IM 71-41 LOGISTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAOS PANHANDLE SINCE THE INIATION OF OPERATION LAN SON 719, MARCH 1971.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000400030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 120
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 9, 1971
• Content Type: MFR

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Logistics
Nov 70 ER IM 70-170, Recent Communist Logistical Developments In Southern
Laos And Cambodia , Copy 116
Dec 70 ER IM 70-190, Communists Launch Dry Season Resupply Campaign In
Southern Laos And Cambodia, Copy 6
Feb 71. ER IM 71-21, Stepped-Up Communist Resupply Campaign In Southern
Laos And Cambodia, Copy 15
Feb 71. ER IM 71-25, The, Growth And Current Deployment Of The Laotian-Based
559th Transportation Group, Copy 12
Mar 71. ER IM 71-44, The Ho Chi Minh Trail, Copy 11
Max 71. ER IM 71-41, Logistic Developments In The Laos Panhandle Since The
Initiation Of Operation Lam Son 719, Copy 9
DCI memo, dated 5 Mar 71, re Memorandum
on Logistic Activity in South Laos (forwarding
Memo for Record, dated 9 Mar 71, re IM 71-41
refusal to provide General Ratkovich with copy
of IM 71-41, suggesting he get it through one
of the three recipients outside of CIA)
Maj. Gen Stewart (DIA) memo, dated 8 Mar 71,
Transmittal of ER IM 71-41, March 19t1
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SUBJECT: IM 71-41 Logistic Developments In The Laos
Panhandle Since The Iniation Of Operation
Lam Son 719, March 1971.
1. In response to a request from one Sergeant
Holiday for a copy of subject report for General
Ratkovich I advised him as follows as per Mr. Helms
instruction relayed via
Mr. Helms was keeping this type of reporting
very closely restricted for the duration of
Operation Lam Son 719. Subject report had gone
outside the Agency in five copies, three of them to
the Pentagon -- to Secretary Laird, Deputy Secretary
Packard and Admiral Moorer. If the General wanted
a copy of the report he would have to request it
from one of these recipients. I told the Sergeant
that we were sure the General would appreciate
Mr. Helms' desire not to give these reports wide
dissemination during this sensitive period while
the LS operations were still in process.
Deputy Director
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Distribution List
Copy 1
2
Richard Helms
Henry Kissinger
Melvin Laird
David Packard
Admiral Moorer
Alexis Johnson
DDCI
ADDI
DD/OER
SAVA
Y Vl an c..-,
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 Approved For Release 2006/03/06: CIA-RDP7
5 march 1971
MEMORANDUM"1 FOR-. Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Acting Deputy Director for
Intelligence
memorandum on Logistic Activity
in south Laos
1. On 22 February you provided Dr. Kissinger
at his request a review of logistic activities
in south Laos. The attachment is an update of that
study prepared on the basis of information available
to us as of 1200 hours today.
2. 1 have prepared transmittal notes to Dr.
Kissinger and your WSAG associates in the event
you wish to disseminate this report.
Deputy Dirac r~
Economic Research
Attachments
SC-02383/71 Cy
Transmittal Notes
Distribution
Cy 1 & 2 - Addressee w/,att
3 - DDCI w/att
4 ADDI w/att
DD/OER w/o aTf
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cxc
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MEMORANDUM FOR: George Carver
Attached is OER's latest evaluation
of logistics activity in South Laos.
Deputy Director
Economic Research
FORM N IOI REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
(DAT )
c.'
for National security
Affairs
sistan
Dr.
White souse
fto attached andua is our latest
a valaat of enew logistics activity
o Laos. It is a update of a
no.
FORM GH 54 101 WHICH RELACES
MAY FORM
I AU
BE 10-101
(DATE)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Melvin Laird
The Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Attached for your information is
our latest evaluation of enemy logistics
activity in south Laos.
Richard Helms
Copy No.
(DATE)
FORM NO. n REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 IQI WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David Packar
Deputy Secretary of Defens
Department of Defense
Attached for your information is.
our latest evaluation of enemy logistcs
activity in south Laos.
Copy No.
(DATE)
FORM NO. I, i REPLACES FORM 10?101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Admiral 'T` Lomas .i . _ioor r
C:i;.sirmai~, Jo tit C hiefs of
Staff
Department of Defense
k taaaed for your inform ition i3
our latest evaluation of enemy logistics
activity in south Laos.
Richard Helms
Copy IIo .
(DATE)
FORM NO? IOI REPLACES FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY DE USED.
? MEMORANDUM FOR: The Hon U. Alexis Jdlanson
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs
Department of State
Attached for your information is our
latest evaluation of enemy logistics
activity in south Laos.
Richard Helms
I
(DATE)
FORM NO. IOI WHPICHCMAYF BEM US10- ED.01
I AUG 54
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Copy 1 N.
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8 March 1971
:MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richard Stewart
Asst. Director for Intelligence
Production
Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT Transmittal of ER IM 71-41,
March 1971
Attached for your information is a copy of
our latest rack--up of the logistic developments in
south Laos. This was prepared for the Director and
given very limited distribution.
Deputy Director
Economic Research
Attachment:
Logistic Developments in The
Laos Panhandle Since The
n tia an` o t era on
am on 715,
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/cy 16 of Att
1 - DD/OER
OD/OER/I
(8 Mar 71)
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MORI this IM pages 11-26
Intelligence Memorandum
Logistic Developments In The Laos Panhandle Since The Initiation
Of Operation Lam Son 719
Secret
ER IM 71-41
March 1971
Copy No. 9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1971
Logistic Developments In The Laos
Panhandle Since The'Initiation
Of Operation Lam Son 1 9
This memorandum is the second in a series
analyzing logistical developments in the Laos
Panhandle since the initiation of Operation Lam
Son 719. Our first memorandum reviewed the sit-
uation through 21 February.* This analysis
focuses on events since that date but refers,
when necessary for better perspective and under-
standing of logistic operations, to events re-
ported previously.
Areas of Disruption
1. Operation Lam Son 719 has clearly caused
the Communists numerous logistical difficulties
in roughly a 450-square--mile area bounded by
Route 926 on the south, the Se Bang Hieng river
on the north, the Laos/South Vietnam border on the
east, and a line some seven miles to the east of
Tchepone. Route 92, one of the north-south ar-
teries of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, was interdicted
along several segments early in Lam Son 719 and
* CIA. Current status Of Logistics
Activity In The Laos Panhandle, 22 February 1971,
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Economic Research and coordinated within the
Directorate of InteZZigence,
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since 20 February has reflected no sensor detec-
tions m /
As late as 28 February, units of two antiaircraft
regiments were having mainte-
nance problems, a rice shortage, and a shortage
of vehicle drivers,
2m
One unit a to return to Muong Nong on 15 Feb-
ruary because of "obstruction" on Route 926 an
access route into South Vietnam.
transfer of cargo to Communist combat forces byV
Rear Service units in areas along Routes 92C,
92D, and 922. Binh Tram 41 elements which recently
relocated from the Muong Nong area to the area
adjacent to Binh Tram 33 also were having resupply
problems,
some units were out o provisions, low on
medical supplies, and short of oil and gasoline
for bulldozers and prime movers?
3. During the period 25 February to 1 March
an onslaught of unseasonable torrential rains
made many of the roads so wet and slippery that
traffic levels declined significantly. Reports
of localized POL shortages also had an impeding
effect on some logistic activity, particularly
with some units involved in the second phase of
th
"
e
general offi" ih
ensven te Muong Nong area,
Tram 34 indicated that gasoline and oil-was being
shipped on a priority basis to transportation
units operating there. As a result the amounts
of gasoline for other elements of Binh Tram 34
were limited. As late as 4 March, some units
subordinate to Binh Tram 33 reported that they
were running short of ammunition as a result of
combat with the enemy.
4. Despite these problems the overall disrup-
tive effects seem to be relatively short lived
and localized. As will be discussed below, traffic
levels by 3 March had returned close to the high
levels noted during the February crash offensive.
Th
e enemy seems t biti
oe mananing a heavy south-
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Communist Logistical System in Southern Laos and Cambodia
'LAOS
esanh
lei
Mu rl
I,.!:,
THAILAND
D
Binh Tram....
POL pipeline
Communist controlled
rr>ypong
MOM .
C - B-C11A
}
X ,
~, ut r < a iCrntib
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four major logistic
entities -- Binh Trams 27, 34, 35, and 53 -- had
achieved high degrees of efficiency in the second
phrase of the transportation offensive, The
reference to Binh Tram 53 is notable because of
its probable location in northern Cambodia F-
In2ut Roads
5. Sensors reflected high levels of traffic
on the major input corridors since the start of
the "crash" program on 7 February to 24 February
when torrential rains hit the Panhandle, tempo-
rarily hindering logistic activity. Throughout
this period, all three input corridors showed
high levels of activity, Ban Karai Pass reflecting
the heaviest traffic. Further north at Mu Gia
Pass, detections increased after 14 February, re-
versing the decline apparent there in previous
weeks:, Shortl after the start of Lam Son 719 it
became evident hat input through the
western DMZ was being used in support of enemy
security and logistic forces in the Binh Tram 9
and 27 areas, and more recently for movement to
the Headquarters elements of Binh Tram 41 south
of Tchepone near Binh Tram 33,
6m Aerial observers corroborate sensor detec-
tions on input traffic. Heavy traffic flows on
the entry corridors,* which were under way when
Lam Son 719 began, continued through the end of
February, according to PACs. To counter recent
concentrated bombing of several target areas in
the Ban Karai Pass, the enemy has nearly completed
* Photography of North Vietnamese Routes 15 and
137 leading to the Laos border continues to re-
flect Large vehicle counts and Large quantities
of supplies cached along each of the routes.
For example, photographic coverage of Route .15
dated 18 February revealed nearly 100 trucks along
the road within 10 miles of the border crossing
point. The following day, coverage of Route 137
showed 115 trucks (five towing probable 100-mm
weapons). Photography of 1 March reflected "nu-
merous" vehicles and personnel on these routes.
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a new road bypassing the heavily bombed area.
According to pilots, all roads in the western DMZ
corridor (excluding Route 1032B) sustained heavy
truck traffic through the end of February, In
this area, pilots also reported that Route 9110
has been receiving increasing truck traffic. This
connector route links the cross-border access
routes (Routes 1039, .1038, 1035, and 92A) with
the north-south route structure, and its increased
use probably reflects the rerouting of traffic
from the interdicted Route 1032B, After disrup-
tions early in February, the enemy apparently has
again begun using the Se Bang Hieng river for the
movement of supplies. On 18 February, FACs sighted
drums floating down the river and others caught
in retrieval areas near Route 913 north of
Tchepone,
Tchepone/Muong Nong Areas
7, Communist intentions to continue a very
high level of activity in the northern Panhandle
were revealed
25-30 miles northwest o c epone, w is
stated that 200-250 vehicles were to pass through
its area every night for the remainder of the month,
Traffic at this level would involve the greatest
number of vehicles ever noted to be moving through
a Binh Tram's area on a nightly basis,
8. The Communists have been moving large
volumes of supplies through the Tchepone area by
making use of the multiple route structure west and
south of the town, Although the size of the flow
the traffic moving through the
in ram 33 area probably has been at record levels,
Heav
rai
y
ns an wa er-
iogged roads in late February, however, hampered
the effort. Nevertheless
the Binh T
,
ram reported
the achievement of 90% to 100% of its planned goals
through much of February, on one occasion characte-
rizing the performance of its subordinates as "out-
standing."
