SOUTH AFRICA: DEFENSE STRATEGY IN AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002600150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Director of
Central
Intelligence
South Africa: Defense
Strategy in an Increasingly
Hostile World
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NI IIAI 79-10025
December 1979
289
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25X1
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SOUTH AFRICA: DEFENSE
STRATEGY IN AN INCREASINGLY
HOSTILE WORLD
Information available as of December 1979 was
used in the preparation of this memorandum.
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FOREWORD
This memorandum analyzes the defense strategy of the South
African Government as it appears to be evolving, and discusses major
implications of this strategy for South Africa over the next three to four
years. The paper also suggests some possible implications for the United
States during the same period. The basic drafts of the memorandum
were prepared by of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, with the participation of other DIA analysts and analysts in the
Central Intelligence Agency; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State; and the National Security Agency. The paper was
coordinated at a working level within the intelligence Community.
Differences of view are noted where they exist. Queries or comments
may be directed to the office of the National Intelligence Officer for
Africa
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD ............................................................................................................ iii
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 3
The South African Environment ........................................................................ 3
Forging the Strategic Tools .................................................................................. 4
Economic and Political Underpinning ................................................................ 5
Can It Work? .......................................................................................................... 6
Implications for the United States ...................................................................... 8
ANNEXES (to be issued separately)
A. Economic Strengths and Vulnerabilities ......................................................
A-1
B. Attitudes of Major European States Toward Sanctions on South Africa ..
B-1
C. South Africa's Regional Policy: The "Constellation" of Southern
African States ..............................................................................................
C-1
D. The South African Security Forces ..............................................................
D-1
E. Military Self-Sufficiency ................................................................................
E-1
F. Nuclear Policy ..................................................................................................
F-1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The South African Government under Prime Minister P. W. Botha
is developing a set of interrelated strategies designed to make South
Africa substantially more immune to foreign economic pressures and to
enable it to act with greater independence in the political and military
fields.
Over the next three to four years, these strategies are likely to result
- An expanded and strengthened military establishment, with
somewhat greater nonwhite participation, structured to operate
in both counterguerrilla and conventional modes.
- A capability to produce and deploy nuclear weapons on short
notice.
- A degree of economic self-sufficiency greater than that
prevailing now, but still incomplete in important respects (even
though the economy can already sustain an import cutoff of
more than a year).
- A restructuring of apartheid that will further reduce the more
obvious forms of racial discrimination without intentionally
altering the fundamental idea of separation of races and the
dominating role of the white community.
- A foreign policy focus on South Africa's regional situation with a
view to creating as large a geographical and functional area of
cooperation as possible with neighboring states.
The South Africans hope that the effects of these developments
will be to mitigate their country's international isolation, create a
regional buffer zone which denies hostile black nationalism and
Communism a foothold, and encourage nonwhites to feel they have a
stake in South African society even though it remains under white
control.
These hopes are not likely to be fulfilled to any large degree. The
racial attitudes of the South African white community are not likely to
evolve fast enough or appear sufficiently unambiguous to win
significant support in the black and other nonwhite communities or to
stifle foreign critics. South Africa therefore is likely to experience:
- Gradually increasing international isolation, with fewer mem-
bers of the international community willing to extend overt
cooperation.
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- A continuation of regional tensions, with the question of white
dominance in South Africa as the core issue.
- Growing divisiveness as well as resistance within the black
communities in South Africa, with continuing ambivalence on
the part of other nonwhites.
For the United States, these developments and trends imply a
sharpening of the dilemmas surrounding Western policies toward South
Africa:
- As South Africa becomes more resistant to specific economic
pressures, US ability to influence its leaders through these means
will decline further.
- As regional tensions persist, the dangers of further Soviet or
other Communist involvement will also persist and possibly
grow, although the likelihood of direct military intervention still
appears low.
- As South African military capabilities, and willingness to use
those capabilities, increase, conflicting demands that the
Western powers "do something" about South Africa and about
Communist influence in the region will also increase.
- Those limited successes which South African strategies do
achieve will serve more to fuel debate and create confusion of
purpose in the West than to reduce African pressures for action.
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SECRET I
country's races, with the white community in a domi-
nant position. Nevertheless, the country's growing
international isolation, springing fundamentally from
its racial policies, has forced the white leadership into
a probing reassessment of national priorities and into
the formulation of a more coherent national defense
strategy-or set of interrelated strategies-than lead-
ers have previously offered. Thus, over the last few
years, the government has moved perceptibly toward
putting heavy emphasis on three elements:
- Ensuring that its military forces are not only
materially strong and tactically flexible, but as
little dependent on foreign supply as humanly
possible.
