DIA PRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000100030030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 3, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
U-019/DC
3 FEB 1977
TO: Mr. E. H, Knoche
Acting Director-of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
SUBJECT: DIA Presentation
1. Attached is a copy of the presentation I made to the Interagency
Classification Review Committee.
2. It was carefully coordinated within the Intelligence Community
and represents, I believe, a fair assessment of the issues related
to the need for protection of national security information versus
the public's right to know.
3. You might find this helpful in developing presentations along
similar lines.
FOR THE DIRECTOR:
1 Enclosure a/s
DIA review(s) completed.
OHN T. HUGHES
Senior intelligence Adviso
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PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
1 DEC 1976
The invitation to address this symposium specified that I speak for the
Intelligence Community on behalf of the need to protect selected national
security information from unauthorized disclosure to the public. Before
I discuss the basic issues, I would like to say three things in introduction.
First, although what I say does represent a fairly strong consensus for
more openness within the Intelligence Community, I cannot "speak for" the
Community as a whole. The subject of public disclosure is controversial,
not only in the public sector, but also within the government.
Second, like many in the Intelligence Community, I firmly believe there can
be compatibility between the public's right to know and the government's
need to withL.;;ld selected national security information of which our foreign
intelligence information is a special consideration. It must be remembered
that the Intelligence Community collects, analyzes, and reports information
on foreign powers in order to, give U.S. policymakers the information they
need to make vital decisions affecting the nation as a whole -- and, indeed,
the free world. We in the Intelligence Community recognize that the general
public also plays a role in policy development. The people themselves,
their representatives in the Congress, and the elected and appointed members
of the Executive Branch -- all need information of varying types and degrees
in order to make or support sound decisions.
The third point to be made in introduction is that the Intelligence Community
recognizes that preventing the unauthorized disclosure of truly important
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secrets depends, to a fairly large degree, on keeping the number of those
secrets relatively small. This supports the earlier thesis that there can
be harmony between disclosure of essential information and secrecy, since
disseminating such information not only informs the public, it also reinforces
the security discipline necessary to protect truly sensitive and source
revealing information,
With these thoughts in mind, I will now focus on. three basic areas. First,.
the essential and continuing need for a security classification system to
protect intelligence sources and methods, as well as other national security
information. Second, the growing support for greater release of intelligence
information to the American people to insure broadened awareness about
national security issues of urgent concern. Third, some actions underway
to increase public access and awareness while protecting vital national
security information, especially that concerning intelligence collection
.sources and methods and analytical, procedures.
Let me turn now to the first major theme, the need for protecting selected
national security information from unauthorized disclosure. In doing so,
I will concentrate on examples closely related to my own special area of
interest -- intelligence collection sources.
What is that truly sensitive information that must be protected against
disclosure? The Intelligence Community is primarily concerned about protecting
the sources of its intelligence information and protecting certain analytical
methods employed to develop meaningful findings and estimates. Everyone, I
think, accepts the fact that a human agent with access to the secrets of a
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foreign power? if identified, will be neutralized, and will no longer be
able to give intelligence analysts, or the U.S. pu,blic, any useful information.
The Intelligence Community believes that the need to protect source identity
far outweighs any benefit to the public through explicit disclosure of a
sensitive source. In fact, such a disclosure would be self-defeating to
the very public who needs the intelligence products. Clearly, the public's
right to know ought to include the right not to have intelligence sources
negated through needless publicity about the identity of such sources.
Of course, a great deal of information these days is not obtained from spies
or agents but from very sophisticated, highly technical means of intelligence
collection. The effectiveness of these sophisticated collection systems can
often, through unauthorized disclosure, be neutralized by a foreign power,
sometimes as easily as a human agent. Preserving the flow of information
from technical sources depends very largely on concealing what those sources
are and how effectively they work. Clearly, by breaking an enemy communica-
tion code (as we did against the Japanese during WW II), we can obtain vital
information on an enemy's plans and intentions. Once he learns we have
broken that code, however, it is an easy matter for him to change the code,
and thereby, either shut off that source of vital information or make our
future collection and analytical efforts more difficult and costly.