9, The North Vietnamese plan to continue large-
scale supply movement
i
s
n the Tchepone area during
March:
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"the last day of the first phase of the offensive,"
engineer units were working hard to finish a bypass
road in time for the "second phase@" This phase of
the transportation offensive began on 4 March and
is expected to run through the month.
the "crash," or first phase,
auncne on e ruary, was completed on schedule,
10. Other sources also indicate surging traffic
flows in the Tchepone area since 8 February" In the
first two weeks of Lam Son 719, sensor detection on
the heavily canopied Routes 917 and 914 west and
south of Tchepone rose to a level roughly double
that noted in the two weeks prior to the operation.
Although detections dropped sharply after 24 Feb-
ruary, coincident with torrential rains and the
ending of the "crash phase" of the General Offen-
sive, they continued to reflect a fairly high level
of traffic on Route 914, the main road through the
Tchepone area, from Binh Tram 33 to Binh Tram 34.
Sensor detections of 1-2 March show traffic to be
rebounding to the high levels of the February
crash programs. Aerial observers also reported
heavy use of roads in the area throughout February,
Both Route 911 and parallel north/south routes to
the west supported heavy truck use between the entry
corridors and the staging areas near Tchepone and
Muong Nong. FACs indicate that both Routes 917 and
914 showed increased use and that their numerous
spurs carried very heavy traffic after 8 February.
11. Pilots report that Route 23 west of Tchepone
continued to show consistently moderate use but no
dramatic change, indicating that the enemy has not
been forced to redirect most of his traffic to a more
secure system because of Lam Son 719. FACs report
that traffic on Route 23 was moderate from north
of Tchepone down to the Se Bang Hieng crossing until
Operation Desert Rat began on 16 February. Since
then, both Route 23 and Route 9 have reflected only
light to very light traffic.
South of Tchepone
12. Recently, much of the Communist effort has
been shifting to the region well south of Tcheponem
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be conducted simultaneously with the "second phase"
of the offensive north of the Tchepone area. This
suggests that the North Vietnamese intend to push
supplies into the southern Panhandle throughout
March and perhaps well into April.
13. This pattern of supply activity is in keep-
ing with the enemy's normal dry season supply move-
ment: "crash" efforts progress southward along
with peak levels of cargo shipments. The beginning
of an accelerated supply program south of Muong
Nong is consistent with the evidence that large
quantities of cargo have been moved through the
Tchepone area during the past few weeks, FACs re-
ported on 21 February that formerly abandoned Route
234/2341, which parallels much of Route 914, had
been made serviceable and was supporting moderate
traffic, Its use provides a western bypass around
the crucial Route 914/92 junction and has helped
the Communists to move supplies into the Muong
Nong area.
14. From the start of Lam Son 719 until the end
of the "crash phase," sensors reflected heavy traf-
fic on Routes 99 and 92 -- the main roads south to
Ban Bac. There was an apparent trebling of detec-
tions on Route 99 coupled with a decline in detec-
tions on Route 92. Aerial observers also indicate
that Route 99 leading from Muong Nong south to Ban
Bac was in "moderate to heavy" use throughout
February, except for the last several days of the
month when it was in "light to moderate" use. Since
Route 99 also falls under the jurisdiction of Binh
Trams 33, 34, and 35, the sensor and FAC reporting
confirms that traffic is moving out of the Tchepone
area to areas south of Lam Son 719 operations.
15. FACs have indicated that Ban Bac, the area
served by Binh Tram 35, remains a hub of logistic
activity and that the Route 92/96 corridor leading
through the complex continued to show "moderate to
heavy" use. In this area a storage facility
was filled to capac-
y and was having difficulty accepting incoming
cargo because of the high level of supply input.
Through this period the facility apparently func-
To
insure the transportation mission, antiaircraft
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protection of Binh Tram 35 is being augmented by the
addition of an AAA company. Further south, sensor
detections on Route 96 just south of Chavane con-
tinued to reflect moderate traffic levels through-
out February; although they did dip sharply on
24 February they recovered on 25 February to normal
levels
16. Exit routes leading off the Route 92/96
corridor also exhibited little change in traffic
use according to pilots: Route 922 showed heavy
traffic until 25 February and light-to-moderate
traffic thereafter. Exit Route 165/966 extending
east from Chavane reflected light to moderate
vehicle activity to within several miles of the
South Vietnamese border, and pilot reports of
2 March indicate the road to be in "good" condition?
Farther south, exit Route 110 showed varying levels
of vehicle activity on both its eastern and western
ends according to FACs. On 19 February, pilots saw
16 trucks on the western end of the route near the
Cambodian border -- the peak sighting this dry sea-
son on this route and an indication of the probable
increasing throughput of supplies into Cambodia.
We have received little reporting since that date
on the status of Route 110, particularly where it
enters into South Vietnam, The western end of
Route 110 leading into Cambodia was reported as
carrying "heavy" truck traffic on 26 February.
Enemy Supply Losses
17. Through 4 March, about 951 tons of enemy
supplies had been captured or destroyed, as tabu-
lated below:
Class
I (food)
381.
Class
and
II and IV (weapons
equipment) a/
61
Class
III (POL) -
373
Class
V (ammunition)
136
Total
951
42 tons of miscellaneous equipment and
supplies. In addition,, 226 vehicles
have been seized or destroyed (153
trucks and 73 tanks).
a. Including 19 tons of weapons and
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18. The rate of supply captures in Laos was
highest during the first week of operations when
441 tons of supplies were seized -- 46% of total
losses to date. POL supplies comprised the bulk
of losses reported in the first week of operations.
Some 325 tons were seized -- 87% of such losses to
date. Since the first week of the operation, food
and ammunition losses have risen substantially, but
the overall rate of supply losses has diminished.
Losses averaged 63 tons daily during the first week,
50 tons daily in the second week, and only 16 tons
daily during the last 10 days. The total tonnage of
ammunition and weapons losses through 4 March
equated to 1,800 individual weapons, 400 crew-served
weapons, and some 200,000 rounds of ammunition.
Irregular Forces
19. :Irregular forces targeted against the
logistic system in the Laos Panhandle are attempting
to further complicate the movement of supplies.
Operation Desert Rat began on 16 February and is
aimed at interdicting Route 23 south of Muong Phine.
If successful and sustained, this operation would
help to deny the Communists unimpeded use of the
western route structures, cutting off the sole
alternative to the traditional route structure
through the Tchepone/Lam Son 719 area. If the
Communists should apply significant force against
these guerrilla units, they would, of course, have
to withdraw. In response to the operation to date,
the Communists have redeployed at least one batta-
lion to the Muong Phine area. In addition, Binh
Tram 31 elements near there have reportedly engaged
the "enemy" forces. Overall, however, contact be-
tween irregular and Communist forces has been light
and sporadic. Irregulars have reported cratering
Route 23 south of Muong Phine. Pilot reports of
only very light enemy use of Route 23 in this area
indicate the road is probably blocked.
Cambodia
20. Communist logistic activities in northern
Cambodia have increased significantly since December
1970. Since that time the enemy has constructed
or upgraded nearly 100 miles of roads and motorable
trails along the Route 97/Tonle Kong and Route 13
corridors between Laos and Stung Treng. Most of
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this construction occurred between early January
and early February. The Communists now have a
direct and unimpeded access corridor between Laos
and the key Cambodian supply points of Siem Pang and
Stung Treng, significantly improving their overall
capability to move supplies into the region. New
bypasses, storage areas, and transshipment points
further enhance the enemy's logistic capabilities
in the area.
21. Enemy supply flows into Cambodia have prob-
ably increased as the more viable logistic system
has evolved.
raphy has revealed increased enemy use of various
roads in northern Cambodia and confirms a direct,
actively used route between Laos and Stung Treng
via Routes 97, 136(113), and 13 and various
secondary roads. In addition, FACs reported
"heavy" traffic on Route 97 in January and the
development of new, active storage areas and
transshipment points along the road. Pilots
attacking Route 97 during the past month have
reported increased instances of secondary explo-
sions and fires, indicating probable growing
ordnance stockpiles; one FAC reported that
secondary explosions continued at 15-second in-
tervals for about 30 minutes after an attack on
Route 97 about 10 miles north of Siem Pang in
late January. In sum, the evidence available from
photography and FACs strongly suggests that over
the past month or so the amount of supplies being
moved from Laos into Cambodia has been substan-
tially greater than that indicated by sensors and
roadwatch teams along western Route 110 in the
southern Panhandle or riverwatch teams along the
Se Kong.
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22, All intelligence sources indicate that the
Communists have been able to move large amounts of
supplies into and throughout the Laos Panhandle
despite Operation Lam Son 719,
they plan to maintain the effort
in the weeks ahead
They included
Binh Tram 27 located at the western DMZ entry
route, Binh Trams 34 and 35 located south of
Tchepone, and Binh Tram 53 located in northern
Cambodia.
23. sensors, and aerial reconnaissance
provide an impressive catalogue of an accelerated
and high rate of supply movement from North Viet-
nam through the three entry corridors to Binh
Trams 32, 33, and 41 and thence to Binh Trams 34
and 35 southeast of Tchepone and south of the
operational area of Lam Son 719. The continuous
pattern of heavy truck traffic extends to the
Ban Bac area, 90 miles south of Tchepone. Further
south, there is considerable evidence that in-
creasing -- but still unquantifiable -- amounts
of supplies have been moving out of Laos into
Cambodia. over the past month or so.
24. Although generally successful, the Commu-
nist supply effort has not been without problems.
Route 92 north and south of Route 9 was inter-
dicted early in the operation; over 950 tons of
supplies have been lost to ARVN forces; and
bombing of vital lines of communication continues
to cause problems. Torrential rains beginning on
24 February and ending two days later left roads
waterlogged and many water crossings temporarily
blocked, which impeded traffic flows, The sharp
drop in sensor detections after 24 February prob-
ably reflected both problems associated with the
poor weather and the fluctuation in activity as
one transportation phase ends prior to the
beginning of the next. By 2 March, detections
had again surged upward.
