PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE STATUS OF JORDAN'S WEST BANK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160079-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: November 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
Proposals for Resolving the Status of Jordan's West Bank
Confidential
1 November 1973
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Confidetflial
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1 November 1973
Introduction
This paper presents background information on
the Israeli-occupied West Bank of Jordan and outlines
some of the many proposals that have been put forward
for the resolution of its problems. Some new propo-
sals are also presented. Implementation of any of
these plans, old or new, would pose delicate questions
for US policy--none of which is treated in the paper.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publica-
tion are welcome. They may be directed to
o the Office of Current Intelligence,
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Background
Physical Setting. Jordan's West Bank is a hilly
area about 130 kilometers long and 50 kilometers wide
(80 by 30 miles). A north-south ridge line about 20
kilometers (12 miles) west of the Jordan River paral-
lels the valley and forms the Mediterranean - Jordan
Valley drainage divide. To the east, rough, barren
slopes descend to the valley through which the Jordan
River meanders in a 100-kilometer (62-mile) course
(all below sea level) from Lake Tiberias (Sea of
Galilee) to the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth.
West of the divide are the less abrupt, more fertile
slopes that overlook the ten-mile-wide Israeli
coastal plain.
The scant rainfall on the eastern sloj.?i, some
100 to 250 millimeters (4 to 10 inches) per year sup-
ports only a semi-desert complex of scattered thorn-
bush; there are no non-irrigated crops. The western
slope, although not quite a desert, is also dry coun-
try despite an annual rainfall of 510 to 760 milli-
meters (20 to 30 inches). Virtually all the rain
falls between October and March and there are no per-
manent streams; much of the water supply for the long
summer thus depends upon wells and springs.
Although the western slope is the "richest" part
of Jordan in terms of agriculture, it is a food de-
ficient area. Agricultural experts estimate that the
West Bank's 2,100 square kilometers (825 square miles)
of cultivable land can support a population of some
370,000. At this time, the total population of natives
and refugees is something over 630,000 persons.
Historical Setting. After centuries of Turkish
rule, control over the West Bank was passed to the
British in 1920 as part of the.Lea ue of Nations
mandate of Palestine.
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THE WEST BANK
Arab Population
Over 10,000
o 5,000-10,000
? 1,000-5,000
SINAI
1067 Canae-
,FIre Line
l1
CAI Qunaylllrah
GoiANSyria
HEIGHTS 7
it \
CAI Karak
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CONFIDENTIAL,
Beginning with the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agree-
ment--a series of exchanges between Great Britain,,
France, and Russia--many plans for the carving up of
the mandate were submitted. (A few of the better known
are shown on the map at the end of the text.) Although
varied, they had certain elements in common. Nearly
all, including the Jewish Agency Proposal of 1946,
assign what is now the West Bank to the Palestinians,
but all made their assignments without consulting the
Palestinians. The 12th of President Wilson's 14
points argued for "unmolested opportunity of auton-
omous development" for peoples formerly under Turk-
ish rule, but it had little effect.
Although winners in the 1948-49 struggle, the
Israelis did not quite have the margin to take Old
Jerusalem from Jordan's Arab Legion and they were
not interested in taking the rest of the West Bank.
In 1967 they were able to take both. They consider
certain places, such as Hebron, important for reasons
of religion, but their major interest in West Jordan
has been in eliminating a tactical threat from a
hostile--and conceivably dangerous--neighbor.
Since June 1967, Israel has "created facts" on
the West Bank, including at least 18 Israeli settle-
ments, a large building program in East Jerusalem,
new road construction, and a program of encouraging
thousands of Arab workers to seek employment in
Israel. Critics, both Israeli and foreign, accuse
Mrs. Meir's government of moving toward "creeping
annex?4"4 r +-hc =ran_ ni f-i nQ f-hp actions noted
links, and the spreading Israeli electricity network
further tie Jerusalem and the entire West Bank to
Israel.
