THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SPIRAL: SOVIET REACTIONS TO US INITIATIVES?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000400490002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence
Council
The Strategic Weapons Spiral:
Soviet Reactions to US Initiatives ?
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Top Secret
ugu- ~~~ 3
227
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~l Intelligence
The Strategic Weapons Spiral:
Soviet Reactions to US Initiatives ?
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Top Secret
NIC M 83-/00/3
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The Strategic Weapons Spiral:
Soviet Reactions to US Initiatives?
Preface The crux oJ'the matter is that the USSR has on no occasion initiated the
/n/ormation available development of new types of weapons, and [hasJ produced them only as a
as oJ'l5 August /983 response to their appearance in the United States.
was used in the preparation
4f this Memorandum.
-How To Avert the
Threat to Europe
Moscow 1983
The Soviets have long characterized their strategic nuclear programs as
reactions to the US initiatives that have fueled the arms race, and as
necessary to prevent the United States from achieving its goal of strategic
superiority over the USSR
The relationship of US and Soviet strategic developments is complex. At
the level of grand strategy, there is clearly an action-reaction pattern.
Western concepts of containment and military planning have been mainly
reactions to Soviet expansionist objectives. The Soviets' strategy and their
military developments have been in large part intended to break out from
what they have perceived as Western encirclement. At the level of military
strategy and plans, strategic defenses of either side are obviously reactions
to the other's perceived offensive capabilities.
In their strategic programs, the two sides have also followed different
paths. US strategic forces, influenced by World War II experience, began
with an emphasis on strategic bombers, and for a number of reasons, not
all of them related to the Soviet threat, developed a roughly balanced triad
of nuclear forces. The Soviets, with their continental land warfare orienta-
tion, have given primary emphasis to land-based ballistic missiles. The
long-range plans for both sides' strategic forces, in numbers and character-
istics, were set down in the late 1950s and early 1960s. After surging ahead
of the Soviets, the United States faltered in the 1970s. The Soviets adhered
to their plans for continuing modernization, unaffected by US unilateral
restraint and only modestly restrained by arms limitation agreements
Recently, in their efforts to slow or halt US and NATO strategic force
modernization programs, the Soviets have stepped up their rhetoric in the
media and in official communications about US initiatives as the cause of
the arms race. They have become more specific in pointing out their
capabilities to match the United States, program for program, and have
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become more threatening in asserting their intentions to do so; they are
also asserting that they can now compete as an equal in weapons
technology. Their propaganda campaign, carrying a simple, easily under-
stood message, has had some effect in furthering their cause.
It is difficult to refute the Soviets' claims about the nature of the arms
competition in a public forum since information on their weapons plans and
programs-which are conceived, decided upon, and developed in total
secrecy-is also considered classified in this country. Because US pro-
grams often reach public awareness early in their development (years
before comparable Soviet programs), major US weapons appear to predate
similar Soviet systems, giving support to Soviet assertions of having to
react to US initiatives. Analysis of intelligence on Soviet strategic pro-
grams conveys a situation quite different from Soviet claims. The lack of
awareness of the falsity of these Soviet claims is a major competitive
advantage for the Soviets in their efforts to restrain US weapons programs.
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i op ~ecrec
Competition in Weapons Technology
Development of Comparable Weapons Systems 2
Soviet Rationale for Developing Some Similar Weapons 4
Soviet Systems With No US Counterparts 4
Quantity vs. Quality: Problems Ahead? 6
Implications 6
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1 Val ~7CCfCl
The Strategic Weapons Spiral:
Soviet Reactions to US Initiatives?