25? The Communists currently face a dual task:
.at the same time that they are expediting supply
flows through Laos for their forces in Cambodia
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and South Vietnam they must resupply augmented
security forces countering ARVN forces in the
Tchepone area. They appear to be meeting this
challenge. Maintenance of high supply flows re-
flects the fact that Lam Son 719 has not pushed
far enough into Laos to cut the most important.
arteries that carry supplies from North Vietnam to
South Vietnam and Cambodia. Even if the forces
reach Tchepone, the main arteries will remain in-
tact because the Communists' logistical movements
currently are following a northwest-southeast
axis (Routes 917 to 914, 234/2341 to 99 and 96)
that at its nearest point is about five miles
south of Tchepone and Route 9. By following these
routes, Communist logistical commands have been
able to transport supplies through the area occu-
pied or threatened by Lam Son 719 without serious
disruption.
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 Muong
Phine
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Routes interdicted Route
by ARVN
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Quang Tri
Phong
Dien
92 ti Operation Lam Son 719
Ban rJ 33 Binh Tram (approx. POL pipeline
c_~--ti location)
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 DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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Secret
MORI/CDF this IM; pages 27-41
Intelligence Memorandum
The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Secret
ER IM 71-44
March 1971
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Introduction
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, the popular name for
the Communists' logistic system in the Laotian
Panhandle, is very much a misnomer. It is really
a labyrinth of roads, trails, waterways, small
dispersed storage buildings, truck parks, and
repair facilities. The 1,900 miles of roads within
the Panhandle are not the Lincoln highways of the
1920s, nor are they in the same class as a Burma
Road or Alcan Highway. They are more similar to
the logging roads of the west or Canada, but even
these roads are designed to carry much heavier
vehicles than those used in the Panhandle of Laos.
The road system of the Ho Chi Minh Trail ex-
tends in a north-south direction for over 300
miles across a rugged mountain chain 2,500 to
3,500 feet in elevation, from Mu Gia Pass in the
north to the tri-border area (where Cambodia,
Laos, and South Vietnam join) in the south. In
terms of terrain and distances closer to home,
moving supplies through the Ho Chi Minh Trail would
be roughly analogous to traveling from Allentown
to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Weather is a major factor in understanding
the operation of the enemy's logistical system in
Laos. In the Panhandle the dry season arrives in
mid- to late October and lasts until about mid-
May. During this period the Communists must move
the bulk of their supplies to Cambodia and South
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Economic Research.
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Vietnam because once the rains start it becomes
extremely difficult to move large volumes of
supplies over water soaked roads and to ford
swollen streams. Finally, in moving supplies
through the Ho Chi Minh Trail the Communists
not only must overcome the problems of terrain,
distance, and weather but must also cope with an
unprecedented scale of US bombing.
The Communists rely heavily upon Soviet built
trucks to move supplies. They also rely on a
wide variety of other transport means as well.
These include pipelines in the northern reaches
of the Panhandle, and, when needed, oxcarts,
bicycles, pirogues, and porters. Innovations such
as free floating POL and food down the rivers are
used with skill and effectiveness.
Description of the System
Entry Corridors
1.. Supplies enter the Laotian Panhandle
through three major corridors: (1) the well-known
Mu Gia Pass which is the northernmost entry route,
(2) the Ban Karai Pass which was first opened in
April 1966, and (3) Ban Raving Pass, more commonly
known as the Western DMZ entry corridor, which was
opened to traffic in December 1969. A look at a
map makes it clear why the North Vietnamese have
added the new entry corridors. From Mu Gia Pass
to Tchepone is 90 miles. From the western DMZ to
Tchepone is only 30 miles.' Thus, by using the
southern entry routes traffic moving into the
Tchepone area avoids much of the harassment of the
bombing. The availability of three major entry
corridors also makes it easier for the North Viet-
namese to counter the bombing.
2. In the northern reaches of the Panhandle,
from the three passes south to the Tchepone area,
there are a vast number of alternate roads that
the North Vietnamese have built to counteract the
effects of the bombing. Thus when one road is
-See tthe system map following page 10. A de-
tailed map of the Tchepone area follows page 8.
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interdicted there may be as many as four alterna-
tive routes over which the North Vietnamese can
shunt traffic. In the Ban Karai Pass area there
are as many as 5 roads that can be used to move
supplies across the border into the system. The
number of roads, alternatives, and bypasses in the
area north of Tchepone has grown to such an extent
that the road system there can be characterized as
a web of interconnecting veins rather than a few
mainline arteries.
3. South of Tchepone the road system is less
dense because once supplies reach the Tchepone area
they have passed the main brunt of the bombing.
Nevertheless, the road system south of Tchepone is
still highly redundant. There has been no letup
in roadbuilding in the Panhandle: in 1965 there
were 340 miles of road in the Panhandle, in 1968
there were 1,200 miles, today there are over 1,900
miles.
4. As one moves south through the road system
there are key lateral roads running from west to
east. These are the roads used to move supplies
into South Vietnam. The first such lateral road
is Route 9 which was an important enemy supply
artery during the siege of Khe Sanh but was never
used much by the Communists after that. Farther
south Routes 926 and 922 lead to the A Shau Valley.
Another 90 miles to the south a fan-shaped net of
roads leads eastward from Chavane toward the cen-
tral areas of Military Region 1 of South Vietnam.
At the foot of the north/south system through the
Laotian Panhandle is Route 110 which is used to
move supplies either eastward into South Vietnam
toward the vicinity of Dak To or Kontum or westward
to the Cambodian supply route running south toward
Siem Pang and Stung Treng.
Logistical Forces
5. The 40,000 to 50,000 personnel charged
with moving supplies through the Panhandle of Laos
are organized into about 16 logistical commands
spread throughout the Panhandle. These commands --
called Binh Trams, meaning "military stations"
in Vietnamese -- are of regimental size and will
have between 1,500 and 3,000 men subordinate to
each. Each Binh Tram has a number of engineer,
transport, and AAA battalions.
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On maps produced
By e intelligence community e designated lo-
cations of Binh Trams tend to give the false im-
pression that they operate at very specific loca-
tions. In fact, Binh Trams have large areas of
responsibility that include many roads, numerous
storage facilities, and other support facilities.
Because of the threat of air strikes, storage
sites and truck parks are carefully camouflaged,
well dispersed, and only a part of them are in use
at any one time. Each Binh Tram has subordinate
units that man the defense and logistical facili-
ties along the routes in its areas of responsi-
bility. Rear Services Units command complexes of
small dispersed storage buildings which may con-
tain as many as 900 tons of supplies. Individual
platoons may be in charge of a personnel way sta-
tion (called a T-station). Even smaller groups
will be dispersed along the roads to control
traffic and relay forewarning of US air attacks
that may be occurring further down the road.
7. We have learned from captured documents
much about what can be called the "crude sophisti-
cation" of the enemy's logistical system. Truck
repair, to cite one example, is performed at three
separate echelons. A carburetor adjustment or
other minor repair is supposed to be done by a
repair crew of a few mechanics attached to a trans-
portation platoon. More complicated repairs are
done by larger repair shops attached to the trans-
portation companies or at the battalion level.
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Captured documents spell out in great detail
work-order numbers, manpower norms, and all the
other accounting measures that are the penchant
of the Communist countries.
8. The-Communists have assigned about 2,500
trucks to the Panhandle. The number of trucks
attached to a single transportation battalion
generally varies from 60 to 70. Defense and
engineer battalions also maintain vehicles for
their own use so that there will be between 60
and 300 trucks assigned to any one Binh Tram, the
number generally declining further south along
the main route structure. On any one night, how-
ever, usually not more than 50% of the trucks
available in the Panhandle are on the road.
How the System Operates
9. The enemy's logistical system operates by
moving supplies southward from one Binh Tram to
another until the supplies are shunted eastward
along one of the lateral routes leading to South
Vietnam or until they reach the bottom of the
funnel. in the southern Panhandle and are moved
into Cambodia (or South Vietnam).
10. This mode of operation calls for a great
deal of shuttling by the trucks. A typical opera-
i
t 1
on wou be as follows: Trucks move out of a
northwest of Tchepone, load supplies from a dis-
persed warehouse, and set out for a warehouse in
just south
of Tchepone. Depending upon e reat of air
attack (and more recently ground attack) a convoy
of from 5 to 15 trucks, dispersed at 30-50 yard
intervals, will move down the road. Speeds are slow,
usually averaging about 10-15 miles per hour.
Canopied parking areas are located at frequent
spots along the road to avoid as much as possible
having the trucks caught in an exposed position
during an air attack. The trucks usually start
their journey at nightfall so as to get to their
assigned destination and be unloaded before day-
break. The empty trucks usually make the return
trip the next night although, under "crash" programs
such as we are observing now, they may make their
deliveries and return the same night. Although it
is unusual, trucks move in broad daylight on some
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occasions, especially when there are emergency con-
ditions or crash programs under way or inclement
weather seriously inhibits US air operations.
11. Over the years, we have come to recognize
a distinct three-phase cycle to movement of supplies
through the Panhandle. The first phase begins in
late September or October and is designed to get
the roads, bridges, fords, and warehouses back in
operating status. Bulldozers come out of caves
where they have been in storage sites during the
rainy season, and together with the engineering
troops armed with axe and shovel, the road system
is put back in operating condition in about a month.
12. In the second phase we begin to see the
input of supplies into the system. These first
inputs are used to replenish the stockpiles drawn
down during the rainy season and to meet the pro-
jected needs of those who are operating the system
as well as the thousands of infiltrators that pass
through the system each year. The Communists
methodically seem to concentrate on the restocking
of the system before facing up to the problem of
maintaining a throughput of supplies to replenish
their stockpiles of combat material in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. This dry season and last the Com-
munists devoted most of the month of December to
this restocking phase.
13. In the third phase the system goes into
high gear, or what the Communists call their
"general offensive," when they push supplies
through to South Vietnam and Cambodia. This year
the general offensive began on the night of
4 January, about the same date as last year.
The Surge Effect
14. Both last year and this year, activity in
the Panhandle clearly reflects what we have come
to call "the surge effect" as supplies flow south
ward through the system.
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15. As a specific Binh Tram reports on the
accomplishments of its own crash program, Binh
Trams further to the south then become more active.
As the southward flow of supplies into the area
under its control increases, the receiving Binh
Tram then launches its own crash program to move
the goods even further south. This pattern was
very clear last month when the Communists launched
a "crash" program on 7 February.
16. This surge of supplies from north to south
through the Panhandle is similar to what we observed
last year. The southward surge was reflected in
a of which began to report greater
throughput tonnages exiting to South Vietnam as
the transport offensive went on.
17. The surge of supplies that we observe is
not a one-time, massive slug of supplies finding
its way for 300 miles south through the system.
Last year, for example, the surge reached II
the area around Ban Bac in the sout ern
Panhandle, about mid-March. At about the same
time the input of supplies through Mu Gia Pass,
the most northern entry corridor, began to taper
off, but the inputs through Ban Karai and the
western DMZ routes were continuing at high levels.
By late March the input through Ban Karai had
pretty much phased out. But it was not until well
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into April.that the inputs through the.western DMZ
route began to phase down. Thus for several
months --- March and April in particular -- there
were large flows of supplies moving throughout the
entire system.