Prospects for the Refugees. Should an Arab-
Israeli political accommodation be reached tomorrow,
the West Bank refugee problem would remain. A por-
tion of the surplus population might be absorbed if
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CONFIDENTIAL
modern agriculture and industry were developed--a
major task that involves the retraining of a tradi-
tion-oriented population. The majority of the refu-
gees, however, have little potential for useful em-
ployment on the West Bank.
Even if refugees are permitted to migrate freely,
the political climate and the congested labor market
in neighboring Arab countries do not favor the ab-
sorption of the many thousands of refugees. In the
absence of regional good will and cooperation, there
is little likelihood of a realistic solution to the
intricate problems of repatriating, compensating,
or resettling an economically depressed and politi-
cally sensitive refugee population.
The Various Plans
The Allon Plan. Minister of Labor (now Deputy
Prime Minister) Yigal Allon placed his plan for
dealing with the occupied territories before the
Israeli Government in July 1967, about a month after
the end of the war. It has never been officially
considered by the Knesset, but many of its elements
have been implemented during the past six years.
The key element of the plan for the West Bank
is the establishment of a security zone immediately
west of the Jordan River and around the northwest-
ern portion of the Dead Sea. The proposed zone
would be some 96 kilometers long by 16 to 24 kilo-
meters wide (60 miles by 10 to 15 miles) and would
occupy about one third of the total area of the West
Bank. Interference with the Arab population would
be minimal because only an estimated three percent
of the West Bank Arabs live in the arid, barren floor
of the Jordan Valley.
According to the plan, the Arab-populated hilly
areas of the West Bank would revert to Jordan and a
corridor from Ramallah to Jericho would link the Arab
sectors to the East Bank. The plan calls for 20 to
28 Jewish settlements in the area, 12 of which were
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THE WEST BANK
The Allon Plan
(1967)
ED
Proposed security zone
Mediterranean
SeG'
Netanya', ./ (ulkarm
Ashgelon
Gaza
GAZA
STRIP ,
Rah h
SINAI
R m
,ola
Lebanon
Tyre,/
S
1967 cease-
"Fire Line
?AI Qunny%irnh
GOLAN S y r
HEIGHTS
f t
Haifa ) / --/\, i..-; \
GI'
Arab)
y'
Sector
1 01
Beersheba!
Latrun ' f- j
Salient Je!(fsai~itt
Bn4hlefi~l'(i~.''k
1949
Armistice
Line
Dimona
!./earl l
Sru
Uln~r
I a
I
((,Jarash
.1.
flr,da
Oaanye
bridge ? l
cs Salt
Allenby
brrdjj
Prince 4br!ulle%
hrirlrc
*Amman
Al CKarak
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established shortly after the 1967 war; of these,
five have already been converted from Nahal (mili-
tary) settlements into civilian settlements.
The plan would be a territorial compromise,
assuring Israel of defensible borders without in-
cluding a sizable Arab population and without shut-
ting off political options for peace. Allon has
held that if Israel gave equal rights to the West
Bank Arabs, it would cease to be a Jewish state,
but that if it refused equal rights, it would
cease to be a democracy. He saw no choice but to
give up territory.
Sapir's Ideas. Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir,
concerned over the economic cost of absorbing large
numbers of Arabs GTLd the threat to a Jewish majority,
has also urged the return of Arab land. He has stated
that continued occupation of Arab territories cap-
tured in the 1967 war threatens Israel's security
and moral image. Sapir, a leading dove in the Is-
raeli cabinet, agrees with Deputy Prime Minister
Yigal Allon that Israel should expect a settlement
to involve important Israeli territorial concessions
but that these should not endanger, Israeli security.
He has presented statistical projections to show
that Israel would be half Arab by 1993 if it an-
nexed all the occupied territories. Sapir's ideas
correspond largely with those of Foreign Minister
Eban, who has said that Israel wants a maximum of
security with a minimum of territory.
The Weitz Plan. The author of this plan is Dr.
