TEN STEPS TO COUNTER MOSCOW S THREAT TO NORTHERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100030004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 30, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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? ?
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
f Yr
NIC/AG
30 May 1984
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.It n
Ba will ill
May 30, 1984
TEN STEPS TO COUNTER MOSCOW'S THREAT .
TO NORTHERN EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
Moscow has been escalating military and political pressures
on northern Europe. In.early April, the Soviet Northern Fleet
conducted its largest maneuvers ever in the Norwegian Sea and
North Atlantic as part of an aggressive show of force following
NATO's deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.
The Swedes have been searching for yet another Soviet submarine
near the naval base at Karlskrona and the Norwegians have been
sighting foreign frogmen in Norway's territorial waters. All
this is part of what appears to be a calculated strategy by
Moscow to test its northern neighbors' defenses and to intimidate
their peoples. More ominous, given the aggressive nature of
Soviet amphibious assault exercises and fully coordinated "all
arms" attacks near the shores and borders of its neighbors, the
Kremlin probably is actually planning offensive operations against
the Nordic countries.'
The Soviet military buildup in northern Europe threatens NATO
control of the Scandinavian littoral, the Baltic Straits and the
vital sealanes across the Atlantic upon which NATO depends for
reinforcements in any major military conflict in Europe. Soviet
naval and air power projection capabilities also intensify the
strategic nuclear threat to the continental U.S. and complicate
timely defense against Soviet missile submarines and bombers.
Finally, Soviet occupation of the Scandinavian littoral will
provide Moscow with a springboard for a decisive strike against
Central.Europe.
Marian K. Leighton, "Soviet Strategy Toward Northern Europe and Japan,"
Survey, Autumn/Winter 1983, pp. 112-151.
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an
attempt to aid or
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N256 The Heritage Foundation ? 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202)5464400
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The Nordic countries are-also targets of Soviet destabi
tion and subversion. In -Janua liz
ry, for Norwegian official, was arrested for eing a Soviet Moscow, meanwhile, exercises considerable einfl the xample, Arne Trehold, a
on NATO nuclear force modernization; its agentsewer r in thpdebate
cockpit of the opposition movement against missile deiloyme
directed antinuclear activists throughout Scandinavia. ent and
In the past, the Soviet threat to the Nordic countries was
viewed solely in the context of a war in central Euro
Scandinavian as
peninsula as a peripheral theater.2
But Pt, there yet is
growing target in order to alter dramaticalltself now may s
NATO's northern flank. Physical control be a major
yeofeNorwayeand the Baltic
straits could then provide Moscow with a secure flank an
springboard for subsequent attacks on central Europe. d a
To counter this, the U.S. and its NATO allies must adopt a
ten-point plan that includes:
1) ? Increased Allied naval activity in the North;
2) Upgraded anti-submarine warfare capabilities;
3) Stockpiling more supplies in the North;
4) Expansion of Norwegian and Danish airbases;
5) Improved northern air defenses;
6) Increased training in northern terrain;
7) Upgraded command, control,'and communications systems;
8) Streamlined command structures;
9) Encouraging Sweden to intensify its defense efforts;
10) Heightened U.S. concern with the security of the area.
THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NORTHERN FLANK
NATO control of the Baltic straits, the Norwegian littoral,
and the Greenland-Iceland--U.K. gap (GIUK) is critical to the
Kenneth A. Myers, North Atlantic Securit
ton
ton Paper No. 62, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and Alterna-
tive Studies, 1979; Marian K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat Washing-
Flank (New York: na-
National Strate to NATO's
Erling Bj;1, "Nordic Securit }' gY Information Center, 1979);
national Institute for StrategicAStudies,a1983)No. 181 (London: Inter-
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superpowers' strategic nuclear balance. The Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom gap forms the first line of defense for antisub-
marine warfare (ASW) against Soviet nuclear powered ballistic
submarines (SSBNs) leaving the Baltic and Barents seas. Con-
versely, the U.S. deploys a significant number of Poseidon and
Trident submarines in the North Atlantic within striking range of
Soviet targets; their continued safety hinges on NATO's ability
to keep Soviet attack submarines from reaching the open ocean.
NATO command of the passageways to the North Atlantic is.
also vital to ensure timely reinforcement of Europe. NATO's
entire military planning and strategy of flexible response depends
on the safety of the sealanes of communications during wartime.
World War II underscored the strategic significance of the North
Atlantic and the Norwegian sea, where'a few German submarines and
aircraft operating from bases in Norway inflicted significant
losses on allied convoys en route to the ice free Soviet harbor
of Murmansk on the Kola peninsula. Growing sea denial capability
of Soviet naval-forces thus. jeopardizes not-only the integrity
of NATO's northern flank but also might spell defeat in central
Europe.
