THE SICK SOVIET SOCIETY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001203970167-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 167
• Publication Date: August 3, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE MALAISE OF SOVIET SOCIETY
1. In recent years there has been a growing feeling of malaise in most
sections and at most levels of Soviet society. People simply no longer believe
in the Party. They do not think in terms of problems being overcome by changes
in the leadership, but rather that the whole party system has to be done away
with. Young people even say as much in the presence of Brezhnev's grandchildren.
Only careerists are willing to talk about their faith in the system as if they
believe what they are saying.
2. Over the years, the gradual increase in corruption and theft by party
officials has encouraged more and more people to see what they can get out of
the system for themselves--with ever decreasing concern about the legality
of what they are doing. This malaise had been reflected in both the growth
and the pattern of Soviet crime. Certain parts of Moscow and other big cities
are no longer considered safe after dark. There has been a sharp increase in
the number of muggings by teenagers and the number of murders committed in
general. The authorities are worried by the fact that the proportion of murders
committed without a known motive has now risen to 80 percent.
3. Robberies from private flats used to be virtually unknown in the Soviet
Union. Now, however, people are so worried that they install double doors and
burglar alarms (wired via the telephone system) in their homes. Despite such
precautions the apartments of violinist David Oistrakh and other leading artists
have been burglarized, as have those of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and even
KGB) officials. Public concern has been heightened by revelations that some
of the militia, which control the burglar alarms, have been working in con-
junction with professional thieves.
4. There has also been a steady rise in the number of armed robberies
of big stores, jewelry shops, banks and couriers delivering wages to big enter-
prises. Such robberies are now frequent enough occurrences for them to be
mentioned in novels, which they never were before.
5. Nowadays no place seems to be safe from thieving fingers--even the
KGB Headquarters in Lubianka. Yuriy Andropov, KGB Chief, would still like
to know who stole six.fine fur hats belonging to important visitors from
the hat stand outside his office in the latter 1970's. (Fearing that more
than hats might leave the inner sanctum of the Lubianka unnoticed, Andropov
then ordered a high security "screen" to be built around his suite of offices).
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6. Despite this malaise there are few, if any, signs that crime has
acquired a distinctly political focus. There is little political graffiti
to be seen and such armed attacks as there have been on party officials have
usually been in the republics. In the short term terrorist attacks are
more likely to come from national minorities (e.g. the bombing of the Moscow
Metro by three Armenians) than from European Russians themselves.
7. The story of the Soviet leadership's recent efforts to cover up
corruption in high places and details of some of the things which have been
going on in the militia provide vivid vignettes of the present state of
Soviet society.
THE DISCONTENTED GROUPS
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS
8. The serious food shortages in recent years have added to the discontent
of the working class with their generally low standard of living, the shortages
of consumer goods, the "failures" of the system and the resentment they feel
about the privileges enjoyed by senior party officials.
9. The authorities have long felt that alcohol was an essential opiate
for the Soviet people in general, and the working class in particular. People
are well aware that the authorities make reusable caps for the bottles of
vodka which are exported, but not those sold in the home market. Once a
Soviet man opens his bottle he is expected to finish it. In 1971 a secret
party directive went so far as to recommend that local authorities should
open liquor shops close to the entrances of all major plants. At the same
time the authorities launched an official campaign against alcoholism. In
the recent past much official concern has been expressed about the increase
in alcoholism in the Soviet Union, but the authorities have not really tried
to combat the problem. Prices have gone up, but supplies are still good and
are consumed just as quickly as before.
10. Workers can often be heard saying that they do not care whether they
are employed by a capitalist "boss" or the state, so long as the money is good--
and there is something worth buying with it. In the past workers said such
things in public when drunk. Now they frequently say them when sober.
11. The more skilled the worker, the less fear he has of voicing his
discontent. If the KGB suggests a skilled worker should lose his job because
of what he has said, the factory manager and the party secretary are likely
to defend him because they cannot replace him easily.
