LETTER (SANITIZED)FROM BARRY GOLDWATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000701300047-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: March 11, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

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BARRY COLDWATER. AR12.. CHAIRMAN
I ANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.. VICE CHAIRMAN
JAKE DARN, UTAH WALTER 0. HUDDLESTON. KY.
JOHN H. CHAFES. R.I. JOSEPH R. SIDEN. JR., DEL.
RICHARD 0. LUGAR, NO, DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO. HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
DAVID DURENBERGER. MINN. PATRICK J. LEAKY, VT.
WILLIAM V. ROTH. JR.. DEL LLOYD EENTSEN. TEX.
WILLIAM S. COHEN. MAINE
HOWARD H. BAKER. JR.. TENN.. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO
ROBERT R. SIMMONS. STAFF DIRECTOR
GARY J. SCHMITT. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
March 11, 1983
ESIOClldvo R6Q16S%]j j,
Executive rector
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence is charged with the
responsibility "to oversee and make continuing studies of
the intelligence activities and programs of the United
States Government, and to...report to the Senate concerning
such intelligence activities and programs."
Most of the work of the Committee is, of necessity, conducted
in secret. Nonetheless, the Committee believes that
intelligence activities should be as accountable as possible.
Therefore, the Committee has routinely published an
unclassified report of its oversight activities every two
years since its establishment in the spring of 1976.
Enclosed for your information is the most recent copy of
this report, covering the oversight activities of the Select
Committee on Intelligence during the 97th Congress (January 1,
1981 to December 31, 1982). I recommend it to you and
would welcome any comments which you might want to offer
regarding it.
Cnff eb ,Sif a tez ,$enaf e
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
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A
con,gression.al 'Record
United States t`J
of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1983 No. 22
Senates
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF telligence community accountable to
THE SENATE SELECT COMMIT- the general public. No other govern-
TEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND ment produces the kind of public
RULES OF PROCEDURE report that summarizes the activities
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I 'of its intelligence oversight. In effect,
send to the desk a report on the activi- we have made our intelligence services
ties of the Senate Select Committee the most public secret services in the
on Intelligence, and I ' ask unanimous world. This action, along with the well
consent to have 1,000 copies of this established budget authorization pro-
report printed. cedure, has made the American system
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With. of legislative oversight of the intelli-
out objection, it is so ordered. gene community unique.
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senate In- The budget authorization process is
telligence Committee submits this !standard procedure now. No other
report of its activities covering the nation in the world does this. I? believe
period January 1, ?1981 to December. it is the best method of accountability
~
31, 1982. Under the provisions of there is in our Government. This
method makes it clear that' our consti-
Senate Resolution 400, the committee tutional responsibilities are fulfilled,
has been charged with the responsibil- hil at the same - time maintaining
ity to carry out oversight over the in-
telligence activities of the United
States. Most of the work of the com-
mittee is, of necessity, conducted in se-
crecy. Nonetheless, the committee be-
lieves that intelligence activities
?should be as accountable as possible.
Therefore, we submit this public
report to the Senate in order to meet
,
this responsibility.
I believe this report will reflect my ministration. This congressional i al over-
view that the intelligence community aspect of
is alive and well, and getting better . sight of the intelligence community.
is
every day despite the turmoil it expe- Through this process, we can deter-
rienced in the 1970's. This committee mine if intelligence continues to be
was formed 7 years ago as a result of well managed and responsive to our
that turmoil and, I am happy to say, needs. It gives us a ? chance to-focus on.
the recovery process started following a wide range of issues, all important to''
our national interests, such as interna-
Mrthe. committee's
tional trade and monetary policy, nu-
President, we formation. are the only
nation in the world that makes the in.. clear proliferation, energy. political
w e a
the confidentiality necessary for an ef-
fective intelligence system.
We examine in detail the budgets of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, and the in-
telligence activities of the Department
of Defense, State, and Treasury, and
of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
and the Drug Enforcement Ad-
tion
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2
developments in Third World coon- America. The committee also made an
tries, international terrorism, and nar-
cotics.
Mr. President, even covert action,
the most secret and sensitive activity
of the intelligence community, comes
under the scrutiny of the Intelligence
Committee. The committee has re-
ceived detailed reports and has heard
testimony on covert action programs,
and has actively monitored the prog-
ress of those programs once launched.
Certain covert action programs have
inquiry into the conduct of the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence. It looked
into the serious problems of technol-
ogy transfer and it supported legisla-
tion to protect our agents' indentities
from being disclosed.
Recent years have witnessed a
growth in public awareness of the im-
portance of intelligence that is timely,
relevant, and of the highest quality.
Accurate intelligence is required for
been modified to take into account' critical defense and foreign policy
views expressed by the. committee. issues, such as the development of na-
Under the provisions of Senate Reso- tional nuclear weapons programs or
lution 400, the committee has also pro- Soviet use of chemical .agents in war-
vided briefings on some programs to fare.
members of other committees. Mr. President, my firm belief has
In addition, the committee has been always been that good intelligence is
active - in reviewing covert action
during the annual budget authoriza-
tion process. In that connection, the 1
committee has continued its practice
of annual review of each covert action
line-item by lihe-item. Given the sensi-
tivity of information regarding covert
action, and the Presidential findings
regarding it, this report does not dis-
cuss the. details of these matters al-
though they occupied, a substantial
amount of time and attention of our
committee members.
This report shows that the commit-
tee and staff were involved in many
areas of interest to our national secu-
rity and foreign policy. For example,
we have examined whether the intelli-
gence community was effectively re-
sponding to the situation in Central
informed decisionmaking on. many
needed to protect the kind of freedom
we enjoy in our great country. I be-
this report will also show that we
lieve
are getting good intelligence informa-
tion which is so vital to our survival as
a people and a Nation. I hope that this
report will also show that congression-
al oversight of intelligence activities is
effective,. and that the American
people are better off because of it.
In concluding, I would like to thank
all of the. staff for its fine work over
the course of -the 97th Congress. As
well, I would like to thank Robin
Cleveland, a professional staff member
of the committee, who bore the major
burden of preparing this report and
coordinating its production with the
members of our committee.
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United States
of America
VoL 129
a:Ongressional 'Record
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98 rh CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1983 No. 22
Senate
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF,
THE SENATE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I
rise to Join the Senator from Arizona,
Senator GOLDWATER, the distinguished
chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, in submitting this report
of the committee's activities during
the 97th Congress.
As vice chairman of the select com-
mittee for those.2 years, I believe the
report accurately reflects- the work
done by the committee.
The report is important because it is
an opportunity for the Senate and the
public to get some sense of the nature
of the committee's oversight of the in-
telligence community. It is also impor-
tant in that its compilation forces they'
committee to see where it has been
these past 2 years and, implicitly,
where it is headed.
We do well to recall the situation in
1976 when the select committee was
established. Investigations had re-
vealed. that our intelligence agencies
abused their authority. In addition,
the intelligence community had expe-
rienced a 40-percent reduction in per-
sonnel in the previous decade. Yet the
world was becoming an increasingly
dangerous place as the Soviet Union
was engaging in an unprecedented mil-
itary buildup and the Third World
presented new challenges to the inter-
ests of the United States. Not surpris-
ingly, questions were raised. about the
ability of the CIA ' and its sister agen-
cies to supply the President and his
advisers the kind of information they
need to steer a prudent course for
American foreign policy.
During may 6 years on the commit-
tee, we have concentrated our efforts
on two major tasks. The first of these
was to establish effective mechanisms
for insuring that the intelligence com-
munity stays within the bounds of the
law and common decency. The second
wqs to provide the resources necessary
for rebuilding our intelligence capa-
bilities. It is to be hoped that the read-
ers of this report will cull from its
somewhat cryptic and numerous pages
a sense that these tasks are in large
part being accomplished.
Mr. President, in 1972, I observed
that the public life of our age seems
dominated by the unexpected and the
unforeseen, while the task of govern-
ing seems increasingly that of impos-
ing some measure of order on this less
than cosmic chaos. I referred to the
task as one of coping-of striving or
contending on equal terms with a
measure of success. While my remarks
then concerned the practice of Gov-
ernment in general, they are entirely
applicable to the experience of the
Select Committee on Intelligence. I
think it can fairly be said that the
commitee has coped well with the
issues it has addressed. But in citing
the committee's accomplishments,
there is no intent to* imply a sense of
complacency. Oversight is not a static
process. We have lain only the first
blocks in the reconstruction of our in-
telligence community, not the final
edifice. We are still a young commit-
tee, and during its, less' than 7 years
tenure, there has been a continual
effort to identify ways to improve our
oversight. This is the spirit in- which
the members of the committee will
continue their work in the 98th Con-
gress.
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98TH CONGRESS
1st Session i
J REPORT
No. 98-10
REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
JANUARY 1, 1981 TO DECEMBER 31, 1982
FEBRUARY 28 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 23), 1983.-Ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
11-010 0 WASHINGTON: 1983
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York, Vice Chairman
JAKE GARN, Utah WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming HENRY Al. JACKSON, Washington
DAVID DURENBERGER, Minnesota PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT R. SIMMONS, Staff Director
GARY J. SCHMITT, Minority Staff Director
DORTHEA ROBERSON, Chief Clerk
[During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select Committee on
Intelligence was as follows :]
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York, Vice Chairman
JAKE GARN, Utah WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
DAVID DURENBERGER, Minnesota PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, New Mexico
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT R. SIMMONS, Staff Director
ABRAM N. SHULSKY, Minority Staff Director
DORTHEA ROBERSON, Chief Clerk
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PREFACE
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
a report of its activities from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has
been charged with the responsibility to carry out oversight over the
intelligence activities of the United States. Most of the work of the,
Committee is, of necessity, conducted in secrecy. Nonetheless, the
Committee believes that intelligence activities should be as accountable
as possible. Therefore, we submit this public report to the Senate in
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman.
DANIEL PATRICK. MOYNIHAN,
Vice Chairman.