In addition to its strategic significance, the northern
flank's growing commercial importance could tempt Moscow. There
are rich hydrocarbon and fishing resources. The precise demarca-
tion of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea is disputed and
a constant source of tension between Norway and the USSR. Moscow
has been flouting Norwegian sovereignty and is quietly establish-
ing a military outpost in the Svaalbaard archipelago, despite
Norwegian protests.
THE GROWTH OF SOVIET POWER IN THE ARCTIC
Immediately after World War II, Moscow sought a territorial
buffer zone in the North akin to the one it was establishing in
Eastern Europe. It failed at this when Denmark and Norway became
founding members of NATO. The Kremlin then launched the major
economic and military development of the Kola region. The railway
to Leningrad was completed and Moscow enlarged the White Sea
canal as an internal link between the Northern and Baltic Fleets.
This transformed the Kola peninsula into a vast military base.3
Frontline ground forces are concentrated in two 12,000-strong
motorized rifle divisons, especially equipped for high mobility
arctic warfare. Modern Hind MI-24 attack helicopters, also in
Frank Brenchley, Norway and Her Soviet Neighbor: NATO's Arctic Frontier.
(London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982); John Erickson, "The
Northern Theater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," Strategic Review,
Vol. 4, 1976, pp. 67-82.
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use in Afghanistan, and HIP (MI-8)etransporters give f heseedivi-
sions great tactical mobility. These are iles as
ment divisions. Air defense is provided
system. SPermanentlysdeployed
well as the ZSU-23 antiaircra gun forces number more than 70,000 can
with 1,400 tanks. Three airborne
formidable force.
There are also two tactical missile brigades, equipped with mis
wit Scud and Frog nuclear capable urrespectivelyaca separate airh a
range of 40 miles and 170 miles
defense brigade armed with nmissiles and an t army
artillery regiment. The
amphibious light tanks, armored personnel carriers, rrie ships. otIts her nlight
fighting vehicles as well as assault s. It anavalious
pioneers, frogmen and demolition experts can support
assault behind enemy lines to establish bridgeheads and conduct
sabotage missions against coastal fortifications.
Soviet regional air power has improved ayload.
Forty first-rate airbases, protected by nse
missile systems, can accomodatenaointercept rssareapermanentlyaircraft.
and
About 1.00 all-weather fighters
deployed for terminal air defense, including the MiG-23 Flogger B
D
and Su-19 Fencers.' The MiG-21
reconnaissance2aircraftrhave
attack aircraft and MjG-25 Foxbat
offensive strike missions. Some viauseizedeNorweg antairfields_
for airborne troops or reinf
are also available.
Soviet aircraft flying from Kola bases can cover most of
Norway and Sweden; the SU-24 Fencer with a range of 1,000 miles
is even able to strike targets in southern Norway. Together with
the air forces located in East Germany, onsfromt
Baltic littoral, Moscow can strike
the air.
Soviet offensive naval aviation consists of 50 patrol ai6
craft, 150 Tu-16 Badger, 30 Tu-22 and the new long-range
Backfire bombers for strike and ASW missions. There
Sare also two
medium range ballistic missile launching sites with -andal
Soviet missilesintermediare
missiles. Advanced SS-22 nuclear
being deployed as part of the the perimeter acqui-
sition force deployment by NATO. Finally,
sition radar for the Moscow anti-blfurtherythemregionss"
is located on the Kola peninsula, increasing
strategic importance to Moscow.
Ground and airforces protect the formidable Northern Fleet r-
r-
that grew from a coastal defense force in the 1950s into a poweof its
the Moscow deploys
ful force projection armada.
onr45nsubmarines
seabased nuclear forces with of various types which have theater and strategic nuclear missions
The bulk of the strategic force consists of the 9,000-ton Delta
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class submarines with 16 SS-N-6s or 12 SS-N-8 ballistic missiles,
the latter with a range of 4,200 nautical miles, placing all of
Europe within their range from their sanctuaries north of the
Arctic Circle.
'In 1983, a gigantic 30,000-ton Typhoon class submarine was
sighted with the Northern Fleet. Continuous modernization with
deeper diving, faster, and less noisy submarines with longer
range ballistic missiles diminishes their vulnerability to NATO
anti-submarine warfare along the GIUK gap and will eventually
allow strikes against the continental U.S. from Arctic sanctuaries.