12. Discontent, aggravated by food shortges, has already led to many
brief strikes. The two major strikes of 1981 were at Gorkiy and Togliatti.
By the spring of 1981 meat and milk shops in Gorkiy had been closed for
months. Unrest and tension had been growing. Without warning stoppages
broke out one day in several separate parts of the Gorkiy plant. Within
a short while the strike had spread and production was at a standstill.
The next day the meat and milk shops, miraculously well stocked, reopened.
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Production restarted at the plant without delay. There were no arrests and
at the time the authorities made no attempts to find strike leaders. The
main interest, as usual, was hushing up the matter as quickly as possible.
13. Despite the authorities' efforts a similar pattern of events soon
unfolded in the nearby major car plant at Togliatti, Again the workers
were bought off with improved food supplies.
14. Efforts to modernize industrial practices have also run into
difficulty. At a number of plants the introduction of piece rates has been
badly handled. Productivity has usually shot up quickly in response to the
incentives of the new system. This has made the authorities think they set
the piece rate too high. They think that they will still be able to get much
of the increase in production they want even if they pay a lower piece rate.
Cuts in piece rates, however, have usually led to strikes. One of the most
important of these strikes took place a few years ago at the tractor plant
at Volgograd.
15. The great majority of agricultural workers want collective farms
(the Kolkhoz), in effect to be broken up--at least into small cooperatives,
if not independent farms. They argue that only such a reorganization, together
with a freer market for their produce, will give them the type of incentives
they need to increase their output significantly.
16. Recent regional experiments have shown production can be increased
significantly when small groups are allowed to farm land for their own profit
(i.e. the Zveno/"Link"/System). The party leadership, however, has rejected
the idea that Soviet agriculture should be remodelled on these lines. They
are simply terrified by the prospects of people having an independent economic
base, free to a large extent from party control.
17. During the past couple of years state help for private plots has
increased and price controls have been removed on sales at the officially
sanctioned private markets. These changes, however, have only produced a
slight improvement in supplies from that sector. Most farmers have found,
of course, that they need to sell less to earn the same amount of money. As
the choice of goods they can buy is not great, they have little incentive
to earn more cash.
18. The food program to 1990, approved by the Central Committee Plenum
on 24 May 1982, is unlikely to produce a significant increase in output.
There will still be far too much bureaucracy interfering with farming decisions
and price incentives will not be great enough for the agricultural workers.
In these circumstances the investments planned under the program will neither
be very productive, nor will they really overcome some of the main structural
problems of Soviet agriculture.
19. One of the key problems of Soviet agriculture stems from the fact
that rural life in much of the country is very disagreeable. In European
Russia, for example, collective farms are usually unprofitable and rundown.
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The majority of young people have drifted to the cities. It will be a long
time before conditions improve sufficiently to encourage young people to stay
on the farms, let alone bring them back from the cities. After all industry,
too, is eager to get more labor.
20. In the Ukraine the situation is somewhat better. Agriculture there
has been fairly profitable for many years. This has made it possible to
improve the quality of rural life. As a result a good proportion of young
people have remained on the land--which in turn has-helped production and
profitability. But retaining manpower and winning it back are very different
matters.
THE INTELLIGENTSIA
21. At present the most influential members of the intelligentsia are the
writers. Many of them are, in reality, both subtle and profound critics of many
aspects of the Soviet system. They not only find ways to criticize the negative
side. of Soviet society, but they also articulate the discontent of a large number
of people against the Soviet system as a whole.
22. Influential writers today tend to be against the party, for less
antagonism between classes in Soviet society and for a greater pride in Russian
nationalism. The KGB watches such writers closely, but most of their books
are still published. The leading members of this group include Vladimir
Soloukhin, Valentin Pikul, and Valentin Rasputin, as were Gil Lepatov (who
wrote critically about local party officials), Vasili Shukshin and Vladimmir
Vysotsky (the very popular poet/singer) who kept on protesting until their
recent deaths.