18. Last year's pattern is being repeated this
dry season, and we clearly see. an increasing level
of traffic moving farther and farther south in the
Panhandle. The new wrinkle this year is that the
Communists, clearly anticipating the Allied incur-
sions toward Tchepone, have accelerated their
supply movements in a series of crash programs.
19. This system of a series of crash programs
to accelerate an increased level of supply move-
ments has a two-fold objective. First, to supply
.the Communist combat forces opposing Lam Son 719,
and, second, to move at record rates the normal
throughput of supplies out of the potentially
dangerous Tchepone area to the Binh Trams to the
south.
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Pleasuring the Flow
21. The most difficult problem in understanding
the operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail is to gain
an appreciation of the volume of supplies that
move through the system. Ideally, one would want
to know the volume that entered the system, the
volume consumed within Laos, and the tonnages that
moved into Cambodia and South Vietnam. Obviously,
the composition of these supplies whether rice,
ammunition, weapons, or salt is even more important.
22. Years ago when Mu Gia Pass was the major
entry point the task was easier. Then the daily
reports of a roadwatch team could be used to arrive
at a reasonably accurate estimate of the total
input of supplies into the Panhandle. Other teams
stationed throughout the Panhandle were able to
report on the volume of the traffic as it moved
southward, if not its composition. As more entry
points were established and more bypasses were
constructed, it became impossible to measure the
supply flows by aggregating the roadwatch reports.
It became clear from looking at other sources --
aerial photography land aerial
observer reports -- tnat t e roa wa c teams could
tell only part of the story.
23. New techniques for measuring the supply
flow have been tried. One of the most recent is a
complicated "model" primarily dependent upon elec-
tronic sensor reporting. Regrettably this system
has a number of internal inconsistencies which
affect its results. It also behaves erratically
when compared with other intelligence, sometimes
confirming, sometimes contradicting. Thus, at this
point in time there is no method, based on either
human or technological resources, which we regard
as reliable enough to produce a set of hard numbers
on the flow of supplies into, through, or out of
the Panhandle. Of all of these flows the estimating
of throughput tonnages into South Vietnam and
Cambodia is the most difficult.
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26. In view of the vast amount of labor that
has gone into the building of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
the total tonnages of supplies moved from one Binh
Tram to another frequently sound small to those
unfamiliar with the logistic statistics on the war
in Indochina. Indeed, they seem small compared to
the 40,000 to 50,000 men employed in moving them.
They are microscopic when compared to other bench-
marks -- US requirements in South Vietnam, or even
Communist military requirements in the Korean War.
27. However, they can be put in perspective in
terms of the war in South Vietnam by realizing
that the very large tonnages of ordnance that
arrived in Sihanoukville -- a route not subject to
interdiction or natural obstacles -- for the
VC/NVA forces -- 21,600 tons -- averaged out to
about 20 tons a day between the time these deliveries
started and the time they ended. Thus the ammunition
and weapons that nightly move down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail seem adequate for maintaining a hot war in
Indochina.
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Secret
Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MORI/CDF this IM; pages 42-66
Intelligence Memorandum
The Growth And Current Deployment Of The Laotian-Based
559th Transportation Group
Secret
ER IM 71-25
February 1971
Copy No. 12
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1971
The Growth And Current Deployment
Of The Laotian-Based
559th Transportation Group
The North Vietnamese over many years have
developed a complex logistical system in south
Laos --- the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail -- to
support their forces in South Vietnam. Always
important to the enemy's war effort in northern
South Vietnam, the system has become since the
closing of the port of Kompong Som (formerly
Sihanoukville) the vital life line for the Com-
munist forces in all of South Vietnam and Cambodia.
In 1959 the Communist logistic forces in south
Laos consisted of a single battalion with a strength
of about 500 men. Today this strength has grown
to between 40,000 and 50,000 personnel organized
into two major transportation groups -- the 559th
which dates back to May (the fifth month) of 1959
and the 470th which was established as recently
as April (the fourth month) of 1970.
The logistic forces in south Laos operate with-
in a corridor 300 miles in length and from 50 to
75 miles wide containing about 1,500 miles of main
and bypass roads plus thousands of trails and two
waterways. In its northern reaches there are two
POL pipelines that have been constructed since 1968.
Sixteen Binh Trams now extend throughout South Laos
(see Figure 1) each functioning as a regimental-size
authority controlling personnel and supply movements
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Economic Research and coordinated within CIA.
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Disposition of the 559th and 410th Transportation Groups in the Laotian Panhandle
Fal
Mou
Nong
Mu Gi
Pass
Ban Karai
_P;3ss
LA0S 4Fwd72
CAMBODIA
.. .,,;Birth Trarp of the; 0,59th
50 Birth Tram af the 410th
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through a specific geographic area. Each Binh Tram
has subordinate to it the necessary transportation,
engineer, infantry, medical, and air defense ele-
ments needed to carry out its responsibilities.
This memorandum provides a current assessment
of the communist logistic forces in south Laos and
provides an historical review of their development
from 1959 to 1970 (see Appendix A). A chronology
of significant events in the development of the
559th is contained in Appendix B.
Strengths
1. Communist logistics strength in the Laotian
Panhandle is now centered on two organizational en-
tities: the long-established 559th Transportation
Group, and the recently established 470th Transpor-
tation Group. The estimated combined strength of
both groups is about 40,000 to 50,000 men with
about three-fourths of the total forces assigned
to the 559th. Administratively, the groups are
divided into Binh Trams. The subordination of
identified battalions is given in Tables 1 and 2.
2. The tabulation below shows the growth of
logistics personnel operating in the Laotian Pan-
handle for selected years since 1959.
Year
Personnel Strength
1959
400
- 500
1961
2,000
- 2,500
1963
3,500
- 4,500
1967
10,000
- 13,000
1968
20,000
- 30,000
1969
30,000
- 40,000
1970
40,000
- 50,000
Growth during the last 11 years has been rapid,
but most striking during the 1967-68 period, at
which time the North Vietnamese undertook a rapid
buildup of men and supplies to meet the quickening
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Currently Identified Battalions Subordinate to Binh Trams of the 559th Transportation Group a/
Antiaircraft
Communications
Tram
Area of Operations
Artillery
Engineer
Transport
Liaison
9
Western DMZ input corridor
4th
94th
878th
from North Vietnam
7th
337th
16th
668th
17th
24th
from North Vietnam
770th
14
Ban Karai Pass input corridor
13th
13th
52nd
7th
from North Vietnam
17th
24th
781st
21st
335th
29th/42nd
27
Western DMZ input corridor
35th
161st
(Se Bang Hieng River) from
18th
162nd
North Vietnam
34th
163rd
31
Route 23/238 area south of
14th
27th
Muong Phine
9 3rd
32
Route 91/914/917 Complex north
1st
31st
60th
9th
of Tchepone
12th
35th
102nd
16th
69th
990th
22nd
33
Route 9/914 southeast of
20th
71st
61st
Tchepone
26th
965th
34 b/
South of Muong Nong along
10th
29th
51st
Route 92 and 922
44th
101st
35
Ban Bac area Route 92/96
6th
5th
59th
12th
32nd
41st
162nd
43rd
41
Route 9/925/926 exit corridor
to South Vietnam
4th
8th
1st
2nd
54th
14th
28th
39th
73rd
75th
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Currently Identified Battalions Subordinate to Binh Trams of the 559th Transportation Group a/
(Continued)
Binh Antiaircraft Communications 25X1
Tram Area of Operations Artillery Engineer Transport Liaison
42 Route 922 exit corridor to 2nd 4th 55th 15th
South Vietnam 36th 37th
45th
47th
a. A dash indicates that battalions of this type have not been identified. There are additional units
that may be under the control of the 559th, but not subordinate to its Binh Trams. These include the
24B (4th Battalion only) and 48th Infantry Regiments; elements of the 4th, 10th, and 98th Engineer
Regiments; and elements of the 282nd and 591st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments. The status of other
units such as the 141st Infantry and 675B Artillery Regiments is not clear, but they may also be asso-
ciated with the 559th.
Overall strength estimates given in paragraph 2 were derived by aggregating the reported strengths
of units associated with the 559th. Where reported strengths were lacking, force levels were estimated
by averaging the reported strengths for each type of unit and applying that average to the number of
units of that type associated with the 559th. A net addition of 10,000 men were added to the 1970
estimate, reflecting personnel infiltration data carried in the 5,000 series, which identify groups
destined for southern Laos probably for the 559th and 470th.
b. Also subordinate to Binh Tram 34 are the 26th and 133rd Signal Battalions that have the responsi-
bility for stringing and maintaining land lines. There are probably signal battalions attached to
other Binh Trams that have not been identified.
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Identified Battalions Subordinate to Binh Trams of the 470th Transportation Group a/
Binh
Antiaircraft
Communications
Tram
Area of Operations
Artillery
Engineer
Transport
Liaison
36
Chavane area, Route 96 and 165
40th
341st
972nd
-
37
Junction of Route 96 and 110
30th
2nd
58th
16th
east of Attopeu
38th
50
Possibly along the Se Kong
River south of Attopeu
51
Unlocated; probably in Cambodia
54
Unlocated; probably in Cambodia
a. A dash indicates that battalions of this type have not been identified.
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pace of the war in the South. The net increase that
occurred in 1970 was the result of the emergence of
the 470th and the augmentation of the 559th.
3. In addition to the 559th and the 470th, two
other major military commands operate in southern
Laos - the 565th Group and the 968th Front. The
565th serves both as the senior NVA administrative
authority in south Laos and as the adviser to Pathet
Lao forces. The 968th Front is responsible for
ground security in the Panhandle and controls most
of the infantry units there.
Response to Cambodia
4. The current deployment of enemy logistics
forces, as shown on Figure 1, reflects adjustments
that the North Vietnamese instituted shortly after
the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the Allied
incursions into Cambodia last spring. At that
time the 559th Group, after apparently completing
its mission for the 1969-70 dry season, was pre-
paring to withdraw many of its units to North Viet-
nam as had been done in the 1967 and 1969 wet
seasons. This intention changed abruptly with the
Allied cross-border operations into Cambodia. The
operation had a telling impact on the enemy in at
least two respects. First, he was forced to abandon
sizable stockpiles of supplies as his forces with-
drew deeper into Cambodia. Second, and perhaps more
important over the longer term, the cross-border
operations established a new precedent which the
enemy feared might lead to similar Allied operations
in southern Laos.
5. On the basis of these considerations, Hanoi
decided to keep most of the 559th Transportation
Group in the Laotian Panhandle during the 1970 wet
season. The group would remain not only to carry
additional supplies south if needed but also to
protect the lines of communication (LOCs) through
south Laos in the event of Allied attack. The
security of the route through the Laotian Panhandle,
now the only avenue for large-scale movement of
arms and ammunition to their forces, was critical
if the Communists were to maintain a credible mili-
tary posture.