U.S. attack submarines will then have to search and destroy Soviet
missile boats in the vast expanse of the polar waters, a virtually
impossible mission given the small number and.tactical limitations
of U.S. offensive submarines operating under the ice cap.4
Moscow's 130-plus attack and patrol submarines, some armed
with the SS-N-19 long-range antiship cruise missile, including
the-high-speed nuclear powered Alpha class, can engage NATO naval
forces in the area. The deployment of some 30 Victor class
submarines upgrades Soviet anti-submarine capabilities against
U.S. strategic nuclear submarines and attack submarines escorting
U.S. carrier task forces. The newest model, the Victor III is
fitted with the Soviets' first towed array ASW sensor. The
Northern Fleet has 72 major surface combatants including the Kiev
V/STOL carrier and nuclear powered Kirov class cruiser. The*
fleet also deploys 11 ships for amphibious landing and a large
number of craft for coastal defense.
The Northern Fleet enjoys a well-rounded capability. With
its supply and repair ships, it can remain on station in the
North Atlantic for long periods of time under protective cover of
Soviet long-range naval aviation. The fleet's task forces are
configured to conduct simultaneously anti-submarine, interdiction
and sea denial missions in an ever growing operational area.
SOVIET POWER IN THE BALTIC
The strategic center of Soviet naval power has shifted from
the Leningrad military district to the Murmansk area. But the
Baltic Fleet still plays'a critical role in Soviet strategy for
military conflict in Europe. It has been modernized commensurate
with growing mission requirements. Moreover, the combat capabili-
ties of Moscow's troops deployed in East Germany, and along the
Baltic inside the Soviet Union have been improved through.compre-
hensive modernization of ground and air forces.
The Baltic Sea is both a buffer and a theater of operations.
Warsaw Pact control of the Baltic Sea enables Moscow to attack
Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern
Flank," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 28=54.
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simultaneously southern Norway via neutral Sweden, to deny NATO
command of the Danish straits and to exert military pressure on
the northern sector of the central front by inserting troops on
the Jutland peninsula and the coastal areas of northern Germany.5
Since the-southern littoral is occupied by. Warsaw Pact
countries and constitutes their strategic rear in any war in
central Europe, the chief objective of Warsaw Pact naval forces
is to protect this exposed flank against interdiction and to
quickly deny NATO naval forces the Baltic through offensive and
defensive engagements.
Moscow's Baltic Fleet is supported by the smaller, special-
ized navies of Poland and East Germany. It is designed for local
operations, has modest theater nuclear capabilities and plays no
role in strategic deterrence. Its few large surface combatants
will probably be deployed elsewhere before the start of hostili-
ties and its mission now extends into the North Atlantic as joint
naval exercises with. the Northern Fleet have been conducted regu-
larly in recent years.
The amphibious assault landing ships in service with the
Baltic Fleet pose perhaps the most serious threat to NATO. The
latest innovation is the Rogov class landing ship, the largest
ever built by the Soviets. and capable of handling 5,100 tons of
cargo, including helicopters and hovercraft. The Warsaw Pact
deploys a combined total of about 110 landing craft for rapid
amphibious assault.
The fleet's growing number of hydrofoils, which carry 400
naval infantry troops or a mix of tanks and soldiers with light
armor, are essentially invulnerable to conventional mining and
ideally suited for landing operations across mined areas in the
shallow western part of the Baltic.
The Warsaw Pact navies are able to conduct large-scale
amphibious operations against the Jutland peninsula, the Danish
isles and the West German coast of Schleswig-Holstein with minimal
warning. The Soviet Baltic Fleet alone is capable of landing
three fully armed regiments with 6,000 soldiers at any location
in the Baltic. Warsaw Pact merchant fleets have a growing number
of roll-on/roll-off ships that do not need unloading facilities
and are ideal to support amphibious operations. U.S. designed
Seabee barge transports from Finnish shipyards that can unload
25,000 tons of cargo in only 13 hours are also in service with
the Baltic Fleet. Flying from airfields in East Germany, Soviet
tactical attack aircraft can reach their targets in the Danish
isles and southern Sweden in about two minutes and thus can
provide air cover for amphibious operations.
Erling Bj4l, "Nordic Security," op. cit., pp. 33-44.