23. Soloukhin's novel about a peasant who wished to restore a 13th
century church conveys well the way these writers get across their message.
The peasant in this novel feels so strongly about the importance of saving his
village church from delapidation and collapse that he is willing to restore
it himself. He gives up drink to save the money to buy the materials he
needs to supplement his own building skills. All he wants from the authorities
is permission to restore the church (which for him is symbolic of Russia and
its historic greatness). No one in the local administration or the local party
or the next level up is willing to give him the go ahead. In the end this
good peasant, frustrated and enraged, throws away his tools, gets drunk and
curses Soviet society.
24. Pikul, in his books, has continued to develop his theme that Russians
should be proud of their history. Generally speaking, he argues, Russia had
great Tsars, good rulers and good political leaders before the October
revolution. This is one of the themes of his book At the Limit," which dealt
with the last period of Tsarism. Suslsov was enraged by the fact that Pikul
did not even make the slightest reference to the Bolsheviks. But Pikul still
writes and his books are published. One way or another he conveys the same
message.
25. Among the non-literary intelligentsia Sakharov still commands much
respect. His academic standing, his personal history and the fact that he
remains in the country tend to override any criticism people may voice about
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his links with the West or some of the advice he has given the West (e.g. his
call to the West to increase its military strength). In some intellectual
circles Sakharov's confinement in Gorkiy is often referred to by the words
"Lenin in exile."
26. The dissident movement itself enjoys little public support, even in
intellectual circles. The writers referred to above and their supporters
feel that the Soviet Union must solve its own problems, in its own way, and
in its own good time. The public dissidents are disliked because of their
links with the West. Moreover, it is generally felt that these groups (for
example, the Helsinki Monitoring Group) are little more than devices which
Jews unable to leave the Soviet Union use to further their own cause, not
that of "Russia."
THE MILITIA (POLICE)
27. The militia is one of the least discontented, yet most disliked,
groups in Soviet society. The reason is simple--the militia is doing so
well through corruption. These days militiamen are mainly former soldiers
from the provinces who have come to Moscow and Leningrad, in particular, in
the hope of cashing in on the local corruption. They have become brazen
enough to take bribes from almost anyone, even from known KGB officers.
28. The most corrupt group in the militia is the one responsible for
investigations into the theft of state property). These militiamen have
numerous opportunities to take bribes and to ask for them. They have become
deeply involved in the activities they are supposed to be stopping. Corruption
in the militia has become such a serious matter that the KGB is trying to
persuade the party to let them have the responsibility for investigating
theft of state property.
29. The militia is also involved. in organized crime, incuding murder.
At the lower end of the scale, the militia is involved in robberies from
homes of some of the more prosperous Soviet citizens where they have installed
the burglar alarms (via the telephone system). At the other end of the scale,
groups of militia. have been discovered murdering well-to-do people for their
apparel and personal possessions.
30. The most infamous case took place in 1978/80. During that period
a number of people had disappeared without trace. The KGB got involved when
one of Andropov's senior colleagues (his personal adviser on personnel matters)
joined the list of those missing. A massive KGB operation was mounted to
discover what had happened to him. After many months the KGB discovered a
group of 25 militiamen, headed by a Lieutenant Colonel, which had murdered
more than 20 people for their possessions and had then effectively disposed
of the bodies. Other similar groups were exposed later.
31. As a result of these exposures and other incidents, relations are
now extremely bad between the KGB and the militia. If ever arrested by the
militia, KGB officers have instructions to conceal their true function. The
reason is that the militia is believed to be so keen to embarrass the KGB that
they will even fabricate the evidence if they think they can get away with
doing so. A more important reflection of the leadership's view of the militia
is that the KGB expects that it will soon be allowed to recruit agents in the
militia, something which it has been forbidden to do for many years.
