CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005600090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Civil-Military Command Relationships in the USSR
Secret
N2 42
17 February 1967
No. 0277/67A
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CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE USSR
The long-unsettled issue of the proper institu-
tional relationship between the national civil and
military authorities in the Soviet Union may again
be under active consideration. Since the fall of
Khrushchev in 1964, no formal body above the Defense
Ministry is known to have exercised a leadership
function in this area. Earlier, however, a variety
of approaches to the problem had been tried at one
time or another. The essential issue involves the
degree of Communist Party control over command
decision-making, and the military have always had
good reason to be wary of the politicians, particu-
larly since Khrushchev. Of late, however, the mili-
tary seem to have become apprehensive that the ab-
sence of formal machinery at the apex of the command
structure might be a serious handicap in time of war.
Background
The constitutional framework
for high-level political/military
relations in the USSR is sketchy.
According to the present consti-
tution, the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet (the legislative
body) appoints the military high
command, and the Council of Min-
isters (the government) coordi-
nates and directs the work of the
Ministry of Defense. Both the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
and the Council of Ministers
recognize the leading role of
the party, as do all organiza-
tions and administrations in the
USSR.
However, there is no formal
designation of a supreme com-
mander in chief and no formal
framework for high-level civil-
military relations. At present,
only informal arrangements exist,
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based upon the power of individ-
uals and institutions participat-
ing in policy-making in the USSR.
If the new Soviet constitution
targeted for adoption to "crown
the glorious 50 years of the coun-
try of Soviets" is to redress
these shortcomings, discussion of
high-level command and control
arrangements would be in order
at this time.
In the past, Soviet leaders
have employed at least three
varieties of high-level political/
military organ. The Labor and
Defense Council chaired by Lenin
functioned as an "inter politburo"
during the Civil War, as did the
State Defense Committee headed by
Stalin during World War II. Al-
though formally subordinated to
the Council of Ministers, these
groups exercised absolute author-
ity not only over the military
command, the state apparatus, the
economic administration, and the
party, but also over the central
committee and its politburo.
A second type of body--the
Main Military Council (1938-41
and 1946-50?) and its apparent
successor, the Supreme Military
Council (1950-57? and 1958-63?)--
has functioned from time to time
as a transmission organ between
the central committee and the
Ministry of Defense. Bringing
together the nation's most impor-
tant political and military
leaders, these councils not only
served as discussion forums to
advise the political leaders on
military matters, but also issued
directives to the Ministry of
Defense and the other organiza-
tions responsible for executing
policies in the military sphere.
A third type of body, re-
ferred to as the Military Council
(1934-38) and as the Higher (or
Supreme) Military Council (1963?-
present), has functioned as a
collegium within the Ministry of
Defense, paralleling the struc-
ture of military councils exist-
ing at lower levels in the armed
forces. Including in its member-
ship the defense minister, other
leading military figures, and
some high-level party and gov-
ernment figures, this body has
advised the minister of defense
in his supervision of the armed
forces and shares with him the
responsibility for all major de-
cisions made within the Ministry
of Defense.
After World War II, high-
level political/military relation-
ships in the USSR fluctuated,
and the history of formal com-
mand machinery during the period
1946-57 is, at best, unclear.
One of the charges belatedly
levied against Marshal Zhukov
after he had been ousted from
the politburo and as defense
minister in 1957 was that he had
insisted upon the liquidation
of the Supreme Military Council
in order to weaken the party's
control over the armed forces.
Shortly after Zhukov's ouster,
Khrushchev revitalized the mili-
tary councils and the Supreme
Military Council. The latter
body gave the professional mili-
tary leaders, who were no longer
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represented in the politburo, di-
rect access to Khrushchev and his
"inner politburo" at an early
stage in the policy-making proc-
ess, but the role of the military
is believed to have been largely
consultative and their advice was
in no way binding. At the same
time, the council's composition
and modus operandi enabled Khru-
shchev to operate through his
"inner politburo" and thus by-
pass the politburo itself on cer-
tain military/political matters.