Raanan Weitz, head of the Jewish Agency's Department
for Development and a member of the Labor Party. He
also heads the International Settlement Study Center
in Rehovot. According to the Weitz Plan, Israel
would tie the controlled areas to Israel proper and
the whole would be divided into five Jewish and three
Arab zones. The Jewish zones would consist of the
Zefat, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Ashdod, and Beersheba zones.
The Golan Heights would be anne.,:ed to the Zefat Zone;
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Jewish area
Arab area
Existing Israeli settleniant
Mediterranean
Sea
Lebanon (
1 /
Netanya/.? (Tulkarm
algilya
& A2(A
Rafah
Jericho,. .
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THE WEST BANK
The Weitz Plan
(1973)
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CONFIDENTIAL
the northern section of the Jordan Valley to the
Haifa Zone; the Latrun region would form part of
the Tel Aviv-Yafo Zone; the Ezyon Bloc would form
part of the Ashdod Zone; and the Rafah Enclave (down
to the approaches of Al Arish in the Sinai Peninsula)
would be included in the Beersheba Zone.
The three Arab regions would be the Nablus,
Hebron, and Gaza zones. A new settlement region
would be developed north of Beersheba and annexed
to the Gaza Zone for Gaza refugees. Jerusalem would
form a unit in itself and be the capital of the
State and the seat of the central government. Its
administration would be local and semi-autonomous.
If no peace were reached with Jordan, two other
alternatives might be feasible, according to the Weitz
Plan: establishment of a Palestinian State or of a
federative community. The Palestinian State would
include the three Arab zones, which would unite to
form a single independent entity. N,.z military force
would be permitted in the new state. The federative
community would presumably unite the three Arab Zones
and join them as a semi-autonomous region to Israel.
This would not be significantly different from the
proposals of the basic Weitz Plan, but it would di-
lute the Jewish nature of-the state to a greater ex-
tent and would thus not, in the Israeli view, serve
as a particularly desirable alternative. The present
Israeli Government is officially opposed to the
establishment of any independent Palestinian State
on the West Bank. Prime Minister Golda Meir has
repeatedly said that any such state can exist only
in east Jordan.
The Dayan Plan. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
favors a peace treaty which would give Jews the right
to settle anywhere in the West Bank or the Gaza
Strip, "this being our home." He believes that Is-
raeli forces should be stationed on the River Jordan
and has claimed that he no longer "remembers" the Green
Line (the 1949 armistice line) formerly separating
Israel from the Jordanian West Bank.
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Dayan, like many others in the Government of
Israel, appears convinced that a negotiated peace
settlement with Jordan should not come before a break-
through in the impasse with Egypt. Dayan advocates
that Israel demand more of Jordan than security; peace
with Jordan must guarantee freedom of movement for
Israelis in the West Bank and their right to live
and worship there. The Defense Minister has said,
in fact, that Israel cannot get all it wants from
Jordan, and he believes that the only guarantee ac-
ceptable today, in the absence of a viable peace, is
direct Israeli control of the occupied territories.
He professes the hope that the situation will improve
to the point where this requirement for Israeli con-
trol might disappear or diminish, but he sees no
chance in the near future for a peace agreement with
Jordan. He thus believes Israel should strengthen
economic links with the occupied territories and
employ Arabs from these zones inside Israel itself.
Many of Dayan's ideas have been incorporated in
the Labor Party's plan for the occupied territories
(this plan is sometimes called the Gallili Plan for
Ministe:^ without Portfolio Israel Gallili). The evo-
lution of Labor Party plans from 1969 to 1973 re-
flects the growing attitude of the Israeli majority
that more of the occupied territories should be held.
An Israeli Government Plan for the West Bank.
One Israeli plan for the development of the West
Bank was given in the 1.971 Ministry of the Interior's
publication Judaea and Samaria: Lines for Physical
and Regional Planning. Because the publication has
been restricted, information on its contents is in-
complete. The plan appears, however, to assume per-
manent Israeli control of.the area; if implemented,
it would "create facts" toward the complete union of
the West Bank any? Israel.