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32. Within the KGB there is a strong feeling that "something needs to
be done to put this country in order." The KGB is particularly disgruntled by
its inability to take effective action against those it believes are undermining
"society," particularly dissidents and the party itself. Legally, the KGB has
difficulty in stopping the expression of anti-regime sentiments. A man, even
in the Soviet Union, is entitled to his personal opinion. He only commits
an offense when he tries to encourage others to pursue anti-Soviet activities.
Skilled workers are usually protected by their employer and the local party
secretary, almost regardless of what the KGB says. The KGB resents having to
"caution" dissidents, instead of being able to take executive action against
them.
33. The other problems connected with dissidence have also been pre-
occupying the KGB. For some years the Soviet authorities have been worried
about the use which might be made in periods of social unrest of the sizeable
amounts of unauthorized weapons in private hands and the illegal presses used
for printing Samizdat.
34. Although the KGB has had some success in collecting weapons, greater
quantities of arms continue to be smuggled out of arms factories (e.g. at
Tula and Kovrov). Most of these weapons are small arms, but the KGB believes
that some heavier items, still in working order, have remained concealed since
the second world war, mainly in the western part of the Soviet Union and the
Causcasus. Tracking down these weapons has remained one of the KGB's top
priorities since the mid 1970's.
35. The KGB has had no difficulty in monitoring the circulation of
Samizdat publications and the authorities have not been unduly concerned
by the tone of their contents. What has been more disturbing for the KGB
(and for the authorities) is the little success it has had in locating the
illegal printing presses. The authorities fear that in more troubled times
these presses will be used to print inflammatory leaflets, posters, etc.
36. Even more resentment in the KGB is caused by the Party's privileges
and the abuse of its powers. Party secretaries at the raikom (district)
level and other party employees of that rank and above enjoy extensive privileges,
including access to special food shops. Compared to their party colleagues
the KGB, the Army and the government, even though they are also party members
and hold equally senior positions, only receive small perks.
37. The KGB knows a lot about corruption and straight theft from state
enterprises. It has great difficulty, however, in getting charges brought
against those concerned for the simple reason that they are protected by their
party position or their connections. Rarely is the Party willing to do more
than chide the offenders. The Party, KGB officers often say, wants to maintain
its isolation from society and protect itself from prying eyes. It also wishes
to avoid its laundry being washed in public. Scandal is to be avoided if at
all possible.
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38. If the KGB acquires incriminating evidence against a party official
(or the close relative of a senior party member) it is under strict instructions
to take no further action and to report the matter directly to the head of the
KGB. During the many years Andropov headed the KGB he claimed that he would
deal with the matter "personally" and in his party capacity as a member of the
Politburo. It was noticeable that despite the evidence he received rarely did
anything ever happen to the accused. Many KGB officers feel that this sense
of "discretion" is one of the main reasons Andropov is acceptable to the Party.
39. There is widespread belief among Army officers that the Party has
shown itself incapable of running the country--either by Stalinism or through
reform. Some middle ranking officers, including lecturers at the General
Staff Academy, go so far as to tell friends that sooner or later someone will
lead a coup d'etat against the Party. The Army dislikes and resents the Party
because of the general state of the country, the Party's involvement in cor-
ruption and theft and because party officials' privileges are much greater
than those enjoyed by Army officers of equal standing.
40.. Although the Army wishes to see change, it is generally opposed to
the idea of a return to Stalinist policies. One of the main reasons for this
is the Army's memories of the purges of the 1930's. The Army, and particularly
the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence), has never forgotten the enthusiasm
with which the KGB (then known as the NKVD) had pursued its role as "the armed
detachment of the party." Moreover, the Army dislikes what it views as the
close symbiotic relationship between the KGB and the Party.
41. For all of the Soviet dislike of the state of affairs in Poland, many
Soviet Army officers (including some senior officers) view with a certain
interest the role. which Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish Armed Forces
are now playing in the country's affairs.