- Developing an economy that is so self-sufficient
that it can withstand prolonged periods of rela-
tive isolation from world trading patterns.
- Instilling in the South African population as a
whole a strong sense of unity or, in the case of
nonwhites, a stronger attachment to the political,
social, and economic order.
In the view of the current leadership, South Africa's
survival depends on accomplishing these objectives.
5. In practice, this has meant and will continue to
mean that other policy objectives are subordinated to
implementation of this strategy, and that extensive
resources will continue to be diverted to the develop-
ment of armed forces capable of dominating regional
adversaries, deterring intervention by Communist
powers, and meeting externally based guerrillas as far
forward as possible. It means reinforced emphasis on
internal security in the wake of the politically tranquil
periods of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Here,
however,- the Botha government evidently intends a
more sophisticated mix of repression and reform-
with, for example, a pervasive police apparatus as well
as new constitutional arrangements within the frame-
work of separate development. It even means, at least
on the part of the leadership, a willingness to forgo a
high economic growth rate where this implies greater
dependence on foreign countries and therefore greater
vulnerability to international sanctions.
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DISCUSSION
The South African Environment
1. White South Africans see themselves in a struggle
against a "total onslaught" by black guerrillas and
radical states supported by Communist powers. Since
the first settlers arrived at the Cape of Good Hope
more than 300 years ago, whites have been concerned
for their survival and their privileged way of life.
Years of conflict with black tribes, struggle against
British colonialism, and the southward march of Afri-
can nationalism have produced among whites an "us
or them" view of the world that shapes their attitudes
and forms the framework within which successive
governments have formulated foreign and domestic
policies since the Afrikaner Nationalist Party took
power in 1948.
2. In private, South African whites today sometimes
talk pessimistically with outsiders about the future of
their country. Their concerns are not usually focused
on current events but on what the quality of life in
South Africa may be for the next generation. Occa-
sional media treatment of the emigration of skilled
whites also attests to an underlying apprehension that
the country's future is clouded. Attitudes, of course,
differ among the white groups, although the differ-
ences have gradually become less pronounced. Eng-
lish-speaking South Africans tend to be more pessimis-
tic and more inclined to look for opportunities in other
countries, while Afrikaners tend to see themselves as
without serious alternatives to staying in the coun-
try-"we have no boats to get into."
3. In public, however, government leaders project a
tough, defiant stance. Deeply aware of their history,
they look to the future and pragmatically plan for any
plausible contingency, preferring to err on the side of
preparedness rather than risk even the appearance of
weakness in the face of a threat. So far, the leadership
seems confident that, despite trials, white solidarity
will be maintained, and that available human and
material resources are sufficient to cope with any
physical challenge that might be mounted from within
or without.
4. With this outlook, South Africa's political and
military leaders retain the overriding goal of preserv-
ing a system of separate development among the
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6. It would, nonetheless, be a mistake to read all
South African attitudes and policies as pointing in a
single direction. White South Africans have long iden-
tified with the West and desire to be accepted as full
members of the Western community. In the past, the
government contended that it was a logical participant
in the Western defense system, assuming it had a role
in guarding the sea routes past the Cape. Years of
rebuffs have lowered, but not eliminated completely,
South African expectations. While Pretoria recognizes
that it cannot expect Western support in southern
Africa, it also calculates that the West is not unified
and that extensive and profitable ties between South
Africa and Western Europe-especially with the
United Kingdom and France-can be counted on to
prevent the West from acting in unison with others to
impose effective economic sanctions. There is also a
lingering hope, occasionally burgeoning into some
small confidence, that all is not lost, and that future
leaders of future governments in the West, especially
in Washington, might take a different and more
sympathetic position toward South Africa.
7. Furthermore, embedded in the rhetoric of Prime
Minister Botha's concept of a "constellation" of states
in southern Africa, there is not only a redefinition of
the Afrikaner defensive laager, but also a sense that
the ultimate prospects for better relations with black
Africa generally may not be hopeless. The South
Africans know from experience that their assistance
and cooperation can be valued by other African
leaders even though it cannot be acknowledged. De-
spite extolling the virtues of national self-reliance,
South Africa continues to seek international and even
regional respectability, and it is anxious to cooperate
with any government prepared to enter into an open
or a covert relationship.
