Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050023-0
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100050023-0
Army, Navy, USAF and
USMC review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100050023-0
Approved r I 0
Background
1. (C) The combat air program in South Vietnam utilizes an ex-
tremely complex mixture of South Vietnamese Air Force units generally
flying propeller-driven aircraft in support of SVN land forces; US Air
Force units equipped with a variety of aircraft flying in support of all
land forces in SVN; US Marine Corps units equipped with a variety of
aircraft generally flying in support of Marine land forces but contri-
buting excess capability to meet any overall requirement; and US Navy
aircraft flying in support of all land forces in SVN. Incorporated in
this overall program are the US Army fixed and rotary wing aircraft engaged
in visual and photographic reconnaissance and armed escort missions.
2. (C) Generally, the types of sorties flown in South Vietnam are
as follows:
Sortie Function
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Attack
Escort
Escort
Escort
Escort
Recon
Recon
Recon
Recon
Recon
Army, Navy, USAF and USMC
review(s) completed.
Approved F R
Type Mission
Interdiction
Close Air Support
Armed Reconnaissance
Defoliation
Flak Suppression
Escort, Helicopter
Escort, Train
Escort, Convoy
Escort, Ship
Infared Reconnaissance
Side Looking Radar Reconnaissance
Electronic Reconnaissance
Defensive Survey
Weather Reconnaissance
NFIVEN14AL 00100050023-0
Approved r EIND'171.5A4I,00010 0050023-0
Sortie Function Type Mission
Air Alert Airborne Alert
Combat Support Forward Air Control
Combat Support Combat Observation
Combat Support Combat Support Liaison
Combat Support Artillery Adjust
Combat Support Flare Drop
Combat Support Tactical Air Evacuation
Combat Support Airborne Command Post
Psych War Psychological Warfare
Air Refuel Aerial Refueling
Support Airborne Assault
Support Troop Airlift
Support Airlanded Assault
Combat Support Search and Rescue
3. (C) Generally, all type missions listed in paragraph 2 above
are flown in SVN except that to date there has been little or no require-
ment for flak suppression missions although this type mission could increase
if VC/PAVN forces introduce conventional AAA to any degree in SVN.
4. (U) Type aircraft available in SVN or off-shore to accomplish
these missions are listed at Tab A to this appendix.
5. (C) There is evidence that in the early days of the campaign in
SVN, there were not sufficient aircraft of the various types to accomplish
the variety of missions required. This, coupled with a relatively loose
air request and control system, led to a variety of complaints on the land
force side that a cohesive air support program did not exist, that the air
elements were not responsive and did not react quickly enough, that they
did not provide the type support desired, and that the request system
was cumbersome. The air elements countered these complaints with charges
that land forces did not preplan air requirements or that air elements were
C-I-2
Approved F R / 00100050023-0
Approved r A"Fil) EiNDhif Ajooo 100050023-0
not privy to the planning conferences, that US advisors with ARVN land
forces did not make use of preplanned and airborne alert aircraft, that
the request system from advisor to ARVN element and up through the various
channels was so slow and cumbersome that the requirement ceased to exist
by the time the request reached the air element, that ground/air communi-
cations systems did not allow proper and precise control of the mission
aircraft, and that language difficulties contributed to lack or loss of
control.
6. (C) In spite of these complaints, use of close air support con-
tinued and gradually evolved into an extremely acceptable program used
effectively, as an adjunct to ground fires, to destroy and harass the
enemy. With the buildup of US forces in Vietnam beginning in the first
part of 1965 and continuing into the current period, the requirement for
closer control of air resources of VNAF, USAF, USMC, USN, and US Army
became more urgent. Air resources had been under centralized control,
but this control was made more effective by a refinement of the allocation
and request system. This was prescribed by MACV Directive Number 95-4,
dated 13 July 1965 which superceded a similar directive, dated 7 September
1964. The new control provisions, detailed in succeeding paragraphs,
appear to have resolved many of the above-noted early difficulties in
control of the air effort.
7. (C) The current directive retains the air operations center (AOC)
in MACV headquarters; additionally, it covers the following areas:
a. Directs the Commander of 2d Air Division to establish and
operate in conjunction with RVNAF a tactical air control system (TACS)
for command and control of USAF/VNAF and for the coordination of USMC/USN
strike aircraft.
b. Directs Commander, 2d Air Division to establish in conjunc-
tion with other US and RVN agencies, an air traffic control system (ATCS).
C-I-3
Approved F R ID/ P 00100050023-0
Approved F I 'D: I 8 0 000100050023-0
c. Directs CG, US Army Support Command to establish and operate
Army aviation elements (AAE) at Corps and Division Tactical Operation
Center (TOC).
d. Directs CG, III MAF to establish and operate an organic
tactical air control system (TAGS) to include a tactical air direction
center (TADC).
e. Requests CINCPACFLT to provide strike aircraft as directed
by CINPAC to operate in coordination with USAF/VNAF TAGS.
f. Directs Corps Senior Advisors to establish an Army Aviation
Element (AAE) co-located with the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)
in each corps area and within each ARVN Division TOGO
8. (C) Aircraft operating under the TAGS will be allocated through
the AOC to the ASOC's (MC aircraft excess to MC requirements will be re-
ported to and allocated by the AOC). US Army aviation resources are
allocated by the Army Aviation Operations Section (AAOS), Joint Operation
Center Branch, J-3, MACV, to Corps or Separate Division US Senior Advisors
for employment in support of ARVN/US/third country operations. US/third
country units will request US Army aviation support through the Corps
Tactical Operations Center (CTOC of the Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) which
they are supporting.
9.
(C)
a.
b.
c.
Requests for tactical air support are made in 3 ways:
Emergency air request channels.
VNAF/USAF immediate air request channels.
VNAF/USAF preplanned air request channels.
Tabs B through D are diagrams of these three systems.
C-I-4
Approved F R / 00100050023-0