CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00129R000100130008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 28, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT
AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG
USIB MEMORANDUM
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
17 April 1963 Memorandum, as revised 28 May 1963
SECRET
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 28 May 1963. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations ('Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the AssistantChief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and' the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Inpestigation, abstained, the subject being outside
of their jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FRO AUTQQMAT4C DOWNGRADING
AND ECLASSIFICATION
33493 - 3 494
WARNING
This material contains information offectin9 the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
28 May 1963
SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET
AND SINKIANG
The object of this study is to examine the offensive capabilities
during 1963 of Communist China's ground forces against India and the
Himalayan border states. This study does not consider attacks that might
be launched by Chinese forces through Burma. It does not estimate Chinese
Communist intentions.
A. Chinese Communist forces presently in the Sino-Indian border
area consist of 4 divisions, 11 separate combat regiments, 5 border
defense regiments, and administrative and support troops totaling about
120,000 men. A major offensive effort against India, as specified in E,
would require the redeployment of additional divisions from elsewhere,
which the Chinese could do without seriously jeopardizing their.overall
military posture. (Para. 2)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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B. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road from rail-served base depots
at Chengtu in Szechwan; Lanchou, and Hsiatung in Kansu; and in the
vicinity of Urumchi in Sinkiang. From these railheads supplies are
moved into the frontier area by motor transport over long and difficult
routes, ranging from 500 to 1,800 miles, thus limiting the quantities
of supplies which can be delivered. (Paras. 3-4)
C. We estimate that the Chinese could deliver an average of 1,600
tons per day to Tibet and southwest Sinkiang; this operation would require
about 40,000 trucks. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment
of substantial reserves in the forward areas, would be sufficient on a
continuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of about
225,000 combat and service troops. Of these a maximum of approximately
175,000 could be supported logistically in simultaneous attacks. The
tonnage of 1,600 tons per day also could support air operations consum-
ing approximately 450 tons daily. This maximum support effort would
tax China?s motor transport capabilities and would result in a heavy
drain on POL supplies. (Paras. 5-6)
D. We believe that the maximum threat to India and the Himalayan
border states would be limited to simultaneous attacks in Ladakh,
through the border passes between Ladakh and Nepal, into Nepal, either
into northern Assam across Bhutan or into the Siliguri area across
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Sikkim, and into the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA). We believe the
maximum Chinese force could be as large as 175,000 men, consisting of
7 light infantry divisions, 2 standard infantry divisions, and 15
independent infantry regiments.
E. We estimate that the Chinese, should they launch the attacks
described above, would have the following military objectives:
a. In Ladakh, to extend Chinese control to include the
capture of the important center of Leh.
b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal, to seize
c. In Nepal, to seize the major valley approaches and the
city of Katmandu.
d. In the east, to occupy NEFA and to interdict Indian
communications and control of Assam. (Paras. 14-32)
F. The next favorable periods for offensive operations begin in
May for the avenues of approach on the frontier west of Katmandu and in
September for the avenues east of Katmandu. (Paras. 7-9)
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