Forging the Strategic Tools
8. As the South Africans see it, the first and most
immediate requirement to carry out a strategy of
independence is to expand the size of the South
African armed forces. Until recently, force expansion
has come largely from heavier recruitment and length-
ened callups from the white community, but plans
now call for an appreciable increase in the use of
volunteer personnel from the Indian, Colored, and
black communities. The objective is to double the 1977
size of the Permanent Force (regular professional
military personnel) by 1981, and enhance the commit-
ment of nonwhites to national defense. To make
military service more attractive to nonwhites, the
armed forces have moved much more rapidly than the
wider society to reduce the petty aspects of racial
discrimination.
9. Up to recently, the South African ground forces
have been structured mostly for counterinsurgency
operations, and military plans and training stress quick
reaction, mobility, and aggressiveness against essen-
tially guerrilla opponents. These would be engaged in
forward areas, with ground and air strikes attacking
guerrilla camps, while police and local reserve units
took responsibility for countering operations in the
interior of the country, particularly in the urban areas.
10. However, since the Angolan civil war, when the
South African military first encountered in combat
modern Soviet weaponry manned by foreign troops,
there has been a growing perception of a conventional
threat. This has hastened modifications of unit organi-
zation and development of major weapon systems,
such as infantry fighting vehicles and heavy artillery.
Training programs now stress increased readiness as
well as combined arms operations. This implies a
concept of striking preemptively beyond South Afri-
ca's frontiers at threatening military forces, using
mobility, surprise, and overwhelming firepower while
avoiding prolonged engagements that could cause a
loss of skilled manpower and deplete inventories of
sophisticated materiel not readily produced within
South Africa.
11. This last consideration is particularly applicable
to the South African Air Force, which probably gives
special attention to the need to husband scarce re-
sources, notably jet fighter aircraft. Maintaining air
superiority would be critical for engaging opponents in
forward areas, especially those outside the country,
although in the event of a conventional engagement
the Air Force's principal missions would remain to
provide reconnaissance, transportation, and close air
support to the ground forces. Paralleling the ground
forces' interest in improving their capabilities for
conventional warfare, the Air Force is upgrading the
air defense system by using more effectively antiair-
craft weaponry and radars, by building hardened
forward bases, and by developing a centralized com-
mand and control network.
12. The South African Navy, too, is being reori-
ented, in this case away from the potential NATO
support role in the South Atlantic envisioned earlier
and toward coastal and harbor defense missions (in-
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eluding Walvis Bay, which South Africa claims and in
any case clearly hopes to have access to after Namibia
becomes independent).
13. The South Africans intend to carry out this
program of force expansion and redirection in the face
of the UN arms embargo, imposed in 1977. Develop-
ing an indigenous arms industry capable of producing
a full range of military equipment has thus become a
prime strategic target. The priority now is on adapting
foreign technology to local needs, with emphasis on
the production of those relatively high technology
items-missiles, radars, aircraft parts, heavy wea-
14. One special tool is available to the South Afri-
cans as an option in developing their strategy: their
nuclear weapons program. There is no question that
the South Africans have the technical capability to
produce nuclear weapons. What is not clear is the use
to which they now intend or eventually will put this
capability. Certainly the knowledge or assumption on
the part of other African leaders that such a capability
and program exist adds a dimension to South Africa's
quest for international influence. The South Africans
have contributed to this by the ambiguity with which
they have surrounded their program. In addition, it
would appear almost certain that in South Africa's
circumstances its leaders wish to have a nuclear
weapons option available as a last resort defense
against hostile threats or pressures.
Economic and Political Underpinning
15. To enable the South Africans to sustain and give
real meaning to their "independent" defense strategy
in southern Africa, they have for some years recog-
nized that they must undertake specific economic
programs to meet civilian as well as military needs.
They have also, more belatedly, come to recognize
that an independent strategy can carry implications
for domestic as well as foreign political arrangements.
16. The threat of additional UN sanctions has given
point to South Africa's programs in the economic field.
By reducing imports of vital commodities such as oil,
encouraging import substitution industries, and build-
ing strategic stockpiles, South Africa's leaders intend to
demonstrate economic invulnerability and thereby
sow doubt about the impact of sanctions. The aim is
not to cut ties with international economic partners,
which would put white prosperity in immediate jeop-
ardy, but rather to discredit the use of sanctions as a
policy instrument against South Africa. If this failed,
and sanctions came, the programs would limit damage
and help buy time and room for further maneuver.