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NATO's INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK
NATO defense of its northern flank relies on the military
resources of Norway, Denmark, West Germany, augmented by rapid
reinforcements, mainly from the U.S., U.K., and Canada. Though
they are NATO members, Norway and Denmark are careful not to
prokoke Moscow. Consequently, the two NATO states do not allow
the permanent stationing on their soil of foreign troops or
nuclear weapons during peacetime. Both restrict exercises of
NATO troops on their territories. This constricts peacetime
military preparations and limits NATO's ability to mount a suc-
cessful defense of Norway and the Baltic approaches.6
Denmark
Danish military strength has been sapped by years of austere
defense budgets. Active personnel declined from 44,500 in the
early 1970s to about 32,000 today. Major force modernization
programs have been impossible because of inadequate funding,
amounting to a mere 2.4 percent of GNP (compared to 5.8 percent
for U.S., 3.5 percent for West Germany; and 14 percent for the
USSR). U.S. leaders openly have raised questions about continued
commitment of U.S. troops to 'reinforce Denmark in the light of
the country's unwillingness to intensify its own defense efforts.?
Denmark's Army consists of 18,000 troops, one-third of them
conscripts, organized in five infantry brigades: They are armed
with 250 main battle tanks, 700 M-113 armored personnel carriers
and 350 artillery pieces of which only a dozen are larger than
155mm. The Army also has three regimental combat teams, composed
of two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. Its
Bornholm Force consists of one reduced infantry brigade.
The navy has a peacetime strength of 5,800 and operates 5
submarines, 10 frigates, 22 large patrol craft and 13 mine/anti-
mine warfare vessels. Underfunding has forced the navy to with-
draw from the open Baltic. It is now simply a coastal defense
force in the internal waters of the Danish archipelago. Mine
warfare is its major mission. Its resources are inadequate even
for this.
The Danish Air Force of 7,800 flies 112 F-104G Starfighters,
Drakens, and F-100 Super Sabres which are nearly two decades old.
Moulton, "Northern Flank," Navy International, vol. 82, May 1977, pp. 4-9.
U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown stated this quite frankly in a letter'
to his Danish Counterpart Poul S4rgaard in 1980: "Unless Denmark is able,
and is seen to be able, to carry out these tasks, I will find it extremely
difficult to justify to Congress and the American public commitments to
reinforce Denmark and preposition equipment there." Quoted in The
Economist, April 10, 1981.
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Though it is being modernized with U.S.-designed F-16 aircraft,
it will be unable to replace its aircraft on a one-for-one basis
and thus will field fewer than 100 planes by the late 1980s.
Under a 1976 agreement with the U.S., the air force has prepared
four Jutland airfields to receive five U.S. Air Force squadrons
in an emergency. Denmark also is permitting expansion of NATO
depots on its soil to. store considerable quantities of equipment
for use by U.S. and German reinforcements.
West Germany
Germany's contribution to COMBALTAP (Command Baltic Approaches)
is significant. It amounts.to a total of 25,400 naval troops,
11,000 naval air force, and one heavy armored division stationed
in Schleswig Holstein.
Of greatest value for COMBALTAP is the West German navy,
configured for operations in the shallow waters surrounding
Jutland and the Baltic straits. It consists of 24 small submarines
with long-range wire-guided torpedos developed especially for the
area's maritime characteristics. The submarines are extremely
quiet and have an amagnetic hull. The German navy also deploys 7
destroyers and 7 frigates, with 6 more on order, armed with
Exocets and Harpoon missiles. Its fleet of 39 fast patrol boats
is armed with surface-to-surface missiles and 10 new vessels have
been ordered. Mine warfare capabilities consist of 18 modern
mine/counter-mine vessels with 21 minesweepers on order.
Even with the West German units, however, NATO's Nordic
forces cannot sustain combat against the vastly superior Warsaw
Pact. NATO's naval forces are outnumbered 4 to 1, its air force
5 to 1,.and the ground forces 3. to 1. And this would be the case
with only parts of the Warsaw Pact's northern front divisions
committed to the Baltic theater. Only massive and rapid reinforce-
ment will save NATO forces from collapse.
Norway
Norway is equally dependent on timely NATO reinforcements.
But unlike the Danes, the Norwegians spend considerable sums on
defense, devoting 3 percent of GNP to it. Oslo has resisted
Soviet political pressures to alter the status of Svaalbaard, and
has faced down Moscow on numerous issues involving the administra- _
tion and Soviet militarization of the archipelago.. Norway has
rejected steadfastly Moscow's terms for a settlement of the
dispute over the seaward extension of its boundary with*the
Soviet Union. It has also initiated important steps to improve
its military posture in the North and in 1981 agreed to all U.S.
to preposition equipment in the Trondelang area to speed up
effective deployment of U.S. reinforcements.8
Leonard Downie, Jr., "Norway Proposes Storing U.S. Military Equipment,"
?Washington Post, September-11, 1980,.pp. A29, A34.