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CONTENTS
Page
1. Introduction ----------------------------------------------------
1
Covert Action------------------------------------------------
2
II. Legislation and Executive Orders----------------------------------
2
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982--------------------
2
CIA Spouses Retirement Equity Act of 1982 Bill----------------
7
DIA and NSA Personnel Management------------------------
9
Foreign Missions Act -----------------------------------------
10
Protection of the DCI and DDCI ------------------------------
11
Protection of Intelligence Personnel---------------------------
11
Freedom of Information Act Legislation--.--------------------
11
Special Authority for Undercover FBI Operations--------------
13
Executive Order oil Intelligence Activities---------------------
14
Executive Order on National Security Information------------
16
III. Foreign Intelligence : Collection, Production and Analysis-----------
17
Arms Control Monitoring----------------..-------------------
18
Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation-----------------------------
18
MX ICBM Basing-------------------------------------------
18
Middle East --------------------------------------------------
19
Central America------------------------------.---------------
19
Falklands ---------------------------------------------------
20
Soviet Succession--------------------------.------------------
20
Chemical Warfare --------------------------------------------
20
Narcotics Traffic_____________________________________________
21
IV. Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism--------------------------
22
Technology Transfer ------------------------------------------
22
Counterintelligence Organization-------------------------------
23
Counterintelligence Procedures ---------------------------------
24
Counterintelligence Threat Assessments-----------------------
24
Counterterrorism Threat Assessments-------------------------
25
Counterterrorism Capabilities---------------------------------
26
V. General Oversight------------------------------------------------
27
Confirmation :
William Casey-------------------------------------------
27
Admiral Bobby Inman-----------------------------------
28
John McMahon------------------------------------------
28
Inquiry on Mr. Casey----------------------------------------
29
Reports to Committee : Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Financial
Privacy Act, Classified Information Procedures Act----------
30
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act --------------------------
30
Journalist/Academic/Clergy Cover Arrangements--------------
31
Wilson-Terpil Case--------------------------------------------
31
Defectors ---------------------------------------------------
32
Nazis ------------------------------------------------------
33
Reports requested by other Committees :
GAO Security Report------------------------------------
34
Burt Damage Assessment--------------------------------
34
V. Budget ----------------------------------------------------------
35
VI. Appendix -------------------------------------------------------
39
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98TH CONGRESS t SENATE REPORT
1st Session 1 No. 98-10
REPORT TO SENATE ON SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. GOLDWATER, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a growth in public awareness of the
importance of intelligence that is timely, relevant and of the highest
quality. Accurate intelligence is required for informed decision
making on many critical defense and foreign policy issues, such as
the development of national nuclear weapons programs or Soviet use
of chemical agents in warfare.
With the passage of the Intelligence Oversight Act,' the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, its counterpart in the House of
Representatives, and the Intelligence Community formalized a mutual
commitment to insure that this nation has the best possible intelligence
collection, analysis and production capabilities consistent with the
protection of the rights of Americans provided by the Constitution
and statutes. In brief, this Act requires that the Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of all intelligence agencies keep the two
Congressional Intelligence Committees "fully and currently in-
formed" on all aspects of the Intelligence Community's activities and
that they respond to the Committees' requests for information. In
turn, the Committees are responsible for protecting the information
provided and for assuring that the Community is given the legislative
and budgetary direction necessary to perform its mission. Within this
' The Intelligence Oversight Act passed in the United States Senate in 1980. It sub-
sequently was incorporated into the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1981, as an
amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. (50 U.S.C. 413) The Act was patterned
after Senate Resolution 400 which had been in effect since 1976.
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framework, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Intelligence Community have established a sound and productive.
working relationship.
In January, 1981, the Republican Party assumed control of the
Senate and 'Senator Barry Goldwater succeeded Senator Birch Bayh
as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan became Vice Chairman of the Committee.
Because both Senators had served on the Committee for a number of
years, the transition of leadership was orderly and successful. In a
letter to the members of the Committee, Senator Goldwater said :
... the Committee has to be non-political . . . I have al-
ways believed our major job is to oversee the intelligence
community and to do everything in our power to improve
that community... .
The public's confidence in U.S. intelligence activities is preserved
and enhanced in part through this process of Congressional oversight
of the activities of the Intelligence Community. The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence reviews the Community's programs, de-
termines their budgets, and is regularly notified of significant intel-
ligence activities at home and abroad. In discharging its constitutional
and statutory functions and preserving necessary secrecy, the Com-
mittee has sought to steer the difficult course between meaningful re-
view of executive intelligence activities and judicious treatment of
highly sensitive information.
In the area of covert action, as provided by Executive Order 12333,
Senate Resolution 400 and Title V of the National Security Act of
1947, and Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the
Hughes-Ryan amendment as revised in 1980), the Committee has re-
ceived detailed reports and has heard testimony on covert action pro-
grams before implementation, and has actively monitored the pro-
gress of those programs once launched. Certain covert action pro-
grams have been modified to take into account views expressed by the
Committee. Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Com-
mittee has also provided briefings on some programs to members of
other committees with an interest in these matters.
In addition, the Committee has been active in reviewing covert
action during the annual budget authorization process. In that con-
nection, the Nmmittee has continued its practice of annual review of
each covert action line-item in the budget process. 'Given the sensi-
tivity of information regarding covert action and the Presidential
findings submitted to the Committee, this report does not discuss the
substance of these matters which occupied a substantial amount of
time and attention of Committee members.
II. LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION
In recent. years, Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, along with other colleagues in Congress, have become in-
creasingly concerned about the systematic effort by a small group
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of Americans, including some former intelligence agency employees,
to disclose the names of covert intelligence agents.
The names of more than 1,000 alleged CIA officers were disclosed
in two books by former CIA officer Philip Agee. Louis Wolf, the co-
editor of The Covert Action Information Bulletin to which Agee
contributes, claimed it had disclosed the names of more than 2,000 CIA
officers over a six year period.
The danger of such exposure was underscored by incidents of
violence in Greece, Jamaica and Nicaragua. Richard Welch, CIA
Station Chief in Athens, was shot and killed in front of his home
in December 1975, less than a month after he was identified in The
Athens Daily News. His name was publicly circulated earlier by a
magazine then published by Agee.
On July 4, 1980, in Kingston, Jamaica, shots were fired into the
home of an American Embassy official, Richard Kinsman, only 48
hours after editor Wolf named Kinsman and 14 other American
diplomats in Jamaica as alleged agents of the CIA. On July 7, 1980,
three days after Kinsman's home was machine-gunned and bombed,
another Embassy employee listed by Wolf apparently was targeted
but escaped without harm. In addition to the disclosure of names,
Wolf also made public the addresses, telephone numbers, automobile
license plate numbers and even the color of automobiles driven by the
Americans he cited.
On November 6, 1981, several weeks after Philip Agee had visited
Nicaragua and charged at a press conference that at least 10 CIA
agents were "hiding" in the U.S. Embassy's Political Section, four
American officials were listed as CIA agents in a pro-government
newspaper in Managua. Thereafter, all four were harassed by armed
amen. Between November 6 and December 13, 1981, three women em-
ployees at the Embassy were assaulted, bound and gagged by armed
men who overpowered total guards and broke into their homes in
Managua.
Security considerations preclude confirming or denying the accuracy
of specific attempts at identifying U.S. intelligence personnel. There
have been, however, many such disclosures. The destructive effects of
these disclosures on U.S. intelligence operations have been varied and
wick-ranging. The Select Committee on Intelligence is aware of
numerous examples of such effects which cannot be addressed in a
public report.
The Committee concluded in 1980 that the United States cannot
collect, human intelligence it requires unless intelligence officers are
provided effective protection and its sources of intelligence are as-
sured anonymity. The Committee found that existing espionage
statutes needed to be supplemented with specific prohibitions which
would permit more effective prosecution of persons who expose covert
intelligence identities.
Numerous proposals had previously been made fora criminal
statute to punish disclosures of the identities of agents. Senator Bent-
sen introduced intelligence protection proposals in the 94th and 95th
Congresses, but no action was taken. In 1979, Representative Boland,
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, introduced H.R.
5615, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which was cospon-
sored by other Members of that Conmlittee. Identical provisions were
included in S. 2216. introduced on January 24, 1980, as the Intelligence
Reform Act of 1980. by Senator Moynihan and cosponsored by Sena-
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tors Wallop, Jackson and Chafee. Provisions similar to Senator
Bentsen's bill were included in S. 2284, introduced on February 8,
1980, as the National Intelligence Act of 1980, by Senator Huddleston
and cosponsored by Senators Mathias, Bayh, and Goldwater.
In -a meeting on May 8, 1980, the Senate Intelligence Committee
decided to pursue intelligence identities protection using S. 2216 as
the vehicle for further consideration of this issue. The Committee
held hearings on June 24 and 25 which focused specifically on intel-
ligence identities protection provisions of 'S. 2216. Those hearings
also considered other proposals on the subject, including S. 191 intro-
duced by Senator Bentsen on January 23, 1979, and similar provisions
of S. 2284.
On July 25, 1980, the House Committee unanimously approved
H.R. 5615, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, with amend-
ments.
The Select Committee on Intelligence met on July 29, 1980, to con-
sider S. 2216. Senator Chafee offered an amendment in the nature
of a substitute which differed from H.R. 5615, as approved by the
House Committee, on only one issue. The House Committee had ap-
proved the following standard for criminal penalties if the disclosure
of an agent's identity is made by a person who did not learn that
identity as a result of having authorized access to classified
information :
Whoever, in the course of an effort to identify and expose
covert agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, discloses, with the
intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities
of the United States, to any individual not authorized to re-
ceive classified information, any information that identifies
a covert agent knowing that the information disclosed so
identifies such covert agent and that the United States is tak-
ing affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intel-
ligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.
Based on testimony critical of the intent standard contained in the
House version, Senator Chafee proposed the following standard :
Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended
to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to be-
lieve that such activities would impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any in-
formation that identifies an individual as a covert agent to
any individual not authorized to receive classified informa-
tion. knowing that the information disclosed so identifies
such individual and that the United States is taking affirma-
tive measures to conceal such individual's classified intel-
ligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.