The development of Jerusalem, according to the
plan, will expand its municipal boundaries to the
suburbs of Ramallah in the north and of Bethlehem in
the south. Jerusalem's dependence on her western
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CONFIDENTIAL
hinterland would be increased. ThiF forecast re-
enforces the idea of integrating Jerusalem with the
State of Israel, and of integrating both areas with
the rest of the West Bank.
In the Jordan Valley, a new urban center would
be created near the Damiya bridge on the Nablus-
Jericho-Amman road for the settlement of nomads and
refugees. This would be contrary to the Allon Plan
suggestion that the center serve primarily the newly
established Israeli settlements in the valley.
The refugee camps should, according to the plan,
be eliminated or changed to form independent rural
units or, if adjacent to a town, municipal suburbs.
(This is already being done in the Gaza Strip.)
The idea of transferring refugees from Gaza to the
West Bank is put forward as a possibility. The plan
considers the West Bank suitable for intensified
settlement provided the proper agricultural improve-
ments are made and industrial enterprises are estab-
lished. Development of tourism would be centered
around places connected with Jewish history; na-
tional parks and nature preserves are planned for
the desert areas.
Transportation would be improved. Some towns
in the West Bank would gain local airports. East-
west roads crossing the pre-1967 boundary would be
improved as integral parts of the Israeli road net-
work. It is assumed that economic necessity will
cause the border towns of Janin, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya
to remain dependent on close ties with Israel, and
the plan encourages this economic relationship.
Special Israeli Requirements on the West Bank
Israeli officials from time to time have de-
tailed Israeli territorial requirements for security
on the West Bank. They declare that no Arab army
can again cross the Jordan River; that the Allon
Plan is the minimum acceptable to the Israeli gov-
ernment; and that, as Mrs. Meir has said, there must
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be major, not rainox, territorial changes on the West
Bank: the Latrun Salient must be removed, and Is-
rael's narrow coastal waist must be widened.
The vast majority of the Israeli public rejects
most plans which permit restored Arab control of the
West Bank. The prevailing attitude has been one of
yielding as little as possible, and the recent con-
flict has reinforced this attitude. Most Israelis
undoubtedly feel that their country h.s been the in-
nocent victim of Arab aggression and that the Arab
aim is the eventual destruction of Israel. They are
in no mood to yield any of what they regard as their
rightful territory and as territory necessary for
their security.
King Husayn's Plan. In March 1972 Jordan's
King Husayn proposed the formation of a new fed-
erated state that would include his present kingdom
and a semi-autonomous province of Palestine on the
West Bank. The new nation, with Husayn at its head,
would be known as the United Arab Kingdom. The
capital of the country and of the eastern region
would be Amman and that of the Palestinian western
region would be Jerusalem. This plan was initially
condemned almost unanimously, not only by the Is-
raelis, but by other Arab states and by the Palestin-
ian guerrilla ieaders as well. It is probable, how-
ever, that most West Bankers, given no other alter-
natives, would choose Husayn over the Israelis, and
the altered situation created by the war could heighten
interest in the plan as one workable basis from which
to begin a negotiating process.
Palestinian Attitudes. Most West Bankers are
obsessed with Israel's occupation of their country
and seek only to end it, without any clear idea of
what their political future should be thereafter.
They largely reject King Husayn's plan for a federal
state, but many regard it with more favor than their
current situation. There has recently been increased
advocacy for some form of West Bank entity, and West
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 CONFIDENTIAL
Bankers in general are showing renewed interest in
possible solutions to their problems.
Fedayeen guerrilla leaders, in addition, have
apparently begun recently to realize that movement
toward a negotiated settlement--which they have
always categorically rejected--is now inevitable and
that, unless they acquiesce and join in, neither the
Israelis nor the Arab states will support their
interests. Although still not totally ready to give
up their ultimate goal, the destruction of Israel,
fedayeen leaders are increasingly talking of adopt-
ing a position that would give them a reasonable voice
in peace negotiations. That position appears to be
a call for the establishment of an independent Pales-
tinian state on the West Bank, to include the Gaza
Strip.
