THE SITUATION IN MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010036-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: September 4, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
4 September 1959
MEMORLNDDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Situation in Morocco
1. Tension is running high in Morocco, as the government
grapples ineffectively with growing political instability and
a serious financial crisis aggravated by the indecision of the
government over stabilizing the position of the Moroccan franca
Relations between the King and some members of the cabinet, in-
cluding Premier Ibrahim, have become dangerously strained, and
the government may be dismissed at any moment, Under these con-
ditions Moroccan negotiations with the US over base rights and
arms supply to Morocco are being conducted against a backdrop of
uncertainty and political maneuver, Ibrahim and his government
are striving to achieve a settlement with the US which can be
politically exploited as a victory for Moroccan interests.
2. The political malaise now troubling Morocco is rooted
in the factional maneuvering within the dominant Istiglal party.
When the leftist-led wing of the Istiglal wrested control of the
government from the conservatives in December 1958: hostility
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between the two factions became a fact of Moroccan political life;
the struggle is currently carried on largely with verbal weapons,,
but has erupted into violence from time to time. King Mohamed V,
whose public popularity is high, has sought to remain above the
deep political divisions separating the so-called leftist wing ?
Ben Barka, Ben Seddik, Ibrahim, and a good majority of Istiglalts
rank-and-file -- from the moderates led by ex-premier Balafrej and
Allah el Fassi. However,, the King's position has boon increasingly
compromised as the struggle has grown more bitter, and followers of
certain leftist cabinet ministers openly displayed their republic-
ax m, and in some cases their profound admiration for Egyptrs Nasser.
3. In an effort to solidify his personal position without en-
dangering the representative character of his government, the King
has retained some key cabinet posts for his own entourage, and has
installed the Crown Prince as Army Chief of Staff, Furthermore he
has from time to time encouraged the growth of political movements
and careers not identified with the Istiglal. By these tactics the
King has probably insured himself of the loyalty of the bulk of the
Royal Moroccan Army and the security forces, and has soon to it that
a small but effective group of his most loyal supporters hold key ad-
ministrative positions. Those men are distrusted by both factions of
Istiqlal,
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I. Although the Istiglalts leftist faction can probably
count on more public support than the moderate wing - including
the bulk of the powerful labor movement (the UMT) -- its freedom
of action has been severely limited by a deteriorating economic
situation. Ever ainco the devaluation of the French franc in Dec..
ember 1958 the government has sought unsuccessfully to find a solu-
tion to problems caused by the overvaluation of the Moroccan franc.
For nationalistic reasons Finance Minister Bouabid has refused to
consider devaluation, but instead has boon casting about for ways
to reduce Moroccan economic dependence on France and the franc zone.
To date, however, no specific plan has been announced. Meanwhile
the franc has continued overvalued, exports have fallen off, business
has declined, and foreign business interests (especially the French)
have continued to curtail their operations&
5. There are also indications that powerful elements within
Morocco are quietly attempting to block what appears to be the
countryls imminent departure from the franc zone. The palace is
known to be troubled over the prospect of a reduction in economic
ties with France, fearing that these relationships would inevitably
be replaced by more active trading arrangements with the Bloc. How-
ever, as conditions worsen and unemployment increases, the pressures
on the government to make up its mind on financial policy continue to
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increase, we believe that the Ibrahim government will soon choose
to leave the franc zone, and that when it does the friction between
palace and cabinet will increase.
There would be little likeli-
hood, however, of a sudden shift in Moroccan trade patterns towards
the bloc.
6. The desperate attempts of the present government to stay
afloat in these difficult economic and political conditions has
given a new importance to US-Moroccan negotiations over base rights
and related subjects.
0
Moroccans can be made more tractable on the central issue of
base tenure by accepting Moroccons right to collect customs on
private goods imported for use at SAC bases and by offering lump sum
payments in settlement of past claims. On the tenure issue we believe
Ibrahim is anxious to arrive at a formula which he could represent
as a triumph for his government. If he succeeded, he would reduce na.
tionalist criticism and at the same time reassure the palace
that his government was not acting with irresponsible haste against
Western interests. Given the pressures of the moment, it is possible
that he might now accept a three-year withdrawal timetable for US
elements,
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In general, however,, the outlook is not bright in Morocco,
a new government headed
by palace leaders, should be formed in which Istiglal influence of
both moderate and leftist persuasion would be minimized. Such a
move might open new political divisions in Morocco and would cer-
tainly evoke bitter reaction from republican elements and the
Istiglal left-wing. The King probably appreciates thir danger and
is more likely to attempt a reshuffling of the cabinet to make it
representative of all Istiqlal elements. Such a government would
probably be quickly brought to an end by factionalism among its
members,
8, The Pronch continue to fish in troubled waters, and have
already indicated their displeasure at US willingness to supply
Morocco with arms. Any hesitancy on our part in this matter would
strengthen the attacks of the extreme nationalists on the policy of
dealing with the US! and would diminish the prospect that the US
could roach an agreement to retain its bases.
9, Recent reports of Mohamed VIs failing health following a
tonsillectomy are Xx obably exaggerated. However1 the concern caused
by those reports emphasizes tho central and unifying position ho
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holds in the turbulent world of Moroccan public affairs. If the
King should the or become incapacitated, widespread political dis-
orders would almost certainly follow his departure, as competing
political forces struggled for power. The Crown Prince is highly
unpopular in many circles and probably does not command the full
loyalty of the army and the police* Extremists within the leftist
wing of the lstiglal would probably use the occasion to demand the
establishment of a republic. They would probably be joined by the
loosely organized remnants of the dissident Army of Liberation,
which still operates in the Moroccan hinterland. Under these cir-
cumstances a situation close to civil war would be possible, in
which US installations and personnel might become the objects of
demonstrations or violence.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
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 STANDARD FORM NO. 64
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Office iemorandum ? UNITED' STATES GOVERNMENT
m . General Cabell DATE: September 59
PROM : Abbot Smith
SUBJECT: Attached Memo for the DC I
J-2 informed me yesterday that they would like an SNIE on
Morocco, and will probably (not certainly) bring the matter up
at the next USIB meeting.
Our staff had just finished a memorandum on Morocco, and
in view of J-2's request we herewith send it along to you. I
have given it no outside distribution, save for a copy sent in-
formally to Colonel McCann of J-2.
The memo was prepared in consultation with OCI and DDP rep-
resentatives, but they have not seen the final version.
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