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6. Hanoi's decision to keep the 559th in the
Laotian Panhandle during the entire wet season was
not based on the expectation of moving supplies
through the system in amounts sufficient to replace
those lost to the Allied cross-border operations.
The 559th's actions during the wet season indicate
that Hanoi had three things in mind: (a) to pro-
vide security for the system as protection against
Allied incursions, (b) to be in a position to get
the dry season logistics program off to an early
start in the fall, and (c) to make use of the entry
route through the western DMZ -- the shortest route
structure subject to air interdiction -- for the
movement of supplies that would be needed within
the system during the wet season.
7. An initial adjustment by the enemy was to
deploy seven or eight engineer, transportation,
and antiaircraft artillery battalions from the
northern Panhandle to the central Panhandle adjacent
to the entry corridor around the DMZ. Units of the
559th remaining in the Mu Gia Pass area not tasked
with security were allowed to withdraw to North
Vietnam, and the Binh Tram in the area was tempor-
arily deactivated. At about the same time, large-
scale supply movement into south Laos through the
Ban Karai Pass was ended. As the wet season in
the Panhandle continued, the level of supply ship-
ments declined. Worsening weather and continued
air strikes reduced the trafficability of the
roadnet causing continued POL shortages, especially
in the southern portion of the Panhandle. While
available evidence indicates that the,quantity of
supplies moved was somewhat below that planned for
the wet season, the 559th did move sufficient quanti-
ties both to support an increase in the combat
structure of forces in the Panhandle and to increase
its own personnel strength. This expansion of forces
enabled increased security of the LOCs and facili-
tated efforts of the 559th to take on the additional
burden of supporting Communist forces in the COSVN
area who previously were supplied from Cambodia.
8. As the dry season of 1970-71 approached,
the 559th began to redeploy many of its units in
anticipation of the heavy workload ahead. Elements
of Binh Tram (BT) 31 formerly located on the road-
net just south of Mu Gia Pass were relocated south
of Muong Phine where Route 23 intersects with the
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Se Bang Hieng River. BT 38 formerly located at
the intersection of Route 110, the Se Kong River,
and the Cambodian border was relocated north to
Ban Phone apparently to receive supplies from BT
31 via the Route 16/23 complex. The new deployment
of BT 38 also meant that it now could receive
supplies shipped from BT 35 in Ban Bac via the
northern Se Kong River and transship them again on
the river to the Attopeu area.
three new Binh Trams
numbered 50, 51, and 54. At least one of these
Binh Trams (BT 50) is believed to be located in
the area south of Attopeu along the Se Kong River
and Route 110`.' If the enemy has adhered to past
practices of sequential numbering of Binh Trams,
it is likely that the higher numbered Binh Trams
in the 50 series are deployed further south, pos-
sibly along Route 97 in Cambodia. While informa-
tion concerning the function and geographic control
of the 470th is limited, it is believed to control
all known Communist logistic operations south of
the Ban Bac area, including BTs 36, 37, and 38 and
those in the 50 series. Moreover, the location
of the Binh Trams in the 50 series suggests that
the primary mission of the group is to support
enemy operations in Cambodia.
11. Although the present command relationship
between the 559th and 470th is not clear, we
believe that both have equal status in that they
each report directly to the General Directorate of
Rear Services (GDRS) in Hanoi and have ultimate
responsibility for their own area of,operations.
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12. Even while reorganizing, the 559th con-
tinued to prepare the Panhandle logistics system
for the dry season. By mid-November its roadnet
was operational, and extensive construction was
under way on new support and storage facilities.
New bypass routes were constructed in the Chavane
and Ban Bac areas and a connector road between
Route 1032B and 925 was built. By mid-January 1971
the general transportation offensive of the 1970-71
dry season was under way, and very large quantities
of supplies were moving south through its area of
responsibility.
Prospects
13. During the next few months the 559th can
be expected to continue to attempt to improve the
logistics system in the northern and central Pan-
handle. New bypass routes probably will be con-
structed and antiaircraft artillery defenses
improved. The 559th may also upgrade infantry units
assigned to protect its Binh Trams from companies
to battalions in the wake of continued harassment
of their LOCs by friendly irregular forces.
14. With respect to the 470th, it may attempt
to open Route 16 around the Bolovens Plateau from
Ban Phone to Attopeu, providing that the 968th
front gives it adequate security against friendly
guerrilla operations staged from the eastern rim
of the Plateau. In addition, it probably will also
reopen Route 97 which runs from the terminus of
Route 110 in Laos along the Tonle Kong River into
Cambodia and on to Siem Pang. This route coupled
with the existing route structure in Cambodia will
probably provide a direct truckable route from
southern Laos to Communist forces operating in the
Kratie region of Cambodia. Once this route is
operating, the 470th can be expected to begin sub-
stantial supply shipments to COSVN, the major con-
trol authority for Communist forces operating in
southern Indochina. If the responsibility of the
470th is to extend into Cambodia, however, its
structure and personnel strength will probably
require significant upgrading. In this connection,
since early September, some 5,700 personnel have
been observed in the infiltration pipeline destined
for the 470th.
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Historical Review of the 559th Transportation Group
This appendix essentially reviews and highlights
factors underlying the development of the 559th
Transportation Group from early in 1959 to May 1970.
The 1959-61 Period
1. In May 1959 the 559th Transportation Group
was established, consisting of a small headquarters
staff located in Hanoi and one operational subordi-
nate, Battalion 70, located at Ho Village in the
southwestern portion of Quang Binh Province, North
Vietnam. The headquarters staff was primarily
responsible for coordinating the activities of the
70th Battalion with General Directorate of Rear
Services elements responsible for supply movements
within North Vietnam. The 70th Battalion, with a
strength of about 500 men, was responsible for the
actual infiltration of men and material from North
Vietnam into South Vietnam.
2. Coincident with the formation of the
National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLFSV)
in January 1961, the rate of infiltration into South
Vietnam increased sharply. In February, Battalion
70 was redesignated Group 70 and its strength was
increased to about 2,000 men, making it a regimen-
tal-size unit. Subsequently, it has often been
referred to as the 70th Transportation Regiment of
the 559th Group.
3. By the end of 1961, Group 70 contained two
communications-liaison battalions, two infantry
companies, a political staff, and a rear services
staff. The first communications-liaison battalion
was responsible for ten communications-liaison or
T stations* numbered 1 to 10 which were located
along the infiltration route from just north of the
DMZ southwest to the Ban Dong area of Laos. The
communications-liaison or T station is a small
way station for the support of personnel moving
by foot through the infiltration system.
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second communications-liaison battalion was also
responsible for a series of ten T stations; these
were numbered 11 to 20 and ran along the infiltra-
tion route from Ban Dong into Thua Thien Province
in South Vietnam. Both the first and second
communications-liaison battalions had an estimated
strength of about 800 men, with the size of subord-
inate T stations ranging from 60 to 80 men.
4. The 70th Group had two independent infantry
companies directly subordinate to its headquarters
that provided route security. The first infantry
company protected the infiltration route from
attack by ARVN forces operating out of the area
currently known as Military Region 1. The second
infantry company, located in the Tchepone area of
Laos, protected the route from attack by the Laotian
troops of General Phoumi-Nosavan.
5. During this period the personnel infiltra-
tion route of the 70th Group originated at Ho Vil-
lage and ran south along the Long Dai River toward
Mountain 1001. From Mountain 1001 the trail moved
through the western end of the DMZ into Laos.
After entering Laos the route turned southward
paralleling the Lao-South Vietnamese border and
continued into the Ban Dong area where it crossed
Route 9. Below Route 9 the trail extended along
the present alignment of Routes 92 and 922 into
Thua Thien Province, South Vietnam.
6. By the end of 1961 the Communists in
Southern Laos and South Vietnam were being supplied
from North Vietnam through Laos by primitive
transport* on trails and inland waterways. The
supply transport route followed the Se Bang Hieng
River valley around the end of the DMZ to the
Tchepone area of Laos. Supplies were moved further
south from the Tchepone area on foot trails or in
native water craft on the Se Kong River.
The 1962-65 Period
7. In 1962 the Communists in South Vietnam
began receiving increasing support from North Viet-
nam via Laos. For its part the 559th expanded the
capacity of the Laotian infiltration system by
A Primitive transport includes the movement of
supplies by porters, bicycles, and pack animals.
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constructing new roads and improving the existing
infiltration trails. This added capability sup-
ported a major change in Communist strategy from
an internally supported insurgency to an externally
supported war involving major combat units.
8. To provide increasing external support for
South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese began improving
Route 15/12 through Mu Gia Pass and began construc-
tion of Route 23 in Laos.* This new road ran from
the terminus of Route 12 as far south as the Muong
Phine area where it intersected with Route 9.
Since Route 9, constructed by the French years
earlier, ran from the Muong Phine area east through
Tchepone to Ban Dong, the supply road through Mu
Gia Pass was now linked with the personnel infil-
tration trail which ran from the western DMZ through
Ban Dong. Thus, by the end of 1962 the Communists
had a truckable route from Mu Gia Pass to as far
south as Ban Dong.
9. Early in 1963 the Communists also began to
make improvements in their personnel infiltration
system in the North Vietnamese Panhandle. They
constructed a new road, Route 103, as far south as
the DMZ area to shorten the distance infiltrators
would have to walk inside North Vietnam. After
1963, infiltrators entered the 559th portion of
the infiltration route at Station T-1** just north
of Mountain 1001 above the DMZ.
10. In order to expedite the movement of men
and supplies to South Vietnam, the 70th Group,
formerly located at Ho Village, North Vietnam,
moved to the Ban Dong area of Laos where the supply
and personnel infiltration routes joined. In addi-
tion, the 70th Group ceased to operate the infiltra-
tion system beyond the junction of Routes 92 and 922.
The route beyond this area was taken over by a new
559th subordinate, the 71st Group.
11. The 71st Group was formed from infiltra-
tors from North Vietnam and former cadres of
Group 70. It was headquartered approximately 10
miles east of the present junction of Routes 92
and 922 and was responsible for at least 14 T
* For details on the southern Laos road network,
see Figure 2
** Also known as Station 70.
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 NR~NCARY.'.
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stations which ran in a southeasterly direction
along the Lao-South Vietnamese border into Quang
Nam Province. The 71st Group is believed to have
been organized into four battalions with a person-
nel strength of 1,500 to 2,500 men.
12. The route structure in the area of the 71st
Group's operations was substantially improved and
expanded during the 1962-65 period. In February
1963, for example, the former cart path from Ban
Dong to Muong Nong was made truck passable and
turned into a main supply artery, identified as
strategic Route 92. Later that same year construc-
tion on extensions of Route 92 south of Muong
Nong began. Now called 922, this new route ran
from Muong Nong in a southeastern direction to the
Se La Mang River and continued on to the South
Vietnamese border north of the A Shau Valley. In
November 1964, at the end of the rainy season in
Laos, the North Vietnamese began extending Route
92 south from the Muong Nong area. Construction
on this route was continued through the 1965 wet
season, and by the end of 1965 the Communists had
a road extending more than 30 miles further to the
Ban Bac area.