There is another aspect of intelligence information and source protection
which should be considered; that is the impact of accurate and timely
intelligence on allocation of national resources to defense by the President
and the Congress. We all recognize that maintaining U.S. military forces
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as a credible deterrent in today's world is an undertaking which is becoming
more and more costly, One of the contributors to growing costs is
uncertainty -- uncertainty about the military capabilities of potential
adversaries. If the U.S, leadership knew with greater precision the detailed
Soviet plans for deployment and improvement of their strategic nuclear forces,
the U.S. could design its own deterrent forces against a much narrower range
of capabilities. Any unauthorized disclosures which lessen our collection
capability would contribute to greater uncertainties or imprecisions in the
quality of our intelligence information and could generate requirements for
even larger defense expenditures to cover an even broader range of deterrent
possibilities. If through disclosure of the intelligence sources we do have,
and the consequent loss of vital information, the range of uncertainty is
increased, then our weapons costs will probably go up.
Another aspect of the defense resources problem concerns the costs of
intelligence collection systems themselves. You realize that the U.S. develops
and operates some very sophisticated collection systems to get necessary
information about foreign military capabilities which is not available from
overt sources. You also recognize that the Soviet Union is a closed society
which permits few overt sources to exist, and thus appreciate that this means
the U.S. must employ expensive collection systems to get necessary information
about Soviet military capabilities. Compromise of the vulnerable aspects of
these expensive systems would not only deny us needed information, it could
also force us into ever greater expenditures on new collection systems and
processing techniques. Competition in armaments is expensive, but accurate
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and timely intelligence helps keep the cost down, Competition in intelligence
collection is also expensive, but good security - protection of information
about sources and methods -- helps keep the cost down in this realm, too.
Let me move to another major point about the need for security classification.
Requests for disclosure of defense and foreign intelligence information are
often accompanied by the comment that: "we are not asking the government
about its sources, we just want to have the information -- to know the facts.'
In some instances, the facts can be provided. However, there are other facts
which can only have come from a particular and sensitive sources, and disclosing
those facts would automatically reveal the source. For this reason, the
Intelligence Community must disguise some facts -- "sanitize" them as we
say in our jargon -- so that the foreign target of our intelligence collection
will not learr the source identity. Sanitization involves rounding off
details, generalizing and, most important, combining individual raw items
of information with other less sensitive information, thus making more
difficult the foreign intelligence analyst's job in tracing the facts back
to a particular source. Sanitization is never easy, and sometimes it is
impossible. Unfortunately, when a fact cannot be effectively sanitized,
it is hard for the Intelligence Community to explain or prove to the general
public how a given fact reveals the source of that information. I think this
particular problem is a major cause of many disagreements today, between those
who argue for greater disclosure and those who argue for greater security.
You often read a sensitive item in the papers which was published because
neither the reporter nor his informant knew enough about sensitive intelligence
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collection and processing methods to recognize how damaging that disclosure
could be. The Intelligence Community in turn cannot explain publicly this
relationship without making the loss of that source even more likely.
What I am saying here is that, to a degree,..you cannot expect the Intelligence
Community always to be prepared to explain publicly, in comp complete and convincing
detail, why a particular item of information is sensitive, because the
explanation itself may very well be sensitive. We must often ask the
public's forbearance when we say that a certain item would reveal sensitive
sources and methods. I feel the public understands this and wants to prevent
disclosure of intelligence vital to national security.
I said in my introduction that there is a consensus in the-Community these
days toward more openness. Many have come to believe that some sources are
not so easily ;;eopardized through disclosure as we once feared. Hence, many
now believe that we can afford to risk disclosures which reveal some kinds
of sources more than we once were willing to. We are trying to narrow our
definition of what is a vulnerable source and to be more liberal in regard
to dissemination of intelligence information from the least sensitive source.
We are working on this approach and making some progress, but just as there
are some who are working hard toward this goal, there are others -- dedicated
public servants -- who are not persuaded that the risk of security compromise
is acceptable in many of these cases. Since an intelligence source once lost
is seldom regained, we have to move prudently, and this is another area in
which the public can be helpful. Compromises and leaks naturally generate
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support for more restrictiveness. The more the public is willing to recognize
that some intelligence sources are vulnerable and need protection, and not
press for complete disclosure, the more progress we can make.
