GROWING UNREST IN SOUTH KOREA AND PROSPECTS FOR TAKEOVER BY MILITARY STRONGMAN CHON DOO HWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200020024-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: May 9, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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 Approved Forrelea
The Director of Central Intelligence
9 May 1980
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Security Council
SUBJECT . Growing Unrest in South Korea and Prospects
for Takeover by Military Strongman Chon Doo Hwan
MORI .
review(s)
completed.
1. Current reporting indicates that the level of antigovernment
activities by South Korean students, supported by opposition political
leaders and workers, is coming to a head. Student activists and
sympathizers have enumerated a series of demands and set a deadline
of 14 May for government action, failing which they threaten demon-
strations in the streets. ROK authorities are reportedly devising a
series of steps to forestall a confrontation, with the use of force
the last resort. It appears doubtful, however, that the activists
will respond to government pleas for moderation. The outcome of clashes by
students and troops, if they occur, will depend on the response of
several key actors, and certainly on the state of mind and the role
played by military strongman Chon Doo Hwan.
2. While what we have observed of North Korean reactions to
developments in the South since the Park assassination does not yet
suggest an intention to exploit the situation militarily, I continue
to be concerned about the adequacy of warning on Korea. In this
light, the current South Korean unrest, which brings with it the
possibility of a military takeover, is yet another in a series of
recent events that could undermine stability in the South and tempt
Pyongyang to attack.
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9 May 1980
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
GROWING UNREST IN SOUTH KOREA AND PROSPECTS FOR
TAKEOVER BY MILITARY STRONGMAN CHON DUO HWAN
A serious confrontation between ROK authorities and
South Korean students is taking shape. While only a
portion of the university student enrollment is involved,
activists appear determined to test the permissiveness of
the authorities and have put forward a series of political
demands deemed unacceptable by ROK authorities, including the
Lifting of martial Law by 14 May and the dismissal of top
government leaders. Students in many parts of the country
are planning to take to the streets and sta e marches if
their deadline is not met.
These developments have caused great concern among ROK officials,
particularly since they are occurring at a time of labor unrest. Officials
are particularly alarmed about the possibility that student and labor
demonstrators will join forces in the streets. President Choi is
reported to be considering a variety of measures to deal with these
threats but probably lacks the will and ability to act decisively. The
ROK Army Chief of Staff placed the infantry regiments of five divisions,
the Special Warfare Command, and the Capital Security Command on standby
alert. They are to be prepared to move into Seoul to support Martial
Law Command efforts to control student demonstrators. On 6-7 May, two
special forces brigades moved into the Seoul area, joining four others
garrisoned there.
The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the
Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence
Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior poZicymakers are
aware of impending potential developments that may have serious
implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these
developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at
the working Level with CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR.
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The outcome of clashes between students and troops would depend
upon the reactions of opposition figures, the business community, and
the general public. Opposition political leaders already have expressed
support for some student demands and have called for a special National
Assembly session later this month to discuss the situation. Sympathy
for the students among other elements, however, is limited. The
majority of South Koreans probably hope that actions which might lead
to instability, to a military dictatorship, and to a loss of foreign--
and especially US--confidence can be avoided. It is possible, therefore,
that the authorities would be able to suppress student activism without
causing the confrontation to spread to other sectors of society. It is also
possible, however, that such clashes--especially if they involved loss
of civilian life--might bring workers and opposition political leaders
into the confrontation and rupture the process of political reconstruction
under way since President Park's assassination. I
The attitude and role of military strongman Lt. Gen. Chon Doo Hwan
with respect to these developments probably will be decisive.
All of the actors in this situation will, however, be very mindful
of US Government attitudes. Student and opposition party leaders will be
looking to the United States to restrain and inhibit crackdowns by the ROK
Government and the military. Chon himself will want to avoid as much as
possible provoking US reactions that could undermine his position or the
US/ROK security relationship. Nevertheless, if Chon believes that the
United States is out to get him and that his power within the ROK military
is eroding as a result, he may be prepared to discount US attitudes in the
interest of taking full control of the government.
North Korea does not currently appear to be taking any military steps
in response to the deteriorating political situation in the South.
However, the events of 26 October and 12 December 1979 caught the North
by surprise. That is not true of the present situation. As we pointed
out in SNIE 42/14'.2-79, 20 December 1979, and in an Alert Memorandum,
8 February 1980, the emergence of widespread civil disorder in the South
would prompt Pyongyang to consider forceful reunification of the peninsula.
If Washington were seen to be preoccupied with the situation in South
Asia and domestic issues, Pyongyang would probably be further emboldened
by a conclusion that the US capacity to resolve the situation in the
South or to defend South Korea was seriously weakened.
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