Proposals for new weapons programs in the United
States invariably draw heated propaganda from the
Soviet Union as being the start of another round of
the "arms race," to which they must reluctantly
respond. This message, which is echoed in the West,
uses new weapons programs as a metaphor for the
"arms race." This formulation works to the advantage
of the Soviets since the initiation of their programs is
shrouded in secrecy, and it disregards other indicators
of the Soviets' military effort-budgets, numbers,
weapon procurement rate, and level of research and
development.~~
With the implementation of the present US strategic
force modernization program, Soviet propagandists
have trumpeted new warnings about US stimulation
of a new action-reaction cycle of the arms race. A new
twist has been added to their rhetoric: they are
buttressing their claims of US action-Soviet reaction
by ticking off specific Soviet weapons, such as the
SS-X-24, the Typhoon, and the cruise missile that
were developed supposedly in response to specific US
weapons. They are also threatening that they will
continue to copy our weapons. According to Defense
Minister Ustinov, "The economy, science, and tech-
nology of the Soviet Union have attained such a level
that they can guarantee the creation of any kind of
weapon that our enemies wish to gamble on."
bit further. He has stated that, unlike in the past,
Soviet programs will not lag behind those of the
United States by five to seven years; instead they will
be simultaneous.
The purpose of this Memorandum is to evaluate the
Soviets' claims that they are reacting to US initiatives
based on what we know from intelligence sources
about their strategic offensive weapons in develop-
ment and testing. It addresses Soviet competition with
the United States in weapons technologies and Soviet
programs to acquire weapons like those the United
States has proposed or developed. It also addresses
those initiatives by the Soviets that do not appear in
their propaganda about arms race and action-reaction
cycles-that is, a host of other programs for strategic
offensive weapons that have no US counterparts. The
Memorandum does not address the many factors
other than US weapons developments that figure in
Soviet force planning-economic and political factors,
or military factors such as force restructuring and
command, control, and communications improve-
ments. Nor does it assess the adjustments in defenses
resulting from the appearance of new offensive weap-
ons, and the cycle of countermeasures and counter-
countermeasures in both sides' weapons design.
The United States is generally recognized as being in
the forefront in research of many weapons technol-
ogies. In some important cases, however, (for example,
ICBMs, H-bomb, Sputnik, liquid-propellant SLBMs)
the Soviets have successfully taken technology paths
independent from those of the United States. In many
areas, however, the Soviets pursue efforts similar to
those in the United States. Their pursuits, aided by a
well-organized, centrally directed, overt and covert
technology acquisition program, have not been reluc-
tant reactions to US initiatives, as the Soviets would
have us believe. Rather, the Soviets' access to the
results of successful technological developments by
the United States has eased their technology choices
and shortened their weapon development times.
The Soviet military R&D organizations are aware of
most US weapons programs and technologies at a
very early stage in development, and they are imbued
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with a strong sense of technical competition in devel-
oping comparable systems. This competition is sup-
ported by a political leadership committed to a doc-
trine which has espoused the necessity for Soviet
"military-technical superiority" over the West. In a
speech not long before his death, Brezhnev said,
"Competition in military technology has sharply in-
tensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new char-
acter. Alag in this competition is inadmissible."
The Soviets require that every major civilian or
military project be measured against the best foreign
technology before it is approved to proceed. Once a
project is in development, government standards re-
quire the continued comparison of the characteristics
of hardware, at different design stages, with similar
Western hardware. com-
petition with the Untte States is a primary aspect in
the development of Soviet missile technologies:
? A "priority factor" in the development of Soviet
missiles is competition with US missiles, in terms of
their characteristics.
? Each generation of missiles has to "keep pace" with
foreign technology achievements.
? By the beginning of the 1960s, Soviet missile de-
signers were assigned the "most important national
task" of developing missiles superior to US missiles
Defense Minister Ustinov has claimed publicly
that their new ICBM, the SS-X-24, will not be ~
inferior "in any way" to the MX. Despite such claims,
to match the United States in weapons technologies
With their access to many details of US weapons, and
a relative lack of competition within the Soviet R&D
community, Soviet designers are, in effect, competing
with US weapons designers. US system characteris-
tics are used as a yardstick against which Soviet
technical capabilities are judged and presumably,
decisions madel
Development of Comparable Weapons Systems
the Stealth bombe
Intelligence on development of Soviet systems that are
counterparts to those of the United States conveys a
different impression than the Soviets' claim that they
are simply reacting to US initiatives. Using their
responsive, centrally planned R&D establishment and
with virtually unrestricted access to many details of
our future weapons, the Soviets apparently program
some counterpart weapons systems to be developed
and appear at about the time our systems appear.
