SECURITY HANDLING OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PRODUCTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A003500030036-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM ]FOR: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
NSA review
completed
SUBJECT:
Security Handling of Satellite
Reconnaissance Products
16 This memorandum is responding to your oral request for
advice on, whether the Presidential Directive of August 26, 1960, which
establishes the TALENT-KE'Y'HOLE Security Control system for the
protection of the products of satellite r9connaissancr, should Include
products other than photographic. It was understood that this question
recognized that the products of SAMOS have already been excepted from
the Presidential Directive.
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NRO
review(s)
completed.
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4. Some who consider this question might coma to the conclusion
that no special protective measures are required because the USSR can,
readily assume that the United States is at least exploring the use of
electronic collection in satellites since electronic systems are known
to them and are a part of the control of the satellite. In this same vain
some may conclude that the USSR can presume? on the basis of its
findings from the downed U4x of 1 May 1964 that our satellite capsule
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recoveries must bephotographic in nature. Whatever one considers to
be the Russian, estimates of our satellite reconnaissance capabilities.
the United States has not admitted any such reconnaissance and has in
fact prepared and uses cover stories to protect what It is in fact doing.
Furthermore,, as for as we know# there has been no violation of security
by which the Russians have had confirmed either the fact of our recon-
naiseance or its scope and quality.
. S. In particulars the analysis of FLINT and in the future CO MT
and the sppiication of both to COMINT production does and will require
the partlcipstion of a much larger number of personnel within NSA than
has thus far been essential in the application of satellite reconnaissance
photography to NSA's mission and function. To bring these products
into T..ZH would greatly expand the number of those who might perhaps
learn of the fact of satellite photographys but who would not require such
knowledge, This would not be true of other agencies. If the sensitivity
of clandestine satellite reconnaissance (ELINT and COMINT) remains
as outlined in paragraphs I and 2, then even within NSA some compart-
meot will. have to be established to embrace the large number of people
who it appears are required for e~cploitation and fusion. This compart?
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meat admisctstered by NSA within itself must provide controls which
ensures that only those designated will become aware of satellites as
the soores.
6, The publication of information derived from NSAls exploitation
which reveals the satellite as a source, will require some practicable
arrangement to provide exclusive handling within consumer agencies.
This arrangement already a fists in the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security
Control System. At the point of publication the information should
enter that system. This will avoid the introduction into the Community
of still another security system and will take advantage of well estab-
lished procedures.
7. Conclusion:
ab That the Presidoutial Directive of August 26, 1960
should apply for the protection of the materials and information
derived from clandestine satellite collection operations;
b, That special security arrangements may be required
in the initial phase in the exploitation of certain of the materials
as its currently required for ELINT and COMINT exploitation as
outlined in c, blow;
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ce That should proceed to establish a spacial compart-
Meat for oxploitatlon. applicable only within NSA which must
unsure that the fact of derivation of the FLINT or COMINT should
be hdowa only to thase authorised an a "must know" basis; the
iateltigeaace information produced by NSA analysis will be pub-
lished in and controlled by the T?XH system which shall govern
all relations between other U. Sr. agencies and NSA in this regard.
subject to the additional controls of COMINT when in fact the
information is COMM but not FLINT.
84 Recommendations:
s. That the conclusions in paragraph T above be approved.
b. That the Presideadiel Directive of August 26, 1960 be
revised to read as fellows (Insertions underlined:
I hereby direct that an of the products
of clandestine satellite reconnsissauca
and information of the fact of such
reconnaiasauce revealed by the producto
shall be given strict security handling
-S-
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under the provisions of a special security
control system approved by me. I hereby
approve the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security
Control system for this purpose It s6-13
not, however apply to the products of the
SAMOS Project which is overt.
n4_
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