This language had the full support of CIA and the Justice Depart-
ment. Two amendments to Senator Chafee's substitute were adopted
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unanimously by voice vote; one amendment offered by Senator Hud-
dleston added a definition of "pattern of activities," and the second
amendment by Senator Bayh provided that it shall not be an offense
under the bill for an individual to disclose information that solely
identifies himself as a covert agent. Senator Chafee's substitute, as
amended, was then adopted by a vote of 13 to 1. S. 2216, as amended
by Senator Chafee's substitute, was approved by the Committee as
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1980, with i recommenda-
tion for favorable action.
On August 22, 1980, S. 2216, as reported by the Select Committee
on Intelligence, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The
Committee held hearings on September 5, 1980. On September 17,
1980, the Committee met to markup S. 2216, as reported by the Select
Committee, and four amendments to this bill were adopted. The Com-
mittee reported the bill out September 24, 1980. Although proponents
of the bill made efforts to bring it to the floor, the prospect of an
extended debate resulted in delay of floor action. The effect of these
delays was that S. 2216 did not reach the floor of the Senate before
the second session of the 96th Congress came to a close on October 3,
1980.
,lfter the convening of the 97th Congress, Senator Chafee and 19
other Senators introduced the Intelligence Identities Protection Act
of 1980 (S. 391) on February 3, 1981. This bill was virtually the same
as the version of S. 2216 which was reported from the Select Com-
mnittee on Intelligence the year before by u vote of 13 to 1, the only
difference being the numbering of paragraphs. S. 391 was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary where it was subsequently sent to the
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism for action. On June 24, 1981,
S. 391 was polled out of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
by a vote of 3 to 1 with 1 abstention.
On September 23, 1981, the House of Representatives voted 226 to
181 to pass an amendment to the House version proposed by Congress-
man Ashbrook adopting the Chafee language for subsection 601(c).
After several other amendments, the House passed H.R. 4 by a final
vote of 254 to 56.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered S. 391 at a busi-
ness meeting on October 6, 1981. S. 391 contained in Section 601(c)
a standard of proof requiring that disclosures of information derived
from unclassified sources identifying covert agents must be made "in
the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose
covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would
impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States." Senator Biden offered an amendment to strike this language
and insert in its place the language that was found in Section 601 (c)
of the House bill as reported from the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. This amendment passed by a vote of 9 to 8 with
Senator Heflin voting "present".
Thereafter, Senator Baucus offered an amendment to specifically
exclude from Section 603(a) the Peace Corps as a department or an
agency to be designated by the President for the purpose of providing
assistance and procedures for establishing cover for intelligence offi-
cers and employees. Senator Baucus' amendment carried by a vote of
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11 to 7. As amended, S. 391 was ordered reported from the Committee
on the Judiciary with 17 Members voting affirmatively.
On December 16, 1981, S. 391 was taken up on the floor of the Senate,
but extended debate by Senator Bradley resulted in further postpone-
ment of action on the bill.
Following the convening of the second session of the 97th Congress,
S. 391 was once again taken up on the floor of the Senate. On Feb-
ruary 25, 1982, Senators Chafee, Biden and Goldwater engaged in
initial debate over the provisions of Subsection 601 (c) which had been
the focus of much of the debate on the bill. On March 1, this debate
continued with Senators Jackson, Wallop and Leahy of the Intelli-
gence Committee adding their views.
On March 3, 1982, Senators Chafee and Durenberger of the Intelli-
gence Committee engaged in an extended colloquy which clarified
several important issues related to the legislative intent of an amend-
ment offered by Senators Chafee and Jackson restoring the language
of Subsection 601 (c) to the form originally reported out of the Senate
Intelligence Committee. Senator Durenberger concluded his remarks
by stating that "Senator Chafee's careful drafting and his participa-
tion in this colloquy will go far to insure against the sort of abuses that
some people fear will occur."
Debate on Subsection 601(c) continued on March 16, with Senator
Huddleston adding his views. The following day, the Senate voted 55
to 39 to accept the Chafee/Jackson amendment. The effect of the
amendment was to make the Senate version of the proposed new law
conform to the House version as it was passed the previous fall. The
Chafee/Jackson amendment required proof that the disclosure of
information identifying covert agents was made in the course of a
"pattern of activities" intended to identify and expose covert agents
and "with reason to believe" that such exposure would harm U.S.
security interests. The "intent" to impair or impede U.S. intelligence
activities would no longer be an element of proof.
On March 18, 1982, the Senate rejected an amendment offered by
Senator Bradley. The bill was then passed by a vote of 90 to 6 with 3
Senators not voting.
For a period of almost ten weeks following the Senate action on
S. 391, conferees represented by the staffs of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence engaged in lengthy discussions on how to resolve the dif-
ferences between H.R. 4 and S. 391 as passed. A Conference Report
was agreed to on May 20, 1982 with an accompanying Statement of
Managers which clarified the legislative intent of the Congress. On
June 3, 1982, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982
(H.R. 4) Conference Report. passed in the House by a vote of 315
to 32 with 85 not voting. On June 10, 1982, it passed in the Senate by a
vote of 81 to 4 with 14 not voting.
On June 17, 1982, in a ceremony at CIA Headquarters in Langley,
Virginia, President Reagan signed the Intelligence Identities Pro-
tection Act into law. After praising the late. Representative Ashbrook,
Senator 6hafee, and other Members of Congress for their work in
promoting the legislation, the President stated, "The revelation of
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the names of secret agents adds nothing to legitimate public debate
over intelligence policy." He went on to say that the law was carefully
written "so that it focuses only on those who would transgress the
bounds of decency=not those who would exercise the legitimate right
of dissent."
A guest at the ceremony was Christina Welch, the widow of Richard
Welch, the CIA Station Chief whose 1975 slaying in Athens, Greece,
sparked a Congressional outcry for legislation to prevent the exposure
of agents' identities.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 represents the
culmination of a two and a half year effort by Congress to legislate
against the pernicious activity of "naming names." While much of
the legislative activity in the second session of the 97th Congress took
place outside of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the work
of Committee Members and staff played a key role in moving the bill
through Congress. Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, characterized this contribution on
the. floor of the Senate on June 10, 1982, when he stated :
Mr. President, I commend my colleague on the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator John H. Chafee
of Rhode Island, for his courage and his persistence in pursu-
ing this legislation. He worked to mold it into its current
shape when the Committee reported the bill out in the sum-
mer of 1980, and lie has worked long and hard in getting this
legislation through the Congress ever since. He has done a
great job for the Committee, for the Congress, and for the
Nation. I, for one, consider it the high point of my Chair-
manship of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that
I amn Chairman at the time this bill has passed the Congress
and will be signed into law. This is a great event, and I am
proud to be a part of it.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SPOUSES' RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT
OF 1982
During the winter of 1981-82, a number of CIA spouses and former
spouses and other individuals associated with the Agency, including
Mr. William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, ap-
proached Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Senator Inouye, former chairman of the Committee,
to request that legislation be enacted to make CIA retirement benefits,
which were.paid exclusively to the employee except when specified
otherwise by court divorce order, automatically available in part to
former spouses of these employees. In response to these contacts, Com-
mittee staff met with several of these individuals and also with CIA
officials, notably Mr. Stanley Sporkin, Agency General Counsel, to
discuss the concerns of CIA spouses and former spouses, especially
in connection with divorce. As a result of this meeting and other
actions, the CIA established a task force on spousal concerns, and
this task force subsequently prepared a report on divorce-related prob-
lems and other issues. The task force is expected to continue to meet
to address spousal and family concerns.
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Difficulties appeared to be present in the equitable distribution of
retirement benefits to former spouses and the handling of divorce-
related requests by spouses or former spouses for Agency assistance
in securing through judicial action a share of the retirement benefits
of Agency employees. These difficulties were not completely resolved
by Executive Order 12197 of 1980, which inter alia provided that re-
tirement benefits under the CIA Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS), like Civil Service retirement benefits, would be subject
to judicial apportionment in the context of the division of marital
assets at the time of divorce. Specific problems in administer-
ing the Executive Order and equivalent Civil Service provisions
made it difficult for former spouses of CIA employes to obtain relief
both during and after divorce proceedings. These difficulties were
compounded by the overseas location of these spouses during much of
their professional life and also by the need of the Agency to retain
secrecy concerning the details of the identities and assignments of
its personnel who have operated in a clandestine capacity.
In response to these concerns, Committee staff drafted S. 2422,
which was introduced by Senator Inouye on April 22, 1982, on be-
half of himself. Chairman Goldwater, Senator Moynihan, Vice Chair-
man of the 'Select Committee, Senator Durenberger, and Senator
Huddleston. S. 2422 as introduced would have adapted the provisions
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 relevant to retirement benefits
for former spouses for insertion in the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
The Committee's hearing on S. 2422, held on May 5, 1982, was closed
due to the sensitive nature of some of the personal identities and case
histories discussed. The testimony of several CIA spouses and
former spouses was heard, as well as the testimony of high-ranking
exofficials of the CIA including Mr. Colby. The Agency was repre-
sented by General Counsel Sporkin as well as supporting staff from
the Agency's personnel division. Testimony of several former CIA
intelligence officers was also heard. The Committee also received over
seventy-five written comments for the record by Agency employees
and their current or former spouses.
In response to the comments received from ex-officials of the CIA,
spouses, former spouses and CIA representatives, and also in light
of the passage of similar provisions by the House of Representatives
in Title VI of H.R. 6068, Committee staff developed several amend-
ments to S. 2422 as introduced. On June 17, 1982, the full Commit-
tee meet under the chairmanship of Senator Inouye to markup S.
2422. Senator Bentsen asked to have his name added as a co-sponsor
of the bill. The technical amendments to the bill were adopted by
the Committee in the markup and the Chairman, without objection,
instructed Senator Inouye to submit the measure and an accompany-
ing report (Senate Report 97-484), to the floor for positive consid-
eration.