Up to this point, we have focused attention on the need to protect information
about intelligence sources and methods. There are other.kinds of information
which need protection. Over the past 50 years, there has evolved a set of
circumstances, including the threat of war, which justifies withholding
certain defense-related information from the public sector and, thereby,
from easy access by a potential adversary. In time of war or crisis, advance
information concerning military plans could result in. the defeat of major
military operations. Even during peacetime, the disclosure of information
about contingency military plans or data concerning certain aspects of U.S.
military technology can assist foreign powers in coping more effectively
or in developing countermeasures.
Let me give you some examples of the importance of keeping some kinds of
defense-related information secret. Those of us who are intelligence collectors,
have gained some insight into the value of information on foreign weapons
systems and military plans. The kinds of things we collectors go out looking
for on foreign powers, are precisely the kinds of things the U.S. has to keep
secret as far as our own forces are concerned.
The first example has to do with missile guidance systems. You have all seen
in the papers recently that the U.S. Navy was prepared to spend over a million
dollars to recover a Phoenix air-to-air missile, along with the F-14 aircraft,
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 from the iur`t~e sea, ii'r orcie rOt7o0p reventAi-tssPrecoovery '? tee u sslans. This
expenditure was justified by the fact that the effectiveness of the Phoenix
hinges, to a considerable degree, on keeping some of its operating
characteristics from a potential enemy. If these characteristics -- operating
frequencies, coding devices, guidance logic--- are known to a potential enemy,
he can design electronic countermeasures equipment which will seriously reduce
its effectiveness. We are then placed in the position of having to change
those characteristics, or design counter-countermeasures, which add
immeasurably to the cost. We also lose time, which can mean a much reduced
effective life for the operating system. If we are anxious enough to spend
a lot of money to prevent physical recovery by a potential enemy, it is clear
that we are not going to publish the detailed system characteristics in the
newspaper to save them the trouble of having to collect the information.
Classifying and withholding this kind of information contributes to the
effectiveness of the weapon in combat, hence increases the likelihood that
the U.S. will win an engagement in which the weapon is used. Conversely,
disclosing the information will increase the likelihood that the weapon would
be defeated and such an engagement won by a potential enemy.
Another example from recent news reports is instructive. Many of you, I
am sure, have read in the press about recent proposals to restructure the
military posture of the NATO forces in Central Europe, because of a belief
that the Soviet Union is capable of a standing start offensive against the
West. Such proposals may involve considerable expenditure of funds, and could
affect the capability of the NATO powers to respond to a surprise offensive.
This example is adduced to point up that precise knowledge of Soviet readiness,
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and Soviet Plans for an offensive in Europe, would permit the Western Allies
to position their forces most effectively to counter an offensive, and with
maximum resource efficiency. Not knowing those plans and that readiness
forces us into difficult choices, it raises the chance of ineffectiveness
or inefficiency in structuring our conventional force deterrent. The Soviet
Union thus gains a real advantage by withholding from us information on their
readiness and their plans. In exactly the same way, we seek an advantage
keeping from the Soviets (and unavoidably the U.S. public) detailed information
on U.S. readiness and U.S. plans for defense of Western Europe.
Let me conclude this discussion of the needs for security classification with
the observation that intelligence officers do not consider themselves the
adversary of public affairs officers, newsmen, or citizens. By and large,
intelligence officers are dedicated to dissemination of information -- which
is acquired at such great cost and personal effort -- to the Congress and
the public, where feasible, so that they can use it in-effectively performing-
their role in the political process of this country.
Now let us turn to the second major portion of this discussion -- the high
level awareness of the need to disclose selected national security
information to the Congress and the public, and review some case histories
of key releases.