There is ample evidence that
not only the "outs" among the po-
litburo members but also the mil-
itary establishment in general
became dissatisfied because Khru-
shchev used the council and his
"inner politburo" to ram through
his innovations in military mat-
ters during the late 1950s and
early 1960s. There is reason to
believe that some sort of com-
promise curbing Khrushchev's
council was worked out in the
spring of 1963 in the aftermath
of the Cuban missile debacle. The
Dictiona of Russian Language
Areviations published in Moscow
in 963 refers to the council in
such a way as to suggest that it
had been abolished or modified
by approximately that time.
In any case, the USSR's mil-
itary leaders since then have
enjoyed greater autonomy than
formerly in determining how to
safeguard the nation against ex-
ternal enemies and have thus
gained a correspondingly greater
influence in national policy-
making. However, this "unfetter-
ing" of the high command has not
constituted a "victory" of the
army over the party. Instead,
it appears that the political
authorities have become more re-
ceptive than before to the mili-
tary's argument that military
theory and strategy should be
primarily determined by profes-
sional considerations.
The Present Arrangement
In October 1965, Brezhnev
stated he was the 25X1
chairman of a "Defense council,"
the nature of which he did not
specify. Although such a council
may exist as the lineal descend-
ent of the Khrushchev council,
this has been the only known ref-
erence to such a body during the
post-Khrushchev period. On the
other hand, spokesmen for the
armed forces have denied that
any body such as the 1958-63
Supreme Military Council now
exists "outside the Ministry of
Defense." They have insisted
that the only high-level polit-
ical/military organ now function-
ing in the USSR is the Higher
Military Council--also sometimes
referred to as the Supreme Mil-
itary Council--which they say is
merely the apex of the system of
military councils in the various
service branches and at the mil-
itary district level, not a
supra - Defense Ministry body.
The scanty evidence available
thus suggests that the present
arrangement in the Soviet Union
for civil-military relations at
a level above the Ministry of
Defense is an informal one.
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In theory, the post of su-
preme commander has remained
vacant since Stalin gave up that
title early in 1946. Marshal
Sokolcvsky's classic treatise,
.Military Strategy, published in
1962 a.nd 1963, implied that in the
event of a future war, an organ
similar in function to Stalin's
old State Defense Committee would
be formed. According to Sokolov-
sky, this body would be headed by
the CPSU's first secretary and
the chairman of the Council of
Ministers, "to whom the functions
of the supreme commander in chief
would also be entrusted."
When Sokolovsky's book was
published, Khrushchev was both
party first secretary and chairman
of the Council of Ministers, and
during the XXII CPSU Congress in
October 1961 Defense Minister
Malinovsky had referred to him
as the armed forces' supreme com-
mander. During the celebration
of Khrushchev's 70th birthday in
.April 1964, Malinovsky and sev-
eral ether military leaders again
referred to Khrushchev as the
armed forces' supreme commander.
Since Khrushchev's removal,
however, the top party and gov-
ernment posts have been separated,
and Soviet officials from time
to time have indicated that the
post cf supreme commander remains
vacant. Defense Minister Malinov-
sky is said to be commander in
chief of the armed forces, but
only in wartime would party Sec-
retary General Brezhnev, the po-
litical leadership's most authori-
tative spokesman on military af-
fairs, become supreme commander.
Against this background, a
recent discussion of the question
of top-level political/military
relationships in the Soviet mil-
itary newspaper, Red Star, ac-
quires unusual sinificance. As
a rare public airing of this par-
ticular phase of the frequently
discussed general problem of com-
mand and control arrangements,
the article may be an indicator
of the direction of coming change.
Written by Major General V.
Zemskov, who in the past has com-
mented on various questions of
military doctrine, the article
in effect argues the case for the
peacetime creation of a high-
level "War Council" in the Soviet
Union.
Zemskov spells out the con-
ventional Soviet line on the
supremacy of the policy-making
political leadership over the
policy-implementing military es-
tablishment. He polemicizes
against those "in the foreign
press" who argue that under the
conditions of modern war the
importance of political leader-
ship is greatly reduced. On the
contrary, according to Zemskov,
the political leaders' responsi-
bilities--which include mobiliz-
ing the nation, conducting its
foreign policy, and exercising
ultimate control over its nu-
clear arsenal--would become sub-
stantially more important in
time of war. He adds that the
political leadership must also
involve itself "more actively
and to a greater extent" in the
solution of even those purely
military problems that will arise
during a war. Zemskov concludes
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that the two world wars "demon-
strated" that wartime leadership
"cannot be left in the hands of
the military command alone," and
that under modern conditions
there would not be time to re-
organize when war comes.
