WHAT NEXT FOR RHODESIA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800020004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 15, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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**W No
Secret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
What Next for Rhodesia ?
Secret
15 November 1968
No. 21-68
? 1O I/CDF Pages 1 & 3 thrra 1
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~ftw too
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP l~
EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
L DOWNOR ADIND AT D
DEUI.AESIPICATION
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
15 November 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 21-68
We think the chances are better than even that Rhodesia
and the UK will reach a settlement by which Ian Smith's white
minority "rebel" regime is legitimized. Black Africans,
sensing such an outcome, have already served notice that they
will try to block any effort in the UN to remove the economic
sanctions against Rhodesia, and are likely to instigate more
fireworks in the UN and elsewhere. Some may stage angry
demonstrations against the UK, break relations, or drop out
of the Commonwealth. Other nations, including the US, which
have implemented the UN sanctions decree would then face
difficult decisions on how to treat a "legitimate" Rhodesia.
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by
the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office
of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research in
the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Clandestine Services.
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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Now low
I. Background
1. Three years ago this month Ian Smith defied Britain
and the world by proclaiming the independence of Rhodesia under
white minority rule. The resulting dispute between Rhodesia
and the UK has centered around the terms of Rhodesia's
constitution, most of which date from 1961, when a complex
parliamentary electoral system was devised to ensure white
control. It has been a strange rebellion in many ways.
The Security Council, applying for the first time Chapter VII
of its charter, declared Smith's government a threat to world
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law-
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peace and imposed specific mandatory economic sanctions. Again
in the spring of 1968 the Security Council invoked Chapter VII
in setting more stringent mandatory sanctions. The US, UK,
and others have implemented the successive UN resolutions by
their own declarations. Despite increasing pressure from sanctions
and ostracism from the world community, white Rhodesia with the
connivance of Portugal and South Africa has survived by import
substitution and clandestine trade. Until the last few weeks,
the prospects for any settlement, or even any meaningful
negotiations appeared exceedingly bleak.
II. Recent Developments
25X6 I the current exchanges are keyed to
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ways of bestowing legitimacy on the Smith government without
actually violating the terms of the Six Principles which were
announced as minimum British demands before Rhodesian
independence.*
During the summer white Rhodesians were
discussing the terms of a republican constitution which would
have edged them closer to apartheid, and reduced the chances
for any negotiated settlement. Smith has strengthened his
political position by successfully getting rid of some cabinet
The Six Principles are: a guarantee of unimpeded progress
towards majority rule; guarantees against retrogressive
amendments of the constitution; immediate improvement in
the political status of the Africans; progress towards
ending racial discrimination; the acceptance of the con-
stitution by the people of Rhodesia as a whole; and no
oppression of the majority by the minority or vice versa.
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members who were hard liners on the racial issue and has thereby
increased his ability to make a compromise settlement which would
gain a recognition of legitimacy for his regime from the UK.
5. Ian Smith, though moving in his usual unhurried manner,
is clearly eager to win an early agreement with the UK. He has
tested Wilson's firmness on one of his key demands, i.e., that
Rhodesians have the right to appeal to the British Privy Council
as the final court on constitutional matters, and found, probably
to his surprise, that Wilson was flexible. This has encouraged
him to balk at other sticky points in the proposals which Wilson
presented at Gibraltar. But, so long as both sides are amenable
to continuing the negotiations, the talks are likely to go on
for some time.
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6. Smith has virtually a free hand to deal with the
metropole in the name of white Rhodesia. In the years since
seizing independence his political power and popularity have
increased considerably. He has withstood challenges from the
right wing of his party, and purged from his cabinet the
extremists who might have balked at any compromise. To those
in the political center, Smith symbolizes what they regard as a
successful defiance of a hostile world. The hardships imposed
by economic sanctions and a severe drought and the dangers
raised by periodic forays of black insurgents from Zambia have
both stiffened the resolve of the whites to cling to power and
enhanced their support for Smith.
7. There are limits to the concessions which the whites
would accept as a price for legitimacy, but these are limits
which Smith would probably not exceed in any case. Few white
Rhodesians at this stage would tolerate a constitution which
offered the blacks more than token participation in the political
process now and over the short run. The left, in the peculiar
spectrum of white Rhodesian politics, would accept a gradual
rise in black participation, based on "merit" rather than numbers,
if assured of white domination for a very long time. Rhodesian
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rightists generally advocate some form of separate development
along South African lines, and would probably reject any
compromise agreement which Smith might work out with Wilson.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Smith is counting on their
support or their neutrality. He probably is aiming towards a
constitution which will be acceptable, or at least tolerable,
to the left and center, and is willing to face the anger of the
diehards.