Such systems might have been developed without the
stimulus of a US program, as the Soviets exploit the
latest technology to improve their weapons. They also
claim as responses similar Soviet systems that were
already under way when US programs were autho-
rized. The result of this process is a Soviet "counter-
part" to every major strategic weapons system the
United States has in a publicized development or
deployment program, with the probable exception of
with "counterpart" 'Soviet systems.
Table 1 compares US systems now in development
' It is often not possible to infer from comparing the developmental
history of US and Soviet weapons whether a US program was
responsible for the start of any particular Soviet program
We often have to judge
However, this method allows a reason-
able estimate of when a development program was initiated because
of the orderliness and bureaucratic rigidity in the Soviet weapon
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'l'op Jecret
Table 1
Soviet Systems Under Development
With US Counterparts
Initial operational capability.
n Estimated year of development decision by the Politburo.
Claimed or implied as a response by the Soviets.
Soviet Estimated Soviet
"Counterpart" Start Date b
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decision to begin their actual development.
? The Soviet programs for the Typhoon submarine
and its SS-NX-20 SLBM, Blackjack bomber, and
long-range cruise missile probably began develop-
ment after comparable US programs. Although on
this basis the Soviet weapons can be categorized as
"responses," we do not know how long the Soviet
systems were under consideration prior to program
initiation or the actual reason for their initiation.
They are weapons systems that the Soviet military
could justify as needing on the basis of their require-
ments,.regardless of the status of US programs for
similar systems, and they have followed a normal
development process. Justification for the systems
was made much easier because the United States
was developing like systems.
? The SS-X-24 and the SS-NX-20 follow-on missiles
are clearly not responses to US program initiatives.
The Soviet systems were decided upon, began their
development, and will be deployed prior to the US
MX and D-5 missiles to which the Soviets claim
they are responses. The concept of both US missiles
? The system that responds to the Pershing II is not
yet clear. In March of this year, Soviet Central
Committee member Zagladin stated that if the P-II
is deployed, the Soviets would have to deploy an
equivalent missile. A modified version of the
MIRVed SS-20 IRBM
was tested
once in February prior to the Zagladin statement,
but not since. This system
the only "new" intermediate-
range ballistic missile in flight-testing, is apparently
the result of an unusually high-priority preflight
development program. Development probably began
at about the time of the 1979 NATO decision on
INF deployments, but we are not confident about
the relative dates. At one point, the developers were
probably working on the missile on an around-the-
clock basis. The apparent objective was to quickly
reach flight-testing, so that it could be available to
provide, as an option, a possible Soviet claim that
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they have developed a missile in response to P-II.
There are disagreements within the Intelligence
Communitv, however, about this interpretation of
development program.
In the USSR, the very existence of programs to
develop weapons systems, let alone their technical and
operational details, are state secrets. Secrecy allows
them the advantage of being able to control when and
how to play the US action-Soviet reaction story that
best fits their political needs. For example, the Soviets
have had programs under way since the early 1970s to
develop long-range land-attack cruise missiles. The
fact of their existence was not made public until late
1982, when they were well into flight-testing. By
delaying the announcement until then, the Soviets
were able to sharpen their "reaction" claim and also
give the impression of being a technological "sleeping
bear" that, when aroused, can quickly develop any
system the United States has. They will similarly
control information concerning deployment of the
cruise missiles until and unless their deployment plans
can be played for maximum political advantage in the
INF arena. Also, if it serves the Soviets' political
ends, systems that are not necessarily equal in ca a-
ili to US systems will be played as if they are.
