CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 5, 1951
• Content Type: IM

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44.
Dissemination Authorized
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
locomen? No.
No Change In Class. D
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By:
Office of Current Intelligene
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Intelligence Memorandum
Subject: Current Soviet Attitude Toward Peaceful Settlement of the
Korean War.
I. Within the last two months there have been a nuMber of reported
Soviet peace "feelers" regarding Korea, These "feelers," which have been
generally of a low level and devious Character, uggest that the USSR
would be willing to settle the Korean War on the basis of a return to
the status .a..tao ante Judging from present evidence they probably do not
represent'mcre than Soviet efforts to probe' the position of the Western
power, and at the same time to open up one or more bsnnels which could
be utilized should the USSR. decide upon A settlement. For the most part,
however, the unacceptable Chinese Co let demands concerning Formosa '
and seating in the UN have not been mentioned, t may be significant
that Soviet propaganda in connection with the Johnson resolution for an
armistice in the Korean War omitted reference to these Chinese Communist
demands It may also be significant t t some of the reported Soviet
approaches developed after the repulse by UN forces of the first phase
of the Chinese Communist spring offensive and following the opening on
4 May of the Senate hearings concerning up policy toward the Far East,
which made it clear that the US was determined to continue the Korean War
in the absence of an acceptable settlement and might in the future feel
forced to expand measures against the Chinese Communlets,
2. Soviet delegate to the United Nailons Malik denied on 28 May,
perhaps because of the premature ptblicity, that the USSR has made any
offer to discuss a settlement of the Korean War. According to the .
Israeli delegation to the UN, Malik on 14 March took the initi tive in
r ising the Koreanquestions apparently seeking the views ef the Israeli
delegate as to the possibility of settlement. About 7 April Malik, when
asked by a member of the US ifl delegation about Soviet objectives in
Korea, replied that his government wanted a peaceful solution. This
statement merely reiterated the public position taken by the USSR over
since the beginning of the Korean War, first clearly enunciated at the
time of the Gromyko-Kelly talks in Moscow duri July 1950. On 2 May,
during an exchange of views vith members of the US delegation, Malik
declared that the US definitely does not want a peaceful settlement of
the Kere n War, but that if a settlement were really desired it might
be accomplished through the Paris conference. He &said further that the
Korean dispute, as well as other outst nding matters, could and should
be settled by discussion between the US and Soviet Governments and that
the Soviet position on uch military discussions is well known. He also
stated twice that any settlement must contain honorable terms for sal
interested parties, apparently referring to Chinese Communist conditions
for settlement. Despite these statements, Soviet officials, including
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members of the Soviet delegation to the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting
at Paris, have not reacted to generals tentative approaches by US repre-
aentativea. There have been, however, several circuitous feelers which
have reached the US through the representatives of neutral countries. They
were of such a nature that the Soviet Government was in no way officially
associated with them and could, therefore; easily deny their existence.
3. On severaloccasions during April and May the Yugoslav UN dale-
gate has expressed .the view that the USSR y be almost ready for a
negotiated settlement. He stated that Stalin 'a self-interview of 16
February contained a form of Soviet peace feeler despite all its propa-
ganda. The Yugoslav delegate was incline to believe that the Soviet
Government takes a serious view of the present military situation in
Korea, since Chinese Communist military setback cannot be retrieved
without a Soviet intervention which would prtebly lead to global war --
a situation he thinks the USSR wishes to avoid. If the US, were to invade
North Korea again and the S viet Union did not intervenes Soviet prestige
would be seriously damaged throughout Api . The Yugoslav delegate
thought that a secret discussion initiated by the US with some Soviet
official held promise but that it would be only an initial step to be
expanded later into a full-scale conference with at least Chinese Com-
munist participation.
4. The general pattern of Soviet propaganda treatment of the Korean
Mar has not changed since the North Korean invasion of 25 June 1950. While
condemning the US for its part in the Korean Wars the USSR has carefully
avoided the question of committing iteelf overtly to more than moral sup-
port for the ComMunist forces, The Kremlinis tonsiatent avoidance of any
hint of direct Soviet involvement in the conflict permits maximum maneu-
verability in almost any direction. In any case, current Moscow propa-
ganda does not provide a reliable guide to the intentions of the Soviet
Government with regard to Koreas since support for the Commnnist forces
opposing the UN must be reconciled with the Oar's world pe oe campaigns
which is designed to influence the noe-Communist eesee against their
governments.
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