Subsequently, on June 30, 1982, the provisions of S. 2422 were
added as Title VT to S. 2487, the Senate version of the Intelligence
Authorization bill for fiscal 1983. Its provisions were passed that
day. On August 19, 1982, the House and 'Senate conferees on the In-
telligence Authorization Act filed their report. H. Rept. No. 97-
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779, which essentially adopted the Senate version of Title VI with
a few minor revisions. The Authorization Act was passed by the Sen-
ate on September 10, and was signed by the President on September
27, 1982.
The purpose of this Act is to secure an equitable share of retire-
ment benefits for qualified spouses of Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) employees who have served a substantial period overseas. These
benefits include retirement annuities, survivor payments, and lump-
sum disbursements from the retirement fund. This Act will help assure
that the spouses of CIA officers, many of whom have made deep per-
sonal and professional sacrifices by following their intelligence of-
ficer-partners abroad in difficult service, will not be left without means
of support in their retirement if their marriages later end in divorce.
Under the Act, an individual who has been married for more than
ten years to a CIA officer, during the officer's period of creditable
service, is presumptively entitled to a pro rata share of the officer's
retirement benefits, up to fifty percent, based on the length of the
marriage during the period of service prior to divorce. The spouse is
also entitled to a similar share of the officer's survivorship benefits.
These provisions are substantially equivalent to those the Congress
adopted for Foreign Service spouses under Section 814 and related
provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Public Law No.
96-465. Only employees and spouses who have served for more than
five years abroad together during the marriage are covered by these
amendments.
This Act not only goes -a long way toward financially protecting
CIA spouses who have followed their husbands or wives abroad, but
will also help the Agency attract the best possible calibre of employee,
such as those who otherwise would have two career marriages. It
should also help to highlight publicly the difficult personal and pro-
fessional situation of our intelligence officers and their families who
serve the Nation abroad.
While providing these assurances, the Act will not necessarily alter
the outcome of divorces involving CIA officers. The entitlement of the
former spouse to a share of the retirement or survivorship payments
is fully reviewable by courts in the context of dividing marital assets
subject to apportionment by state divorce courts. The fact that the
payments to former spouses would be made automatically from the
retirement system, unless the divorce court orders otherwise, however,
will make these benefits more dependable, particularly during the time
before final judicial determination of the terms of the property
division.
At the request of Senator Wallop, the Committee added a provision
to the FY 1982 Intelligence Authorization Act establishing a Senior
Executive Service (SES) in the Defense Intelligence Agency (P.L.
97-89, Title VII, December 4, 1981). The Service was inaugurated on
December 6,1982.
Senator WTallop's original proposal would have provided authority
for the Secretary of Defense to improve DIA's personnel management
system for civilian employees not covered by the SES. This would
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include an exemption from civil service classification requirements,
greater flexibility in fixing pay, and authority to terminate any civilian
employee if necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
While these provisions were included in the FY 1982 Authorization
bill passed by the Senate, they were deleted in conference. They were
again reported by the Committee in the Defense Intelligence Agency
Personnel Management Act (S. 2488). The bill was passed by the Sen-
ate on May 4, 1982, but no action was taken in the House.
Both the SES provisions and S. 2488 are intended to give DIA
authority over personnel comparable to that now enjoyed by the United
States' other major intelligence agencies. The Committee has sought
to equalize authority over personnel primarily in order to enhance the
DIA's ability to compete with CIA in the field of intelligence analysis.
Having accepted the notion that the country would be best served if
top policymakers received analyses of key intelligence subjects from
more than one source, the Committee sought to equip DIA to be a more
effective, more competitive provider of analyses.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1982 also established
a Senator Cryptologic Executive Service for qualified civilians in the
National Security Agency. In addition, the Act gave NSA statutory
authority to address difficulties in the recruitment, training and reten-
tion of qualified linguists in numbers sufficient to meet both routine and
crisis needs. The Act authorized NSA, among other things, to provide
financial support to educational institutions and government training
facilities for language development programs; establish a reserve of
cryptologic linguists recruited from among former NSA personnel;
and pay the costs of training and incentives for current personnel to
improve their language skills.
During the 96th Congress, Members of the Committee helped shape
and pass an important provision of the Foreign Missions Act (22
U.S.C. 4309). Over the years, foreign governments increased limita-
tions on U.S. missions and personnel, while the United States provided
those same governments with relative freedom. The Committee felt
that the United States needed to reciprocate with a policy of stronger
oversight and regulation of activities of foreign governments and their
representatives in our country.
In this spirit, Senators Goldwater, Moynihan, Jackson, Inouye,
Durenberger, and Huddleston sponsored an amendment designed to
assure the Foreign Missions Act would adequately protect and advance
national security interests. In a joint floor statement, these Senators
noted that "both the provisions of this Bill and its subsequent admin-
istration must affect the broad national security interests of the United
States." To this end, the amendment provided that the authorities
granted to the Secretary of State under the Act "shall be exercised in
accordance with procedures and guidelines approved by the Presi-
dent." As explained in their joint statement. it is intended that these
procedures provide for oversight by the National Security Council,
and include specific requirements for obtaining the recommendation
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of and coordination with appropriate national security and law en-
forcement agencies on significant decisions and policy matters.
This amendment was approved unanimously by the Senate and in-
cluded in Section 212 of the Foreign Missions Act. The Foreign Mis-
sions Act was included in the State Department Authorization Act
for FY 82 and FY 83.
PROTECTION OF THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
On April 8, 1981, S. 907 was introduced in the Senate and referred
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The purpose of the bill was
to amend Sections 351 and 1751 of Title 18 of the United States Code
to provide penalties for crimes including assassination, kidnapping
and assault against Cabinet officers, Supreme Court Justices, and
Presidential staff members. On March 10, 1982, the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary reported the bill to the Senate which passed it on
May 5; 1982.
On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Schmitt
offered an amendment to include the Director and Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence among those federal officials to be protected
under the new Title 18 language. The amendment was accepted by
unanimous consent by the Senate.
The House of Representatives passed S. 907 on September 14, 1982.
The Senate amendment which included the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence was retained in the House version of
S. 907. The Senate agreed to the House version on September 22 and
the Act was signed into law by the President as Public Law 87-285
on October 6, 1982.
On May 5, 1.982, Senator Biden introduced S. 2522, "a bill to protect
the safety of intelligence personnel and certain other persons." This
bill was identical to provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for FY 1982 that passed in the Senate in 1981, but were not agreed
to by the House. The bill established as new offenses the murder, man-
slaughter, assault, threat against, extortion or kidnapping of persons
in the U.S. under U.S. intelligence auspices or persons provided U.S.
permanent residence status in accordance with provisions in the CIA
Act of 1949. Further, the bill added to current penalties for killing or
attempting to kill officers or employees of any department or agency
in thte Intelligence Community.
In December, 1982, the section of S. 2522 increasing penalties for
crimes against employees of the Intelligence Community was in-
corporated into S. 2411, the Justice Assistance Act of 1982.
This bill was vetoed by President Reagan in January, 1983, on other
grounds.
In May, 1981, Chairman Goldwater and Senator Chafee introduced
S. 1273, a bill that, under certain circumstances, would exempt the
intelligence agencies from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
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but would still permit U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens to
request information on themselves. The language of S. 1273 was
virtually the same as in Section 3 of S. 2216, introduced in the 97th
Congress by Senators Moynihan, Wallop, Jackson, Chafee and several
others not on the Committee. It was also similar to provisions for CIA
included in the National Intelligence Act of 1980 (S. 2284) introduced
in the 97th Congress by Senators Huddleston, Mathias, Bayh and
Goldwater.
In connection with this proposed legislation, the Committee held
a public hearing on July 21, 1981. The witnesses included Admiral
Inman from the CIA, General Faurer, NSA, General Larkin, DIA,
K. Prescott Lowe, American Newspaper Publishers Association,
Robert Lewis, Society of Professional Journalists, Allan Adler and
Mark Lynch, American Civil Liberties Union, Jack Maury, Associa-
tion of Former Intelligence Officers, and Samuel Gammon of the
American Historical Association.
On November 24, 1981, the Committee held a closed session to learn
from Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
how the FOIA affects our intelligence relationship with other coun-
tries. FBI Director Webster also provided the Committee with clas-
sified materials indicating the impact of FOIA on FBI counterintel-
ligence and counterterrorism investigations. No further action was
taken by the Committee on S. 1273.
The principal argument for amending the FOIA regarding the
intelligence agencies is the effect of the Act in discouraging individ-
uals, organizations and other countries from providing information
and cooperating in other matters with the United States' intelligence
agencies. Additional, but less important arguments address the high
cost, in money and personnel, of carrying out the Act and the likely
utilization of the Act by hostile foreign intelligence services.
The principal argument for retaining the present provisions of the
Act is that the statutory exemptions for classified information and
material relating to intelligence sources and methods adequately pro-
tect national security interests, and that the interest in public informa-
tion outweighs any effect such requests might have on the intelligence
agencies.
Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, signed
on April 6, 1982, affected FOIA cases by changing some classifica-
tion criteria. This led Senator Durenberger, on April 28, 1982, to
introduce S. 2452, which would amend the Freedom of Information
Act in two ways. Section 3 would amend the (b) (1) exemption for
classified information by requiring both that such information meet
the "identifiable damage to national security" standard and that a
"balancing" test be made by executive branch decision-makers that
the need to protect the information outweighs the public interest in
disclosure. Section 2 would amend the (a) (4) (B) language on de
novo review by limiting a district court's review of the "balancing"
test to ascertaining that the test was in fact made. Senators Moynihan,
Leahy, Biden, Huddleston and Roth cosponsored this legislation,
which was referred to the Judiciary Committee.
No legislative action was taken on either S. 1273 or S. 2452 in the
97th Congress.
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In 1981 the Select Committee reported legislation to provide cer-
tain administrative authority needed for the use of undercover op-
erations by the FBI to collect foreign intelligence and foreign counter-
intelligence. Previously, similar authority for both FBI law enforce-
ment operations and collection of foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence had been provided in annual Justice Department
authorization bills and continuing resolutions. The purpose of the
1981 legislation was to give the FBI permanent authority for the col-
lection of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence and to
modify certain requirements that are inappropriate in this field. In
general, the FBI would have been authorized to lease or purchase
property, enter into contracts, establish proprietaries, use proceeds
therefrom to offset expenses, and deposit funds in banks in a manner
that concealed the FBI's identity or role.