III. A Settlement: Its Likely Nature and Repercussions
8. We think the chances are better than even that
negotiations will lead eventually to a settlement in which the
UK bestows legitimacy on a white-dominated Rhodesian government.
The bargaining is likely to be hard and the process may drag
on for several months. Neither the left wing of the British
Labour Party nor the rightists in Rhodesia would find the outcome
pleasing, but neither group is likely to be able to do much more
than complain. We think that both Wilson and Smith are sufficiently
adroit to find means of mollifying their domestic foes, without
endangering their own positions or the agreement. Furthermore,
the controversial clauses in the new constitution would probably
be so ambiguous or so deliberately fuzzed as to allow both sides
to claim a victory.
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9. In this case a settlement with the UK would by no means
resolve the Rhodesian affair. Indeed, the legitimizing of white
minority rule in Rhodesia would be likely to inflame further the
racial antagonisms between southern and black Africa, and bring
on more fireworks in the UN. African members of the UN, already
sensing the possibility of a deal between Wilson and Smith, have
served notice that they will try to forestall any move to with-
draw the sanctions resolutions earlier adopted under Chapter VII.
If the Security Council actions were not rescinded, Rhodesia
could remain an international outcast for some time. Those
nations, including the US, which have acted in accord with the
Chapter VII resolutions to ban trade and other relations with
Rhodesia, would then face difficult decisions on how to treat a
"legitimate" Rhodesia. Some European countries would probably
tacitly allow a resumption of trade, but it is doubtful that many
would accord early diplomatic recognition.
10. In black Africa, most governments would regard any
likely Smith-Wilson arrangement as a sell out, no matter how
cleverly presented. Feelings against the UK would run high,
particularly in Zambia and Tanzania. These two might drop out
of the Commonwealth or possibly break relations with the UK,
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and would look for other ways to retaliate against Wilson. If
demonstrations were to get out of hand, there might be some
harassment of UK nationals, some damage to British property and
perhaps even some danger to lives, but we do not foresee any
widespread attack on whites. Nonetheless, some other Europeans
or Americans might be affected, either by accident or because
anti-British feelings could in the heat of the moment take an
anti-white turn.
11. Elsewhere in black Africa reactions, though generally
vociferous, would probably be less severe. Some of the radical
states, e.g., Guinea and Mali, might sever relations with the
UK, and would certainly raise a commotion in the UN and the OAU,
and call upon the world powers to use force against white
Rhodesia. Even some of the more moderate states, e.g., Kenya
or Uganda, are likely to manifest their displeasure by noisy
demonstrations, and angry denunciations, and might even leave
the Commonwealth. Many others, perhaps the majority, are too
preoccupied by domestic concerns or too distant from Rhodesia to
take serious heed of the matter. They would join in African
expressions of indignation, but would soon forget about it. Needless
to say we do not foresee any early trend toward African acceptance
or recognition of white Rhodesia.
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12. For years Pretoria has looked on the Rhodesian affair
as an embarrassment, in part because it has attracted world
attention to racial problems in southern Africa, and especially
because it has resulted in the application of economic sanctions
against Smith, and thereby placed South Africa in the awkward
position of either risking a demonstration of how sanctions
can bring down a government or of defying the UN and world
opinion by aiding Rhodesia. Having opted for the latter policy,
Pretoria now feels exposed to possible UN-instigated punitive
measures. Indeed the General Assembly in early November passed
by an overwhelming margin a resolution calling for the extension
of economic sanctions to include South Africa. Even though such
actions by the UN are not binding, and South Africans for years
have ignored other exhortations and condemnations from the world
body, they don't like the situation and would welcome anything
which reduced their conspicuous posture as the principal support
of white Rhodesia. South African Prime Minister Vorster is,
therefore, encouraging Smith and Wilson to come to terms, and
would endorse almost any likely accord.
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13. The legitimizing of Rhodesia would diminish its
economic dependence upon South Africa, but would probably not
affect the security cooperation now in effect. Rhodesian
security forces could probably handle the occasional forays of
black Rhodesian and South African insurgents from the north
without South African help. Nevertheless, white South Africans
are hypersensitive about black insurgents anywhere in southern
Africa, and feel much more secure with the Zambezi River as the
front line rather than the Limpopo. South Africa, which now
has some 200 police deployed in Rhodesia, is therefore likely to
remain involved in Rhodesian security affairs for a long time
regardless of whether a settlement is reached or not.
