IRAQ- -A POLITICAL STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160061-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: August 3, 1973
• Content Type: IR

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INTELLIGENCR REPORT
SUBJECT: Iraq--A Political Study
OCI-2323/73
3 August 1973
This paper deals in brief with the Iraqi political
system--its background, structure, and conflicts. It rQviews
some of the predominant political forces in the country and
some of the recent political changes that have been set in
motion.
Backgr~: -Modern Iraq is a case study of military
involvement in the political ,life of a country . The Iraq
Army had the dubious honor of introducing the military coup
to the modern Arab political scene in 1936. In the der~ade
and a half since the coup in 1958 that toppled the monarchy
and esta~kilished a de.~ure republic but a de facto dictator-
ship, Iraq has experienced four distinct changes in regime,
ten coups d'etat ar attempted coups, and at least 14 cabi-
nets with an average longevity of less than a year. In
virtually every instance, the military was involved to some
extent,. and was often the prime mover.
The rr:~.litary revolution in 1958 altered the entire com-
plexion of Iraqi politics and government. It virtually
eliminated the upper class "old g~~ard" and placed the gov-
ernment in the hands of more radical officers drown primarily
from the lower middle class and lacking political training
and experience. The ensuing uncertainty and lack of direc-
tion ha.s resulted in an increasing concen~ration of political
power in the hands of a few men.
The ct3rrent regime, whicki seized power in 1968, is an
alliance of moderate officers and the socialist Baath Party.
It has substituted one-party governnterit for one-man rule,
but like its predecessors, is inherently unstable. If it
differs in any appreciable way it is in the tenacity with
which it clings to power--confounding the many political
observers who expected it to tear itself apart long ago. 25X1
The recent coup attempt has tended to unify competing forces
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within the regime, temporarily at least, and has accelerated
the trend toward a further consolidation of power.
The Dynamics of the Regime
Iraq is nominally a constitutional republic, but in
fact power is concentrated in the office of the president,
the 15-member Revo~.utionary Command Council (RCC) , and the
leadership of the Baath Party--the only legitimate political
party in Iraq, There are no popular elections per se, al-
though there are in :ra-party elections. Tn the aftermath
of the recent coup attempt, the RCC seems to be moving toward
the establishment of a National Council which will have at
least symbolic legisla?~ive functions. It will be appointed
by the RCC, however, and presumably will be responsive to
the present leadership. (See annex for discussion of the
structure of government.)
The principal actors in Iraqi politics include:
-- the military, and particularly the 90,000-man army,
which is the mainstay of any Iraqi regime. The army ~s
the self-appointed "custodian of the national interest"
and as such can impose its will on any government. In
the current scene, however, the army has been content
to remain aloof from the political turmoil in the wake
of the abortive coup attempt . The army per se apparently
was not involved, although individual soldiers m~~y have
been along with the internal security forces. Tie army's
interests are represented in both the RCC and the Regional
Command of the Baath Party.
-- The ruling Baath Party, a secular political institu-
tion with an involved, if somewhat vague, left-wing
socio-political philosophy. Its credo appeals to the
educated middle class elite more than to the less
sophisticated peasants and workers. Like the Communist
Party, it has a tradition of c~andestine activity and
maintains a highly compartmentalized structure composed
of cells , sections , and branches . The entire structure
(defined in party terms as a "region" of the Arab "nation")
is directed by a 7-man Regional Command. Baath members
tend to combine informally into "civilian" and "military"
:vings ; rivalries ae~tween the two are a source of f riction .
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Other political parties. Although they are techni-
cally proscribed, the government apparently sanctions
the numerically small but influential Communist Party
and the Kurdish Democratic Party as long as they cooper-
ate with the regime and maintain a low profile.
-- The Kurds, who make up about 30 percent of the
Iraqi population. They are concentrated in the northern
mo~,ultains rind are in a chronic state of revolt. They
are part of the some 5-6 million Kurds located in con-
tiguous areas of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Their
ultimate goal is an independent Kurdish state, but the
Iraqi Kurds will settle, for the moment at leGst, for
autonomy within a unified Iraqi state as long as they
also share in the central government. The Dakr regime
by an agreement signed in March 1970, promised autonomy
to the Kurds by Niarch 1974. Recently the government
has begun to hedge on this commitment. Persistent
rumors of sharp clashes between the Kurds and government
forces remain unconfirmed, but the Kurds reportedly
expect further serious fighting. The Kurds have token
representation in the national government, and the
Kurdish Democratic Party headed by Barzani has been
invited by both the Baathist and the Communists to join
in a national front government. Barzani, highly
suspicious of the motives of both groups, remains aloof
in his mountain fastness.
The two most influential leaders are President I3akr ar~d
Saddam Husayn Tikriti, Vice Chairman of the RCC and Deputy
Chairman of the Regional Command of the Baath Party. In
addition to his role as chief of state, Baler serves as his
own prime minister and assumed the defense portfolio follow-
ing the death of General Shihab during the June 30 coup
attempt. Although there is no stipulated presidential term,
he presumably may be removed by action of t'~e RCC. Tikriti
has been described by some political observers as the
"strong man" of the regime. Certainly he play-ed a key role
in putting down the recent coup attempt, although some
suspect he may also have had a hand in planning it. Tikriti
hss played a more prominant public role in recent weeks
through public appearances, announcements, and press confer-
ences and has engaged in important meetings with foreign
representatives. Baler and Tikriti are potential rivsls,
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but for the presont at least, they appear to be working
together to consolidate their power and to unif,'y the country.
They are also probably purging suspected dislo~~al elements
from the Baath Party, the government, and the secuxity
forces.
Point of conflict--Personalities, social philosophies,
and ethnic d~ences, rather than political, social, or
economic issues per se, underlie the various political
groupings and power blocs in Iraq.
Within the Baath Party government itself, there appear
to be no basic policy differences, but there; are varying
degrees of emphasis amo:tg individuals and groups jockeying
for position. President Bakr, as a former army general, is
often identified with the so-called "milit