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
42. Until a few years ago many of the younger officials believed that it
was still possible for the Soviet Union to follow the path of gradual economic
reform which in due course would widen the margins of cultural freedom and
political debate. Few people still believe such hopes can be realized. Within
Soviet society, these younger officials see widespread discontent with the Party
from the industrial and agricultural workers, the KGB, the Army and the
intellectuals. Moreover, they see a party which seems incapable of overcoming
the problems which it faces because it is preoccupied with preserving its own
position.
43. In 1920 Lenin had written (in "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile
Disorder") that: "only when the 'lower classes' do not want the old, and
the 'upper clases' cannot continue in the old way, can the revolution be
victorious." Many of the younger officials are beginning to feel that the
Soviet Union is moving closer and closer to such a situation.
CONCLUSIONS
44. There is little prospect that after Brezhnev leaves the political
scene the Soviet leadership will embark upon a more systematic program of
reform.
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45. In some respects the Party itself has become one of the discontented
sections of Soviet society. It still has its privileges, but it is less sure
about how much authority it can command. Economic problems pose the most serious
threat to the Party's position.
46. The influence of detente and the general erosion of discipline in
Soviet society have led to growing criticism of Soviet institutions and the
regime in general. To embark on reform in any circumstances would be to court
disaster. In Eastern Europe some experimentation can be tolerated because if
the situation gets out of hand there, Soviet troops are on hand to reassert
control; if things go wrong in the Soviet Union itself, however, no one will
protect the party.
47. Given the tensions within Soviet society a return to a more Stalinist
policy is quite possible. Andropov's recent appointment as a party secretary
will facilitate such a move, but it is not dependent upon him replacing Brezhnev
as general Secretary.
48. .If more draconian domestic policies are pursued the main features will
probably be:
A. A propaganda campaign claiming that the Soviet Union is seriously
threatened by the West.
B. Severe penalties for theft of state proprerty and associated cor-
ruption (e.g. food destined for state shops is often sold in
cooperative shops, with the connivance of the state shops who
take cut of the profits).
C. Tough KGB measures against any form of anti-socialism.
49. Initially, such draconian measures can win the acceptance, even favor
of some discontented elements in Soviet society. In the medium and longer term,
however, the measures will lose their impact. The main reason for this is that
the Soviet people have become more difficult to control individually and there
are now so many of them who are discontented. As draconian measures cannot
overcome these problems, discontent will build up and an incident could, at-some
stage, unleash a crisis.
50. Many Soviet people believe that industrial unrest could esily lead
to clashes with the police and workers being shot. Bloodshed, in turn, could
lead to massive and spontaneous demonstrations against the authorities. Large
scale protests could not easily be stopped by the authorities quickly buying
off the demonstrators with improved food supplies as happened in Gorkiy and
Togliatti in 1981. If demonstrations burst out in several places, the authorities
would not be able to provide supplies quickly enough to keep everyone happy.
51. A more serious problem for the authorities, however, is the weakening
of the cohesion and discipline of Soviet society which has taken place in recent
years. This could make it very difficult for the authorities to regain control
of the situation.
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52. Faced with widespread demonstrations the Party would have to call
in the Army. European conscripts would be most reluctant to fire on other
Europeans voicing similar discontents to their own. KGB troops might fire on
demonstrators at first, but it is doubtful for how long they would hold the
line. The authorities would try, no doubt, to use non-European troops to
re-establish order. Given the present structure of the Soviet Army, however,
this would not be easy--particularly to move them quickly to the areas where
they were needed. The outcome of such clashes would be unpredictable.
Bloodshed could soon lead to widespread violence. Faced with social unrest
other discontented groups could well turn against the Party--and one of the
discontented groups is, after all, the Army. If that happened the Party would
have little chance of surviving in its present form.
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