17. At the same time, the South African Govern-
ment actively promotes. the expansion of mineral
exports desired by other countries, and this has the
effect abroad of accentuating the potential negative
consequences of breaking economic relations with
South Africa. An implied threat that strategic minerals
such as chromium or platinum-group metals might be
withheld calls attention to South Africa's special im-
portance to industrialized countries in the West and
also Japan.
18. A more subtle element of South African eco-
nomic calculations is the possibility of expanding and
reinforcing economic links with other states of the
southern and central African region. The reasoning
here is that such links not only are desirable in
themselves for political and economic benefits, but
that they would create a situation in which sanctions
against South Africa would strike at the economies of
neighboring states as well, perhaps even generating
urgent requirements for foreign relief assistance to the
black-ruled states. For the West, then, the price of
sanctions would go even higher.
19. Interest in deeper relations with other regional
states goes well beyond economics, however. As South
African political and military leaders have come to
abandon strategies that rely on Western cooperation,
they have given increasing consideration to a "forward
defense" approach. South Africa, in addition to having
strong economic ties with its neighbors, would become
the hub of a "constellation"-a system of alliances and
informal arrangements for military training, supply,
and mutual defense. Namibia and Zimbabwe-Rhode-
sia, as well as the "homelands," are South Africa's most
obvious candidates for participation in this kind of
"constellation," but as many other states of the region
as possible would be included. While this strategy in its
purely military aspect has been resisted by opponents
within the government-particularly in the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and the Department of
National Security-who favor a less military-oriented
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approach to regional relations, the general concept
evidently is attractive to Prime Minister (and Defense
Minister) P. W. Botha.
20. One major reason for this attraction may be that
it would appear to dovetail with the objective that
Botha has so strongly espoused of building nonwhite
commitment to national defense and reducing internal
social tensions. To the degree that either of these
efforts succeeds, South Africans would hope foreign
criticism could be blunted and the way made easier
for black-ruled states in the region to collaborate in
various ways.
21. While Botha and like-minded colleagues are
constrained by conservatives in the Nationalist Party
and the Afrikaner community, they nonetheless are
cautiously attempting to find compromises that give
nonwhites the appearance of power sharing and whites
the feeling that grand apartheid-geographic separa-
tion of blacks and whites-is being realized. Over the
next few years, this approach will likely include
carrying out measures that already have won grudging
acceptance from white conservatives-reducing. dis-
crimination in jobs and public facilities, improving
educational opportunities for nonwhites, and stimulaf-
ing economic development in the black homelands. It
will also include encouraging further discussion among
whites and leaders of other races regarding proposals
for limited regional autonomy for the separate white,
Indian, Colored, and perhaps even black urban
communities.
22. What the specific effects of such overtures as
these may be on the leaders of other racial and ethnic
communities is not easy to say, and would depend on
the specific content of the proposals. Certainly some
will be tempted to collaborate, even as the "leaders" of
the various homelands are already doing. Beyond this,
there is likely to be a wide range of response to
government efforts at co-option. While some blacks
will indeed cooperate, others will reject new arrange-
ments as falling far short of their expectations. Still
others will espouse or continue armed resistance. On
the whole, however, those who reject all open coopera-
tion are more likely to set the "ideal" for the majority
of South African blacks.
Can It Work?
23. Prospects for carrying out the various elements
of South Africa's strategy will depend heavily on
domestic and international developments-the most
"independent" strategy is not immune to the influence
of unforeseen or uncontrollable events. Also, while
South Africa is remarkably self-reliant for a country of
moderate size, commanding impressive resources with
which to resist external threats and pressures and to
maintain internal control, its capabilities are far from
limitless.
24. Probably the first key factor that underlies most
aspects of the Botha strategy is continued high earn-
ings from mineral exports, because such a strategy is
expensive. If export earnings failed to maintain a high
level, as they did in the mid-1970s, South Africa
probably would adjust its sights but would not aban-
don the goal of economic independence.
25. Another key factor will be the degree to which
nonwhites give credence to the government's proposals
for dismantling some of the structure of racial dis-
crimination and for increasing local autonomy and
accept that such proposals do in fact promise a future
that is worth defending in the present. If these propos- .
als should be rejected, or accepted by only a small''
minority, the Afrikaner community would face yet
again the need for a painful adjustment of its concepts
to the reality of black African attitudes. The impact on
strategy would be fairly direct: plans to incorporate
increased numbers of nonwhites into the overall de-
fense effort would encounter resistance from within
the white community, as would the vision of a "con-
stellation" of states.