I have been involved in three significant efforts by three Secretaries of
Defense to disclose important national security information to the public
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which was derived from sensitive sources. I'm sure there have been and
will be others. A brief summary of the three illustrates how the government
is broadening its efforts to inform the public about foreign military capabilities
The first instance was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Once we had obtained
direct evidence from photographic reconnaissance of Soviet strategic missiles
in Cuba, President Kennedy decided that this threat to national security was
so important to the security of the country that the people as well as the
Congress needed to be fully informed. The objective was first to clearly
establish that the Soviets had installed the missiles, and later that the
Soviets had removed all strategic weapons from the Island and returned them
.to the Soviet Union. Initially, a series. of classified presentations were
provided to the Congress. Subsequently, Secretary McNamara sponsored a
televised press conference at which aerial photography, acquired during the
Crisis, was displayed and explained to the public. To my knowledge, this was
the first revelation of our U-2, quality photography and of our comprehensive
knowledge of the nature of the Soviet presence.
The second and more recent example resulted from Secretary Schlesinger's
belief that the Congress and the public should be informed of the hard
evidence on the growing Soviet presence in Somalia and the implications for
U.S. Indian Ocean policy. In 1974, the Secretary of Defense gave a series
of presentations to the Congress using sensitive imagery of Somalia and
including many facts related to the imagery which we had initially learned
through other sources. Concurrent arrangements were also made to provide a
presentation before an open Senate session and to release copies of the
photographs themselves to the public.
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The third example is one In which. DI'A is now engaged. At the direction
of Secretary Rumsfeld, an unprecedented series of classified-presenta-
tions has been given to the Congress about current Soviet military
capabilities and trends, using information-derived from extremely
sensitive sources. The Congress published an unclassified version
in the Congressional Record.
Let me make one very important point about these three examples of
public disclosure. All of the briefings were primarily classified and
addressed-first to the Congress. This reflects a recognition that,
even though.sources may be vulnerable and all information cannot always
.be revealed to the general public, it must be revealed to the public's
elected representatives in the Congress. Where we can declassify,
we will. Where we cannot, we must ensure that the Congress is always
informed.
I would like to emphasize that the most difficult problem we deal with in
these briefings is how to get the hardest possible evidence (which means
unfortunately the most source-revealing) before the public. In this
instance, I can tell you that we are still uncertain as to how open we
can be without endangering these critically important sources. I can say
that we are carefully and gradually working towards what I think will be
a new more liberal information release policy, with many implications for
all of the government in the future.
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Now, for the last of the three major subjects, let me describe some specific
proposals to increase public access and awareness, which are currently being
discussed within the Intelligence Community.
First,. we need to be much more disciplined i_ii the way we write intelligence
reports. We must make the greatest possible effort to use highly sensitive
material only when necessary, and then have it clearly identified so that any
sanitization of reports for public release (either on our own initiative or
in response to FOI requests) will not jeopardize sensitive information and
be more timely. Some things we are looking at in this area are: the problem
of "inherited classification" (classifying a document because of the documents
which preceded it rather than its actual substance); the need for greater
differentiation between reports written for intelligence analysts who need
source details and users of intelligence who need the substantive results of
analysis.
Further, we are making a major effort to reduce to some degree the use of
special compartmentation and dissemination restrictions, which hinder down-
grading and declassification.
Second, we need more emphasis in the Intelligence Community on policing
disclosure procedures. The mechanisms which exist inside the Intelligence
Community to prevent overciassification are in a more rudimentary state
than those outside the Community. In this area, we can learn from you.
Third, we are thinking hard about formalizing public disclosure arrangements.
We are considering the need to establish mechanisms within the major
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intelligence element, for regular, routine, and more frequent preparation
or release of unclassified reports,
In summary, I have talked first about the reasons for keeping sensitive
national security information secret; second l have cited some examples in
which Defense has disseminated source-revealing information to the public
while maintaining essential security; and third I-have described specific
steps in progress or under consideration towards improving the balance
between secrecy and disclosure.
I think it should be clear to any reasonable person that certain information
must be protected against disclosure, in order to ensure that the flow of vital
intelligence about foreign powers is able to continue. Other national security
information also must be protected against disclosure in order to make more
difficult a potential enemy's efforts to counter our military plans, operations
and weapons systems.
While vital intelligence information must be protected, I believe we are
doing much to maximize the flow of information to the Congress and the
public, and can and will do more. Fundamentally, I believe a balance
between secrecy and disclosure can be struck which will meet both goals.
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