BENIN: A GROWING BASE FOR LIBYAN SUBVERSION (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400097-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: November 4, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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SEC T
BENIN: A GROWING BASE FOR LIBYAN SUBVERSION
L t Y
aid-- Nigeria, the most powerful state in the region.
Libya in recent years has eagerly responded to the
security and economic problems facing Benin, supplying
increasing amounts of financial and military aid and
cultivating close ideological ties to the left-leaning
regime of President Kerekou. Tripoli's large presence
and extensive activities in Benin are a growing worry
to the moderate neighbors of this small west African
country, who fear that Benin is rapidly becoming a base
of Libyan subversion in the region. Although Kerekou
has allowed the Libyans a fairly free hand in Benin, he
recognizes the need to stay on good terms with France--
Benin's former colonizer and main source of economic
Kerekou has managed to stay in power for nine years--
longer than any other government in this coup-plagued
country--but his regime's security concerns and deterio-
rating economy have opened the door to Libyan blandish-
ments. Bitter factional rivalries rooted in personal,
tribal, regional, and ideological differences plague the
regime. The predominant faction, an unofficial grouping
of Marxist radicals known as the "league," poses the
greatest challenge. This group appears to be the main
force behind the regime's leftist orientation and its
favorable disposition toward Libya.* Kerekou, moreover,
has been preoccupied about external attempts to overthrow
his regime ever since 1977 when government forces foiled
an airborne attack on Cotonou by Beninese exiles and
white mercenaries. Since then, he has welcomed military
*After embracing Marxist-Leninism in 1974, the Kerekou regime adopted
a socialist development strategy and established close relations
with the Soviets, Cubans, and other Communist states. Since then,
Benin has consistently supported radical Third World positions on
global issues and followed the Soviet line in international forums.
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support from Libya to supplement aid from Benin's lead-
ing arms supplier, the Soviet Union, as well as from-
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Cuba and other Communist countries.*
productive state enterprises.
Libya reportedly has become Benin's fourth-largest
source of foreign economic support after France, the
European Community, and West Germany. No figures are
available on the dollar value of Libya's economic aid.
Benin's economic straits have been brought on by problems
in the agricultural sector, government corruption and
mismanagement, unchecked spending, and reliance on un-
region. **
Ideological Affinities
Benin's radical posture and Libya's anti-imperialist,
anticolonialist views are made for each other. One of
Muammar Qadhafi's major goals is to displace French in-
fluence in West Africa and promote the establishment of
a pan-Islamic state in the region's heavily Islamic Sahel
to Libyan positions on international issues.
Benin's proximity to uranium-rich Niger, which
maintains close ties with France, and Nigeria, a country
with a large Muslim population, offers Libya a strategic
location from which to pursue this goal. Although only
12 percent of Benin's population is Muslim, it borders
Niger and Nigeria, and provides fertile ground for Qad-
hafi's pan-Islamic vision. Benin serves Libyan purposes
by waging a self-proclaimed Marxist struggle against its
French colonial heritage and by lending political support
-`Some 50 Soviet military advisers are present in Benin. Most are
involved in training the Beninese armed forces. Others reportedly
are assisting in the construction of a Soviet-financed military air-
field northwest of Cotonou. If the airfield is built to the maximum
proposed length of 3,000 meters, it will be suitable for use by long-
range transport and naval reconnaissance aircraft. The Cubans pro-
vide a small but important presidential security guard for Kerekou.
'-*The Sahel includes Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, and the northern
regions of Upper Volta, Benin, and Nigeria.
4 November 1981
 Libyan Activities
The increase in Libyan activities in Benin has been
substantial in the past year. There are now an estimated
97 official Libyans there involved in military and eco-
nomic aid projects and suspected covert activities.
Kerekou was given red--carpet treatment in Tripoli last
September and three Libyan delegations have subsequently
visited Cotonou.
Since the late 1970s Tripoli has provided military
training in Libya and Benin, armored cars, small arms,
uniforms and rations, and cash for military expenses.
Supplies often arrive in Benin at night on Libyan com-
mercial airline flights.
Libya has given Benin $10 million to build roads, a
hospital, and housing projects, and has financed cattle-
raising, fishing, and mining projects. In addition it
haa picked up the tab for overdue civil service salaries,
and reportedly will soon open a bank in Cotonou. Tripoli
has also financed the building of several mosques and
has distributed money to Benin's Muslim community.