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Norway can mobilize 285,000 troops, including the Home Guard.
Its 42,000 standing forces outnumber those of more populous
Denmark. Three quarters of its 24,400 man army are conscripts.
Its navy boasts 40 coastal artillery fortifications, 14 submarines,
5 missile carrying frigates, more than 40 fast attack craft
fitted with antiship missiles and 12 mine/anti-mine vessels. The
Norwegian Air Force deploys 114 combat aircraft and is being
upgraded with F-5As and F-16s.
Norway's main line of defense is the heavily fortified
Tromso area some 500 road miles from the border with the Soviet
Union. East of Tromso, Norway maintains only a token presence of
500 men in a garrison at Sor-Varanger and some 1,000 men further
West at Porsanger. No allied training exercises have ever been
conducted in this sparsely populated and inhospital area. Topo-
graphically, the whole Tromso region is a natural fortress.
Norway can deploy 80,000 troops in'its northern regions on
short notice. A Soviet combined amphibious assault south of
Tromso in the Bodo area and an airborne assault on the Andoya
region, however, could outflank the main Norwegian defenses near
Tromso, disrupt Norwegian mobilization and seize strategic assets,
such as airfields and fortifications.
Soviet ground forces will advance at a slower pace given the
rugged terrain and presumably would take the short-cut through
Finland and northern Sweden. Despite their advanced capabilities.,
the two squadrons of F-16 warplanes stationed in the region will
have trouble attacking advancing Soviet ground forces, as the
Norwegian airfields are within striking range of Soviet aircraft.
Air defense capabilities of the northern airfields are highly
deficient and need immediate improvement.
Norway is allowing the U.S. to preposition entire aircraft
servicing facilities on four Norwegian airbases for use by U.S.
reinforcements. But one carrier task force in the Norwegian Sea
may be necessary to ensure NATO air superiority in the area.
Another carrier task force may be required to establish NATO sea
control, a vital prerequisite for successful resupply of Norway
by sea.
SWEDEN: FROM PROVIDER TO CONSUMER OF SECURITY
During the postwar era, Sweden's armed neutrality has been
the linchpin of the nordic strategic balance. It permitted
Denmark and Norway to enter NATO and assisted Finland in estab-
lishing some measure of independence from the Soviet Union.
Sweden's role as a "buffer" however was based on a military
capability to enforce its neutrality. In recent years, however,
Sweden's arsenal has been shrinking so much that the country has
been transformed from a provider of security for NATO into a
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potential consumer of NATO resources in the event of a military
conflict.9
This imposes new mission and force requirements on NATO's
Command Baltic Approaches (BALTAP)?and Allied Forces Northern
Europe (AFNORTH) as-it can no-longer be assumed that Sweden will
be able to deny the use of its territory to the Soviet Union.
In an attempt to do this, Sweden has maintained a standing
force of 66,000 men based on universal conscription and the
concept of total defense. It can mobilize over 700,000 army and
home guard forces in less than two weeks. Sweden produces about
80 percent of its weaponry and miltary equipment needs. Despite
horrendous costs, Sweden is developing a new generation multipur-
pose supersonic aircraft, rather than buying U.S. F-16s or Western
European-made planes. The reason for-this is that the country
wants to maintain its independence from foreign suppliers and
support advanced airplane and electronics industries. Yet Stock-
holm's reliance on foreign suppliers for advanced technology and
electronic warfare components is bound to grow.
In the past, Sweden's air force of 400-plus planes has
allowed NATO to concentrate its air assets on the central front.
The capabilities of the Swedish ground forces, meanwhile, reduced
the need for massive NATO reinforcements of Norway and Denmark.
But the gradual decline of Sweden's military prowess is changing
this calculus' dramatically. Together, the Soviet military buildup
and the hemorrhage of Sweden's defense forces undermine NATO
northern flank strategy.
The Swedish force posture has suffered from years of under-
funding. As a savings measure, conscript military service was
shortened step by step to 7h months in the mid-1970s and length
and scope of reserve training was cut in half.
Between 1950 and 1982, defense spending was slashed from 5.0
percent to 3.2 percent of GNP. As a percentage of total government
expenditures, defense outlays dropped from 18 percent in 1962 to
about 7 percent in 1982, while welfare spending ballooned. The
size of Sweden's territory requires heavy reliance on expensive
high technology weapons, but rising personnel costs have reduced
further the procurement component of the defense budget. Political
constraints on foreign military sales preclude larger production
runs and cause prohibitive unit costs for domestically produced
weaponry.10
William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Defense Policy of Sweden," in: Douglas J.