As permanent legislation, this measure would have eliminated the
need for annual re-enactment of authority. The Select Committee
determined that the types of activities engaged in by the FBI in this
area should be based on specific, permanent legal authority to enhance
the effectiveness of its collection of foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence. The proposal also would have eliminated specific
statutory requirements for written certifications by the FBI Director
and the Attorney General that each action was necessary for the con-
duct of an undercover operation. The Select Committee concluded
that such requirements were unnecessarily rigid for activities in the
foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence field and that the
Attorney General should have the discretion to establish appropriate
certification and review procedures in consultation with the FBI
Director.
The Select Committee's recommendations were based on the con-
tinuing review of FBI foreign intelligence and foreign counterintel-
ligence collection activities that the Committee conducts through
the intelligence budget authorization process and other oversight
practice. The legislation was reported on May 6, 1981, as section 509
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982 (Senate
Report No. 97-57). This bill was referred sequentially to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, which voted to delete section 509 on the
grounds that the subject could be better dealt with in the Department
of Justice Authorization Act or other legislation. (Senate Report
No. 97-1.48, July 9, 1981).
In February 1982, the special provisions for FBI undercover opera-
tions that were previously contained in the Justice Department au-
thorization bills lapsed; and the FBI advised the Select Committee
that their absence imposed substantial costs in the use of undercover
operations for foreign counterintelligence purposes. These provisions
were reinstituted in the continuing resolution for Fiscal Year 1983
passed in December 1982, but they will expire at the end of the fiscal
year unless reenacted.
The final report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Law En-
forcement Undercover Activities of the Department of Justice, issued
in December 1982, recommended enactment of permanent legislation
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for FBI undercover operations comparable to the measure reported
by this Committee. The Select Committee to Study Undercover Ac-
tivities was assisted in its work by this Committee. Chairman Gold-
water, at the request of Senators Mathias and Huddleston, approved
the provision of staff and equipment in support of the inquiry into
law enforcement undercover operations. As indicated by this Com-
mittee's action in 1981 and the unanimous report of the Select Com-
mittee to Study Undercover Activities, permanent legislative author-
ity for FBI undercover operations should receive serious consideration.
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Early in 1981, the Reagan Administration made known its intention
to replace Executive Order 12036 on Intelligence Activities with its
own Executive Order. During the confirmation hearings on William
Casey for the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and
on Admiral Bobby R. Inman for the position of Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), the issue of a new Executive Order on
Intelligence Activities was raised. Director Casey made a commitment
at his confirmation hearing, when questioned by Senator Huddleston,
to consult on this matter with the Committee. Admiral Inman reaf-
firmed that commitment later, after a draft order became public and
the Committee met with Inman to discuss the status of the draft and
the arrangements for consultation. A later draft was provided to the
Committee by Director Casey in May but was withdrawn for further
consideration within the Executive Branch shortly thereafter.
The Administration forwarded copies of the final draft of the Execu-
tive Order to the Committee on September 23, 1981. As part of the
consultative process, the Committee agreed to review the proposed
Order and to forward its comments, observations, and suggestions to
the Administration in an expeditious manner.
The Committee understands that the promulgation of an Executive
Order is solely the prerogative of the President. However, within the
oversight responsibilities of the Committee and due to the important
and highly sensitive nature of intelligence activities and the turmoil
within the Intelligence Community during much of the 1970s, it was
believed that the best interests of the Community would be served by
cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches of gov-
ernment. The consultative process on this Executive Order took place
in that spirit.
Upon receipt of the proposed new Executive Order, Senator Gold-
water, Chairman of the Select Committee, requested Senator Schmitt,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation and the Rights of Amer-
icans, to conduct a review. Senator Schmitt and Senator Leahy, Vice
Chairman of the Subcommittee, held three meetings in early and mid-
October with representatives of the Intelligence Community.
The first meeting took place on October 1, 1981, at which time
Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
Stanley Sporkin, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and Admiral E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., Deputy Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, met with Committee Members. The Subcom-
mittee held its second meeting with General Richard G. Stilwell,
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Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Britt Snider,
Director of Counterintelligence and Security Policy, on October 5,
1981. On October 15, 1981, Richard Willard, Counsel to the Attorney
General for Intelligence Policy, and Edward O'Malley, Assistant
Director for the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, met with the Subcommittee. Each of the three sessions pro-
vided representatives of the Intelligence Community an opportunity
to present their views as well as answer questions posed by Committee
Members.
The recorded meetings and written correspondence between the
Committee and Intelligence Community agencies has provided the
Committee and Congress with a history of the intent of the provisions
of the Executive Order. This history will assist the Committee in
fulfillinn its oversight responsibilities.
In addition to the consultative meetings held by the Subcommittee,
individual Members of the Committee met with and discussed the
proposed Order with representatives of the Intelligence Community
and the Administration.
The Subcommittee drafted a proposed Report and submitted it to
the full Committee on October 27, 1981. The full Committee reviewed
the Subcommittee's draft Report and on October 30, 1981, submitted
its Report to Dr. Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The Report contained four observations
about the draft Executive Order and the consultative process and
seven recommendations about the Executive Order. The Report was
submitted by the Committee as a consensus Committee Report.
While a consensus Committee Report was submitted to the Admin-
istration, various members of the Committee had additional areas of
concern and interest which were not addressed in the Committee
Report. The Committee decided that it would prove helpful to the
Administration if each Member of the Committee were given an
opportunity to express his individual concerns as part of the Report.
For this reason, an Additional Views section was added to the Report.
Eleven Committee Members, individually or in groups, submitted
additional views addressing various aspects of the proposed Executive
Order.
On December 4, 1981, the President signed Executive Order 12333
on United States Intelligence Activities. On the same date, the Com-
mittee was briefed by the Administration on the changes which had
been made to the draft Executive Order before its promulgation which
resulted from consultation with the Committee.
The Committee concluded that its involvement prior to the pro-
mulgation of the Order, rather than after its promulgation, was use-
ful to the Committee and the Administration.
Following the promulgation of E.O. 12333, the Community sub-
mitted implementing guidelines for the Committee to review one week
prior to their effective date. In addition, the Committee has asked the
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, in con-
sultation with the Committee, to establish mechanisms or procedures
for continued internal and Committee oversight of implementation
of the new Executive Order.
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L8
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information was
signed by President Carter on June 28, 1978. By 1980, the Carter
Administration had begun a review of E.O. 12065. One reason for
the review was the 1979 General Accounting Office (GAO) recommen-
dation that systematic review be abolished. GAO had concluded that
"systematic review" of classified information provide only marginal
benefit at great expense.
The Reagan Administration continued the review of E.O. 12065
in light of the Carter Administration review and its own views con-
cerning classification. That review involved the various departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch and committees of the Congress.
The Administration forwarded copies of their proposed Executive
Order to the Committee on February 4. 1982, for the Committee's re-
view and comments. The Committee drew upon the experience of con-
sultation with the Administration which took place on the Executive
Order on Intelligence Activities in 1981. As part of the consultative
process, the Committee agreed to review the proposed Order and to
forward its comments, observations, and suggestions to the Adminis-
tration in an expeditious manner.
Upon receipt of the proposed Executive Order on National Security,
Senator Schmitt, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation and
the Rights of Americans, and Senator Leahy, Vice Chairman, held
a meeting on February 24, 1982, with representatives of the Executive
Branch involved in the drafting of the proposed Order.
The briefing was attended by Steven Garfinkel, Director, Informa-
tion Security Oversight Office of the General Services Administration;
Ernest Mayerfield, Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency; and Arthur Van Cook, Director of Information Security,
Department of Defense. The Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) coordinated the drafting of the Executive Order and pre-
sented the Administration's position on the draft Order. Representa-
tives of the CIA and the Department of Defense were requested to
attend to comment on the sections of the draft which were important
to their functions.
In addition to the consultative meeting held by the Subcommittee,
written responses were provided to questions for the record, and rep-
resentatives of ISOO and DOD met with Committee staff. The
recorded meeting and written correspondence between the Commit-
tee and the Administration provides the Committee and Congress
with a history of the intent of the provisions of this Executive Order.
This history* will assist the Committee in fulfilling its oversight re-
sponsibilities.
The Subcommittee proposed a draft Report to the full Committee
which was discussed and amended to reflect a consensus view of the
Committee. The Report contained five observations about the proposed
Executive Order and the consultative process and nine recommenda-
tions for the Executive Order. The Report also contained the additional
views of four Members of the Committee whose concerns and views
were not included in the Consensus Report.
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The Report was forwarded to William P. Clark, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and Steven Garfinkel, Director
of the Information Security Oversight Office of the General Services
Administration on March 9, 1982. The Executive Order was signed
April 6,1982.
III. INTELLIGENCE : COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
The Committee seeks to assure that American policymakers receive
the highest quality of intelligence possible in a timely fashion, and a
full appraisal of where there are differences of opinion on a given
topic among analysts throughout the Intelligence Community.
The Subcommittee on Analysis and Production chaired by Senator
Lugar, has held hearings, has met with representatives of the Intelli-
gence Community, and has begun a dialogue with the CIA's Direc-
torate of Intelligence (DDI) regarding the quality of the U.S. intelli-
tml
gence product. With the cooperation of the DDI, the Subcommittee
has instituted a procedure in which questions raised by current intelli-
gence products are forwarded, on an informal basis, to the community
for clarification or explanation. Such an exchange is useful both to
analysts in offering objective responses to their work and to the Com-
mittee as it seeks insight into the quality of analysis and production.
In addition to oversight of the quality of assessments produced by
the Intelligence Community, the Committee is also a major consumer
of intelligence analysis. The Committee is the recipient of a large
volume of finished intelligence which enables the Members to keep
apprised of developments relevant to the work of the Senate. The
Committee has also been called upon periodically to provide the Sen-
ate with independent evaluations of intelligence data relevant to im-
portant policy decisions. The oversight and information-gathering
functions of the Committee are often intertwined. For example, in
1979 the Committee reported to the Senate on U.S. capabilities to
monitor compliance with the limitations set by the proposed SALT II
Treaty. Since that time, the Committee continued to oversee the
adequacy of the Intelligence Community's capabilities to monitor
Soviet military activities relevant to several arms control agreements,
and has been kept abreast of intelligence on Soviet compliance with
these accords.