13. In order to gain maximum benefit from the
improving Viet Cong situation in the South, Hanoi
began the infiltration of at least three regular
North Vietnamese Army regiments to South Vietnam
in the 1964-65 dry season. These units, which
proceeded along the infiltration route maintained
by the 559th, entered South Vietnam then moved
south to the Central Highlands. At the same time,
Hanoi began to upgrade the firepower of Communist
main force units in South Vietnam by progressively
arming them with a standard family of small arms
using one caliber of ammunition and by providing
them with more modern supporting arms. This con-
version shifted the logistic burden from sources
of supply inside South Vietnam, such as captured
Allied ammunition, to sources outside South Viet-
nam. Thereafter, the Communists were required to
send substantial quantities of arms and ammunition
to South Vietnam on a continuing basis.
14. In 1965 the headquarters of the 559th
relocated from the Hanoi area to the North Viet-
namese Panhandle. This move was probably prompted
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by the need to provide closer coordination for the
surging level of shipments into Laos. By the end
of 1965 the 559th had expanded into a truck trans-
portation unit in addition to its portering and
personnel infiltration functions.
1966 and 1967
15. During 1966 and 1967 the 559th rapidly
expanded both its area of operation and its logis-
tics capability. This expansion underscored both
the increasing pace of the war in the South and the
increased effectiveness of Operation Market Time
which greatly reduced the Communists'- capability to
infiltrate supplies directly into South Vietnam by
.yea.
16. To perform this expanded role, the 559th
was completely reorganized. By late 1966, its
headquarters deployed into the Laotian Panhandle
for the first time. Moreover, a series of Binh
Trams (BT) were established to replace the 70th
and 71st Groups. Each BT had subordinate transpor-
tation, engineer, infantry, medical, and air defense
elements to insure the expeditious movement and
protection of men and material in its area of
responsibility. They acted as geographical control
authorities for personnel and logistic movement
through a specific area. In order to simplify the
administrative structure of the new BT system, the
route for personnel infiltration was shifted from
the western DMZ to the roadnet through Ban Karai
Pass.* The T stations formerly subordinate to the
70th and 71st Groups were resubordinated to the
various BTs, and additional stations were added to
cover the southward expansion of the personnel
infiltration route in Laos. The responsibility
for personnel moving through the Panhandle on foot
remained with the T stations, while the control of
truck movements was handled directly by the BTs
themselves. This division of responsibilities en-
hanced the security of the overall system. For
example, most of the infiltrated personnel captured
in South Vietnam have had very little knowledge of
the supply transport system.
". Route 912 was constructed through the Ban Karai
Pass in May 1966.
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17. During 1966, construction of new roads in
the Laotian Panhandle took place at a rapid pace.
In addition to Route 912, another new road, Route
911, was constructed, reducing transit distance
from the Mu Gia Pass to Tchepone by one-third.
This road also intersected with Route 912 coming
from Ban Karai. Another new road designated Route
913 was constructed bypassing Tchepone to the
south and intersecting with Route 92 just north of
Muong Nong. This new route bypassed Ban Dong, the
former hub of the infiltration system in the Pan-
handle. Route 922 running east from Muong Nong
was extended east into South Vietnam where it joined
Route 548 which ran south via the A Shau Valley.
Below Ban Bac, Route 96 was constructed from the
terminus of Route 92, running south through Chavane
toward the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam. Just north of the tri-border,
Route 96 intersected with another new route,
Route 110. Constructed in an east-west direction
along the southern border of Laos from the tri-
border area to the Se Kong River, Route 110 joined
another new road, Route 97, running into Cambodia.
18. Along this rapidly expanding route struc-
ture, eight BTs were deployed with the following
responsibilities*: BT-1 for the area along Route
911 from just below Mu Gia Pass south to its inter-
section with Route 912; BT-2 for the route struc-
ture from Route 912 south through Tchepone; and
BT-3 for movement along Route 92 to its junction
with :Route 922. Whereas movements from the junc-
tion of Routes 922 and 92 to South Vietnam were
under the jurisdiction of BT-4, those closer to the
South Vietnam border area were controlled by BT-7
located in the A Shau Valley.
19. Although movement along Route 92 south of
its junction with Route 922 was also controlled by
BT-4-for a short distance, most of this route was
controlled by BT-5, located in the Ban Bac area.
Movements along Route 96 into and through the
Chavane area were the responsibility of BT-6 which
also moved men and material into South Vietnam
over Route 165/966.
* These eight BTs had a total of 15 transportation
battalions, 9 antiaircraft artillery battalions,
13 engineer battalions, and several independent
companies,
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20. In the southernmost portion of the Laotian
Panhandle, BT-8 had the primary mission for receiv-
ing and transshipping supplies moving into the
Laotian Panhandle from Cambodia. These supplies
were forwarded to units operating in the southern
Panhandle or to the B-3 Front area of South Vietnam.
Some supplies were also moved to BT-8 down Route
96 by BT-6 at Chavane.
21. During the summer wet season of 1967 the
headquarters of the 559th and most of its personnel
withdrew from the Laotian Panhandle back into North
Vietnam. Only a detached element, later known as
the Forward Headquarters 559th, remained to conduct
housekeeping operations during the wet season. By
November the 559th had returned to Laos to begin
preparations for the dry season.
22. During the dry season the Communists
dramatically increased the flow of men and material
to South Vietnam to support the offensive planned
for Tet 1968. Most of the personnel and supply
shipments were destined for Communist forces
operating in I Corps, South Vietnam, which includes
Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and
Quang Ngai Provinces. Prior to the planned offen-
sives, supplies were stockpiled in Laos near the
border, both to shorten the supply lines in the
Khe Sanh area and to enable the forces to maintain
themselves during the offensive. To the south the
Communists developed a major logistic complex in
the A Shau Valley during 1967 to support forces
in the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and Military
Region 5 in South Vietnam. Supplies moving through
the A Shau Valley were destined either for the Hue
area or were moved south into Military Region 5 for
units operating around Da Nang and further south
along the coast. By the end of 1967 the expanded
route and logistic structure in the southern Pan-
handle enabled the Communists to supply arms and
ammunition to the B-3 Front overland from North Viet-
nam.
The 1968 - April1970 Period
23. High levels of personnel infiltration
continued through the summer wet season to provide
replacement for the heavy casualties taken by the
Communists during the 1968 offensives. To meet
this need, most of the 559th's units remained in
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the Laotian Panhandle during the wet season for
the first time.
24, After the failure of the large offensives
of Tet and May and the abortive effort in August
1968, the Communists abandoned the strategy of
large unit warfare. They returned to 'a strategy
of protracted warfare centered on indirect attacks
by fire rather than large unit engagements. This
new strategy relieved some of the strain on the
enemy's logistics system, giving him time to re-
build his depleted personnel strength.
25. In the fall of 1968 the 559th was reorga-
nized again This reorganization was aimed at
providing greater redundancy in the Panhandle
logistics system because of a sudden and substantial
upsurge in the level of Allied air attacks in southern
Laos. These attacks disrupted supply movements,
causing significant logistic problems for the enemy.
In adjusting to this situation the Communists doubled
the number of BTs to 16 and reduced somewhat the area
of responsibility of each. The BTs were renumbered
and were relocated. The transportation, engineering,
and antiaircraft strengths of the BTswere increased,
new bypass roads were constructed, and a POL pipeline
was extended into the Laotian Panhandle through the
Mu Gia Pass.
26. By early January 1969 the reinforcement
and reorganization of the 559th had enabled the
Communists to alleviate many of their logistic
problems and resulted in increasingly large numbers
of vehicles moving south on the major supply routes.
The overall effectiveness of this reorganization
was indicated in a message from the Deputy Director
of Rear Services in Hanoi to the 559th which stated
that the 559th had achieved a great victory and
that the volume of supplies moved to South Vietnam
had attained a new high in February.
27. By late May 1969 the enemy apparently felt
that adequate levels of supplies and personnel had
been delivered to their forces in the south. They
began to withdraw units of the 559th from the
Laotian Panhandle and to close down logistic opera-
tions there as they had done in 1967. By July 1969,
at least half and probably more of the 559th forces
had returned to North Vietnam.
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28. During October and November 1969 the
headquarters and large numbers of personnel of the
559th returned to the Laotian Panhandle. Initially
activity focused on the restoration of the road-
net which was opened for through traffic to South
Vietnam by the end of November. An intensive pro-
gram also was launched for constructing a new ac-
cess route through the western DMZ area. By
December 1969, Route 1036, which now connected the
North Vietnamese Panhandle through the Ban Raving
Pass with the Tchepone area in Laos, was sustaining
vehicle traffic. In addition, the North Vietnamese
established a second POL pipeline into the Laotian
Panhandle. This one ran through the western DMZ
area toward Tchepone. The new western DMZ road and
POL pipeline substantially reduced the 559th's
logistics burden in the northern Panhandle. Sup-
plies now could be shipped as far south as the DMZ
in the sanctuary of North Vietnam, thus reducing
their vulnerability to Allied air attack.
29. By early December the logistics system in
the Laotian Panhandle was operational and the 559th
began a series of "crash" programs to move supplies
to South Vietnam. These programs, however, gave
way to the "General Transportation Offensive" which
continued from December 1969 through April 1970,
with shipments at substantially higher levels than
ever before.
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Chronolog of Ke Events
.in t e Deve opment
of the 559th Transportation Group
May
1959 The 559th is formed with one operational unit,
the 70th Battalion,.
Feb 1961 The 70th Battalion is reinforced to a
regimental-size unit and redesignated the
70th Group,
Dec 196,2 A truckable roadway is completed from Mu Gia
Pass into the Laotian Panhandle as far south
as Ban Dong?
Feb 1963 Another regimental-size unit, Group 71, is
added to the 559th structure.
Fall 1965 The headquarters of the 559th moves from Hanoi
into the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
Fall 1965 The roadnet in the Panhandle is extended as
far south as Ban Baca
Fall 1966 Operation Market Time drastically reduces
direct sea infiltration of Communist supplies
into South Vietnam.
May 1966 A new access route from North Vietnam into the
Laotian Panhandle is opened through Ban Karai
Pass .
Fall 1966 The roadnet in the Panhandle is extended south
of the tri-border of Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. The roadnet is also extended into
Cambodia along the Se Kong River.
Fall 1966 The headquarters of the 559th deploys to the
Laotian Panhandle for the first time.
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Dry
1966-
The 559th is reorganized with the 70th and 71st
season
1967
Groups being replaced by a series of eight
Binh Trams.
Summer
1967
During the wet season the headquarters of the
559th and most of its personnel withdraw
from the Panhandle back into North Vietnam,
leaving a detached element, later known as
the Forward Headquarters 559th, behind to
conduct housekeeping operations
Dry
1967-
The flow of men and material through the 559th
season.
1968
system increases dramatically in support of
the Tet, May, and August offensives of 1968.