26. In addition, if radical regimes should come to
power in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia or Namibia, white
South Africans would see even the modest beginnings
of a "constellation" policy as having failed, and would
be driven to rethink the character of their relations
with black Africa and the nature of "forward de-
fense." Conversely, an outcome in Zimbabwe-Rhode-
sia that satisfies South Africa's minimum desires-that
is, a black government that is basically non-Commu-
nist, that does not openly support anti-South African
guerrillas, and that accepts the desirability of retaining
white skills and capital in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia-
would give encouragement to the "constellation" strat-
egists. At present, however, South African leaders
appear more anxious than confident on this score.
27. There are also vulnerabilities closer to home. As
a fighting force, South Africa's military and security
services are the most capable in Sub-Saharan Africa.
They will remain far superior to the armed forces of
neighboring nations for the foreseeable future, and
they are likely to be able to contain any internal or
guerrilla threat directed against the republic or Nami-
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bia for at least the three to four years of this study.
Nonetheless, a simultaneous urban guerrilla campaign
and conventional attack all along South Africa's bor-
ders-an unlikely worst case development in the next
few years-would severely strain Pretoria's manpower
and material resources, particularly if the Soviet
Union were providing logistic support to South Africa's
adversaries. The danger of depleting inventories of the
more sophisticated weapons, which in many cases
could not be replaced except over a prolonged period
of time and/or with outside help, would be especially
acute if the South Africans were engaged against
Cuban forces, for example.
28. Shortages of skilled manpower will continue to
hamper South Africa's armed forces in a variety of
ways. The Permanent Force is most unlikely to reach
the 1981 goal of doubling its 1977 manpower. The
relatively small size of the white community, from
which educationally and technically qualified person-
nel would mainly be drawn, cannot fully support a
strategy that involves both maintaining a large active-
duty force and the dispatch of large training or
advisory missions to neighboring countries. Moreover,
as long as some 15,000 to 20,000 troops are active in
Namibia, the forces would be hard pressed to mount a
multibrigade operation into another country.
29. South Africa will continue to fall short of full
self-sufficiency in materiel production. Most of the
equipment needed for counterguerrilla or internal
security operations will be available from domestic
sources, but a variety of items critical for conventional
defense will have to come from abroad. The South
Africans would not wish to share much scarce materiel
with regional allies even though they probably will
continue to succeed in evading the full effects of the
1977 arms embargo against them. Therefore, the
strategy of forward defense would be conducted on a
relatively small scale.
30. The prospects for the independence strategy are
remarkably good in the economic arena, assuming that
the world economy continues to sustain the factors
needed to maintain demand for South African exports.
The South African economy has supported steadily
increasing allocations to defense since 1974, and it is
capable of sustaining substantial augmentations in the
future. It could not, however, be on the scale of the
past eight years without affecting overall growth. The
current military budget is more than twice the amount
budgeted for social services and welfare, without
including military aid to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia or re-
search and development in the arms industry.
31. Pressures for economic sanctions against South
Africa have waxed and waned since the early 1960s.
Recently, sanctions have been considered by the inter-
national community with regard to four issues: Nami-
bia, Rhodesia, South Africa's apartheid policy, and
nuclear matters. Suggestions for sanctions range from
total economic isolation to selected, limited actions
such as an airline embargo. It currently appears
unlikely that anything more than a very limited set of
sanctions would be supported by Western industrial-
ized countries to influence South Africa on any of
these issues.
32. As a result of the economic independence strat-
egy implemented so far, the economy could sustain an
import cutoff for more than a year, although in the
long run the white standard of living would erode and
unemployment among nonwhites, especially urban
blacks, would become severe. Ultimately, of course, an
embargo on all foreign inputs would tell, since South
Africa still requires some influx of foreign capital,
machinery and equipment, technology, managers, and
skilled workers. An immediate effect, however, could
well be a growth spurt because of import substitution,
somewhat comparable to Rhodesia's initial reaction to
sanctions after 1965.
33. An export embargo, on the other hand, would
cut both ways, toward South Africa and toward the
industrialized West and Japan. It is unlikely that the
South Africans would carry out a threat to deny
minerals exports, except perhaps those from South
African industries with low employment, such as
chrome, manganese, and the platinum group. It is also
virtually certain, however, that the impact on Western
investments in South Africa and the dislocations in
world minerals industries would be so severe that the
major West European countries and Japan would be
extremely reluctant to impose such punitive economic
measures-in effect a blockade-or to implement
them effectively if they were imposed in form.