Curiously, the Soviets do not normally publicize the
existence of their counterpart systems-and hence
potential bargaining chips-until both nations' sys-
tems are in the full-scale development phase. This
could reflect the normal secrecy the Soviets attach to
their programs. It could also reflect a reluctance by
the Soviet military to offer to give up a new system,
even if it could lead to halting an important US
program.
has noted that, once started, Soviet programs are hard
to stop because people develop vested interests in
theml
Soviet Rationale for Developing Some Similar
Weapons
The Soviets' primary reason for developing strategic
weapons systems is to meet the military requirements
of their strategy for nuclear conflict, which of course
includes consideration of existing and likely future
military capabilities of all their potential adversaries.
In developing some systems that are similar to those
of the United States, the Soviets probably have other
motivations, including:
? To assure program approval. Programs for weapons
like the United States is developing are probably
easier to get authorized than those for weapons of
unique Soviet design.
? To portray themselves as being the technological
equal of the United States. Their leaders have
historically had a technological inferiority complex.
? To hedge against a US technological breakthrough.
The Soviets are paranoid about US potential for
technological breakthrough and probably routinely
work on anything the United States is interested in.
? To take advantage of US technical progress. Devel-
opmental problems are eased by knowledge of US
technology and the technical requirements the
United States is working to fulfill. They can save
time, money, and uncertainty by having the United
States make the appropriate design and technology
choices, especially if they can then obtain informa-
tion or hardware through technology transfer. Also,
it is easier for the Soviets to measure qualitative
progress against a similar system.
? The inherent potential of such systems for use as
arms control bargaining chips.
? To support Soviet propaganda. The United States
can be accused-using selective examples-as being
the initiator of the arms race.
Soviet Systems With No US Counterparts
The entire Soviet formulation of action-reaction con-
veniently disregards a salient aspect of their weapons
procurement policy-they simply develop far more
weapons than we do. This was particularly evident in
the 1970s and continues today. In addition to the
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Table 2
Soviet Systems Under Development
With No US Counterparts
1987
1987-90
systems listed in table 1, the Soviets have at least 10
other new or modernized missiles in development for
initial testing in the 1980s, which they do not talk
about. These systems, listed in table 2, cannot be
claimed as copies of US systems or as reactions to US
initiatives because there are no US counterparts. The
array of systems provides a compelling case against
the Soviet claim of being caught up in the strategic
weapons spiral by US challenges.
The SS-X-25 missile currently in
testing will pro a ly be initially deployed in 1985 in
silos, in 1986 in a mobile mode
series of Soviet land-mobile ICBM programs, dating
back to the early 1960s. In contrast, the smaller US
Midgetman, a recent proposal, is being developed for
possible deployment in the early 1990s. The Soviets
are already making claims about the need to respond
to it
The Soviets have been trying to stop the deployment
of the US MX, D-5, and cruise missiles, and now
Pershing II, in part by threatening to deploy counter-
part systems. The Soviets have proposed that in
exchange for halting US weapons deployments they
would not deploy similar systems which have already
been revealed to the public. This approach is appeal-
ing to those who believe it would halt the strategic
weapons spiral, and reinforces their notion that the
United States must be at fault. It is evident, however,
that even if the Soviets did not deploy systems about
which the public has knowledge, in trade for stopping
their US counterparts, they would still have a large
number of other missile improvements under way. It
is also evident that they will only go public with
information about their "counterpart" systems
claimed to be developed in "reaction" to US pro-
grams, and not about the rest of their strategic
weapons programs.
