INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and
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NORTH VIETNAM:
CIA/RR EM 65-21
August 1965
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR FOOD CROPS
GROUP
Excludad from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Production of Rice and Subsidiary Crops . . . . . . . . .
2. Food Crop Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Prospects for 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Outlook Through 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?
Appendix
Chemical Fertilizer in North Vietnam . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? 7
Tables
1. North Vietnam: Production of Food Crops, 1959-64 . . . 3
2. North Vietnam: Estimated Supply of Chemical Fertilizer,
1964, 1965, and 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
North Vietnam: Per Capita Production of Food Crops, 4
1959-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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NORTH VIETNAM: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR FOOD CROPS*
Summary and Conclusions
North Vietnam produced about 4.5 million metric tons (mt) of rice
in 1964. This crop, including a bumper harvest of early rice and a
poor harvest of late rice, was slightly below the average for the period
1959-63. The harvest of subsidiary crops (beans, corn, sweet potatoes,
and manioc), though small in comparison with the rice harvest, was the
best on record. The 1965 prospects for the early rice crop, which normally
accounts for about one-third of the total rice harvest, appear to be good.
Although the agricultural performance in North Vietnam in 1964 was an
improvement over that of 1963, it was not sufficient to give more than
a temporary respite to the tight food situation. Per capita production
and consumption of rice have declined during the past 5 years, and the
small increases in the production of subsidiary foods in these years
have not been sufficient to make up the difference. The average daily
per capita consumption of food is believed to be several hundred calories
below minimum requirements for normal body health and activity.
The outlook for agriculture in the next 5 years is not bright. Man-
agement problems, the lack of sufficient capital investments for large-
scale water conservancy projects, and the limited possibility of expanding
agricultural acreage make significant increases in agricultural production
unlikely. Furthermore, the quantity of chemical fertilizer available will
not meet minimum needs unless imports are substantially increased over
present levels.
* The estimates and conclusions in this memorandum represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 July 1965.
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1. Production of Rice and Subsidiary Crops
About 4.5 million mt of rice were produced in North Vietnam in 1964,
about 215,000 mt more than the very poor harvest in 1963 but slightly
below the average of the previous 5-year period, 1959-63 (see Table 1).
North Vietnam: Production of Food Crops
1959-64
Paddy Rice
Year
Spring
Crop
Fall
Crop
Total
Subsidiary Crops
1959
1,768
3,425
5,193
512
1960
1,161
3,051
4,212
455
1961
1,719
2,932
4,651
720
1962
1,614
2,928
4,542
728
1963
1,565
2,731
4,296
649
1964
1,778
2,734
4,512
815 J
a. Subsidiary crops are converted to paddy rice equivalents on the
basis of one unit of beans or corn or four units of sweet potatoes or
manioc to one unit of paddy rice.
b. Preliminary.
The production of early rice, which is harvested in the late spring and
early summer and which accounts for about one-third of the total rice
harvest in the country, was a record 1.8 million mt. Better-than-aver-
age moisture conditions in late 1963 and early 1964, normally the dry
season, tend to support the regime's claim of a bumper early rice crop,
but a portion of the late (autumn-harvested) rice crop in the southern
provinces was damaged by typhoons. Although no final production figures
have been released, the late crop, which normally accounts for about
two-thirds of the total rice harvest, is estimated to have been about
2.7 million mt, or about equal to the poor fall crop of 1963.
About 815,000 mt of subsidiary crops, in terms of paddy rice equiv-
alents, were produced in 1964. This total is a record harvest (see
Table 1) and was primarily the result of favorable weather conditions
in the spring of 1964. The spring harvest normally accounts for 80 per-
cent of the total subsidiary crop output of the country.
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2. Food Crop Situation
In spite of an increase in the production of rice in .196i ove:? 1963,
the food situation remains one of North Vietnam's most important economic
problems. The production of rice, which accounts for about three-.fourths
of the total caloric intake of the population, has declined on a per
capita basis during the last 5 years. Efforts by the reg=ime to offset
this decline by increasing the production of the less popular subsidiary
foods, such as manioc, sweet potatoes, corn, and beans, have only been
partly successful (see the chart). Although North Vietnam has beer.. a net
importer of food since 1961, the quantities involved apparently are not
sufficient to relieve food shortages.
NORTH VIETNAM: PER CAPITA PRODUCTIONOF FOOD CROPS
1959-64
364
33.'
292
1959 1960 1961 1962
308
Subsidiary CrDps ~
Paddy Rice Elun{s
1964
(Preliminary)
The decline in the per capita availability of food is reflected
in official statistics. According to these statistics, the annual per
capita consumption of milled rice declined from 160 kilograms in the food
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year 1959/60 to 148 kilograms in 1963/64. It is not believed that the
1964/65 level of food consumption will differ substantially from the
1963/61+ level.* Meat is strictly rationed and annual per capita con-
sumption has been declining since 1960. The availability of fish and
vegetables, however, is believed to be adequate in most areas.