34. By contrast with its economic situation, South
Africa's political relationships, strongly affected as
they are and will be by its racial issues, comprise its
most important vulnerability. This is also the area in
which the South African leadership's perception of its
situation seems least sound. Despite Prime Minister
Botha's vigorous promotion of a new look, the white
community most probably will continue to prevent the
kind and pace of movement on racial policy that
would attract serious support from nonwhites and
effectively disarm foreign critics. Repression therefore
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will remain the principal instrument of internal
control.
35. If this prognosis is correct for the next three or
four years, it follows that South Africa is unlikely to
achieve a significant breakthrough in its relations with
other nations during this period. The most that the
South Africans can realistically look for is to maintain
ties that produce economic and military benefits but
not political support.
36. In international affairs, South Africa will be
forced gradually toward greater isolation and clandes-
tinity in carrying on international commerce and
political affairs. The circle of countries with which
South Africa can maintain active overt relationships is
likely to constrict somewhat further, and these rela-
tionships will become more precarious and sensitive to
changes in political leadership, especially in small
African or Asian countries.
37. At the same time, the continuing demands for
South African minerals production and the likely
persistence of racial dissensions that have resonance in
the international community will create requirements
that South Africa's leaders be talked to, conjured with,
and pressured.
Implications for the United States
38. Thus, South Africa will continue to be an area
of major policy concern to the United States, but
direct US influence over South African policy will
likely further diminish as South Africa's strategy un-
folds, even though this strategy is much less than
totally successful.
39. Nevertheless, hostile international reactions to
its domestic policies will continue to affect South
African decisions, since Pretoria is probably more
sensitive to Western criticism and disapproval than
often appears to be the case. But confusion and
controversy over South African issues will likely inten-
sify in Western countries. Some groups will argue that
the Botha program for internal changes merely en-
trenches apartheid. Others will claim with equal pas-
sion that substantial -liberalization has taken place and
more can be expected. Ironically, if South Africa were
to garner support from neighboring states for its
regional strategy, the debate would be exacerbated,
rather than calmed down.
40. If, as seems generally more probable, South
Africa remains strongly at odds with most of its
neighbors, this would raise chances for a higher level
of involvement by the Soviets, the Cubans, and their
associates. While the likelihood of a Cuban combat
commitment in southern Africa against South African
forces is currently low-and that of a Soviet troop,
deployment to the region considerably lower-a con-
frontation between South Africa and Soviet bloc
forces, such as might occur in a civil war in Zimbabwe,
would present the United States with unpalatable
choices:
- To counter Soviet gains by aiding South Africa.
- To compete with Soviet influence by providing
military assistance to African states or move-
ments confronting South Africa.
Developments in the region during the next three to
four years are unlikely to deteriorate to the point
where US choices become this stark, but prospects are
for gradually increasing activity by anti-South African
guerrillas, South African strikes against insurgent sanc-
tuaries in nearby countries-whether in defense of a
"constellation" or of South Africa itself-and occa-
sional skirmishes between South African and other
regional forces. Under these conditions, the Soviets
and their allies would likely step up military assist-
ance, though still well short of direct combat involve-
ment to their clients in the region.
41. Intensified instability in the region within the
next few years could well lead to interference with
mining operations or transportation routes and threat-
en the supply of strategic resources from central as
well as southern Africa to the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan.
42. Confirmation that South Africa had a nuclear
weapons capability would adversely affect US nonpro-
liferation policies. Other countries in the Third World
might feel less inhibited about stepping up or openly
publicizing their own weapons programs. The United
States would come under immediate increased pres-
sure to strengthen international nuclear export controls
and to associate itself with resolutions in international
forums that condemn South Africa.
43. The nuclear problem aside, as other forms of
pressure are seen to be ineffective, momentum is
likely to build in the Third World behind demands for
mandatory UN economic sanctions against South
Africa. Even though such sanctions would be largely
ineffective, pressure on Washington to join in sanc-
tions would be great. African countries would use
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whatever leverage they had. Nigeria, the United
States' second largest single source of foreign petro-
cause severe hardships among South Africa's neigh-
bors. The United States and other Western states
leum, could well threaten to halt oil sales to it. would be called upon to provide them substantially
Moreover, imposition of even limited sanctions could increased foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.
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