According to Zemskov, the
military/political organs neces-
sary for national leadership dur-
ing an all-out war "are already
being created" in other countries.
As examples, he lists the US Na-
tional Security Council and the
defense committees in France and
the German Federal Republic. How-
ever, he makes no reference to
any contemporary Soviet equivalent,
which is significant because of
his praise for earlier Soviet
"war councils"--both the Labor
and Defense Council and the State
Defense Committee--as well as his
approving reference to the pres-
ent-day Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Pact as
an example for the wartime lead-
ership of an alliance. Thus, the
impression left by the article is
that the Soviet Union at present
lacks adequate institutional ar-
rangements in this field.
Furthermore, the tone of the
article is such as to reflect
doubt about the ability of the
present collective leadership to
deal effectively with a military
crisis. Zemskov's analysis of
the relative merits of collective
leadership as compared with those
of command by one man is very
carefully balanced as befits this
politically delicate topic, but
by implication and in effect it
favors the latter. The examples
of civil-military organizations
he cites with favor--both the
Soviet precedents and the con-
temporary Western models--place
ultimate responsibility for na-
tional policy in one man: the
nation's most important political
figure. Zemskov is more restrained
in tone than was Marshal Sikolov-
sky, who endorsed the combining
of the posts of party leader,
premier, chairman of the State
Defense Committee, chairman of
the Supreme High Command, minis-
ter of defense, and supreme com-
mander in chief during World
War II as "the highest degree of
unity in leadership." Neverthe-
less, Zemskov implies that the
assignment of ultimate responsi-
bility for military affairs to
individual political leaders and
to. .a. individual political leader
must be formalized now.
The appearance of the Zemskov
article suggests that the Soviet
military establishment has become
dissatisfied with the existing,
apparently informal arrangements
for national leadership in war-
time. Such a development was
suggested by remarks last Octo-
ber attributed to Marshal P. A.
Rotmistrov, Malinovsky's assist-
ant for military educational
institutions, which implied that
Brezhnev might be named supreme
commander before any question of
the outbreak of war arose. This
hint, together with recent argu-
ments that command and control
arrangements must be completed in
peacetime, as well as Zemskov's
treatment of the existing ar-
rangements, all suggest a move
to have Brezhnev named supreme
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commander now. Such a development
would enhance his standing among
his politburo colleagues as well
as his position vis-a-vis the
military establishment.
There are several reasons
why the military establishment
might wish to press these pro-
posals at the present time. For
one, despite the residue of sus-
picion that probably persists
among most Soviet military lead-
ers, many of them may have con-
cluded that the present political
leaders, operating under the con-
straints of collectivity, would
be unlikely to attempt to take
advantage of such "reforms" to
emulate Khrushchev in interfering
in strictly military matters.
Moreover, the military may view
Brezhnev as sympathetic to their
needs, and therefore would wish
to strengthen his hand against
those of his colleagues who are
less enthusiastic than he about
defense spending. Finally, from
a strictly military viewpoint,
the international situation--both
the Vietnamese war and deterio-
rating relations with China--may
have increased the military es-
tablishment's apprehension about
its ability to meet a military
crisis with its existing command
and control arrangements.
In addition, it is also pos-
sible that the Soviet political
authorities, who face the pros-
pect of a broad changing of the
guard at the apex of the military
establishment, view reorganiza-
tion with favor. Marshal Mal-
inovsky's recent illness is only
one of the indications that the
overaged high command is wearing
out. This personnel change,
when it occurs, will probably
not be confined merely to the
shifting of a few generals, but
will more likely bring a sudden
influx of a new generation of
personalities into the high com-
mand. Thus, the formalization
of the relationship between the
nation's political and military
leaders may be desired to avoid
"misunderstandings" after the
old guard departs. F_ I
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