DRAFT REPORT ON BILLY HITS CARTER, AIDES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200010086-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: September 30, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP99-00498R0002000
F ICL A t,rAn
ON
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE
30 September 1980
f t epor
H1.s
Cay Abd
?e
Administration Cited
For Poor judgment
By Roberta Hornig
WashingtonStarStafi Writer
President Carter and several key
members of his administration used
poor judgment in their handling of
Billy Carter's Libyan connection,
according to a preliminary draft re-
port prepared by the staff of the
Senate subcommittee investigating
the president's brother.
The report, circulated to the nine
Senate investigators yesterday, re-
serves its severest condemnation
for the conduct of the president's
brother himself during the six-
month Justice- Department probe
that led to his registration as a for-
eign agent for Libya last July.
The draft report says that only
after being confronted with the
facts by'Justice did Billy Carter ac-
knowledge his Libyan links, his re-
ceipt of $220,000 in payments from
the anti-U.S. Tripoli government as
well as a multimillion-dollar oil
agreement with that government.
"His conduct was contrary to the I
interests of the president and the
United States and merits condemna-
tion," the draftsays.-
But the report also chastises the
president, national security adviser
Zbigniew -Bre inski, attorney
General Benjamin R.. Civiletti. CIA
Director Stansfield Turner and the
president's appointments secretary,
Phillip Wise, for bungling-in .thee
Billy Carter affair.*-.....:.
Speaking of the president; there-
port states, "the subcommittee con-
cludes (he) should have either is-
sued a public statement or sent a
private message to Libya that Billy
Carter did not represent the United
States and- that Libya would not
gain any influence through Billy."
The report says Carter should
have publicly disclaimed his broth-
er's activities before Billy Carter
'went on his second trip to-Libya, in
the summer of 1979.
The report severely criticizes
Brzezinskiand_Civiletti for their.
Brzezinski had two encounters
with Billy Carter. The first was in
November 1979, when - at the sug-
gestion of Rosalynn Carter. - the
national security adviser. asked
Billy Carter to broker a meeting at
the White House between' him and
the chief Libyan diplomat in Wash-
ington,. Ali Houderi. The purpose
was to discuss the plight of U.S. hos
tages held in Iran and try to gain
Libyan-support for their release.
The second was late last March
when Brzezinski, after receiving
intelligence information from
Turner that Billy Carter was negotii
acing ah'oil-deal w-ith~Libya, tele-
phoned Billy Carter and warned
that- he could embarrass -his
brother, the president. ?,
About the White House meeting
between Brezinski and. the Libyan
diplomat, the subcommittee report
states that it "believes that full and
careful -reflection' Ieads to the -con- -
elusion that the decision to use
Billy Carter'in the hostage crisis'
vas ill advised."
About the telephone warning to
Billy Carter, the report- states: "the
subcommittee concludes-that com-
municating a portion of'the intelli-
gence information to Billy Carter,
-
t ell subject or 't e "information'*
carried with it the riskthat sources
would be compromised'.?:'
Civiletti was chastised-forhisfail-
ure to share "classified information
,(aboutthe.case) that came to him in '
April 1980.with any trustworthy
subordinate who had the necessary
security clearance:" .::
Pointing outthat- Civiletti be-
lieved_the intelligence information
he-receiiie& was so; sensitive that he
. would not =pass _it on-even to subor-
dinafes to whom 'it would have
proven helpful, the report says that
"communicating to'Billy also made
it-.more difficult.fdr-' FARA (foreign
agentsregistratfon:act) investiga-
ors: e-their'case against
he president's brother.; ' 7`7 1:-r.=This-was.a second intelligence re-
port about Billy Carter that came to
the attention of a major Carter ad-
ministration - figure. While
Brzezinski- was given information
on the oil deal by the CIA. the de-
fense intelligence establishment
alerted,Civiletti that Billy Carter
was on ' the verge of receiving
money from Libya: .
ing of this -pertinent information
from his own investigators - infor-
mation it took the investigators
three more months to come up with
"he did'so`without attempting to
learn whether.the.department had
.available to=il other information
which, might have-permitted it to
make'investigative use of the April
1980 intelligence," the report states.
While condemning Civiletti's
behavior, the report praises the Jus-
tice investigators on the case with
"honestly and conscientiously"
.pursuing Billy Carter's: Libyan
links.
The report also.concludes that
Civiletti did nothing "improper" by
sharing-with President Carter the
knowledge that Billy Carter needed
to register as a foreign agent.
But, the report continues ".'.. he
(Civiletti) should not have made
what amounted to a prediction that.
criminal proceedings would not be
instituted if Billy_registered?'be?
cause that had.yet to be determined
by the Department of Justice."
Civiletti gave President Carter
the information at an Oval office
meeting last July, only days-before
Billy Carter finally registered -
partially because of the prodding by
his brother. .
The report is'critical of Turner
for his decision "not to recent e'?
information" on: the oil deal to Civic;
letti, as he had to Brzezinski.
The report states that Turner
made the decision "without calling
for any information that mighit_
have been avairable within the-!
intelligence community and in fact was avatrabt'e."
The report also accuses the presi-
dent's appointments-secretary,
Wise, of causing "some delay in the
progress of the investigation" into
Billy Carter by failing. to cooperate
with the Justice Department.,
It says_Wise was `"less cooperative-;
than he should have been in return-
ing calliby an FBI agent seeking to'
interview-him? and professed not to-
remember events relevant to the
investigation.'-', - -
Wise-was Billy Carter's chief con-
tact at the white House and, accord-
ing to testimony heard by the sub-
committee, -cooperated. with FBI ;
investigators only after several at-
tempts. '
The preliminary report, drafted
on the basis of 10 public and about a
half-dozen executive sessions, was,
circulated to the five Democrats
-and four Republicans on the inves-_ f
tigating subcommittee for com-I
ment.. i:_.. tom,-;ta it