Murray, Paul R. Viotti (eds.), The Defense Policies of Nations (Baltimore,
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 299-332.
"Sweden Upgrading Its Defense Force Despite Funds Shortage," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, December 12, 1983, pp. 83-87.
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Nowhere has the effect of declining defense resources been
more debilitating-than in the Swedish navy; its capabilities and
size have shrunk and its mission has changed from perimeter
defense based on the ability to destroy hostile forces to coastal
defense aimed at merely disabling enemy combatants. The size of
the navy has been halved during the past two decades. Today, it
boasts merely 2 destroyers/frigates compared to 17 in 1966. This
means that Sweden no long will attempt to engage enemy forces
before they reach Swedish waters but rather will rely on hit-and-
run raids with fast torpedo/missile patrol boats near the Swedish
coast. The weaknesses of Sweden's anti-submarine warfare capabi-
lities were starkly revealed when the Soviet Whiskey-class sub- .
marine ran aground near the restricted naval base of Karlskrona in
October 1981, during the April 1983 submarine humts near Harsfjar-
den, and the recent hunt near Stockholm. The Anderson commis-
sion," investigating "Whiskey on the rocks" and a string of other
Soviet submarine intrusions recommended major improvements of the
submarine hunting capabilities. Yet little "new" money has been
allocated and most will come from reprogramming of already com-
mitted0funds. The trend of confining the navy's mission to
close-in coastal defense thus will continue.
Given its multiple mission requirements, Sweden's air force
is the backbone of the country's armed neutrality policy.12 Yet
modernization has been postponed repeatedly. Procurement figures
in the 1984-1989 defense plan will not allow a one-for-one replace-
ment and full scope upgrading of the existing fleet. Instead the
Swedes are trying to maximize aircraft availability through
shorter turnaround times and to avoid aircraft destruction on the
ground or their incapacitation due to the loss of operating
bases. The objective of its long-term defensive program (Plan 90)
is to maintain a fleet of high technology aircraft with minimal
service requirements that would remain combat ready even when
operating from the emergency auxiliary airfields where service
would be limited to minor repairs, refueling, and rearming.
Since Sweden would have only a one minute warning of low-altitude
Soviet air attacks, it air squadrons have been trained to operate
independently of one another and to rely on relatively few hardened
bases for extensive repair and maintenance.
Budgetary contraints also are hurting.the army. Its active
duty strength of 44,500 which includes 36,000 conscripts. Savings
will be effected by reducing the number of conscripts and stretch-
Swedish Ministry'of Defense, Countering the Submarine Threat, Submarine
Violations and Swedish Security Policy, Report by the Submarine Defense
Commission, Stockholm 1983, SON 1983:13; Lt. Gen. Stig Lofgren, "Soviet
Submarines Against Sweden," Strategic Review, Vol. 12(1), Winter 1984,
pp. 36-42.
David A. Brown, "Sweden Adjusts to Military Reductions," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, January 23, 1984, pp. 101-112.
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ing out the frequency of periodic refresher training. Readiness
will be shortchanged.
The army's southern mission is to contain, repel, and destroy
invading forces in a static defense in cooperation with the
navy's coastal artillery units; and armored counterattacks to
dislodge enemy formations and to smash advancing columns.. in the
open plains of south Sweden. For this purpose, Sweden's army has
always maintained in southern Sweden large ground forces modelled
on NATO's forces on the Central Front. But current and projected
funding levels are insufficient to modernize the army's increasing-
ly obsolescent equipment. As a result, decisions on force structure
changes will have to be made in the near future.13
A downsized Swedish army can do little more than play for
time before succumbing to attrition and shrinking supplies. Such
a strategy makes sense only if reinforcements can be expected to
drive back the invader. These reinforcements could come only
from NATO, thus increasing Sweden's dependence on NATO's already
thinly stretched resources in the Baltic theater.
The same applies to the defense of vulnerable Northern
Sweden, the transit area for any Soviet overland offensive against
Northern Norway, where about 20 percent of Sweden's ground forces
are deployed. While the region's topography makes armored assaults
extremely difficult, a helicopter-borne Soviet attack today could
outflank natural obstacles that have traditionally favored defend-
ing forces.. Swedish ground forces cannot contain a reinforced
Soviet combined arms attack and thus contribute little to the
security of Norway's exposed counties of Finnmark, Norland, and
Tromso. Equally questionable is the ability of the Swedish air
force to deny the Soviets the use of its northern airspace in
operations against Norway.