Fa11
1968
The 559th reorganizes, and the number of its
Binh Trams doubles -- increasing from 8 to 16.
Summer
1968
Most of the 559th remains in the Panhandle
during the wet season to handle the high level
of personnel infiltrations
Dec
1969
A new access road is constructed from North
Vietnam around the western DMA into the Lao-
tian PanhandleA
Summer
1969
The 559th withdraws from the Panhandle during
the wet season
May
1970
The 559th prepares to withdraw from the Pan-
handle during the wet season but remains in
Laos, apparently in response to Allied incur-
sions into Cambodian
Oct
1970
The Forward Headquarters of the 559th reorga-
nizes into Headquarters Group 470 which takes
control of the Binh Trams south of Ban Baca
Oct-
1970
At least three new Binh Trams numbered 50, 51,
Dec
and 54 are detected in the southern Panhandle.
These units are believed to .have the mission
of supporting Communist forces in Cambodia,
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 25X1
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Secret
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DD/ OER
DATE
/~ ~~-~ ~
ROOM NO. I BUILDING
~F9~~ I tadars. I
1 FEB 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 Approved For Release 2006/03/06 :CIA-RDP78T02095R000400030001-2
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MORI/CDF this IM; pages 68-86
Intelligence Memorandum
Step~hed- Up Communist Resr~1fi~ily Campaign In Southern Laos
And Cambodia
Secret
ER IM 71-21
February 1971
Copy No.
~~
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 Approved For Rely'
CENTRAL I~dTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1971
Stepped-Up Communist Resupply Campaign
r In Southern Laos And Cambodia
Summary
Ever since the Allied incursions into Cambodia
and the closing of the port of F:ompong Som (for-
merly Sihanoukville) to Communist supplies, it has
been apparent that during this dry season Hanoi
would be facing its biggest logistic challenge in
the Laotian Panhandle to date. During the summer
and early fall, there were numerous indications
that the Communists recognized this challenge and
were taking concrete measures to meet it. These
steps included augmenting the logistical and
security forces in the Panhandle, establishing new
and realigning old logistical commands, and con-
tinued expansion of the route system. The kickoff
of the North Vietnamese logistical "great general
offensive?' in the Panhandle occurred on the night
of 4 January. Its purpose is to establish a
throughput of supplies from North Vietnam to South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
As the mid-point of the dry season approaches,
it is clear that the Cammunists are beset with a
number of problems and have already suffered sev-
eral significant setbacks. These problems are:
Note: This memorandum, the fourth in a series
analyzing Communist logistical activities in
southern Laos and Cambodia since October 1970,
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within CIA.
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a. The Communist resupply effort got
off to a poor start in October because of
unexpectedly heavy rains in the Panhandle
and intensive bombing of the entry cor-
ridors. This caused a month's delay in
starting the resupply effort in Laos.
b, The augmentation of Communist
security and logistical forces in the
Panhandle required a greater logistical
effort to prime the system than pre-
viously and means that much higher in-
ternal supply requirements in the Pan-
handle -- about 25~ greater than last
year -- must be met before a major
throughput can flow to South Vietnam and
Cambodia.
d. NVA/PL forces have failed to
clear Allied units from the Bolovens
Plateau, probably a prerequisite for
heavy use of the new western supply
route --Route 23/16 -- that had been
planned by the Communists.
e. Ground interdiction operations
by friendly irregular forces introduced
an element of uncertainty and concern
that Hanoi has not been troubled with
in years past.
The above problems in part explain why the
indicators of current throughput into South Vietnam
or Cambodia are relatively few despite the many
indications of high levels of logistical activity
alang the entry corridors into and within the Pan-
handle. However, the low level of identified
throughput is not entirely unexpected. In part
it reflects the normal surging of the system
whereby the heavy movement of supplies is first
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detected along the entry routes and gradually
moves south through the Panhandle and then on
the exit routes from Laos. It is still too early
to predict how successful the North Vietnamese
will be in meeting their current logistic challenge
fo.r the season as a whole, but, barring unforeseen
circumstances, the indicators of supply throughput
should rise significantly within a few weeks.
Logistical Developments in the Laos Panhandle
Recent Organizational Adjustments
559th Transportation
Group TG , was re esignated Headquarters, 470th
TG, following its relocation to the tri-border
area in October? At the time of the initial move
of the Forward Headquarters from Ban Bac to the
Binh Tram 37 area, it was believed that the Forward
Headquarters was colocated with the Headquarters,
470th TG. Apparently, the experienced cadre of
the 559th TG Forward Headquarters, which super-
vised logistic operations in the southern Pan-
handle last dry season, were used to form the
command structure of the newly organized group.
As a result of the reorganization, the 470th TG
now exercises control over Binh Tram 36 south of
Chavane, Binh Tram 37 in the tri-border area, and
Binh Tram 38 at Ban Phone, in addition to main-
taining control aver the 50 series of Binh Trams.
The 470th TG is now the primary logistics authority
in extreme southern Laos and in northern Cambodia.
Since early September, some 5,700 personnel have
been observed in the infiltration pipeline des-
tined for the 470th TG.
2. Binh Tram 31, which relocated to Route
23/16 (see Figure 1, inside back covert to estab-
lish the new 559th TG-controlled north-south
supply corridor through the western Panhandle,
may have been split into equal elements recently.
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 Approved For Releas
the Binh Tram was re-
erre o as Bin Tram and Binh Tram 31B, the
Headquarters element probably being A and the
Forward Headquarters being B. Such a division
would mean that Binh Trams 31A and B would func-.
tion as autonomous entities -- a reasonable step
because of the great distance between Binh Tram 31
and Binh Tram 38, particularly if the Communists
still plan to move large quantities of supplies
vii the Route 23/16 corridor.
3. In mid-January, the 83rd Engineer Regiment
with 700 personnel was observed moving south
through the Chavane area. The regiment, which
operated in the central Panhandle last dry season,
is destined to be subordinate to the B-3 Front.
A relocation to the Western Highlands of South
Vietnam (the B-3 Front's normal area of opera-
tions) would be highly unusual because of-the
continued need for additional construction along
the Route 110/97 road complex into northern
Cambodia toward Stung Treng. Thus the regiment
may be earmarked for construction duty with B-3
Front elements that were shifted to Laos or
Cambodia -- either along Route 110 or in the
Stung Treng area. Alternatively, if assigned to
South Vietnam, the relocation may indicate that
the Communists intend to open a second major over-
land route south through Cambodia from the Binh
Tram 37 area. In any event, accelerated road
construction in extreme southern Laos and/or
northern Cambodia is likely in the near future.
Status of Logistical Facilities
4. The Communists continued to restore and
improve parts of their Panhandle logistics system
iniDecember and January. By early January the
system appeared fully operational, as evidenced
by the following developments:
-- Additional bypasses had been
built in the entry corridors;
-- Anew north-south artery,
Route 99, was opened south
of Muong Nong;
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-- Much of Route 23/16 had been
opened;
-- Waterborne supply shipments
had resumed on the Se Bang
Hieng and Se Kong; and
-- Most exit routes into South
Vietnam and Cambodia were
reopened and were being
lightly used.
5. In December the observed truck traffic
in the Panhandle was largely concentrated between
the four entry points and the Tchepone-Muong Nong
staging areas, with enemy trucks mainly using the
heavily canopied western routes, permitting opera-
tions during daylight hours. In early January,
aerial reconnaissance recorded a surge of logistic
traffic from North Vietnam and along the major
roads and waterways into southern Laos. The four
access routes from North Vietnam showed increasingly
heavy truck traffic moving across the border.
Sightings of large numbers of trucks in North Viet-
nam headed south toward Laos became more frequent.
On 12 January, waterborne shipments of supplies on
the Se Bang Hieng flowing out of the Western DMZ
resumed. Pilots observed 200-300 containers
floating in the river -- the first indication of
use of this river since the channel guide system
was rebuilt in early December.
6. During the week ending 4 January, a number
of developments reflected increasing activity fur-
ther south in the Panhandle. Enemy lines of com-
munication south of the Tchepone-Muong Nong
staging areas began evidencing heavy use according
to aerial reconnaissance: for the first time this
dry season, lines of communication south of Ban
Bac began to reflect heavy truck traffic. Route
92/96 still appears to be the primary artery into
extreme southern Laos. Forward air controllers
(PACs) began reporting fresh repair activity and
road grading along Route 96 and parts of Route 110.
They also reported construction of a channel
guide control system along a 40-50 mile long seg-
ment of the Se Kong between Ban Bac and Ban Phone.
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Newly constructed Route 99 between Muong Nong and
Ban'Bac also reflected increasing activity. New
trunk pull-offs and connector roads continued to
be built, numerous antiaircraft positions were
prepared along the route, and two new ferry
crossings were constructed to provide access
across the Se Kong to the Route 92/96 corridor.
_~T Recent reports on the status of Route
23/16 are scarce, but villagers living between
Saravane and Ban Thateng have reported substan-
tial numbers of trucks carrying supplies moving
southward Most of the vehicle activity detected
on Route 23/16 thus far this dry season probably
has been in support of enemy operations against
friendly positions on and near the Bolovens
Plateau. In late December, FACs reported that a
20-mile long bypass road had been recently re-
oper~ed west of Saravane, making the route motor-
able from Muong Phine to Ban Phone. However,
aerial reconnaissance in late December over the
southern parts of Route 23/16 (north of Ban Phone)
continued to reflect only light vehicle use. South
of ]3an Phone the routes were not being used by
vehicles. Concurrent with the resumption of use
of the Se Bang Hieng, pilots began detecting
numerous floating bundles in the Se Kong between
Ban`Bac and Ban Phone? These supplies (probably
rice) presumably are transshipped to trucks or
bows near Ban Phone and sent to dispersed. storage
sites or moved directly to the Cambodian border.
8c Aerial reconnaissance during January along
the: Laotian-South Vietnamese border indicated that
all. the motorable exit routes* were open. .Reporting
by ~"ACs indicates that Route 926 leading toward
the A Shau Valley has been sustaining traffic on
both sides of the border since mid-December.
Route 922 has evidenced the sharpest surge in exit
route activity: heavy sustained vehicle use was
reported by FACs during the first week of January.
Exit Routes 925 and 165/966 also were reported in
'~~ate~Deeember photography continued to show
Rou-te y east of the Route 9/92 junction to be in
disuse and heavGy overgrown Considerable work
zsouZd have to be done to make the. road motarabZe.
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good condition, but as of mid-January showed
little sign of vehicle activity near the border,
as did that. part of Route 110 leading toward
South VietnamT
A semi ar cur ai men in ranspor ac ivi y was
also noted at the same time last year, just prior
to the big transportation push.
T ~s year s o ensive egan at t o same
ime as ast year's, indicating that the logistics
advantage gained by leaving most of the 559th TG
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 Approved For Rele
in'the Panhandle during the 1970 wet season was
lost, probably because of the unusual heavy rains
in the latter half of October and intensified US
bombing.