In the past two years, the Committee has continued to receive an in-
creasing volume of finished intelligence assessments and briefings. The
Committee has had briefings on a wide range of topics including the
situation in Central America. The Iran-Iraq war, Soviet involvement
in Afghanistan, the Lebanon crisis, development in Poland, East-West
technology transfer, the Falklands crisis, developments in Soviet
military capabilities and a number of other topics. These briefings are
useful not only for the information they convey, but also in giving
Committee Members opportunities for closer contact with analysts.
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The Select Committee receives periodic reports from the Intelli-
gence Community on Soviet military activities relevant to various
arms limitation agreements. Pursuant to its obligations under S. Res.
400 (94th Congress), the Committee has continued to report to other
relevant Committees on those developments. In the past two years, the
Committee staff has prepared classified reports and memoranda on
Soviet military activities relevant to the SALT I Interim Agreement,
the ABM Treaty, the Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Geneva
Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Biological Weapons Con-
vention. .
In 1982, the Committee has received several briefings on the
progress of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the
negotiations on the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces
in Europe (INF). The Committee also held a hearing with an inter-
agency group of intelligence officials on U.S. capabilities to monitor
existing and prospective strategic arms limitations. The Committee is
attempting to develop a detailed understanding of all facets of these
negotiations by developing a record that will be used by the Senate in
considering any agreement that is achieved and upon which the
Committee can draw upon if it is asked to assess U.S. capabilities to
monitor such accords.
Tracking the global spread of nuclear materials and technology,
particularly those aspects with military applications, remains a cen-
tral concern of American foreign policy. For the past several years,
the Committee has reviewed the Intelligence Community's collection
and analytic activities devoted to monitoring the international nuclear
trade and foreign nuclear power and weapons programs in order to
ensure that policymakers are being provided with the best possible
data on these critical questions.
In the past two years, the Committee has continued to meet with
analysts and collection managers throughout the Community to en-
sure that adequate resources are being devoted to these problems.
Through its budget authorization actions, the Committee has been a
strong supporter of improvements in nuclear intelligence collection
programs. The Committee has also been briefed on several occasions
on developments in the nuclear programs of a number of states that
may have an interest in fabricating nuclear weapons.
On December 8. 1982. the Committee had two detailed briefings on
intelligence assessments relevant to projections of the survivability of
the.MX ICBM in the closely-spaced basing (CSB) mode. Officials
from the Intelligence Community and from the Defense Nuclear
Agency provided the Committee with detailed insights into topics such
as: Soviet capabilities to develop countermeasures that would defeat
the CSB concept; likely Soviet military political reactions to CSB
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deployment; the methodology for developing estimates of ICBM
silos hardness; and a number of others.
The Committee has also agreed in principle to analyze intelligence
issues relating to whatever MX ICBM basing mode is selected. It may
also prepare a report, requested by Senator Robert C. Byrd, which
will review intelligence judgments on Soviet reactions to MX deploy-
ment in the CSB mode.
The Middle East continued to occupy a major share of the Com-
mittee's attention throughout the period of this report.. Events in that
region involved important American political, economic and military
interests, requiring a significant effort by all components of the U.S.
intelligence community. The Committee sought to ensure that intel-
ligence resources were being used to maximum advantage and that
senior policymakers were receiving timely, objective intelligence
information and assessments of the highest quality. To exercise over-
sight of intelligence coverage of the Middle East, the Committee
received numerous briefings by the Intelligence Community, con-
ducted several hearings, and commissioned staff studies and reports
on key issues. The Committee held hearings on the question of Iraq's
nuclear activities, the Israeli attack on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research
Center in Baghdad in June 1981, the political and military situation
in Lebanon, especially from the summer of 1981 on, culminating in
the Israel's entry into that country in June 1982.
The Committee also carefully examined the proposed sale of sophis-
ticated Airborne WWrarning and Control System (AWACS) and F-15
aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In this connection, the Committee conducted
a study of the intelligence implications of this controversial transfer
and a classified staff report was prepared in the fall of that year. The
Committee also received briefings on issues concerning several key
countries in the area.
Finally, in the fall of 1981 the Committee received a briefing on
the information obtained by the Intelligence Community that was the
basis for taking extraordinary precautions to protect the President
and other high officials from a possible terrorist attack inspired by
Libya. Members were satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for
taking this possibility seriously. In the course of reviewing this situa-
tion, the Committee received detailed intelligence on Libyan involve-
ment in international terrorism directed not only at U.S. officials but
also against foreign leaders.
In 1981, as U.S. policymakers' attention focused on the develop-
ments in Central America, the Committee sought to address intel-
ligence issues on the region. A staff working group was established
to review the available intelligence on such subjects as the composition
of guerilla forces, the nature of external support to insurgents, and
internal political and economic developments. The working group
also assessed U.S. abilities to monitor such conditions. CIA Director
William Casey and other representatives of the Intelligence Com-
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immity briefed members of the Committee on a regular basis and staff
have provided additional updates to all interested members.
The Committee also reviewed such questions as whether the In-
telligence Community had effectively responded to the situation in
Central America by redirecting and expanding its available resources
and whether the intelligence collected adequately supported the com-
munity's various analytical assessments concerning the region.
The Committee has followed the politico-military situation in the
South Atlantic in order to keep abreast of developments there and
assess related U.S. intelligence capabilities, including the ability of
the Intelligence Community to react to rapid developments in dis-
tant areas. The Committee was briefed on intelligence issues related
to the Falklands crisis and staff received and assessed relevant intel-
ligence products.
The Committee staff prepared a classified report on the performance
of the Intelligence Community in providing senior U.S. decisionmak-
ers with warning of the potential for conflict between Argentina and
the United Kingdom. The goal of this undertaking was to explore what
larger implications this case might have for the indications and warn-
ing capabilities of the Intelligence Community. This report was
shared with CIA's internal production evaluation group which con-
ducted a broader review of the overall activities of the Community
during the crisis. While the findings of the Conunitte's inquiry are
classified, mechanisms for continuing this type of constructive inter
action have been established.
At Senator Moynihan's request, the Committee held hearings on
September 28 and 29, 1982, on leadership succession in the Soviet
Union. A closed session with CIA. Soviet experts was followed by an
open hearing with four senior Soviet scholars from outside the gov-
ernment. These hearings explored the nature of past Soviet leader-
ship changes, the type of power struggle likely to ensue in the post-
Brezluiev era, and the backgrounds and policy inclinations of the
leading contenders for leadership positions. A declassified transcript
of the session with the CIA was published along with the record of
the public hearing and a statement by Senator Moynihan.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The Committee has held hearings on intelligence regarding the use
of chemical and biological weapons by the Soviet Union or by Soviet
supported regimes in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. These sessions
and subsequent staff investigations focused not only on the substance
of the issue but also on past collection, analysis, and dissemination of
finished products.
Of particular concern to the Committee were the issues of whether
the Intelligence Community had identified the use of these weapons
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in a timely manner; had assisted the government in the collection
and analysis of evidence; and had evaluated information indicating
Soviet non-compliance with relevant agreements.
Intelligence on illicit international drug trafficking can make a sig-
nificant contribution to the United States Government's efforts to con-
trol the flow of that traffic before it reaches our national borders.
Although the Drug Enforcement Administration has the lead law
enforcement role against illicit drug trafficking, virtually all agencies
within the intelligence community have parts to play in the overall
U.S. Government effort. The Select Committee over the past several
years has regularly followed the performance of the intelligence coin-
mmnity against the illicit international drug trafficking target and
examined particular issues of special concern. In part, this is accom-
plished by the Committee's review of quarterly, monthly, and weekly
reports prepared by DEA.
At the request of Senator Riden, the Committee held a closed hear-
ing on July 14, 1982, on U.S. foreign intelligence activities directed
against illicit international drug traffic. The Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and
the Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration
testified. Several months of interviews on the part of the Committee
staff with relevant officials throughout the federal government and
close review of the documentary intelligence products and policies
preceded this hearing.
The hearing began with a general overview of the illicit drug traffic
intelligence collection and analysis activities of the intelligence com-
munities. It then addressed in greater depth certain problems and pos-
sibilities for improvement in intelligence collection and analysis. It
examined provisions of Executive Order 12333, relevant statutes, and
agency implementing guidelines that govern the conduct of U.S. for-
eign intelligence activities against illicit drug traffic and the use that
can properly be made of the intelligence in law enforcement opera-
tions. Finally, the hearing examined in some detail issues in the coordi-
nation of and cooperation among the intelligence agencies against the
illicit drug target.
This hearing and the record of the intelligence community's histor-
ical efffforts in this field helped the Committee discern steps that the
intelligence community could take to improve collection and analysis
of intelligence on the foreign aspects of illicit drug traffic. On
August 20, 1982, the Vice Chairman wrote to the President and the
Director of Central Intelligence urging them to dedicate more intelli-
gence resources to this problem. In response to concerns of the
Committee, the Intelligence Community has made some changes in
organization and priorities and has undertaken a review to develop a
long range plan to remedy deficiencies in intelligence capabilities in
this area.
It is the Committee's intention, as stated at its July 14th hearing,
to continue to examine closely U.S. illicit drug intelligence activities.
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As part of this continuing effort, in November 1982 Chairman Gold-
water assigned a Committee staff member to travel with an officer of
the Intelligence Community Staff to review and assess U.S. illicit
drug intelligence collection activities in most of the major heroin
source and transit countries.
