik Matak, In Tam, and Son
Ngoc Thanh.
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Some bolder senior government officials-Matak, in particular-have on
occasion complained to Lon Nol about Lon Non's machinations. Lon Nol
customarily does not reply to such criticisms, and evidently only rarely
chastises Lon Non. Recently there have been disturbing signs that Lou Non
is less responsive to the President's bidding if the bidding conflicts with his
own political objectives. Lon Non, for example, has ignored Lon Nol's orders
to facilitate Matak's appointment to the vice presidency and has, in fact,
intensified his campaign to keep Matak out of the government. His in-
dependent actions raise a question as to which of the brothers Lon has
effective control over key political matters.
Bad blood between Lon Non and Matak has figured prominently in the
past three years of political squabbling in Phnom Penh. Matak's departure
from the government in March 1972 was engineered largely by Lou Non,
who fanned student agitation by circulating rumors that Matak was plotting
to restore the monarchy. Lon Non periodically revives this bug bear, and he
is using it again in his effort to forestall Matak's accession to the vice
presidency.
There are several motives for Lon Non's anti-Matak actions. The most
obvious is his determination to prevent Matak from being designated Lon
Nol's constitutional successor. For his part, Matak stresses that he will
become vice president only if Lon Non is neutralized politically. Some
personal animus is doubtless involved. Lon Non is probably jealous of
Matak's lone and close friendship with Lon Nol and may be resentful of
Matak's patrician life style. Lon Non probably also resents and is suspicious
of US backing for Matak.
Other Targets
Lon Non has not limited his machinations to Matak. Lon Non has
zeroed in on a number of other real or potential political challengers. The
coup rumors he peddles from time to time usually allege that Cambodian
Army Chief of Staff Major General Sosthene Fernandez is among the
so-called plotters. The army chief's efforts since last September to carry out
badly needed military reforms have been hurt by Lon Non's attempts to
reduce Fernandez' standing with Lon Nol. Other mernbers of the military
establishment have had similar experiences.
Lon Non has been particularly obstructionist about Fernandez'
attempts to verify the army's actual strength and eliminate "phantom
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troops," whose pay is pocketed by corrupt commanders. Lou Non's reluc-
tance to have his own units investigated encourages other officers to thwart
the verification program.
On the civilian side, the popular former head of the Democratic Party,
In Tani, recently refused to rejoin the government as a special adviser to Lou
Nol-in part because he knew that Lou Non would try to undermine his
authority and activities and guessed that Lon No] would do nothing about it.
Although First Minister Hang Thun Hak is cooperating with Lon Non to kill
Matak's vice-presidential nomination, Hak fears Lon Non is also after his
political scalp. There is sonic evidence that Hak's fears are well-founded. Last
month Lon Non reportedly masterminded a brief strike by Phnom Penh's
industrial workers that appeared aimed at forcing Hak's resignation--or at
least the resignation of his minister for social action.
Lon Non, the "Minister"
In October 1972, Lou Nol substantially increased Lou Non's oppor-
tunity to meddle. Lon Non was given a cabinet pobidon, a reward for
political services in 1972, (Lon Non had contributed to the narrow victory
for Lon Not in the presidential election of June and to the clean sweep by
unopposed Socio-Republican candidates in the National Assembly election
in September.) The outcome of these contests allowed Lon Nol to claim a
return to constitutional rule, but Lou Non's heavy-handed tactics in securing
the desired vote eroded public respect and support for the government.
Lon Non's official title is both nebulous and ironic: "minister attached
to the ministry of interior with special responsibility for widening govern-
ment support." Armed with this undefined charter and unopposed by the
bumbling interior minister, Lon Non has tried to gain control over the min-
istry's most important programs.
One of Lon Non's pet projects is the rallier program. He has devoted
considerable time and interest in overblown and costly schemes involving the
resettlement of ralliers and refugees. The program is an ill-fated one, but it
has been the cornerstone of the government's approach to the Khmer
insurgent problem. Like Lon Nol, Lon Non views the insurgents as misguided
Cambodians who will rally once they are no longer under North Vietnamese
domination. There has been little response to the program, and even Lon
Non has acknowledged its lack of success. More important, the insurgents .re
unlikely to enter into any serious negotiations in which Lon Non plays a
role. They have long pointed to him as a symbol of government corruption.
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Lon Non interprets his vague ministerial duties as giving him primary
responsibility for national security affairs. His hand is firmly in the govern-
ment's various intelligence activities, and he claims to be operating on a
grand scale. Last December, for example, he boasted to US Embassy officers
in Phnom Penh that he had 6,000 secret agents operating in enemy-
controlled areas who could stimulate dissension and increase ralliers. What
Lon Non actually has are probably a small number of low-level intelligence
agents thrashing around in the bush; one reason for his approach to US
officials became evident when he asked for budget funding for his 6,000
agents.
Clearly No Clausewitz
Lon Non's preoccupation with politics has kept him from becoming
overly involved in military operations. When Lon Non switched from the
military police to the army, he had the rank of lieutenant colonel. Last
October, he was promoted to brigadier general-a promotion that owed
nothing to his infrequent forays onto the battlefield. His lack of tactical
experience and his unwillingness to take orders from more senior officers
contribute to his poor military performance.
Lon Non (center) Playinrg Soldier
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Lon Non commands some 14 battalions subordinate to the Third
Infantry Brigm!e Group. Although these units have done some fighting, their
basic mission is political- to counter possible coup attempts. Lon Non is
disliked by most members of the military establishment and would have
difficulty in securing the military backing lie would need to stage a coup of
his own. Iilite Khmer Krom officers, in particular, look down on Lon Non,
contending that he is not fit to lead even a platoon.
Internal stability comes hard in Cambodia even under the best of
circumstances. As Sihanouk once aptly remarked, "It takes a strong leader to
make a Cambodian orchestra play in harmony." Unfortunately, Lon Non is
the most forceful personality in the present government, and he is little
interested in harmony. If lie continues his free-wheeling ways, the already
slim prospects for greater political cohesion in Phnom Penh will disappear.
The decision to rein in Lon Non can be made only by Lon Nol, but the
latter continues to tolerate, if not encourage, his younger brother's activities.
Should Lon Nol finally decide or be persuaded that it is in Cambodia's best
interest to neutralize Lon Non, he could do so most effectively by shipping
him off to a remote ambassadorial post. Even if Lon Nol would be willing to
take Such a step, however, there is no certainty that the increasingly
confident Lon Non would agree to go into exile, gilded or otherwise.
There is also no guarantee that Lon Non's removal-coupled with
Matak's installation as vice president--would be a panacea for Phnom Penh's
political ills. The removal of Lon Non would at least encourage many
military and civilian leaders and hold out hope to the general public for some
improvement in the government's over-all performance. The alternative is
deepening drift and decay.
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