In recent years the average annual consumption of food has amounted
to about 1,900 to 2,000 calories per person per day, of which rice and
other staples accounted for about 80 percent. This caloric intake is
somewhat below the level of the 2,300 calories estimated as a minimum per
capita requirement for normal body health and activity.** Because of
food distribution problems, some sectors of the population probably have
suffered more severely than these figures imply.
3. Prospects for 1965
Prospects for the 1965 early rice crop are good. North Vietnamese
claims of expanded rice acreage and timely transplanting suggest that
the reported drought conditions during the first 3 months of 1965 did
not seriously interfere with the early stages of rice growth. Offi-
cials claim that the rains in mid-April eliminated the threat of drought
and that the rice plants were growing well as of the end of May, when
harvesting operations began. The early drought conditions may have
decreased prospects for subsidiary and industrial crops.
There is no evidence available that US bombing of North Vietnam has
done any harm to the early rice crop. In fact, in an article in the
27 June issue of the Soviet agricultural newspaper Se1'skaya zhizn'
(Rural Life) it was stated that, in spite of the flights by US aircraft,
the harvest was carried out 5 to 10 days earlier than last year. Bomb-
ing during May, June, and July, however, might have an adverse effect
on the late rice crop. The repair of bomb damage might necessitate
the use of some agricultural labor at a time when manpower requirement
in agriculture is at a maximum.
4. Outlook Through 1970
Prospects for overcoming the agricultural stagnation in North Viet-
nam in the next 5 years are not bright. Agricultural production --
especially on a per capita basis -- has declined since 1959 despite
official claims of expansion of irrigated areas, increased availabilities
* There are no separate statistics on the consumption of subsidiary
foods, and they probably are included in the "rice consumption" figures,
expressed as a rice equivalent. However, subsidiary foods used for
livestock feed and industrial use would not be included in the rice
consumption figures.
** Determined by the Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for
National Defense for the People of South Vietnam.
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of chemical fertilizer, and increased capital investments in agriculture.
This decline is believed to have been due in large measure to problems
of management and incentives that have plagued the agricultural cooper-
atives since 1959. Because of basic peasant discontent with collectivi-
zation, these problems probably will not be solved by 1970.
Even with good management, North Vietnam probably could not increase
agricultural production significantly during this period.. The possi-
bilities of expanding agricultural acreage are limited, and the North
Vietnamese officials recognize that any substantial increases in the
production of food crops must come about mostly through increased, yields
from the existing acreage. The increased use of fertilizer, particularly
chemical fertilizer, offers the most likely means of increasing agricul-
tural yields. In 1964, domestic output of chemical fertilizer was only
177,000 mt, consisting exclusively of phosphorus fertilizer, much of which
was a crude variety, having minimal value to agriculture. Import's of
chemical fertilizer added an estimated 173,000 mt, 90 percent of which
was nitrogen fertilizer, primarily for use on the rice crop. It has
been estimated that by 1970 North Vietnam would. need a minimum of
800,000 mt of chemical fertilizer to feed its increased population
at the present low level of consumption.* In view of the scant progress
to date and the possible economic dislocations caused by continuing
military operations, it is estimated that the domestic production of
chemical fertilizer will not exceed 500,000 mt by 1970. The import
of 300,000 mt of fertilizer -- mostly of the nitrogen type -- would
therefore be required to meet these minimum needs. Total costs of
such imports, based on current prices, would. be about US $15 million.**
Agricultural production could also be substantially increased by
expanding and improving the water conservancy facilities. The regime
is well aware of this possibility and has increased capital investments
in water conservancy from less than 5 percent of total investments in
1960 to more than 10 percent in 1963. The regime, however, probably
will be unable to increase the irrigated area effectively. Much of the
acreage claimed to have been put under irrigation since 1955 is irri-
gated by medium-sized and small irrigation projects that are believed
to be undependable both in terms of adequate water supply during drought
and proper drainage during floods. The area subjected to droughts and
floods in recent years, though fluctuating widely from year to year,
has shown a general decline, and the very serious floods and drought
of 1963 indicate that the problem is far from being solved. Large-
scale capital-intensive irrigation and drainage projects -- necessary
for dependable water control -- still are only in the preliminary
planning stage and probably will not be available to contribute signifi-
cantly to increased food production in the next few years.
* On the basis of an estimated requirement of about 5.4 million ml;
of rice, or about 900,000 mt above the 1964 production level. To
produce this additional amount, 450,000 mt of chemical fertilizer
would be needed in addition to the 350,000 mt estimated to have been
available in 1964.