The Select Committee has given high priority to an assessment of
U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and the threats posed by the in-
telligence services of foreign powers in this country and abroad. The
FBI has principal responsibility for counterintelligence activities
within the United States, while the CIA is in charge of counterin-
telligence activities overseas. The counterintelligence components of
the Department of Defense also play a key role in protecting against
hostile intelligence threats to the military services worldwide. Through
the annual budget authorization process and other oversight practices,
the Select Committee has sought to evaluate the performance of the
Intelligence Community in identifying hostile intelligence threats
and in taking measures to protect against those threats. The Select
Committee has also looked into related physical, personnel, document,
and communications security programs that are an integral part of
the Government's countermeasures against hostile foreign intelligence
activities.
The problem of technology transfer was examined in detail during
closed hearings and staff inquiries. At the request of the Select Com-
mittee, the Director of Central Intelligence undertook a comprehensive
review of the adequacy of Intelligence Community programs for deal-
ing with the loss of valuable technology to the Soviet bloc. The DCI
submitted a report to the Committee that identified weaknesses in these
programs and made specific proposals for improving foreign intelli-
gence collection and analysis, counterintelligence, and interagency
coordination with respect to technology transfer. At Senator Jackson's
request, the Committee assigned a staff working group to conduct an
independent inquiry into key aspects of the problem. Numerous inter-
views, briefings, and meetings were held at all the pertinent compo-
nents of the Intelligence Community; and written assessments of
particular subjects were prepared by the relevant agencies. Through
the staff working group, the Select Committee cooperated with the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Affairs, which held a series of important public hearings
in 1982 on the technology transfer problem. The Select Committee
assisted the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in preparing
for its hearings and in developing its report. The CIA submitted to
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations a declassified report
on "Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology" in April 1982, and
the Select Committee provided an independent classified -staff study
which examined certain aspects of the problem in detail.
The report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on
"Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and
I
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Soviet Bloc Nations" 2 represents an outstanding example of coopera-
tion between the Intelligence Community and the Congress on a mat-
ter of significant concern. The Select Committee devoted its efforts to
ensuring that this report would be based on sound intelligence informa-
tion, consistent with the need to protect intelligence sources and
methods. In its oversight capacity, the Select Committee monitored the
steps taken by the Intelligence Community to respond to the problems
identified in the report and to improve foreign intelligence and coun-
terintelligence programs regarding technology transfer.
The Select Committee gave special attention to the division of
responsibility for counterintelligence among several agencies. Due in
part to the statutory ban against CIA exercising "law enforcement
powers or internal security functions," 3 there are limits on the CIA's
authority for counterintelligence within the United States. At times
in the past, coordination between FBI and CIA has been inadequate;
and no decision mechanism existed for establishing national counter-
intelligence policy to protect the United States against the total for-
eign intelligence threat by means of the full range of countermeasures.
Perhaps more important, no one agency was responsible for making a
comprehensive assessment of all aspects of the hostile intelligence
threat.
At the request of Senators Wallop and Chafee, the Select Committee
asked Director William Casey and FBI Director William Webster to
present their views on the need for improvements in the management
and direction of the national counterintelligence program. They testi-
fied before the Budget Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Wallop,
and before the Subcommittee on Collection and Foreign Operations,
chaired by Senator Chafee, with regard to proposals for establishing a
better system to assess the overall threat and develop national policies
for more effective countermeasures. After these hearings, the Select
Committee was informed of the organizational changes adopted to
address these issues. A small interagency counterintelligence staff
drawn from the FBI, CIA, and Defense Department was set up in
the Intelligence Community Staff to make regular overall assessments
of threats and U.S. countermeasures 4
In 19,92 a Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence was established
under the National Security Council with two working interagency
groups for counterintelligence and countermeasures. The Interagency
groups for Counterintelligence, chaired by FBI Director Webster, i
responsible for developing policy recommendations for counterespio-
nage and for countering hostile covert action (what the KGB calls
"active measures"). The Interagency Group for Countermeasures,
chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is responsible for other
national countermeasures policies for dealing with technical intelli-
gence threats and protective security programs. This structure re-
Senate Report No. 97-664.
Section 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) ].
4 This staff was originally established in 1978 to meet the needs of the NSC's Special Co-
ordination Committee for 'Counterintelligence under Executive Order 12036. Until 1981 it
was assigned to the Office of the DCI.
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placed the NSC's Special Coordination Committee for Counterintel-
ligence, created in 1978 by Executive Order 12036. The Select Commit-
tee has been kept informed of the issues being addressed by these in-
teragency groups.
Restraints on U.S. counterintelligence adopted to protect the rights
of U.S. persons are matters of continuing interest to the Committee.
In the process of consultation with the Executive Branch leading up
to the issuance of executive Order 12333 in December 1981, the Select
Committee examined in detail various proposals to modify the stand-
ards and procedures for counterintelligence investigations of U.S.
persons. The Select Committee was also informed before implementa-
tion of the procedures for such investigations promulgated under the
new Executive Order. The Select Committee has sought to determine
whether the Intelligence Community is exercising its authority effec-
tively against serious foreign threats to U.S. security and whether
there are adequate safeguards to prevent misuse of that authority. To
examine these questions, information has been obtained from the
operating elements of the Intelligence Community, from the General
Counsels' Offices, and from the Attorney General's Counsel for In-
telligence Policy.
COiNTERINTELLIGENCE THREAT ASSESSMENTS
The Select Committee periodically receives Intelligence Community
assessments of the threats to this country from hostile intelligence
services. These assessments include both interagency products and
publications of particular agencies. A special, comprehensive long-
range assessment of threats and countermeasures prepared for the
National Security Council in mid-1982 was promptly submitted to the
Select Committee and has provided a basis for evaluating both re-
source and policy issues in the counterintelligence field. Classified.
interagency and FBI publications on hostile intelligence covert
actions have described the development of agents of influence, the use
of forgeries and other disinformation efforts, the control of "front"
organizations, and similar operations directed against the United
States and its allies. The Select Committee has been kept informed of
the efforts of Soviet intelligence officers, other Soviet agents, and
Soviet-controlled organizations to influence the political process in
the United States and abroad.
In certain cases, representatives of particular agencies have briefed
the. Select Committee on security and counterintelligence problems,
including the damage caused by unauthorized disclosures of classified
information. The Committee received briefings on the damage result-
ing from the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Air
Force Lieutenant Cooke and on the steps taken by the Air Force
to improve procedures for handling such cases where assurances are
made to potential espionage defendants in exchange for counterintel-
ligence information. In 1982, a, senior FBI official expressed concern
publicly about the adequacy of certain aspects of security in Con-
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gressional offices. At Senator Huddleston's request, the Select Com-
mnittee received a full briefing from the FBI on the continuing pattern
of hostile intelligence targeting and recruitment efforts against Mem-
bers of Congress and their staffs. Based on the Select Committee's
inquiry into the activities of Soviet bloc intelligence officers on Capi-
tol Hill, the Chairman and Vice Chairman made recommendations to
the Senate leadership for improved security awareness in Senate
offices. These recommendations included better security guidance of
Senate staff who handle classified information, briefings for Members
and key staff on hostile intelligence operations directed against the
Congress, and improved procedures for reporting contacts with rep-
resentatives and visitors from Communist countries.
Overlapping both counterintelligence and foreign intelligence is
the problem of possible Soviet deception of our intelligence system.
The Select' Conimitte has looked into allegations that U.S. intelligence
has been deceived with regard to Soviet missile accuracy. Tt is clear
that the Soviets are engaged in efforts to deceive U.S.-intelligence,
and the Select Committee's inquiry stressed the importance of greater
attention to cross-checking diverse sources as a means of detecting
Soviet deception efforts.
Finally, the Select Committee has examined the growing threat to
U.S. security interests posed by the clandestine intelligence gathering
activities of foreign officials and agents in the United States. The num-
ber of Communist country officials has increased significantly in recent
years. The threat is compounded by the documented use of so-called
"illegals", foreign agents who pose as U.S. citizens or resident aliens
and operate without any overt contacts with foreign officials. Statistics
on the presence of known or suspect intelligence officers of Communist
countries in the U.S. have been provided by the FBI. The Select Com-
mittee has also examined the evidence of Soviet use of facilities in
the U.S. to intercept private communications. To strengthen the ca-
pabilities of U.S. counterintelligence and reduce these threats, the
Select Committee has authorized additional funds for the FBI, has
stressed the importance of reciprocity in diplomatic arrangements,
and has explored additional ways to combat hostile intelligence efforts
more effectively.
The Committee has maintained continuing oversight with regard
to the activities of the Intelligence Community in the field of interna-
tional terrorism, as well as FBI investigations of domestic terrorism.
While international and domestic terrorism are treated separately
under current laws and Executive orders, some aspects are closely
related insofar as an effective counterterrorism program is concerned.
The agencies in the Intelligence Community that produce intel-
ligence studies and reports on international terrorism regularly pro-
vide the Committee information on terrorist incidents and assessments
of terrorism threats throughout the world. This intelligence is vital
for planning protective measures for Americans serving abroad in
civil and military positions. It is also essential in preparing for any
operations that might be needed to save the lives of Americans in
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extraordinary situations. Intelligence on foreign terrorism contributes
directly to the assessments for national policymakers of political sta-
bility in particular regions of the world, as well as the impact on U.S.
interests of foreign support for international terrorism. Studies of
the experience of other countries in combatting terrorism and the ef-
fectiveness of various counterterrorism policies help in developing
countermeasures for the U.S. and its allies. Intellgience appraisals re-
garding the capabilities and objectives of international terrorist groups
add to the understanding of the threat, and formulations of foreign
policy initiatives to undermine their support. Long-range projections
of the prospects for terrorism in the 1980s provide the perspective
needed to set priorities for resource allocation both inside and outside
the Intelligence Community. All these types of intelligence products
have been provided to the Committee for its use in reviewing the qual-
ity of U.S. counterterrorism intelligence collection and analysis.
The Committee has also requested and received additional informa-
tion on areas of special interest. In 1981, the CIA provided comments
requested by the Committee on the book, The Terror Network, by
Claire Sterling. Officials, of agencies involved in preparing a Special
National Intelligence Estimate on "'Soviet Support for International
Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence" responded to questions about
the basis for various analytical judgments and observations. Informa-
tion was also sought and obtained regarding terrorism in Central
America as part of the Committee's overall examination of U.S. intel-
ligence capabilities in that region.