C. The Prospect in Rhodesia Itself
14. Most white Rhodesians would follow Smith, if he
accepted an accord along the lines of the Gibraltar terms.
The resumption of normal economic relations with the UK and
other former trading partners would give a considerable lift
to the now stagnant economy. New investment from foreign
private sources in mining and industry would help to boost
urban African employment. Also Rhodesian businessmen would hail
their liberation from the onerous dependence upon profit-seeking,
crotchety South African intermediaries.
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15. Even if the terms of settlement were to call for
unimpeded African political progress, it is unlikely that the
whites would in practice permit much advancement. Some black
Rhodesians with political aspirations would be further embittered,
and the general resentment of white privileges would grow. This
would be only slightly tempered by the improved economic position
of urban blacks, who are likely to share to some extent in the
development of the country. Also, black Rhodesians are well
aware of the coercive and intelligence capabilities of the white-
led security forces. We doubt therefore that Rhodesian blacks
would resort to organized violence. The militant black nationalist
organizations are too divided, and lacking in effective leadership,
to pose a serious security threat to white Rhodesians for some
time. There will, however, be further raids from Zambia by
black Rhodesians, though of limited scope and with little chance
of success.
16. In the event that no settlement is reached, many white
Rhodesians will be disappointed, and most will blame Wilson
rather than Smith. The economy will continue at about present
levels, aided by South African commercial and financial resources,
and few whites will suffer severely. We think that white
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Rhodesians will be no more likely to accept Wilson's minimum
terms in a year or two than they are now. Rather they will
look forward to a change of government in Britain, and, mis-
takenly or not, will continue to believe that the Tories will
offer softer terms. Meanwhile, Smith might reopen internal
political discussions leading toward a republican constitution,
even though this could complicate further talks with the
British.
17. In the long run, whether or not Smith gains
legitimacy for his regime is to a large extent irrelevant.
Whites in either case are likely to govern Rhodesia for some
years in relatively peaceful conditions. Sporadic exile incur-
sions from Zambia will be irritating but not unbearable. The
larger problem in Rhodesia is the rapidly growing numerical
disparity of the races. As always, African statistics are
dubious, but the best figures available indicate that Africans
in Rhodesia number over four million against 230,000 whites.
The estimated annual rate of increase of the Africans is
better than three percent, among the highest in the world.
At the current rate, the African population will double in
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about two decades. Pressures on the land in tribal reserves
are already heavy, and few jobs are available in urban areas
and on white farms. It will take considerable skill by Smith
and his successors to manage the new internal problems arising
from African population growth. It is difficult to estimate
how long, in these circumstances, the whites could keep peace
in Rhodesia.
Acting Chairman
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1-2 W W. Rostow'
3..i~ John Easton
5-6 Lt. Col. James Co Martin, ACSI
7-8 Capt. Werthmaler Navy
9-10 M
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15-17 Allan Evans, M,
18-19 George Carroll
20-22 Frank Hand
23 7 Harry Beach, NSC
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15 11OV. 1968-68
SPECIAL MEMO a # 21
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Gordon Stewart .
MR PAUL C, =/PENTAG0N
MR. GEQRGE DEIt/PENTAGON &15
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MR. /WHITE HOUSE -`Rd g r~ n7 r "A
MR."PETER STBAUSS/STATE (BID)
MR. JOSEPH, PAZ /STATE
ML THOMAS Qt MY/STATE
MR. OLIVER TBOREL/STATE
MR. rtOBERT MQ0RE/STATE
HOLMES/STATE
MR. ESWARD W.
MR. THOMAS THOR:NE$ JR./STATE
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15 November 1968
Subject to your approval, we would like the following to
receive Special Memorandum No. 21-68:
Pentagon
Mr. Paul C. Warnke
Hon Asst Secy OSI ISA
4 E 806
Mr. George Rader
OSI ISA
1E C 749
White House
Mr. Edward Hamilton
Room 316, Executive Office Building
State Department (AID)
Mr. Peter Strauss
Assistant Administrata7'AFR
Room 6936
State Department
Mr. Joseph Palmer
Asst Secy for African Affairs
Room 6236
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State Department
Mr. Thomas Quimby
Deputy Asst Secy for African Affairs
Room 6236
Mr. Oliver Troxel
Director, Office of Research & Analysis for Africa
Room 7817 A
Mr. Robert Moore
Deputy Asst Secy for African Affairs
Room 6236
Mr. Edward W. Holmes
Country Director, AFSE
Room 5526
Mr. Thomas Thorne, Jr.
RAF/CS
Room 7823
Theodore B. Hodges
Chief, Africa Staff
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