** A more detailed. description of the chemical fertilizer situation in
North Vietnam and prospects through 1970 is given in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX
CHEMICAL FERTILIZER IN NORTH VIETNAM
a. Through 1965
The production of chemical fertilizer in North Vietnam rose
slowly from 36,000 mt in 1939 to 177,000 mt in 1964. Although the pro-
duction goal for 1965 is 240,000 mt, output may not exceed 200,000 mt.
Not only does current output fall far short of the level needed by
agriculture, but it also consists exclusively of phosphorus fertilizer
of which about one-half is of low quality derived from crushed phosphate
rock. Moreover, there is as yet no production of chemical fertilizer
containing nitrogen, the nutrient most needed for growing rice.
Although a number of small plants scattered throughout the country
account for most of the fertilizer production, the higher quality phos-
phorus fertilizer is made at just two plants. The largest and most sig-
nificant was built by the USSR at Lam Thao, 40 miles northwest of Hanoi,
and has an annual production capacity of 100,000 mt of calcium superphos-
phate. The plant began production in June 1962 but because of equipment
difficulties has not yet reach full-capacity output. The second plant,
built by Communist China in September 1963 at Van Dien, about 6 miles south
of Hanoi, has an annual production capacity of 20,000 mt of calcium-magnesium
phosphate, which is a less effective fertilizer than superphosphate. This
plant also has encountered equipment difficulties as well as inadequacies of
raw materials.
b. Through 1970
A sizable increase in North Vietnam's output of chemical fer-
tilizers by 1970 is contingent on realizing added capacity from new and
expanded productive facilities. If, by 1970, fertilizer plants built
with Soviet and Chinese Communist aid are completed and reach full
operating capacity and if the productivity of the small plants turning
out crushed phosphate rock is improved, North Vietnam's annual output
of chemical fertilizer could reach a maximum of 600,000 mt. However,
because of the slow progress to date and possible economic dislocations
caused by continuing military operations, output in 1970 probably will
not exceed 500,000 mt.
Construction work already is underway at facilities included
in the programs for Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam. The USSR
is believed to be expanding the Lam Thao Superphosphate Plant by
50,000 mt and may have the plant operating with an annual capacity of
150,000 mt in 1966. The Chinese are building North Vietnam's first
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nitrogen plant, the Ha Bac Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant at Phu Lang Thuong,
30 miles northeast of Hanoi. There is evidence that this plant will
manufacture ammonium nitrate fertilizer when construction is completed
in 1966 and could produce annually about 100,000 mt in full--capacity
operation. Detailed data are lacking on plans for future expansion of
the plant, but available information implies that added facilities for
the manufacture of ammonium chloride are to be completed in 1970 and the
plant's annual productive capacity will then be 200,000 mt.
2. Imports
North Vietnam relies heavily on imports from both Free World and
Communist countries to supplement its small output of chemical fer-
tilizer. Available information suggests that imports in 1964 amounted
to 173,000 mt, valued at somewhat over US $8 million. Of this total,
about 90 percent consisted of nitrogen fertilizer. In 1965, imports
of chemical fertilizer may be affected by priorities for other materials
to sustain the war effort and, accordingly, could decline to 150,000 mt.
It is believed that, by 1970, an import on the order of 300,000 mt of
chemical fertilizer, mostly of the nitrogen type, would be needed to
close the gap between estimated domestic output of 500,000 mt and a
minimum agricultural requirement of 800,000 mt. An import of 300,000 mt
would cost about US $15 million at current prices.
.3. Supply
a. Through 1965
Domestic production and imports of chemical fertilizer in 1954
are believed to have contributed about equal amounts to North Vietnam's
total fertilizer supply, estimated at about 350,000 mt, an amount
possibly exceeding all previous annual supply levels. The total supply
of chemical fertilizer in 1965 is expected to be not greater than the
350,000 mt available in 1964. The estimated supply of chemical fer-
tilizer that will be available in 1964, 1965, and 1970 from production
and imports is given in Table 2.
North Vietnam: Estimated Supply of Chemical Fertilizer
1964,
1965, and 1970
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Production
Imports
Supply
1964
177
173
350
1965
200
150
350
1.970
500
300
800
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b. Through 1970
Although it is not possible to measure precisely the probable
total supply of chemical fertilizer in North Vietnam by 1970, it now
seems that the supply available will not exceed an agricultural require-
ment of 800,000 mt. This amount is the minimum needed to keep per
capita output of food from falling below current levels. If the Viet-
namese succeed in producing 500,000 mt in 1970, as estimated, they
would have to import about 300,000 mt or about double the present level
of imports.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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