Their SLBM development effort provides a case study
of how the Soviets attempt to use the secrecy of their
programs to their advantage in the arms control
arena. They have four programs under way: asolid-
propellant, MIRVed SS-NX-20 follow-on system for
the Typhoon SSBN, to be deployed in 1988; a second
SS-NX-20 follow-on
and two liquid-propellant SLBMs to be de-
p oyed in 1985 and 1989 on Delta-class SSBNs. The
Soviets would be willing to forgo the SS-NX-20
follow-ons for nondevelopment of the US D-5, while
retaining their programs for new liquid-propellant
SLBMs. Until recently, such considerations were
implicit in their START proposals on future SLBM
modernization. The first of the liquid-propellant sys-
tems will have range and throw-weight characteristics
similar to, or greater than, the US C-4; the second
may be similar in size to the D-5. These two systems
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would offer the Soviets significant advantages over 25X1
the United States if the D-5 is not deployed; at least 25X1
17 Soviet SSBNs could be equipped to carry them. ~~~ ~
They cannot tout these systems as a "response" to US
programs, since a public dialog about the extent of
their efforts would hurt their effort to stop or limit
D-5 deployments. In June, the Soviets backed off their
position in START, which would have disallowed the
D-5 and the improved SS-NX-20. This change, show-
ing greater "flexibility" regarding deployment of the
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D-5, may also have been intended to deflect addition-
al criticism of the Soviet approach to arms control.
Later that same month, they conducted
flight test of the first of their new liquid-propellant
SLBMs~The sudden Soviet "flexibility" on
the SLBM modernization issue would therefore seem
Quantity vs. Quality: Problems Ahead?
Urt1ortunately, comrades, as you all know it is the
introduction oJthe achievements oJscience and
technology into practice that is a snagjor us.
-Yuri Andropov, June 1983
While more appropriate for Soviet civilian industry,
Andropov's statement at the June 1983 party plenum
also has relevance for defense programs. The Soviet
military R&D organizations have probably become
more capable in developing high-technology weapons
systems than industry has become in producing them.
If the Soviets plan to produce Western-style high-
technology weapons systems in Soviet-style quantities,
they could have serious problems.
capability to produce highly sophisticated weapons
systems.
The Soviets are apparently focus-
ing their foreign technology acquisition efforts on
production technologies. Also, many of the more
recent Soviet programs, including the Typhoon sub-
marine, the SS-N-18 SLBM, the SA-10 surface-to-
air missile system, and the Backfire C bomber, have
encountered production-related problems.
The traditional requirement to have quantities of
forces equivalent to the combination of all potential
adversaries-which they have been able to fulfill in
the past-has led the Soviets to make large-scale
producibility a key restraining factor on the level of
technology incorporated in their systems. Now, how-
ever, they seem committed to deploy systems at the
same time and with the same quality as Western
systems. This commitment to both quantity and quali-
ty may be stressing Soviet defense industry as today's
high-technology systems reach the production stage.
Therefore, more capable future Soviet weapons will
probably be produced in smaller quantities than has
been the case, and quality control problems may lead
to delays and to maintenance woes.
The Soviets have far more weapons programs under
way than we do and are committed to military-
technical superiority over the West in their weapons
planning and procurement policy.~~
? They apparently feel that every US strategic weap-
ons system must have a Soviet counterpart. Even so,
most will be justified primarily on grounds of
military requirements. Some weapons systems, inde-
pendently being developed in support of normal
Soviet military requirements, will be claimed as
reactions. Still others may in fact be reactions to US
programs. Historical precedent and programs now
under way strongly suggest that actual mirror-
image programs will be part of the motivations for
Soviet weapons developments.~~
? Any proposal by the Soviets to give up an analogous
program to halt a US deployment will probably
mean they have under wraps another system that
can perform a similar mission. ~~
? The apparent requirement for responses to US
programs may mean that the Soviets could be
susceptible to deceptive efforts that indicate that we
are succeeding in developing advanced technological
concepts or weapons systems, and could be vulnera-
ble to US cost-imposing strategies
? Deployment of high-technology weapons to match
those of the United States will probably contribute
to smaller production runs than has been the tradi-
tional Soviet preference, and may also lead to more
widespread production and maintenance problems.
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