REINFORCING THE NORTHERN FLANK
NATO strategy calls for reinforcement of Norway and Denmark
before their resistance collapses. On land, NATO defense of the
northern flank is coordinated by the C.INCNORTH (Commander-in-Chief
North), by tradition a British General, who reports to SACEUR
(Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and has command responsibility
for the entire AFNORTH (Allied Forces North) area stretching
1,750 miles from the North Cape to the Elbe. His headquarters is
located at Kolsas, outside Oslo. Reinforcement of the Northern
Flank would require help from the U.S. Second Fleet.
If the Norwegians and Danes request it, NATO can dispatch
reinforcements to the North. Available is the Allied Command
13 Steven Canby, "Swedish Defense," Survival, May/June 1981, pp. 116-123.
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Europe (ACE) Mobile Force consisting of eight light infantry
battalion groups drawn from eight countries and totalling 4,000
men. But since it is committed to both NATO flanks, only half
would be available for combat on the northern flank. These units
could be deployed in two to six days. They have held exercises
in northern Norway at least every other year and are familiar
with the terrain and equipped for mountain warfare.
Additional reinforcements would come from British and Dutch
commando groups, the U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Force and a
Canadian Brigade Group. The British and Dutch units have trained
in-northern Norway since 1973, while the Canadian Brigade is
equipped for arctic operations and has held annual three-month
arctic warfare maneuvers. Some 50,000 U.S. marines are equipped
with tanks,-,artillery, landing ships, over 200 aircraft and
almost as many helicopter and Hawk air defense systems. Yet only
one Mobile Amphibious Brigade is actually dedicated to Norway and
most of its equipment is-being prepositioned in the Trondhein
area of central Norway. Its 15,000 men could be airlifted from
the U.S. in less than a week. Due to its own tactical air support
and heliborne mobility this brigade would almost double NATO's
combat strength in northern Norway.
The principal obstacle to reinforcements is the judicious
use of warning time by Norway and Denmark. Except in the worst
case scenario, it is generally assumed that mounting tensions
will precede military conflict, thus affording NATO the opportunity
to augment its defense before hostilities erupt.' Yet reinforce-
ments can be dispatched by NATO to the North only when requested
by Oslo and Copenhagen. These are likely to hesitate for fear of
escalating a crisis and precipitating Soviet attack. The trouble
is that NATO cannot afford to deploy massive reinforcements under
hostile fire. NATO's military success on the northern flank thus
'hinges on the political courage of the nordic leaders.
COUNTERING THE SOVIET THREAT
Moscow's buildup in the Arctic and Baltic theaters of NATO's
Northern Flank is mutually reinforcing. Soviet and Warsaw Pact
forces have acquired a "smash-and-grab" capability of enveloping
the entire Scandinavian region with superior military forces.
The Soviet buildup on NATO's northern flank not only has
significant military implications for NATO. It also threatens
alliance cohesion by potentially eroding Danish and Norwegian
political support for the alliance in'the face of overwhelming
Soviet power and doubts about NATO's ability to safeguard security
in the region. There are a number of sound reasons for these
doubts. Among them:
1) Moscow is increasingly in a position to disrupt NATO
anti-submarine missions along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
gap which impedes NATO's ability to monitor the movement of
Soviet submarines into the North Atlantic.
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2) Passage of Soviet submarines undetected by the layers of
NATO hydroplanes and sonar surveillance devices or aerial surveil-
lance threatens the sealanes of communications upon whose safety
NATO reinforcement of Western Europe depends. Extensive convoying
would be required for which resources are unavailable and thus
Soviet submarines could attrite rapidly dwindling Western sealift
assets.
3) Moscow's growing sea denial capability poses serious
obstacles to NATO reinforcement of Norway. Soviet ships and
long-range bombers can hold at bay U.S. carrier task forces
entering the Norwegian Sea so as to provide air cover for NATO
seaborne reinforcements and lend combat support to ground opera-
tions.
4) Through an unreinforced attack, Moscow can seize quickly
Norwegian airfields and thereby extend the range of its coastal
aviation even further into the North Atlantic. This reinforces
doubts that timely reinforcement of Norway will be possible.
5) NATO control of the Danish straits is no longer assured
because of Moscow's new ability to insert quickly amphibious and
airborne forces in southern Sweden, the Danish Isles and the
Jutland peninsula. Thus, elements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet
might gain unimpeded access to the North Sea if Soviet air strikes
disable NATO defenses and Pact forces succeed in occupying the
critical choke points.
6) Such an attack can secure the exposed flank of Warsaw
Pact troops advancing in northern Germany and divide NATO's
operational theater on the central front.