12. Further south in the Panhandle, logistic
activity also picked up considerably with .the
initiation of the "general offensive." Binh Tram
41 shipped 68 tons of supplies to South Vietnam
via Route 926/616 from 30 December through
20 January. Binh Tram 33 received 120 tons of
supplies on 8 and 9 January. Binh Tram 3I, which
also was participating in the offensive, was re-
cently praised by the 559th TG for outstanding
accomplishments. Apparently, the Plorth Vietnamese
will attempt to move trucks south from Binh Tram 31
through Binh Tram 38 despite the continued govern-
ment presence on the Bolovens Plateau. Waterway
shipments on the Se Kong are also being used to
supplement vehicle activity. Substantial quanti-
ties of rice are being transported by water from
Binh Tram 35 to Binh Tram 38. Binh Tram 37 was
congratulated on 27 January for having achieved
100$ of its transportation quota for the $-3
Front for an unspecified period.
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 Approved For Relea
13. The overall composition of cargo detected
moving during the early stages of the offensive
indicates a decrease in emphasis on food and a
priority on gasoline shipments. Of the 2,811 tons
of supplies shipped from Binh Tram 14 to Binh
Tram 32 for the period :L-20 January, 1,549 tons --
55~ -- was food, a sharp decrease from the 77~
of total shipments noted moving during late
November and early December. POL, on the other
hand, accounted for 31~ -- 865 tons -- of the
total, well above-the dry season average of about
15~. Arms, equipment, and ammunition shipments
accounted for 397 tons -- 14~ -- substantially
below the 20~-25~ noted in previous dry seasons.
14. Despite the large volume of supplies
moving into the Panhandle from North Vietnam in
early January, the enemy continues to have dif-
ficulties operating his logistic system. Trans-
portation difficulties were evident along the
Se Bang Hieng when shipments were halted for
three days between two points as a result of air
strikes. A similar situation occurred on the Se
Kong where air strikes on a transshipment point
on 13 January destroyed cargo nets requiring two
days to repair.
15. The largest quantity of cargo ever de-
stroyed by air strikes in the Panhandle
Allie air
strikes against the "H-1 warehouse" near Ban Bac,
the largest known storage facility in the southern.
Panhandle, destroyed 900 tons of supplies and
forced the Communists to abandon the facility.
Following in the wake of the one-month delay in
launching their dry season supply push, the neu-
tralization of H-1 in this critical area of the
Panhandle was a further setback for the North
Vietnamese.
16. The failure to secure the Bolovens
Plateau, which would have permitted complete use
of the western route structure, apparently has
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 Approved For Relea
forced some change in the North Vietnamese trans-
portation effort.
T e rou a was
scie uled to carry 60~ of all supply shipments
from Binh Tram 33 to Binh Tram 34 south of Muong
Nong for an unspecified period. Construction of
this route probably was accelerated to facilitate
movement of large quantities of supplies initially
scheduled for transport on the western Route
23'16 corridor. Although the North Vietnamese
are still attempting to use the western corridor
during the current offensive, Routes 99 and 92/96
will probably carry most of the cargo moving into
the southern Panhandle for at least the next month
or so.
17. The move by the Communists to use Route 99
is being contested. On 13 January, four govern-
ment irregular battalions and four special teams,
a total of about 1,000 troops, were inserted by
helicopter and attacked Route 99 southwest of
Muong Nong.
Additional security forces as
well as the 141st Regiment were moved into the
area with orders to engage the "enemy" and clear
the area of government irregulars. A sustained
Allied presence along the Route 99 complex could
have a serious disruptive effect on the amount of
supplies being transported and the timing and
coordination of the supply offensive.
18. Sensor detections surged sharply on
5 January with the start of the "general offen-
sive" and through 15 January averaged 1,160 de-
tections per day -- slightly higher than a year
ago (see Figure 2). Since then, however, they
have dropped below last year's level. This has
occurred despite the fact that the number of
active sensors in place has increased substan-
tially -- 1,036 currently, compared with 550 in
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mid--January last year. As the enemy shifts his
traffic to counter US bombing, the frequency of
detections shifts also, particularly on the main
entry corridors into the Panhandle where extreme
fluctuations in detections occur. Since 5 Jan-
uary, there also has been a sharp increase in
detections in the southern Panhandle, notably on
Route 9?. north of Ban Bac and on its bypass,
Route 99. Sensor-detected truck traffic on the
roads south of Chavane :has been sporadic and
light.- Pilot sightings of trucks in the Pan-
handle also are below last year's level: overall,
sightings through 22 January were down some 20~,
but much of the shortfall may be attributed to a
substantial decrease in attack sorties from last
year's level.*
Developments in Cambodia
19. Although evidence of current enemy supply
flows into Cambodia continues to be sketchy and
incomplete, recent developments along Route 97
and the Tonle Kong in the Laos-Cambodia border
area suggest that supply inputs into Cambodia
from southern Laos may be increasing. Aerial
photography of late December and January indi-
cated that Route 97 -- the Cambodian extension. of
Laotian Route 110 and a key input corridor -- had
been refurbished by .the enemy and had begun to
sustain. light to moderate traffic. The photography
showed that new truck parks, transshipment points,
bypasses, and supply/storage areas had been de-
velo ed.
ruc
traffic moving in both directions throughout the
night. The Tonle Kong, which parallels Route 97
aYid has been frequently used by the VC/NVA in the
past, was also active during the period. New
road-water transshipment points were evident in
photography along its banks, and about 700 supply
containers were noted free-floating down the river
north of 5iem Pang. substantiate
enemy supply activity i.n a area
* Attack sorties in December -- the latest period
for which data are available -- were 17% beZo~a
those of a dear earlier.
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00400030001-2
ENEMY TRUCK DETECTIONS IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE
1 October to 22 January, 1:969-70 and 1970-]7
NOTE: Po"rots on thegraph represent daity average. of detectipns pert week. Data
are plotted in weekly increments.. Numbers of trucks are shown without
regard to direction of movement orbcation. Each method of detection
includes ernavoidatrfe multiple counting.
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Route 97* and the Tonle Kong have been used to
move medicine, ordnance, and food into Cambodia
from Attopeu since at least September. Siem Pang,
where additional storage facilities have been
noted in photography, and Stung Treng have been
reported as central supply points from which goods
radiate via truck, watercraft, oxcart, and bicycle
to Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, and Kratie in the
south and Virachei and the D-3 Front. to the east.
20. In related developments, aerial photog-
raphy of 28 December and 8 January showed new
clearing activity along segments of secondary roads
and trails in northern Cambodia. One area involved
is on the east bank of the Mekong about 25 miles
south of Stung Treng. This clearing activity
probably is a bypass around the 20-mile long Sambor
Rapids, a navigable but treacherous segment of
the Mekong. The development of this probable
bypass suggests that the enemy intends to increase
his use of the Mekong south of the evolving Route
97/Tonle Kong corridor into the Kratie-Chhlong
area. Extensive clearing has also been noted along
portions of trails north of Stung Treng. One
alignment forms a bypass for part of Route 13
just south of the Laos border and the other (west
of the Mekong) heads northeast off Route 126 toward
the river into an area of reported enemy supply
facilities. The strategic location of these new
segments generally follows past patterns of enemy
logistic improvements in Laos and North Vietnam
where several routes are developed around a key
corridor to increase overall capability and de-
crease the effectiveness of any interdiction
efforts.
21. The available evidence clearly indicates
that the enemy has improved his overall transport
capability and is probably filtering increased
quantities of supplies into Cambodia. Increased
security and logistic support for this important
corridor also was provided in early January when
the 52nd Regiment of the NVA 320th Division re-
located from southern Laos to northwest Stung
'~ 8 January aerial photography indicated that
the motorabZe limit of Route 97 was about 11 miles
north of Siem Pang.
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 Approved For Rele
Tx-eng Province, joining the 24th and 28th NVA
Regiments which have been there since last sum-
mer.
22. In southeast Cambodia, no changes in the
Communi.s t logis ti c apparatus have been noted
since early December. Groups 300, 400, and 500
(?~nd Rear Service Grouts 50 and 82, which moved
west into Cambodia at the time of the Allied incur--
s.ons) are still believed to be operating in the
Kf?atie-Chhlong area. The 41st Transportation
Regiment -- first observed in November -- operates
south of Chhlong into the Parrot's Beak, an area
where large-scale enemy logistic operations, supply
pt~ints, and rice collection efforts h ave been
noted. A recent raller has indicated that COSVN
.intends to consolidate the VC/NVA position in the
provinces of Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, and Svay
Ri.eng and to "control" Kompong Cham City. Control
of this region would enable the VC/NVA to put con-
tinued pressure on Phnom Penh and to extend opera-
tions west of the Mekong as well as providing
access to Military Regions 3 and 4 in South
Vietnam. To date, the enemy has been able to
achieve relatively free. movement in this region*
and has been successful in establishing a fledgling
cammandjcontrol apparatus for further dry season
activity. Although continued ARVN incursions in
this region have kept the Communists off balance
anal forced them to allocate units to protect cer-
tain areas , they probably have not seriously dis-
rupted enemy logistic movements.
23. Seaborne supply flows into Kampot and
Takeo Provinces of Cambodia and Militar Re ion 4
in. South Vietnam were recently reported
the movement of large numbers
of trunks both north and south at night. In
November, about 150 trucks, some heavily loaded,
z~ere heard during five nights on Route 13, while
in December, about 70 were heard over a period of
about one week moving in the same area. This
activity was probably related to rice collection
and redistribution efforts in Prey Veng and Svay
l~ieng Provinces.
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during the
pas severa mop s e Communi~^~ave moved
supplies by sea to their forces in South Vietnam's
Military Region 4 and in the adjacent Cambodian
province of Kampot.
ordnance an me ica supp ies are move
by motorized junks from Phu Quoc Island in the
Gulf of Thailand to the Pirate Islands about nine
miles of:f the coast. The shipments are then
broken down into smaller quantities and moved in-
land via shallow-draft sampans on the maze of
rivers in the .region, with some goods distributed
to intermediate points along the way. .The final
destination reportedly is the central supply depot
at Kompong Svay in Kampot Province which serves
as the main supply/storage point for enemy units
there and in South Vietnam's Kien Giang Province.
mo orize
dun s carry rice an ammuni ion o~~' o ding
points along the Kien Giang coast,
The amount of sup-
p ies e:~ng move pro y is small in view of
the continued Market Time patrol of the area.
24. In summary, logistic developments in
Cambodia during December and January revealed the
first evidence of Communist supply inputs -- still
unquantifiable -- into Cambodia and preliminary
enemy ef:Eorts to improve key Cambodian lines of
communication to accommodate increased supply
flows in the future. These developments are
closely :related to the launching of the 559th TG's
"general offensive" in Laos in early January and
indicate that the logistic network in Cambodia
may soon be a viable extension of the Laotian
network :in support of supply movements to the
COSVN area.
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Secret
Secret
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