THE VERIFICATION GAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180046-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: September 15, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/09/21: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180046-5
0.J__, ' - 15 SEFrE` BE 1979 0 ca S ~- L T
.0 1
The long delay of Ameri-
can intelligence in spotting
the infiltration of Soviet
combat troops into Cuba has
raised new doubts in the-
Senate about the reliability
of U.S. SALT verification
techniques..'
These doubts 'will' now be-
sharply intensified by. the;
failure, ?previously-'unre-
ported,.of.the Carter admin-
istration- to-obtain- Turkish
assent to an- ingenious. new
method: :of monitoring
Soviet missile tests. The col-
lapse of this attempt- to com-
pensate for the loss of the-
U.S. bases in Iran leaves a
gaping four-year hole in-the,
American verification. capa-
bility.
Last month, Carter offi-
cials reluctantly faced- up to
the Soviets' unwillingness
to allow U-2 flights along the
Russian-Turkish border to
pick up the telemetry-from
Soviet missile tests.-Ground
sites in Turkey are no sub-
stitute for the bases in Iran
because the intervening ter-
rain prevents line-of-sight
.-coverage', of- the launch.
' phase_ of missile testing.:
Without- access to this data,
it will- be... impossible to
determine;.. - -r. -? reliably.
-Whet then Soviets- are
cheatfng?.on:the SALT limits
on the size-and payload of-
new missilest*
After- the Turks^ made:
Soviet acquiescence to such .
U-2 flights- a condition of
their cooperation, Carter
tried and failed to get Leo-
nid Brezhnev's greement
at the Vienna summit- To
Soviet behavior--'
seems almost
designed to maize = -
'SALT'ratification .
.hard+er:.:.;=y
drive home Brezhnev's
objection, Soviet ambassa-
dors around the world have
been telling Turkish diplo--
mats., that Moscow is ada-
mantly opposed to U-2 spy
planes on the. border.
coLacking a substitute forU-
2 verage, the administra-
lion was obliged to admit to
senatorial critics that cru-
cial data on Soviet missile
'testing could not be col-
lected until a new surveil-
lance satellite had been spe-
cially designed and built to
pick up the?.inissing teleme-
try; As `CIA Director
Stansfield Turner, testified
to the Senate, a suitable
satellite - could.not be
orbited until 1984.
To meet the dilemma, the
Carter administration came
up, with' a quick-fix solution.
that at first blush seemed to
promise access?-to the essen-
tial data and an escape for .
,the-Turks,from Soviet pres-
sure. As a substitute for the The adminstration now f
U?2, Carter officials pro- finds itself back at square
posed the deployment in one on a crucial aspect of
Turkey of a differetit type of the verification issue with
plane, the EB-57. This air- no solution in sight until
craft is a two-seater with an - 1984. Carter officials are par-
altitude of 45,000 feet, origi- ticularly concerned that
nally designed to carry elec-
tronic equipment to jam
hostile defensive radars.
Fitted with new antennae
.to pick up the-: missile te-?
lemetry, this plane was to
fly from Turkish bases
when Russian missile tests
were believed to be immi-
nent. With only half the alti-
tude `of the U-2, it would
have. been less effective but
still. capable of recovering
some of the launch data.
In its- favor was the fact
outgoing U.S. ambassador to
Russia, Malcolm. Toon, may_
now, reverse iris grudging
approval of the SALT treaty
oon=s-support, was only
-woa by assurances that the.
U.S1. would. be able to work
out' cooperative arrange-
menu with the Turks to re-
place the. Iranian sites. Now
both, Tobn' and Sen- John
Glenn will be hard to per-
suade that the higher risk of
Soviet evasion is worth tak-
that this plane did not have Moreover, Soviet behave
the U-2's historical record of for - - ? i seems - almost
espionage activity, but un-. deliberately. designed to
like the U-2 it had to fly from make SALT ratification
'Turkish airfields. The hope more difficult. The Soviets'
was that the Turks might ac- are obviously more inter-
.cept its deployment on-their ested in building a cordon
territory and the Soviets sanitaire around their terri-
?would not be able to identify tory to prevent American
its purpose. - surveillance than they are
When U.S. ambassador in in establishing cooperative
Ankara, Ronald Spiers, was verification procedures.
first instructed to request-
Turkish -approval, he balked
on grounds that the Turks The irony is that the Sovi-
would have to refuse be. ets, by openly conducting
cause of the high, risk of field maneuvers of their bri-
exposure. When.his objec- Bade in Cuba, invited a dis-
tions were overruled; Spiers, covery which has given
in mid-August;.'--put the 1 weight to arguments. that
proposal to Prime Minister they cannot be trusted in a
Ecevit,. who predictably de- SALT agreement that is less
clined to go. along. _ than 100 per cent verifiable.
Approved For Release 2007/09/21: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180046-5
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