FBI officials testified before the Committee or briefed the Com-
mittee regarding terrorism threats and investigation on four oc-
casions. Senior FBI executives testified on the activities of interna-
tional and domestic terrorists within the United States in 1981 and
as part of the Budget Subcommittee's hearings on counterintelligence
and terrorism programs in 1981 and 1982. Director Webster briefed
the Committee on the Nyack, New York, bank robbery committed in
May 1981 by persons associated with the "Weather Underground"
and other violent groups. Director Webster provided the FBI's assess-
ment of the intelligence significance of the massive amount of in-
formation obtained in the course of the FBI's investigation in this
case. In view of Director Webster's statement at this briefing identify-
ing Puerto Rican terrorist groups are posing the most serious domestic
threat, members of the staff received follow-up briefings on the FBI's
investigations of such groups, the resource constraints on the FBI's
involvement in Puerto Rican terrorism.
For the purpose of monitoring the 'Intelligence Community's per-
formance in this area, the committee formed a staff working group
on terrorism in 1981. Members of that working group were also as-
signed to assist the Budget Subcommittee in its consideration of coun-
terterrorism programs. Working group members reviewed publica-
tions on terrorism and met with government officials and outside ex-
perts familiar with counterterrorism problems. To review FBI coun-
terterrorism capabilities within the United States, members of the
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working group visited FBI field offices in Miami, Florida; Chicago,
Illinois; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. In November 1982, Chairman
Goldwater instructed a Professional Staff Member of the Committee
to travel to Italy to study terrorism and counterterrorism methods in
that country.
CIA and Defense Department officials also testified or briefed the
Committee with respect to the counterterrorism intelligence capabil-
ities of the Intelligence Community. CIA Director Casey and Deputy
Director for Operations John Stein reported on CIA efforts during
the Budget Subcommittee hearings. General Eugene Tighe, Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, presented a special analysis of
the terrorist threat at the Budget Subcommittee hearings in 1981;
and General Richard Stilwell, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, testified on military counterintelligence efforts against ter-
rorist threats abroad. All the agencies responded to detailed ques-
tions submitted for the record. 'Committee members placed special
enrpliasi ~, on the need to assure adequate intelligence support for any
military operations that might be needed to save lives of American
victims of a terrorist action.
Because of the Committee's concern about the effectiveness of U.S.
counterterrorism intelligence capabilities, members of the staff work-
ing group examined the guidelines and procedures approved by the
Attorney General for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence
and the conduct of domestic security and terrorism investigations.
These guidelines and procedures apply only to activities conducted
within the United States or regarding United States persons (citizens,
resident aliens, and groups substantially composed of citizens or resi-
dent aliens). The standards approved by the Attorney General do not
apply to counterterrorism intelligence activities with regard to foreign
nationals abroad. The Committee's examination of procedures adopted
pursuant to Executive Order 12036, issued by President Carter in 1978,
suggested that much of the complex language could be streamlined to
facilitate necessary and legitimate counterterrorism investigations.
'].'his review of procedures contributed to the Committee's assessment
of proposals for what eventually became Executive Order 12333, issued
by President Reagan in December 1981.
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY TO BE DCI
Three presidential nominations were referred to the Committee
during the time covered by this report. On January 13,1981, William J.
Casey appeared before the Committee as the nominee for the posi-
tion of Director of Central Intelligence. During the hearing Mr. Casey
affirmed, "I intend to comply fully with the spirit and the letter of the
Intelligence Oversight Act. I intend to provide the Committee with the
information it believes it needs for oversight purposes. ." In addi-
tion, during the hearing, Mr. Casey addressed a wide variety of issues
including guidelines for the use of clerical, academic or journalist
cover, the quality of analysis and related problems of attracting and
retaining highly qualified analysts, technology transfer, the protection
of agents' identities, FOIA, covert action and leaks.
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On January 13, 1982, the Committee voted to approve Mr. Casey's
nomination by a vote of 14-0-1. The Senate confirmed Mr. Casey on
January 27,1981, by a vote of 95-0.
On February 3, 1981, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman appeared before
the Committee as the President's nominee for the position of Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. With twenty-one years of service
in the field of intelligence, Admiral Inman had most recently served
as the Director of the National Security Agency. In his confirmation
hearing, Admiral Inman reconfirmed his commitment "to keep the
committees fully and completely informed." Admiral Inman iden-
tified manpower shortages, in particular the need for skilled analysts,
as the primary problem facing the CIA. In addition, Admiral Inman
reviewed issues such as the Intelligence Community's past perform-
ance in assessing the Soviet military threat, counterintelligence, the
organization of the intelligence community, the shortage of linguists,
and the quality of the community's analytic products.
Admiral Inman's nomination was approved unanimously by the
Committee. The Senate confirmed his nomination on February 5, 1981,
by a vote of 94-0.
NOMINATION OF JOHN M'MAHON
On ' May 26, 1982, the Committee met in closed session to consider
the nomination of John N. McMahon for the position of Deputy Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. The following day the Committee con-
ducted a public hearing.
Mr. McMahon had served in the CIA for thirty-one years, most
recently as the Executive Director for the CIA. During the hearing,
Mr. McMahon stated :
I think the American people deserve [oversight], but more
importantly, the agencies deserve it. I, for one, as an individ-
ual who has had to testify before the oversight committees,
drew a great deal of comfort knowing that I was sharing with
them, with the representatives of the American people, our
programs and what we were up to, and that comfort was
derived not only from the beauty that exists in that coexist-
ence between the two branches, but more importantly, it was
G, protection. It was a protection to me as an individual and
it was a protection to the institutions to know that Congress
was a joint partner in these programs.
I feel that oversight is a vital part of our existence in. the
intelligence world and welcome it, and . . . [I] will abide
by the instructions to keep the Congress fully and currently
informed.
In addition to the issue of oversight, Mr. McMahon considered
questions on the Community's budget resources, U.S. strategic mon-
itoring capabilities, competitive analysis, coordination on counterin-
telligence and the FOIA. In the closed session, Mr. McMahon agreed
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to inform the Committee immediately whenever the CIA used its new
authority under E.O. 12333 to collect foreign intelligence concerning
U.S. persons by clandestine means within the U.S.
The Committee unanimously approved Mr. McMahon's nomina-
tion. The Senate unanimously endorsed the nomination on June 9,
1981.
From July through November, 1981, the Committee made an in-
quiry into certain conduct by Mr. William J. Casey while and prior
to becoming Director of Central Intelligence. Questions arose con-
cerning, among other things, Mr. Casey's appointment of Mr. Max
Hugel, a businessman, to sensitive positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency; his role in business transactions that led to some lawsuits
against him; and his failure to sufficiently respond to the Committee's
questionnaire form for nominees and to a similar Office of Govern-
ment Ethics (OGE) form.
On December 1, 1981, by a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee issued a
report of its inquiry which concluded that "no basis has been found
for concluding that Mr. Casey is unfit to hold office as ... [DCI]."
(See Senate Report No. 97-285.) The report noted that Mr. Casey had
accepted "full responsibility" for the appointment of Mr. Hugel as
Deputy Director for Operations and had volunteered that it was a
mistake, a judgment in which the Committee concurred.
As to the civil litigation in which Mr. Casey was a defendant, no
basis was found for any moral culpability.
It was found that Mr. Casey omitted a "large amount" of informa-
tion requested by the Committee's and OGE's questionnaire forms.
The Committee expressed concern that "this pattern suggests an in-
sufficient appreciation of the obligation to provide complete and accu-
rate information to the oversight Committees of Congress." In this
connection, during the Committee's inquiry, Mr. Casey amended the
forms to furnish all information required. He continues to be sub-
ject to annual financial reporting requirements and the Ethics in
Government Act. In May, 1982, Mr. Casey filed his 1981 report. In
addition to listing his financial holdings and transactions, the report
prevent investments which might inadvertently violate ethics regu-
lations. The Director of OGE certified that Mr. Casey's report dis-
closed no conflict of interest under applicable ethics laws and regula-
tions.
One of the facts Mr. Casey had omitted in his nominee questionnaire
form was that, as a private attorney in 1976, lie had represented the
Republic of Indonesia before the Treasury Department in a matter
involving foreign tax credits. This client relationship raised a ques-
tion as to whether Mr. Casey should have registered under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA). However, the Committee report
noted that "this question was not resolved by the Committee because
it is a technical one involving whether there was an attempt to in-
fluence or persuade agency officials and, if so, whether an exemption
applied because his representation was in the course of an established
agency proceeding." For this reason, a copy of the Committee's report
was .sent to the Department of Justice, which administers FARA.
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The Justice Department conducted. a preliminary investigation pur-
suant to the Special Prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act (28 U.S.C. 592) and reported the results on April 7, 1982.
The Attorney General's report concluded that "there is insufficient
evidence to support a. criminal investigation" and that the matter is
"so unsubstantiated that no further investigation is warranted .. .
and that no Special Prosecutor should be appointed...."
Charged with providing "vigilant legislative oversight over the in-
telligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities
are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States,"
the Committee receives and reviews reports, mandated by legislation,
from various agencies and departments of the government.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, for example, contains
a national security provision under which a corporation can be re-
lieved of the requirements for accuracy in corporate books and records
with respect to particular classified matters relating to the national
security in which it may be involved, provided that in each instance
the corporation is especially exempted from liability under the Act
by means of a written directive issued by the Federal agency responsi-
ble for the national security matter in question. These directives must
be reviewed annually and, in addition, the appropriate agency head
must transmit a summary of matters covered by all exemption direc-
tives in force at any time during the previous year to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
The report submitted by the Acting Director of-Central Intelligence
in 1982 summarized those new exemption directives that were issued
and renewals of exemptions issued in the previous year, thereby satis-
fying the CIA's statutory obligation under the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.
The Right to Financial Privacy Act requires that the Committee
be advised of the number of requests made by the FBI for financial
records in connection with foreign intelligence and counterintellience
activities. The Committee received and reviewed such reports in- 1981
and 1982.
The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 requires the
Attorney General to report semiannually to the Committee all cases
in which