Benin appears to be a transit point for flights
carrying West Africans of varied nationalities to and
from Tripoli for military and ideological training. The
Africans are recruited from the ranks of the unemployed
and homeless in Benin and neighboring countries, partic-
ularly Nigeria, which has become a regional magnet for
frustrated job seekers. Some 300 to 1,500 people have
been sent to Tripoli from Cotonou thus far. Upon re-
turning to Cotonou they probably are infiltrated back
into their countries of origin.
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porous borders.
Regional Reactions to the Libyan Threat
Benin's neighbors are justifiably concerned about
all of these Libyan activities. Those most affected,
Niger and Nigeria, have taken steps to counter what they
see as a growing threat of Libyan subversion across their
Nigerien President Kountche recognizes that Libyan
designs on his country's uranium, coupled with tribal
rivalries, a worsening economy, and a thinly distributed
olied
exiles, and he has been increasingly preoccupied with
internal security following Libya's move into Chad last
year. The recent defection to Libya of a small group
of Nigerien officials has contributed to his sense of
insecurity.
Kountche believes that Qadhafi seeks to incorporate
Niger, along with Chad and Mali, into a Libyan-dominated
Saharan state. Libya has supplied modern small arms and
Libyan identity cards to nomadic tribesmen in northern
Niger, increasing the security concerns of the meager
government forces. Radio Tripoli has also begun broad-
casts urging Niger's nomadic peoples to rebel.
To tighten security, President Kountche has ordered
police dragnets in Niamey and security checks throughout
the country. He has replaced his defense and interior
ministers and taken over these portfolios himself. In
an effort to stay on the good side of adhafi Kountche
has resumed uranium sales to Libya.
Nigeria, relatively complacent about Libyan activi-
ties in West Africa until Tripoli occupied Chad, is now
alert to the danger. The Shagari government fears that
Libya may attempt to use its foothold in Benin to exploit
regional and religious divisions in Nigeria. Nigeria,
moreover, feels vulnerable to outside meddling and in-
ternal unrest because of its own military shortcomings
an unsuccessful coup in 1976 by Libyan-backed
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 and a sharp decline in oil revenues stemming from the
world oil glut.
Lagos closed Libya's Embassy late last year rather
than accept its conversion to a People's Bureau. Libya
transferred most of its diplomats in Lagos to Cotonou,
raising Nigerian suspicions that they are up to no good.
This past May Nigeria pressured Benin into accepting
some 100 military advisers to provide some alternative
to increased dependence on Soviet and Libyan military
support. An advance contingent of Nigerian advisers are
now in Benin taking French lessons, and a second contin-
gent is scheduled to arrive for language training late
this year.
French Efforts Toward Rapprochement
The Mitterrand government is trying to promote closer
ties with Benin in hopes of stemming further Soviet and
Libyan inroads. France provided $19.2 million in economic
aid last year. Although the aid was desperately needed,
French influence over Beninese policies is limited.
Kerekou seems to favor increasing Benin's reliance on
French and Western assistance and giving private enter-
prise a bigger role in. the economy, but he cannot ignore
the influential far leftists in his government.
Last September, Kerekou paid his first official
visit to Paris since coming to power. He justified the
trip domestically by underscoring Benin's increased
ideological compatibility with the newly elected Mitter-
rand government, but staunch Soviet and Libyan support-
ers, particularly Foreign Minister Ogouma, lobbied
strongly to prevent the trip. The French, hoping to
boost Kerekou's prestige and encourage his pragmatism,
promised increased economic aid and may have offered a
small amount of military equipment.
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In Sum
The Kerekou government probably will continue on
its present course of maintaining itself in power through
'Libyan and Soviet military support, while attempting to
gain additional Western economic aid. Benin, for example,
may soften its radical stance on certain international
issues in an effort to encourage France to increase its
economic help. The instability of the Kerekou regime,
however, makes it unlikely that Benin will jeopardize
its economic and military relationship with Libya, at
least in the short term. As a result, Benin's neighbors
will continue to fear Libyan subversion and may be forced
to intensify their efforts to counter Libyan influence
4 November 1981
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