7) Warsaw Pact aircraft operating from airfields in southern
Sweden and Denmark offer flexible tactical air support for opera-
tions against southern Norway as well as on the central front,
posing a dual threat to NATO defense efforts.
To counter the shifting military balance on its Northern
Flank, NATO must take concrete steps:
1) NATO must increase the visibility of its naval presence
in the Norwegian Sea through regular patrols of the Standing
Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) task force and visits in
the region by U.S. carrier task forces and other allied units.
'2) Anti-submarine warfare capabilities along the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom gap need upgrading in order to handle
simultaneously multiple Soviet submarines. Currently, NATO can
track only two enemy submarines at a time. This is woefully
inadequate as was demonstrated in early April when some 20 Soviet
submarines entered the Norwegian Sea during large-scale Red Fleet
maneuvers.
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3) As seaborne reinforcement becomes more difficult, NATO
will have to airlift troops. Given its limited airlift capabili-
ties and the need to insert forces quickly, more equipment and
supplies thus must be prepos.itioned in the North than currently
planned if-NATO reinforcements are to mount a successful defense.
At a minimum, all NATO airfield rapid reinforcements should have
their equipment prepositioned near their deployment areas. NATO
must continuously reassess its requirements to counter the mount-
ing Soviet threat.
4) The Norwegian and Danish airbase infrastructure must be
expanded and equipped to accommodate allied troops. There is a
critical shortage of facilities to service and protect aircraft
that would be deployed to augment indigenous airpower.
5) Norway and Denmark must improve air defense capabilities.
More joint air defense exercises must be conducted and reinforce-
ments must be trained to use the great diversity of equipment in
service with their national forces.
6) Troops designated for reinforcement of'Norway and Denmark
need to train more frequently in the North to familiarize them-
selves with the local terrain and to use equipment under realistic
combat conditions.
7) Improvement of NATO command-control-communications
capabilities is needed to integrate and coordinate more closely
individual defense missions and overall battlefield management of
foreign and indigenous forces. At present, there remain serious
impediments to communication due to incompatible equipment even
among the services of national forces.
8) NATO must streamline the overlapping command structures
in the North. The high degree of coordination currently required
would be difficult to maintain under wartime conditions. A more
unified and centralized command could allow NATO to operate more
effectively.
9) NATO should urge Sweden to pay more attention to its
military capabilities. NATO and Sweden should consult on mutual
security issues and construct ways of supporting Swedish defense
efforts by granting selective access to Western defense technology
and sharing of pertinent intelligence. NATO should stress Sweden's
vital role as a balancing force in the Nordic region and convince
Swedish leaders that a viable defense posture will lessen pressures
on NATO to counter the Soviet threat. Swedish support of schemes
like a nuclear free zone or various forms of disengagement of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be discouraged.
10) The United States must assess the implications for U.S.
security of the changing geostrategic balance in the Arctic
region. It must counter the emerging threats to U.S. sea control
in the North Atlantic, the U.S. seabased nuclear deterrent and
the defense of U.S. airspace against-Soviet aircraft. Although
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it is imperative to exact a larger contribution to the common
defense from the European allies, the U.S. must not risk its own
security by relying excessively on greater European defense
efforts.
There are a number of constructive steps the U.S. can take
alone to counter the Soviet threat in the arctic region:
1) Accelerate upgrading of the chain of ASW sonar listening
devices in the GIUK gap and establish a real time detection/attack
capability.
2) Procure more nuclear powered attack submarines for
deployment in the North Atlantic and improve U.S. close-in anti-
submarine capabilities. Consideration should be given to pur-
chasing some diesel-electric submarines for that task.
3) Strengthen U.S. distant early warning assets and upgrade
aerial surveillance off the North Atlantic coast.
4) Establish a dedicated arctic warfare force to supplement
the capabilities of the Marine Corps that currently are overcom-
mitted. Possibly one light Army division could be assigned and
equipped for arctic warfare missions.
Finally, the U.S. and the other NATO allies must press Denmark
and Sweden to increase their defense efforts. Norway should be
encouraged to maintain its current level of commitment and lift
political obstacles to NATO's defense preparations in the Nordic
theater such as restrictions on exercises by NATO forces and
exclusion zones for foreign troops.
These steps do not necessarily require additional resources
and'could be financed through the reallocation of existing funds.
As has been argued throughout, the Soviet threat to the arctic
region and northern Europe has extensive implications for NATO
and U.S. security. All preparations to deter conventional warfare
in Europe will have been in vain if the U.S. fails to check
Soviet power in the arctic. This then should be given the priority
it deserves.
Manfred R. Hamm
Senior Policy Analyst
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