Israel would strongly oppose any such plan. It
would not object to losing the Arabs of the Gaza
Strip but views the area as a potentially dangerous
Arab salient projecting too close to important Israeli
population centers. The Israelis intend to keep the
Gaza Strip. It is almost in:once.'vable that they
would permit East Jerusalem to revert to Arab con-
trol.
Alternative Proposals
The following are presented as possible alter-
natives to the several proposals outlined above.
Plan A. A possible alternative to the Alton Plan
would permit the Israelis to keep their: new settle-
ments in the Jordan Valley security zone north of the
Allenby bridge, but would provide for the retention
of the rest of the valley area and the west coast )f
the Dead Sea within the West Bank. This would cost
the Israelis six or seven settlements and place more
territory and two b.:idge crossings under Arab control.
On the other hand, Jerusalem and the Latrun Salient
would become part of Israel. Minor modifications of
the border would also put Tulkarm and Qalqilya within
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Israeli territory. Special arrangements would be
made to allow the Jewish residents to remain as a
minority in Hebron. The Arab sector of the West
Bank would be demilitarized as in the Allon Plan.
From the Arab standpoint, the primary objection
to this plan--and a major one--would be its incor-
poration of Jerusalem into Israel.
Plan B. This plan would be a variant of the
Weitz Plan. it would create a nev Arab state con-
siderably larger than that in the Weitz Plan and
would include parts of the better Israeli lands sur-
rounding it. Large numbers of Arab farm laborers
would commute to work in nearby Israeli territory
but would have their homes in the new Arab state.
Boundary lines would be drawn to facilitate such move-
ment. No Gaza refugees would be settled in the new
state. The advantages of this plan are that it would
permit Israel to remain overwhelmingly Jewish while
creating an Arab state that might require large but
not completely impossible amounts of outside support
to stay alive.
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PARTITIOf PLAI1S FOR PALESTIf1E
1916-1947
Leo
at '.Pea
b)
??~F~v~r Mol
50 11ar
Laud CLu.Nn(
tvra
vjoj~aii
Zon(
Sykes -Picot ..49rccwtnfr (1916)
(Indoaaa
MAe s
t
1946 Provincial
Autonomy
Plan
Morrison- Grady)
L /
I t
1 1
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Lnltd Claimed
at' ence Coiifcl?cllcc
!Iy Zionists
? I i cI Inlin ndvnp,rnl~
?llrunlatr rf ldu6uc
LC~n~~,.I d,I.nunrd
Cl ,r;:A
Artidrhto,
a Icbran
otertlttba
C Th,.,I 1 L,01
iii U.w A~~Inn
n.lny4r4 t.n c." rtr{'t
Jewish
..grab
Lt.nANOI I
7UIltar,n
u abLs
I
NECEB %
j Jlarris
`. j Ylan
\ I
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Mbtatidnfc of
Palestine
North Frontier est. by
Tranco?Brilisls Convcnlion
of brc. 23, 1920
(CMO. N95)
Enstcrn YYortttcr
?'rolls ?)ordnn separated
from Tnlcslinc Atnndnic
Scyt. 1922.
t76e site of Afarylnnd)
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Amery
Scheme
Jewish State
Arab State
UNSCOP
Majority Proposal)
YariUion with
Economic Union
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?la:areth rncluve
(.Mandated Territory)
Y Partition Commission:
PLAN A
Col6vablr.1rrnt
C ACIFG)
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Tartitiori Commission,
em- in
JtwirhStott: Jewish po . 300,400
-irtb poj. 188,400
Cultivalltarea 519,000
' 2/3 r4 owned by - 4rdIs
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j Tarfition Commission
Plan C
~nvirh State: Am 314,000 arrc$
Arab jay. 54.000
.kwhhyo;% 226,000
.arnb$Infe:.arrn 1,348,000nrrts
j !ovish}r}+. 8,900
.Imbyoy 444,000
~Np0.tNt0.N ~
Jewish O
Arab P~q
UN RurfmGon
'Nov. 1947
9arlilion >alh
Sionomit Union